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In the final months of 2010, a new global cycle of protests and social movements emerged that, 
as the following text will argue, has forced us to critically interrogate and transform the accepted 
ways in which theorists and researchers perceive the relation between aesthetics and politics, 
performativity and critical practice, modernity and its presupposed mimetic dynamics between 
the Global North and the Global South. These protest movements will be examined as various 
instances of the general category that we can call “the Occupy form.” The following research 
begins with an overview of the cycle of struggles and protest that were born out of the global 
revolutions in 1968. After having provided the salient features of this moment of recent political 
history, this text moves on to considerations of the performative turn in both the arts as well as 
in politics, thereby allowing for a broader critique of Modernity and for a conceptualization of 
what one could call as altermodernities. — a category, which obliges the theorist-researcher to 
reconceive of the very notion of performativity in the process. The research also defines 
performative event and its aesthetics in contrast to other existing literature such as social 
performance theory, and it goes on to argue for an aesthetics whose function is to create the 
conditions for alternative subjectifications. As performative politics works on the social relations 
to envision and enact a future society in the present, the transformations in dominant spatio-
temporality – a constituent part of relationality – as well as bodies – in-between which the social 
relationality emerges – will be examined. The processes and mechanisms of constructing and 
imagining collective bodies at the national level, and how performative politics disrupts such 
processes of homogenization will be also an important part of evaluating the impacts and effects 
of occupy movements as well as how these performative movements re-appropriated time and 
space; creating spatio-temporalities different from the established colonial and authoritarian 
linear progress-centered ones reproduced by the nation-state apparatuses, particularly in the 
West Asia and North Africa. It will be also argued that a paradigm of imitation and mimesis will 
come short of explaining the communication and dissemination of protests movement from 
Cairo to New York, from Istanbul to Madrid, thus proposing the idea of performative contagion 
as a model to rethink this communication. Although this research makes use of case studies, 




main subject of this thesis the occupy form of protests and its predecessors, it largely remains a 
theoretical endeavor to use performance and theatre studies in the socio-political field, drawing 
its insights from the tradition of the philosophers of immanence and the thinkers of community 
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2011 was a year that came bearing gifts, but of a kind that would come to be recognized as less 
of a present and more of a Pandora’s box. Looking back, it now seems that this was a year that 
opened onto a situation where all the world’s evils have been distributed to ever farther corners 
of the globe. And if one were to enumerate the countries who would come to suffer the worst of 
what this fateful year held in store, Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, Yemen, as well as a host of many others 
would, without a doubt, top the list of those places where “civil wars” have come to dominate 
the whole of society for a large portion of the world. Terror and bombing, shooting and 
slaughtering, knives on necks and explosive belts around torsos, and bombs hidden inside bodies, 
are all indicating that indeed a spectre is haunting our contemporary world – the spectre of death. 
Dying peacefully in a white isolated room, “the loneliness of dying” as Elias (2001 (1985)) puts it 
as an existential catastrophe, is now a miracle in Mesopotamia. Any invitation to think, it seems, 
could not exceed Brecht’s anger: “Bedenkt das Dunkel and die Groβe Kälte/ in diesem Tale, das 
von Jammer schallt” (Brecht 2009 (1928)).1  
Such is our contemporary world; hopeless, helpless, piling rubble on top of rubble in a single 
catastrophe (Benjamin 2003 (1940)). While once defined as a collective action of a free people, 
politics is now reduced to the exertion of power by various nation-states and their respective 
body-politic.If this is the dead-end of politics as such, when politics is defined as the collective 
self-determination of a people enriched with differences, “to unfold the consequences of a new 
possibility” (Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, 31), then how could one write about politics?  
One should keep in mind, however, that the new phase of destructive identity politics has come 
after a caesura within the international arrangement of geopolitical power. Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Bahrain, Greece, Spain, the United States, and Syria, all erupted one by one in social protest 
movements, exhibiting collective heterogeneous bodies of different, yet communicating types. 
The local-global communication of these movements brought to the surface the real 
 




antagonisms that had long since been covered over through national unifications, religious 
sectarian wars, international consensus building, and ethnic or ideological suppressions. 
Introducing permanent austerity measures, neglecting the growing gap between the commoners 
and the rich, overseeing the crisis in representational democracy, and intensifying the unfinished 
(hi)story of colonialism in post-colonial regions such as the Middle East, neoliberal economic 
globalization has connected the Arab revolutionaries of al-Tahrir to the American dissatisfied 
urban youth (hence the latter started its movement by declaring “Are you ready for a Tahrir 
movement?” (Adbusters qtd. in Writers for the 99%). However, apparatuses of the Same started 
to function soon afterwards; regardless of its costs, homogeneity had to be set up again.  
But in the Pandora’s box still one thing has remained – one that can always be the last gift for an 
imagination of another world: hope. A hopeless hope; not a hope for something, but a hope that 
confirms the hopelessness of the contemporary situation only in order to make itself ready for 
an alternative image of thought. That is why this research claims that the whole situation can 
contribute to an affirmation of performative politics and its exigency, conditioned by a re-
“organization of pessimism” (Benjamin, Surrealism 217). There is no outside; politics begins with 
this recognition only in order to reach a double affirmation of life (Hardt and Negri, 
Commonwealth vii-viii): first, to accept the world as it is; and second, to re-affirm the active forces 
capable of changing it from within, immanently, as it becomes.  
When the Arab Spring and other occupy movements in Europe and the US emerged, performance 
studies became an important discipline in discourses produced around those movements, even 
being recognized by more traditional disciplines such as sociology as a method of enquiry about 
social phenomena (we will discuss the social performance theory in this regard in Chapter Two). 
In writing the final parts of this thesis, I encountered one such work that I surprisingly missed 
until then: Richard Schechner’s Performed Imaginaries (2015).  
Schechner’s text opens with the same analysis and worries with which I began this text, yet 
formulating it differently regarding the field of “performance studies”: 
I sit here this morning (does it really matter which morning?) trying to be optimistic. I want to 




save the world. I am typing while rockets and bombs are exploding in Gaza and Israel; Egypt is in 
turmoil, Syria in the throes of civil war; M23 rebels are closing on Goma in the Congo, putting a 
million people under threat; suicide bombings and assassinations continue in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; the Somali civil war is ongoing. Sunnis and Shias have warred against each other 
since the martyrdom of Hussein in 680 CE; in India, Hindus murder Muslims and vice versa (1). 
The first striking issue in the passage above is the centrality of identity. As a performance scholar, 
he knows better than most that even in its most simplified conception, performativity theory 
argues that an identity comes out of a repetitive repertoire as a product. The subjugated 
performativities of everyday life reproduce themselves, in a context of a spectacle, within pre-
established limits of performance for different identity categories. They code the population, 
dividing it according to gender, class, race, etc., to maintain an imposed hierarchy that is 
subsequently naturalized as “national identity”. Contrary to all these teachings, Schechner’s text, 
“Can we be the (new) Third World?”, deals with the populations of the so-called Third World 
according to identitarian discourses in Western Media — “Sunnis and Shias”, “Hindus and 
Muslims”— with a deep misunderstanding about at least the Shia/Sunni divide by easily 
connecting it to a mythological origin, the martyrdom of Hussein in 1400 years ago2. Does a 
performance studies perspective allow a scholar to neglect epistemological breaks in order to 
defend a mythological basis for identitarian conflicts?  
The other issue comes from this axiom: “performance studies and the performing arts can save 
the world”. In many of those countries that the “Spring” occurred or the resistance and struggle 
against authoritarian regimes emerged, there is no academic field as “performance studies” and 
the performing arts have their best and foremost appearance in the form of performative 
protests and on streets or in tent cities, not in galleries, private salons, or theatres. This problem, 
combined with the previous one, results in the following rather startling comment: 
Today, artists, activists, and scholars are a New Third World … The vanguard of this New Third 
World are – and here I hope you won’t think me too arrogant – performance theorists and artists 
 
2 Shia is a historical construct, as Sunni is. The contemporary Shia in Iran and Iraq only formed during the Safavid 
dynasty, in 16th century – as a direct differentiation with the powerful enemy on the Western borders, the Sunni 




who practice collaborative performance research, persons who know that playing deeply is a way 
of finding and embodying new knowledge, renewing energy, and relating on a performative rather 
than ideological basis (Schechner 9). 
Thus, a return to academic/institutional vanguardism in the wake of leaderless, contagious, 
heterogenous “performative” movements in the form of Occupy. And a claim on representing 
the name “Third World” by a few performance theorists and artists, a claim that ignores the 
concrete specificity of actual Third World peoples, and how they are being treated as refugees 
and immigrants outside the windows of the very room in which Schechner sits and drinks his 
coffee. I believe this comes not from a personal shortcoming, as Schechner shows all best intents 
and good will, but from a theoretical shortcoming in his analysis, and in the dominant discourse 
of performance studies in general. This shortcoming repeats itself in this text too, when 
Schechner writes that “performance studies arises from the premise that everything and 
anything can be studied ‘as’ performance” and goes on to write: 
there is a problem at the heart of all this. If anything can be studied “as” performance, if any tool 
can be used (performance studies being the ultimate disciplinary bricoleur), then what “is” 
performance, what “is” performance studies? As I theorize it, something “is” performance when, 
according to the conventions, common usages, and/or traditions of a specific culture or social unit 
at a given historical time, an action or event is called a “performance.” I know this is a squooshy 
definition, shape-shifting, and unreliable in absolute terms (Schechner 6). 
It is not only a “squooshy” definition, but also shows that performance in performance studies 
discourse still struggles to acquire critical or conceptual value after five decades of being used in 
theory. Although we have to praise Schechner for posing the problem in the first place, a concept 
should be able to differentiate between something and something else: it generates value by 
differentiation, it is a force that comes from a historical dramatization, as Nietzsche believed.  
But Schechner does not see a need for such a value, not because he does not differentiate 
between a massacre and a revolution, but because he believes in universal values. In fact, in 
accordance with previous problem, he takes the so-called “western values” of the White 
intellectual as the already existing universal elements of differentiation for each context. In this 




fact, albeit his claims to do otherwise, his conception of performance is a very solid, fixed, static 
image, that – by way of already presupposing the universal values – does not capture the 
dynamics of performativity. 
The same problem has been repeated in many other commentaries on the Arab Spring and 
Occupy movements, analyzing all of them with the same categories, extracting the same static 
images and drawing similar conclusions. Some would say that these are done as abstract 
argumentations for forming a theoretical framework. But is this really an abstraction? When 
Gilles Deleuze writes about abstraction in thought (Difference and Repetition 276)3 for example, 
he defines it as an attempt to draw a diagram of forces, intensities and movements, not to extract 
a static image, or design a theatrical scene with a prewritten script. Abstraction then should serve 
the understanding of becomings’ dynamics, so that one can delve into a singular context, track 
the forces, and try to hear and see those forces that have been silenced and suppressed for years 
by the constituted power, and not rendered audible and visible by the dominant discourses – this 
may be what Spivak calls “measuring silences” (Can The Subaltern Speak? 82).  
If my critique holds true, then I should try an alternative way of imagination according to one of 
Schechner’s own beliefs:  
Performance studies scholars and performance artists need always to remain actively critical of 
“self-appointed mortal gods.” We must imagine, invent, and perform alternative ways of 
becoming (14). 
The invention of an alternative conception of performativity is then the main methodological 
inquiry of this research. It builds itself of course on the corpus of very significant contributions to 
the field, including ground-breaking works of Schechner himself, but through its particular 
subject matter— the Occupy movements— it attempts to argue for a concept of “performativity” 
that differentiates between ontogenic or morphogenic processes and actualized beings and 
forms. This point will be discussed thoroughly in the course of the present text. Thus, the 
following research will deal with the problematic of new political forms of dissent, especially in 
 
3 Deleuze writes: “The theory of thought is like painting: it needs that revolution which took art from representation 




recent years, and its different events in local contexts. Based on previous research on collective 
art after May 68, and the performative war machine during the first global cycle of protests (1998 
to 2003) in my master dissertations in Tehran Art University and the University of Amsterdam, 
the current research will deal with the second global cycle, roughly started in 2009-10, including 
Iran’s Green movement, the Arab Spring, and Occupy movements in the United States, Spain, 
Greece, Turkey, and Ukraine.   
 
1-1 The First Global Cycle in 21st Century: Politics Performative  
 
On January 27, 2003, Picasso’s “Guernica” was covered up at the United Nations Security Council 
entrance to make “an appropriate background for the cameras” (Stubblefield 182). That was the 
reason given by the United Nations Press Secretary , while some others were concerned whether 
the covering actually made for a more suitable stage for a  warmongering performance. A week 
later, on February 5th, then US Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke to the world about the 
urgency and necessity of an attack to Iraq, during which Guernica was completely covered and 
even hidden behind the Security Council flags. “Mr. Powell can't very well seduce the world into 
bombing Iraq surrounded on camera by shrieking and mutilated women, men, children, bulls and 
horses”, reported the New York Times (Dowd).  
The covering-up at the entrance also marked the terminus of the first global cycle of struggles in 
21st century. Protests against the 2003 Iraq War have been described as the largest world-wide 
protest event in the history of mankind (Callinicos)4. Since 1998, however, the world witnessed a 
globally interconnected network of resistance and struggle. And this was  unprecedented  for the 
simple reason that globally integrated capitalism and its neoliberal forms of economy and politics 
 
4 “The French political scientist Dominique Reynié has estimated that, between 3 January and 12 April 2003, some 




had been recognized and praised as “the end of history”5 while people in the street were shouting 
for a different world.  
The movements began from 16 May 1998. A global street party, called for by London’s Reclaim 
the Street group, happened in more than 30 cities around the world to “transnationally”6 resist 
transnational capital. In the next year, Seattle’s protest became the sign for the possibility of the 
people’s victory against capitalist domination. But in 2001, Genoa proved that the happy, joyous, 
activism of Carnival against Capital was not far from a battlefield full of prepared armed Police 
forces.  
Although the early carnivalesque forms of the alterglobalization movement have disappeared 
gradually after Genoa, the globally coordinated days of protest culminated on February 15, 2003, 
against the coming war on Iraq. People rushed to the streets in more than 600 cities, only to find 
that their voice could not be more unheard by their supposed representatives in a globally 
admired system of representational democracy. 
Even though this global cycle reached its terminus after the beginning of the Iraq War, a new 
“image of thought” had been created through differentiating new paradigms of time and space 
regarding collective bodies, and the body itself, which will be the main focus of current research. 
Politics and aesthetics, performative acts of struggle and activist art practices, have never been 
so entangled than before. New forms of organization and resistance have been created. And in 
contrast to the mainstream imagination in whose apocalyptic novels and movies capitalism is still 
functioning after the end of the world, performativity of struggle contributed to the creation of 
new “poles of imaginal recomposition” (Shukaitis 27, 82) for new and multiple virtual worlds.  
This new performative politics made a decisive break with the preceding tactics of  traditional 
leftist movements, which consisted of – in both traditions of parliamentary or extra-
parliamentary socialism -- long marches from time t1, point s1 to t2, s2 and aimed to seize the 
 
5 Even Francis Fukuyama, who defended the neo-conservative American political model as the ultimate possible 
Good and proposed the concept of the End of History (1992), revised his positions by a critique on the United State 
government after 2003 Iraq War (After the Neocons).  




power of central government and to establish another Head/State; it revolutionized the 
revolution. Though this revolutionizing revolution “began in May 68”, as Felix Guattari and 
Antonio Negri suggest (Guattari and Negri, New Lines of Alliance, New Spaces of Liberty 37), its 
point of becoming-global was in the time of the alterglobalization movements. 
Erika Fischer-Lichte introduced the term “the performative turn” (2008 (2004)) to designate a 
new aesthetic paradigm for the arts in general. In other words, the performative turn does not 
only refer to the emergence of contemporary performance arts in 1960s-70s, but also tracks its 
effects on other arts, and their way of presentation and reception. One could say that the 
performative is the hegemonic “form of content” in different artistic “forms of expression”, and 
these combinations form a new aesthetics – free from modernist limitations, divisions, and 
hierarchies – which nonetheless sets up its own territory of forces and intensities. In the same 
track, the performative turn in dissent politics refers to a paradigmatic break with previous forms 
of protest movements. If it is legible to put art and revolution under the same umbrella, as Terry 
Eagelton does so in Lenin in the Postmodern Age (2007 44), then one could speak about a new 
aesthetics for the new revolutionary politics.7   
The term performative, however, has not been totally absent in political texts. Particularly under 
the influence of Judith Butler’s life-time work on performativity, many theorists have reacted and 
used this term, but they often identify it with theatricality (including Butler herself in some 
instances). Criticizing Laclau’s demand-based populism, Zizek, for example, calls it performative 
politics (2007, 83). However, Zizek qualifies his criticism by saying that “the term ‘demand’ 
involves a whole theatrical scene in which a subject is addressing her demand to an Other 
presupposed to be able to meet it” (ibid). The performative here is identified with the theatrical 
in which the divisions of theatrical apparatus are already presumed: the divisions between the 
performer and the audience, the actor and the director, the authority of text and the submission 
of the performance – in sum, completely opposite to any aesthetics of the performative turn. 
 
7 The performative aesthetical analysis of revolutionary politics and protest movements will be justified further in 




Zizek’s point, on the other hand, is more or less true about the theatricality in Althusserian 
ideological “interpellation” which has been used by Butler as an example for construction of a 
subject through repetitive performance (The Psychic Life of Power 106-131). Nonetheless, it is 
not again in any case what this research calls performative politics. In Althusser’s dramatization 
of interpellation, the individual is made into a subject by virtue of the authority of the State, by 
subjection to the law, or as Zizek puts it, by recognizing the other. The dialectics of recognition 
between  the self and the other, which originated in the notion of the individual conscious subject 
a la Hegel, has long found its way to leftist thought. However, as it will be explained throughout 
the research, the new aesthetics of performative politics speaks a different language. 
Trying to point out the categorical elements of this new aesthetics, Fischer-Lichte writes about, 
among others, its communal character and its autopoietic feedback loop; two characteristics 
through which contemporary performance art goes beyond any dialectics of the self and the 
other. Community indicates a collectivity8 working through this autopoietic  feedback loop, 
“consisting of the mutual interaction between actors and spectators, brings forth the 
performance. The notion of the artist as autonomous subject creating an autonomous work of 
art, which each recipient may interpret differently but cannot change in its materiality, evidently 
no longer applies here.” (The Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics 163) 
It is according to this new aesthetics that Athena Athanasiou challenges Butler with the notion of 
“self-poietics”. According to her,  
Self-poietics does not concern just the “self” – in the way of heroic self-sufficient individualism or 
an alternative liberal “anything goes” – but emerges as a performative occasion in an ongoing 
process of socially regulatory self-formation, whereby under different circumstances the self 
struggles within and against the norms through which it is constituted; and such struggles are only 
 
8 The notions of community and collectivity will be confronted again in the discussion about self-organization. For 
the notion of community should not be presupposed here, because this term historically refers to a homogenous, 
united whole, opposed to the bourgeois individualistic society. Challenging this conception of community, the critical 
contemporary treatment of the term (for example, in Agamben’s Coming Community) links the new community to 
an open whole of singularities. The altermodernities challenge both the modern and conventional/traditional 




waged through and with others, in ways that open up to others (including other selves) (Butler 
and Athanasiou 63). 
While Fischer-Lichte’s autopoiesis surpasses the pre-established limits of individual artist-subject 
and its passive recipients, Athanasiou’s performative self-poietics goes beyond the Hegelian 
dialectic of self and other. There is no more “self”; rather the question is about its dispossession: 
the moment when the other is no longer the antithesis of the self; its rival in recognition; but on 
the contrary, the self and the other both become the limits of the common, the singularities 
which exist in being-together, in a space in-between them. Or as Butler frames it: 
For politics to takes place, the body must appear. I appears to others, and they appear to me, 
which means that some space between us allows each to appear […] No one body establishes the 
space of appearance, but this action, this performative exercise happens only “between” bodies 
[…] the action emerged from the “between” (Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street). 
The performative turn in arts also signifies a break between the theatrical and the performative. 
More precisely, the performative relation has been freed from the theatrical relation, for the 
theatrical relation is only one possible realization of the performative relation. In contemporary 
performance art, bodily movement is not essentially engaged in a signifying relation, acting as 
the signified for a textual signifier (hence the distinction between dramatic and performative). 
Nor is it similar to classical dance, where a certain hierarchical grammar imposes itself on the 
dancer’s body, and bodily movements are imitations from natural, organic movements, 
functioning in a paradigm of similarity. On the contrary, the performative sets the body free, 
makes it open to inorganic movements, and brings it back to the paradigm of difference, although 
it is always prone to assign itself a determinate form, a certain hierarchical organization.  
On the other hand, as Klossowski asserts in his reading of Nietzsche, the performative signs 
cannot be absorbed in the discourse: the performative eludes the capture of the discursive. 
Every movement should be conceived as a gesture, a kind of language in which (impulsive) forces 
make themselves heard. In the inorganic world there is no misunderstanding, communication 




'false' and the 'true' but between the 'abbreviations of signs' and the 'signs' themselves. 
(Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle 44) 
According to Klossowski’s Nietzsche, there’s a gap between the organic world and the inorganic 
world. For while signs remain bodily movements or gestures in the inorganic world; the organic 
world, with its natural organization of impulses, abbreviates these bodily performative signs to 
discursive ones thereby allowing for the formation of the organism. That said, the nature of this 
gap is not of a dichotomy or  dual nature. The inorganic world, the world of permanent becoming, 
is ontologically primary and and only subsequently becomes realized within the organic world as a 
determinate and codified organism.9. 
That said, one should more conveniently note that the 2004 terminus of the alterglobalization 
movement does not refer to a failure. The alterglobalization movement was not a war between 
capitalism and its outside. If the “vanguard party,” in the previously dominant paradigms of leftist 
politics, inhabited a place that was allegedly outside of capitalism, the new performative politics 
began with the affirmation that “there is no outside”; there is no pure space, there are no clean 
hands. The paradigm of struggle has transformed from a dialectical one, based on thesis-
antithesis relation, to an immanent one, which affirms the autonomous constituent power of a 
heterogeneous multitude (not a homogenous people of the party) who are able to change the 
social relations of the current constituted Power, which has crystallized out of their own 
constituent potentia.  When there is no war between outside and inside, when the aim is no 
longer that of “seizing Power”, then there is no total victory or failure. The significance of these 
movements was their temporary realizations of alternatives, of the new.  
 
1-2 Performative Altermodernities: Toward New Socialities 
 
The alterglobalization movements (widely considered, from 1994 to 2003) have actualized some 
potential concatenations of art and politics through machinic performative assemblages in an 
 
9 Nietzsche is widely known as a philosopher of organism. To attribute inorganic to his thinking needs more 




immanent plane of struggle. Through these movements, temporary performativizations of alter-
modernities happened in different contexts. However, the Occupy movements presented us with 
far more complex dynamics of altermodernities and forms of struggle and change; especially with 
respect to their experimentation with spaces and time, and thus with the embodiment of social 
relations. 
As Larbi Sadiki (2015) observed in the Arab Spring, people’s coming together was “to ephemerally 
substitute the authoritarian regimes’ practice, thought and language of controlling power with 
their own conceptions of political practice, thought and terminology” (Unruliness through Space 
and Time 2); a substitution that was, in short, a new performativity. For Benjamin Arditi (2016), 
this performative dimension allows the demonstrators to keep their distance from “more 
conventional, Jacobin-scripted vision of change as a discontinuity between what is and what can 
be” (36), as the occupiers started to live in the tent cities they created in order to realize their 
alternate future in the present.  
Saul Newman (2016) calls this politics the politics of anti-politics “which points towards the 
possibilities of autonomous social relations and political life beyond the bankrupt despotism of 
the financial system and the nihilistic charade of parliamentary politics” (93). According to 
Newman, this politics obliges us to “shift our gaze from the figure of the sovereign to the 
encampments springing up at the gates of the city that are quietly and joyfully laying siege to 
power” (93).The anti-representational aspect of these movements shouted explicitly by 
occupiers themselves, as in the case of the indignados movement (indignados meaning the 
outraged) in Madrid's Puerta del Sol Square, whose slogan was: “you don't represent us!” 
In light of the theoretical discourse surrounding performativity and the recent emergence of the 
“movements of the squares,” this text sets itself the task of  analyzing what is often called 
“performative politics” with carnivalesque, performative forms of expression and new 
organization of bodies or the collective bodies through space and time. It will be argued how 
performative politics signifies a break with previous forms of political dissent,, just as “the 
performative turn” (E. Fischer-Lichte) in the arts signifies such a break and ushers in a new 




This break has been proved difficult to theorize  by central figures in modernist leftist critical 
thought, such as Alain Badiou who – albeit praising the movements as the beginning of a new era 
– calls them “blind, naive, scattered and lacking a powerful concept of durable organization” (The 
Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings 5) or Zizek who mourns that their “authentic rage 
... [is] unable to transform itself into even a minimal positive program for socio-political change” 
(The Year of Dreaming Dangerously 78). But the different names of these movements, the Arab 
Spring, the Spanish Indignados, the Greek Aganaktismenoi (meaning desperate and indignant), 
Occupy Wall Street and so forth are still being heard in the analysis of current affairs at the global 
level, where they are characterized as “events that will come to be understood as having been 
decisively political frequently unfold without notice or confusedly, to all appearances an 
unstable, disconnected series of aggregating aberrations whose collective merits will only 
acknowledged in retrospect” (Woodward, Jones III and Ma 209). 
If these movements have effected a recognizable break, then what is required is a new image of 
thought, and a new paradigm of spatio-temporal relations through which a concrete, practical, 
and situated form of thought made possible. These new relationalities, which are equally social 
and political, will be examined under the name of “alter-modernities”10. The discussion on this 
issue in Chapter One will be accompanied by commentaries on performativity within politics, its 
break with the (post-)modernist discourses and critiques, the emergent alter-modernities, and 
ultimately arrives at an ontogenic account of this kind of performative politics. 
Therefore, the main research question deals with these new spatio-temporal relations and their 
corresponding collective bodies, but it will not ask, for example, “what are they?” Or, “What is 
their essence or nature?” Rather, the relevant question that guides this research is the following: 
“how have these new spatio-temporal relations emerged within these recent protest movements 
and how have they subsequently come to be understood or conceptualized?”. To approach such 
 
10 Alter-modernity has been conceptualized in recent political texts, especially with reference to anti-orientalist and 
post-colonial critique, after its introduction into the field by Hardt and Nergi (2009 101-118). Altermodernism was 
also been theorized by Nicolas Bourriaud. He curated the Tate Triennial 2009 with the title “Altermodern”. However, 
it will be argued that what he conceptualizes there as altermodern is not in any case what this research means by 




a question, the research will define a methodology that it calls performativization method; a re-
thinking of Deleuze’s method of dramatization – a method he assigns to Friedrich Nietzsche (a 
significant methodological choice since Nietzsche and Deleuze both remain important theoretical 
figures for the entirety of this research). 
In the second chapter, the theory of the event will be re-considered and ultimately re-defined as 
a performative event. A preliminary remark is required here since the Event has been 
conceptualized according to different, and even sometimes altogether antagonistic, perspectives 
of critical thinkers as an aesthetic-political happening. In other words, according to activist 
philosophy for example, each event is aesthetical when it works on time/space, folds onto them 
and folds them; and it is also political, because of the participation, or partaking of bodies in these 
time/space relations, transforming them and being transformed by them (Massumi, Semblance 
and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts 2-28). In Chapter three, these insights on 
performativity will guide our inquiry of the collective bodies in the performative event. 
Additionally, each context will be analyzed separately, the established processes of making 
national collective bodies will be revisited and the alternative collective bodies in each Occupy 
movement will be discussed in this chapter.  
In chapter four, I discuss the disruption of the dominant temporality and the constituent time of 
performative event, as well as the singular site of such dynamic social phenomena. Performance 
studies will help this portion of the research to consider the different performative aesthetics of 
each singular time-space, or as it will be called here, kairotope. Arts and performances, theatrical 
and carnivalesque features provide those transversal processes of subjectification, borrowing 
Guattari’s formulation, that create subject-groups capable of performativizing kairotopes.  
To develop this research, I have made use of archival material (documentaries, reports, news 
analyses, images, inside stories) from different case studies, literature reviews, interviews with 
activists, my own lived experience, and my own analyses of cases based on the existent literature.  
The theoretical framework of this research is structured in a way that re-affirms the primacy of 
constituent becoming over actualized being and therefore develops its argument around a whole 




Multiple cases are going to be discussed and mentioned in this research, some in detail and some 
in passing. Their primary purpose is to show the heterogeneity of performative political events 
and dynamics, rather than trying to validate a universal theory for political performativity. Among 
those cases are: the 2010-2011 Egyptian protests, focused mainly in Alexandria and Cairo; the 
2011 Tunisian Revolution; the 2011 Syrian Revolution; Iran’s Green Movement of 2009-10; 
Carnival Against Capital or alterglobalization movement, which took place between the late 
1990s-early 2000s; Occupy Wall Street, 2011; Gezi Park’s Movement in Turkey in 2013;  the 
recent history of the Kurdish struggle in both Turkey  in Syria; the 2011 Spanish Indignados 
movement; the 2011 Aganaktismenoi in Greece,; the 2011 Bahrain Uprising; and so on. In 
conjunction with my analyses of these events, a variety of performative art groups, artivist 
productions, theatre plays, literary pieces, and other artistic discussions will be discussed as well.  
This project, with its ambitious aim to attempt a redefinition of the performative in regard to the 
political, became a lengthy endeavor in theoretical and methodological discussions. It has divided 
its field of study in three main levels: a more general point of view, and a more abstract discussion 
on the concept of altermodernities, performativizations and the performative event, in chapters 
one and two. Then, chapters three and four, the argument  continues by way of  particular points 
of views within performativity theory, one from the point of view of bodies and the other from 
the vantage point of each event's respective time-spaces.  
It seemed necessary to ground the theoretical and philosophical arguments for proceeding in 
each of these points of view; a necessary task  that has made this research lengthy and 
theoretical. However, the concepts in each of these points of view correspond with the concepts 
that emerged out of  the struggles of its perspectival counterparts, forming a necessary 
conceptual network that encompasses the whole of this research and functions as its plane of 
consistency. 
This is not at all a comprehensive work, or a flawless one. If sometimes bold, it retains its ultimate 
modesty. It is above all an exercise in hopeless hope, in this very moment in history. Just now,as 
I am typing these words, Iran is witnessing another popular uprising, this time an uprising made 




knows where the destiny of this uprising will bring it; yet again the streets are the scene of a 
performative struggle, headless, leaderless, swarming in space and time, reclaiming the night, 
becoming “monstrous”. This research hopes to open another path for listening to the inaudible 



























2 Chapter One: Altermodernity Performativized 
 
2-1 Alternative Modern: Creating the Alter- 
 
“Hatred of modernity and of outdatedness are identical”, writes Adorno (Minima Moralia: 
Reflections on a Damaged Life 93), a modernist critic of modernity, who defends his own musical 
experiments under the name of “my modernity” against the conservative neo-classical – yet 
modern – perspective of his first composition teacher (ibid 218); an enthusiastic reader of Kafka 
and Beckett’s modernist literature against Lukácsian condemnation of their decadence, who was 
nonetheless “more thoroughly Lukácsian than Lukács himself” (Lazarus 137). Unlike Walter 
Benjamin, Adorno was not fond of Baudelaire's modernity. By contrast, he saw the victims of 
Hitler’s Fascism hidden in the “sensation” of Baudelaire's poetics. Simultaneously, however, 
modernity for him was “a qualitative, not a chronological, category” that “turns its back on 
conventional surface coherence, the appearance of harmony, the order corroborated merely by 
replication” (Minima Moralia 218). Still, Adornocannot refuse to see that the “cult of the new, 
thus the idea of modernity” (ibid 235), is but “eternal recurrence of damnation” (ibid 236). 
Adorno’s paradoxical entanglement with the modern is not limited to him alone, but typical of 
the anti-modern modernist critique of Modernity. In other words, there is a permanent tension 
inherent to the very notion of the“modern”, which in a way turns modernity against itself, leads 
it to a self-negation, and maintains a negative dialectical relationship while de(con)structing the 
more positive aspects of the Hegelian dialectic. As Bruno Latour has pointed out, this tension 
inherent to the “modern” 
designates a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time. When the word 
'modern', 'modernization', or 'modernity' appears, we are defining, by contrast, an archaic and 
stable past. Furthermore, the word is always being thrown into the middle of a fight, in a quarrel 
where there are winners and losers, Ancients and Moderns. 'Modern' is thus doubly 
asymmetrical: it designates a break in the regular passage of time, and it designates a combat in 




this adjective today, if we qualify it with prepositions, it is because we feel less confident in our 
ability to maintain that double asymmetry: we can no longer point to time's irreversible arrow, 
nor can we award a prize to the winners (Latour, We Have Never Been Modern 10). 
Now, the question is how one can conceive of the modern, modernism, and Modernity in such a 
relationship; and  the possible approaches that would allow thought to go beyond the tension 
that remains an ineluctable fact of the “modern.” To go beyond, yes, but not in order to solve 
the tension, to work out a synthesis, or in a more concrete political term, to finish the unfinished 
project of modernity. On the contrary, to go beyond this tension means to re-affirm the paradox 
and accept the ancient face of the modern for the sake of creating an alternative. The following 
chapter will discuss this inherent paradox of the “modern” and its consequent problem of moving 
beyond it in both thought and practice. 
 
2-1-1 A Modernity with Capital M 
If Adorno is right that the old has been always repeated under the guise of the new, an etymology 
of the very concept of modernity may prove to be useful. The word “modern” comes from the 
Late Latin word modernus, which is itself derived from the Latin root modo (just now, present in 
here and now). In its turn, Modo comes from the Indo-European root, med-, meaning to measure, 
to give advice, and to heal. These three meanings can vaguely reveal the normative implications 
inherent to the word modernity as a Westernized notion from the very outset. For example, St 
Augustine used the word “modern” as early as the 5th century to contrast “the new Christian era 
with pagan antiquity,” as “a means of describing and legitimizing new institutions, new legal 
rules, or new scholarly assumptions” (Martinelli 5). And yet, contemporary discourses regarding 
the status and meaning of Modernity itself– whether those still in favor of the Enlightenment 
project and theorizing the unfinished Modernity or those defending multiple modernities in 
different “cultural” and historical contexts – are not that distant from these earlier uses of the 
“modern” within theological-political discourses. 
Modernization understood as the process of (re)producing concrete (trans)formations under the 




“established itself in the political-ideological climate of the years after the second world war” 
(ibid 1), of the period of decolonization and post-colonial nationalism on one hand, and of the 
Cold War on the other hand. Although different countries had been attracted to either the 
Eastern (the Soviet Union) or  Western (the United States) styles of modernization, the 
modernized politico-economic order would inevitably consolidate political and economic power 
and would take that hegemonic form of what Felix Guattari and Antonio Negri called Integrated 
World Capitalism, which is a “figure of command which coordinates yet exasperates the unity of 
the world market, submitting it to instruments of productive planning, monetary control, political 
influence, with quasi-statist characteristics” (New Lines of Alliance 48). Under the hegemony 
exercised by Integrated World Capitalism, the contradiction between American capitalism and 
Soviet socialism proved to be secondary, as a global market of socialist-capitalist economies 
deterritorialized “statist command and the national states” (48), absorbing the Global Periphery 
in “a network of international organizations, a planetary strategy of the mass media, rigorous 
taking control of the market, of technologies, etc” (49). 
Just as Modernity is “the product of nascent capitalism and develops in close association with 
the worldwide expansion of the latter” (Amin 7), modernization is mainly economic in nature and 
subordinates the cultural and political aspects of everyday life, thereby transforming culture and 
politics into supplemental spheres whose function is aiding in the realization of economic ends. 
Hanna Arendt described this economic modernization as a “modern glorification of labour,” 
which leads to the “deworlding [of] the world through which human-being regress to a merely 
private, atomistic self. And leads to the regression of human form of life, bios, to life as such, zoē” 
(Rensmann and Gandesha 13). This analysis has been taken up and furthered on by Giorgio 
Agamben, who proposes the idea that under modern states of security and control, the nomos 
of the world was that of the concentration camp; replete with a form of juridico-political 
governance that arose from what it deemed to be a permanent situation of crisis and this 




treated as homo sacer: “human beings deprived of their rights as citizen – having the bios as their 
form of life – and become naked life -- a life reduced to zoē12” (see Agamben, Homo Sacer 1998). 
Therefore, the political and cultural modernizations that are proper to the modern economic 
paradigm were re-appropriated according to each local context. The modern nation-state, 
though deterritorialized, is still an important factor for the flow of global capital, reinforced by 
atomism, utilitarianism, consumerism, and the division of the public and the private as its cultural 
side.  
Clearly, modernization propagates a modernity which situates its “origin” in the West and 
conceives its progress as a linear process toward the “end of history” (i.e. American 
neoliberalism). And it is for this very reason that modernity has been analyzed as an evolutionary 
process, going from the backwardness to Western civilization. Thus, one comes to understand 
why some writers called the experience of the communist states of the USSR and Eastern 
European countries a “fake modernity” (Martinelli 14) or why “numerous North American 
sociologists and political scientists devoted themselves to studying the problems that ‘backward’ 
Third World countries had to face in order to acquire the characteristics of modernity as it 
appeared in the developed countries of the West” (ibid 1).  
Hence Modernity with capital m. In order to refer to the homogenized and globalized western 
conception of modernity, and the arbitrary universality of what Adorno called “the universalized 
instrumental rationality” behind the global capitalist system, the following research will write 
modernity with a capital m, as the constituted Power-relation of our (post)modern world. 
 
2-1-2 Modernism 
The authoritarian character typical of discourses on Modernity, accompanied by colonial and 
post-colonial procedures of modernization and “globalization,” have given rise to a wide body of 
 




critical theory, literature, and art, often branded as modernist. And it is from these critiques that 
the widely discussed distinction between modernism and Modernity has arisen. 
Modernism typically refers to that period in history that roughly begins in the 1850s and ends 
after the Second World War, and is described in terms of  counter-cultural, artistic and activist 
processes in which the actors within these fields opposed the very idea of Modernity itself. 
Nonetheless, modernist thought has been situated inside Modernity’s power-relation from the 
outset. For example, Samir Amin gives the following definition for Modernity, as it was 
conceptualized during theEnlightenment, although he directly connects it later to Eurocentrism: 
“[Modernity is] the claim that human beings, individually and collectively, can and must make 
their own history” (Amin 13). After the Enlightenment, this  definition of the human being as a 
bearer of the freedom and obligation to “make their own history” was  further refined by Karl 
Marx: “but [human beings] do not make [history] as they please; they do not make it under self-
selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from 
the past” (Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 10).  
Making one’s own history, the autonomy of mankind, was certainly a part of what Kant would 
call the emergence from one’s self-imposed nonage (Kant). Moreover, Kant’s 1784 essay ‘What Is 
Enlightenment?’  can be read as his public statement regarding his overall view of Modernity as 
a whole: self-governance, appreciation of men’s value, going toward novelty, autonomy, 
democracy and so forth. Therefore, the project of Modernity had a universal aspect of an 
emancipating project with a motto that Kant formulated as having “the courage to use your own 
reason” (Kant). This understanding refers to human reason and reality as its exclusive source, and 
thus changes constantly according to the movement of history and the changes experienced by 
human social life as a whole. This is what Martinelli calls a modernist definition of Modernity: 
Modernity is a process with no end that implies the idea of permanent innovation, of continual 
creation of the new. Living in the present, it is oriented towards the future, avid for novelty, 
promoting innovation. It invented … the tradition of the new (Martinelli 7). 
Therefore, Modernism is simultaneously distinct from, and part of, the whole process to which 




“a constellation comprised of three major elements: the dynamics of modernization (modern 
social and political transformations and formations), the idea of Modernity (normative claims to 
autonomy, self-governance and non-domination) and modernism (the critical or self-reflexive, 
and aesthetic dimensions of political Modernity)” (Understanding Political Modernity 12). 
This fact led to an understanding of Modernity as Janus-faced (see Alexander 148): a dark side  
responsible for a history of suppression, oppression, colonialism, wars, and inequality; and a 
bright, progressive, side – the modernist thought -- which could not realize itself in order to 
overcome its evil doppelgänger. In this fashion, modernism was regarded as “the self-
consciousness of Modernity” (Bernstein 56), as if the problem with Modernity were of a 
dissociative identity disorder, as if Modernity were a Doctor Jekyll, who is supposed to be the 
healer, but sometimes mistakenly turns into an evil Mr. Hyde. In this way, the solution will be a 
psychiatric treatment with more doses of “rational” modernism without any need to a change in 
nature, i.e. the Habermasian idea of Modernity as “an incomplete project.”  
However, this conception of modernist critique is rooted in alinear conception of time deemed 
to be naturally progressive. Modernity has been conceptualized as the new society, particularly 
because time was hypostatized by Enlightenment philosophy; particularly by the German 
Idealists. During the 18th century, views about time and consequently history underwent a major 
conceptual shift. Inspired by Newtonian physics, Kant liberated time from space and movement, 
and turned it into an autonomous axis of existence. Hence the significance of, for Deleuze, 
Hamlet’s lamentation that “time is out of joint;”, a formulation that Deleuze takes up in order to 
re-formulate Kant’s understanding of the nature of time. However, it would be Hegel who 
synthesized the linearity of time with the “movement of History;” a synthesis, says Hegel, that 
the notion that History indeed has a logic (linear progressive development) and thus can be said 
to be rational.Therefore, the German word for Modernity, “Neuzeit”, could refer simultaneously 
to two issues: first, this is the new time of human societies, a new era; and second, the time itself 
is renewed in human understanding. Ultimately, says Martinelli,  it was due to these ontological 
and epistemological breaks made by German Idealism that post-Enlightenment thought would 
move “toward a conception of modernity with the idea of progress at its core” (Martinelli 7). On 




identification of the modern with the here and now”, and “from then on modern society is our 
society” (Martinelli 6) — such reformulations of time  reveal the reasons for the internal tension 
inside Modernity. On the other hand, this attitude toward the new has been identified with an 
attitude toward the status quo of a very particular certain kind of society, their society. 
Like Modernity, however, modernism does not refer to a homogenous branch of thought. As a 
modernist thinker, for example, Adorno criticized the conception of linear time of capitalist 
progress, and its proper “sensations” of excess, speed, violence, and war. For Adorno, on the one 
hand, the modernist style of Baudelaire, Poe, and Wagner or of Futurist art was not different in 
nature from the aesthetic trends valorized by German Fascism, which he calls “the absolute 
sensation” (Minima Moralia 237).  On the other hand, the seemingly more progressive modernist 
art, such as the modernist theatre of Brecht, was also according to Adorno unable to become 
politically radical, since “the illustration of late capitalism by images from the agrarian or criminal 
registers does not permit the monstrosity of modern society to emerge in full clarity from the 
complex phenomena making it” (ibid 144). Avoiding any “identification of the non-identical” 
(Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 29) as a compromise, the obsessive negative dialectics of Adorno was 
itself the anti-modern modernist critique par excellence.  
In the following, therefore, some instances of anti-modern modernist critique and their possible 
passage to an altermodern perspective will be discussed. 
 
2-1-2-1 Anti-Modern critique of the Nation-State: the ambiguity of the Minoritarian  
As it was commented on before, the political form proper to Modernity is the “nation-State.” The 
modernization process, through which many colonial territories and “outdated” sovereignties 
entered the global scene of official politics, consists of forming a State representing its nation as 
a Whole.  
Although it is no more the center of power in the age of control societies, the nation-State still 
remains valid as the “natural” form of organization and one of the most important institutions of 




Particularly after 9/11, the imposed global framework for progress, the economic, political 
principles called “Washington Consensus”13, presents itself in the form of a binary, both of them 
refers to an identity-based State-politics: Bush or Bin Laden. This political dead-end of globalized 
capitalism offers the nation-State as the only political form proper to our contemporary world, 
and merely its form of content – either being a theocratic authoritarian one or a neo-liberal 
parliamentarian and representative one – could be a matter of preference. The nation-State is 
necessary for the functioning of globally integrated capitalism, flowing of capital, and the control 
over produced wealth. 
Because of its authoritarian, hierarchical, centralized, and exclusive nature, the State form has 
been subjected to countless critiques in the history of critical philosophy. Without bringing these 
already clear shortcomings onto table again, one should remember that in particular, the State 
functions as a means for imposing policies proper to economic modernization, protecting the 
private property, and “pacification of a territory via the ‘monopoly of legitimate violence’” 
(Martinelli 15) in order to absorb more foreign investments in the modernization process of post-
colonial countries. 
The newest kind of this post-colonial State-making process is the so-called “Islamic State” 
(originally known as the Jihadi group “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant”); it is indeed the most 
recent (self-)declared State in the world. The declaration of the Caliphate, the performative 
action of saying “I am the Caliph” by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and of expressing allegiance (Bey’at, 
 by the “subjects” in Mosul’s Grand Mosque, 5 July 2014, was the last stage of symbolically (بیعت
establishing a State. The rest will be a period of war, of absence of “Politics”. For the politics is 
always on the opposite side, always a people’s politics; a collective act of self-organizing 
difference and dissensus in an egalitarian, non-hierarchical way. 
The Arabic word for State, Dowla (دولة), is etymologically tied to the word for glory; and glory, 
according to Giorgio Agamben’s discussion on the secularized Christian theological grounds of 
 
13 This term is invented by John Williamson, an international economist, in the same year with the Fall of Berlin Wall 
in 1990, referring to “10 policy instruments about whose proper deployment Washington can muster a reasonable 




the modern Western sovereignty-governmentality, is the empty locus of mediation between the 
transcendent Sovereign Power and the immanent governmentality’s technics, the divine and the 
material (see The Kingdom and the Glory). This is why Islam is merely an adjective of the noun, a 
refined political form of content for a classically universal form of expression which we have 
called it for a long time the State.  
And what is more is that this State has been put into existence in a region marked by Sykes-Picot 
colonial agreement, with a Caliban sleeping on its soil. Thus it seems that the Shakespearean 
drama is playing itself out once more: the monster, which has been wanted tamed, trained, or 
organized properly, is already subjected to a “turned-into-Master” slave authority, only in order 
to finally find the “true” civilized (Western) former Master better than the other one. In other 
words, ISIL is not a radical political group, but has been feeding – like a parasite – on collective 
bodies of resistance and struggle in that region. Or, as Jonas Staal formulates the situation via an 
analysis of ISIL’s performative strategies: 
On [the] one hand, the Islamic State explicitly opposes the colonial borders of Iraq, and thus forces 
into public consciousness the history of foreign occupation, military intervention, and extralegal 
prisons that created the conditions for and in some ways legitimacy of the organization. On the 
other, the Islamic State also functions…as the unlimited patriarchal construct of the total state in 
the form of the ever-expanding caliphate. The performative gestures of Islamic State fighters 
publicly destroying their passports and thus allowing no administrative way back, as can be seen 
in their latest film The Clashing of the Swords IV, actually oppose statelessness and commit to one 
absolute and total state (To Make a World, Part I). 
Just like the so-called Islamic State tries to make Umma (امة) its nation14, each State couples with 
its nation. By definition, the nation is characterized by a homogenous identity. Thus, when 
Modernity comes into an actual territory, a process of homogenizing is undertaken for the sake 
of constructing a “people;” a process that has as one of its main consequences the exclusion of 
some groups from the national identity that is in the process of its realization. To continue with 
the example, one should note that in its pre-modern history, Umma was never a nation. Instead, 
 





Umma, a traditional name referring to the world-wide community of Muslims, was a 
heterogeneous whole subordinated to the transcendent point of the Caliph’s (sovereign’s) 
authority. To become a nation, it could not remain the same. It must be secularized as the divine 
glory been in the Dowla. In this case, a particular Islamic identity has been coined for national 
identity, which means excluding numerous fractions of Muslims from the nation. Thus, ISIL must 
be understood as promoting a very particular kind of Sunni Islam, excluding all other branches, 
including various branches of Shiism, mystical Islam, and so forth. 
As a term, State comes from Pre-Indo-European root “sta-”, similar to Persian “-stan” (country), 
referring to what stands, what is. Additionally, the Ancient Greek term “stasis” means to be at a 
stand still. So, rather than existing as a permanent entity, this stasis of the State refers to an 
interruption of the movement, of the kinesîs. Unlike stasis, it is the Ancient Greek term kinesîs 
that signifies  permanency, (but again as a term it has a derivation of its own that helps us in 
furthering the conceptualization: tasis which means tension, intensity, force, and antagonism, 
extending the sound of an utterance for the pleasure of saying or hearing it. In this etymological 
theatre of words, one could say that what has a permanent role, the one that permanently 
endures, is not the State (the standstill constituted Power), but paradoxically the movement and 
its tension (the constituent power), the pleasurable self-utterance of a people that sometimes 
halts with the loud State’s “clariounes, that in bataille blowen blody sounes” (Chaucer, The 
Knight’s Tale): and the bataille is the State’s civil war against the people. Hence the Foucauldian 
motto: “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, The History of Sexuality 95)). Thus, 
insofar as a constituted Power  continues to exert itself, there is always a resistance against the 
homogenization of  national identity and is perpetually striving to move beyond the State’s 
regime of constituted power. “There is no social system that does not leak from all directions, 
even if it makes its segments increasingly rigid in order to seal the lines of flight” (Deleuze and 




Even in the capital of the most brutal existing State, Raqqa, graffiti painters are risking their life 
to write slogans against ISIL on the walls. And not unlike the “Standing Man” of Taqsim Square15, 
Suad Nofel made her “one-woman rally” protest every single day for three month in front of ISIL 
headquarters in Raqqa, holding a sign with these words: “No for oppression, no for unjust rulers, 
no for atonement, and yes for thinking!” (Taleb). 
These leakages, or lines of flights, can nevertheless lead to two different politics: anti-modern 
identity politics, or alter-modern non-identity politics;+ both of which have been ascribed 
confusingly to the minorities of their territories. And minority politics – whether identity-oriented 
or not – is considered then as an emancipatory politics in political discourses, which are critical 
of modern States. Nonetheless, a certain perspective of minority would be able to differentiate 
between these two politics.  
If minority is considered merely as a people, who is excluded or has a different mother tongue, 
religion, sexuality, or ideological tendency in relation to the majority, then such a definition 
would not bestow an inherent emancipatory signification to minority. According to such a 
definition, racist, purist, or other right-wing radicals are minorities, causing disastrous scandals 
from time to time. Thus, such a definition of minority is merely a quantitative one, purely 
extensive, and not related to the political; rather, it acts against the introduction of the new.  
The quantitative approach leads to the confusion between minority and identity, and 
consequently to a categorization of minorities according to their supposed identities. For 
example in the case of Iran, a Kurdish identity exists which has separate, sometimes conflictual 
interests in comparison with the Balochi identity, homosexual identity, Sunnis identity, leftist 
identity, and so forth. A politics based on such categorization will then take the form of a demand-
oriented one, which has been differentiated from the contemporary performative politics of 
dissent mentioned above. 
Identity means to be identical after all, and thus, making politics out of Kurdish identity means 
covering numerous antagonisms and differences which exist between those who are called 
 
15 A contemporary dance practitioner who, by just standing in the middle of a square, made one of the most famous 




“Kurdish”, in order to construct a homogenous whole. And yet, there is no such a thing as One 
Nation, for every so-called nation is a heterogeneous whole, consisting of different identities. To 
construct a homogenous whole, however, countless procedures of nation-building and State-
craft, which operate via exclusion in diverse and violent forms – from genocide to forced 
displacement, sterilization, mass detention, criminalization, devilization, and so on. 
Just as we have seen regarding the Hegelian dialectic of the self and the other (as two separate 
identities), the political relationship between two identities, one majoritarian and the other 
minoritarian, considering minority as a different identity, should be analyzed inside the realm of 
dialectics. The “identity politics”, which always claims to be of minority, is a political practice that 
can only be done when it recognizes the authority and is conditioned by a master-slave dialectical 
relationship. Therefore, any other social relation that an identity politic seeks to establish, instead 
of the really existing one, lives on a reaction to the Master, the already established Power of the 
central State, and is not “autonomous”. Thus, it is unlike the politics of the performative turn 
since it is not a politics of self-poietics. Kafka’s Number Twenty-Nine aphorism in his “The Zürau 
Aphorisms” (1991) dramatizes the same problem in a master-slave relationship:  
The ulterior motives with which you absorb and assimilate Evil are not your own but those of Evil. 
The animal wrests the whip from its master and whips itself in order to become master, not 
knowing that this is only a fantasy produced by a new knot in the master's whiplash (22). 
In our case, the evil is but the nation-State form, replete with its centralization of power, 
homogenization of national identity, and its hierarchical body.  
Moreover, as long as the minoritarian identity is only negative, based on the mere negation of 
the Master, it reproduces the very relations it wants to destroy by its reactionary as opposed to 
autonomous response. In other words, just as the Master and slave are two sides of the same 
coin, so too are the minority and majority identities; just like the realtion between the Jihadist’s 
hierarchically organized  terrorist group and globally integrated capitalism . The former is the 
unworthy son of the latter and even though they “contradict” each other, their contradiction is 
in the paradigm of the same, since it defines itself through a lack of similarity: a negative  as 




Therefore, the relationship between the minority as identity and the central State is of a double 
subjugation: the minority as identity can only recognize itself when it affirms what it negates, i.e. 
the homogenizing authority; it is not only unable to turn its back on totalitarian sovereignty, but 
maintains an obsessive relationship with it. It is Kafka who again grasps this double, oedipal, 
subjugation best, when he writes in Letter to My Father: 
…from the many occasions on which I had, according to your clearly expressed opinion, deserved 
a beating but was let off at the last moment by your grace, I again accumulated only a huge sense 
of guilt. On every side I was to blame, I was in your debt (The Sons 133). 
Thus, it is not accidental that many identity political movements, including different nationalist 
anti-colonial movements, ended up in similar repressive, sometimes genocidal nation-States as 
– if not worse than — their colonial adversaries.  
The idea of (minority as) identity politics, which has been shared by many conventional socialists, 
situates itself in a dialectical relationship which longs for the identification of the non-identical, 
for a return to the lost unity, to a synthesis. That is the reason why Adorno insists on a negative 
dialectics, a dialectics in which the main attempt is the non-identification of the identical and the 
non-identical. In other words, the tension between the poles of the contradiction should never 
resolve in a “higher” unity: “the whole is false” (Adorno, Minima Moralia 50). However, another 
approach to the notion of minority is possible; an approach which is non-identity-oriented, non-
dialectical, and – far from recognizing a totalizing authority – autonomous.  
 
2-1-2-2 Anti-Modern Critique of Progress 
In a Modernity constituted by the “false promise” of the new, where“everything modern, 
because of its never-changing core, has scarcely aged than it takes on a look of the archaic” 
(Adorno, Minima Moralia 237), one can trace back the remains of the so-called pre-modernity 
which still subsists in the very core of  Modernity itself.  
Trying to do so, Deleuze follows a Nietzschean critique, arguing that even if God is dead, his place 




165, 166). As God designates a historical name for the transcendent, so too does “man.” 
Therefore, if “pre-modern thought had grounded the truth, being and identity of the world on 
God” (Colebrook 28), then modernity has grounded them on individual subject by placing man 
on the throne of transcendence. However, as natural, not divine, laws apply to man, then its 
transcendence necessitates a belief in progress, in his evolution  according to the dictates of the 
values of Modernity. It is for this reason that, “the critique of humanism maps on to a critique of 
progress and ‘the developmental discourse on race’” (Gilbert 49). 
Just like the State apparatus proper to Modernity, the notion of capitalist progress is also widely 
criticized by modernist thinkers and artists in the 20th century. Such a critique is found, for 
instance, in Walter Benjamin’s dramatization of history’s progress in his Theses on the Concept 
of History (Benjamin, On the Concept of History 392); a work whose most famous figure is none 
other than the “angel of history.” Crucially, Benjamin’s angel was a detournement of the one  
Paul Klee had depicted in his “Angelus Novus;” an angel looking backward and witnessing all the 
ruins of history as “one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage”, while the  futural winds 
of Paradise propel him ever forward. “The storm,” writes Benjamin, “irresistibly propels him into 
the future to which his back is turned” (ibid), since he wants to return to the past, wake the dead 
and lead them to salvation. But what is that storm which pushes him forward? The answer is: 
progress. Benjamin criticizes the idea of progress in many of his works. For him, progress is the 
ideological, and bourgeois, alternative for emancipation and history, and under its name, so 
many catastrophes has been piled up. The history of progress is the history of barbarism; a 
history, which leads “from the slingshot to the megaton bomb” (Adorno, Negative Dialectics 320). 
But why does the angel wants to go back? The history behind him, the history that repeats the 
catastrophe, is also a history with so many non-actualized potentialities. Only if all these 
potentialities would be actualized, the continuity of catastrophe and the course of the past as 
oppression would be brought to an end and usher in the salvation of humanity . These 
potentialities are called, in this research, as trends of altermodernities. 
The Benjaminian bridge between the anti-modern modernist critique and the alter-modern 
creation has been made possible by his new conception of time. “A new time”, writes Massimo 




interruption, arrest of the continuum, Jetzt-zeit. Every Jetzt can represent it.” (Cacciari 164) This 
new time is a time proper to altermodernities, whose realization through performative politics 
will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
2-1-2-3 Modernity as a Power Relation  
In an interview I conducted with the activist, urban theorist, and historian Mike Davis, we spoke 
about the way in which the large scale protests in Wisconsin as a show of resistance to the new 
budget repair bill drew inspiration from the spirit and form of the Occupy Al-Tahrir movement 
and through a connection to it; a collective affect that could go beyond an activist student direct 
action and become a popular protest, with a number as high as 100000 protestors. The people, 
says Davis, were shouting in the streets “Government Walker: Our Mubarak” while the others 
had occupied the State Capitol Building. And then on the TV screen, Americans watched placards 
in Al-Tahrir square, saying “Egypt Support Wisconsin Workers – One World, One Pain.” Davis 
concluded that largely broadcast Arab Spring showed the people in the West that democracy, 
which they long had thought it is their exclusive property, is much more present in Cairo streets 
than in their countries, that Arabs are not those cliché images in mainstream media, belonging 
to a region outside of progressive modernity. The seemingly “natural” link between 
modernity/modernism and the West was, therefore,  challenged. 
However, the non-Western and revolutionary avant-garde movements of Modernity, which 
inspired modernists in the West, have a long history such as and the October Revolution of 1917. 
Himself a modernist critical thinker of Modernity, Marx also presupposed the West and its 
industrialized capitalist countries as the origin of the modern against the East as a pre-modern 
despotic region. Engels even went so far that called Turkish people “barbarian” (Engels) and 
“been convicted of the most inveterate opposition to all progress”, arguing in defense of a British 
colonial aggression against possible Tzarian Russia’s rule on Turkish territory as an “interest of 
the revolutionary Democracy” (Engels), without voicing any reservation about the colonial 




revolution – they concluded firmly – would have happened in one of the advanced countries; 
particularly Germany, not in “backward” peasantry Russia. 
Inventing the theory of “the weakest link of the chain” (Lenin, Imperialism: the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism 27), even Lenin himself noted that the revolution should not have happened in Russia. 
It is interesting that Alain Badiou, while reflecting on the Al-Tahrir movement, revives again this 
old Leninist hypothesis, by identifying Middle Eastern Arab dictatorships, such as Mubarak, as 
the weakest link in the chain of globalized capitalism (Alain Badiou on Tunisia, Riots & 
Revolution), restoring the same self-colonizing division of modernist thought. 
Not only the avant-garde manifestations of modern thought have appeared in the non-Western 
regions, but also the repressive, dark side of Modernity was embodied there in a time that 
challenges any geographical origin for Modernity. Foucault’s archeology and later genealogy of 
modern strategies of governmentality and of modern power-relations, for example, does not 
conceptualize their interconnected genesis in the West as well as the East; which Gayatri Spivak 
rightly identifies as Foucault’s “sanctioned ignorance” (Can The Subaltern Speak?).  In particular, 
one can refer to the case of the Panopticon as Foucault’s main model for modern technics of 
governmentality in discipline societies. Foucault refers to the idea of a tall tower in the center of 
a prison that Jeremy Bentham had offered British government for penal reforms. But the 
Panopticon interestingly was not Jeremy Bentham’s own idea, coming from the historical context 
of already “advanced” Great Britain; instead, it was born in the East, in Tzarian Russia, by his 
brother Samuel (Werret). In a semi-colonial context and for the sake of English experts’ control 
over Russian peasants and unskilled shipbuilding workers, Samuel Bentham designed the 
Panopticon, and inspired Jeremy, who in his turn generalized the idea into a universal of 
Modernity. 
The problematic view of Modernity as a system originated in the West has largely been taken for 
granted – as we saw in the case of Foucault – even in the critical discourses against the 
“authority” of westernized Modernity and the literature around modernism and different 
manifestations of the modernist critique. They have also fallen to the trap of presupposing a 




writing about the modernist style of Jame Joyce, notes that “one may claim that modernism 
‘should have’ broken out in the world metropolis of Britain, but it did so instead in the stagnant 
backwaters of colonial Ireland”. (Eagleton 53) 
Not surprisingly, the Western-oriented modernist critique was even present in the first 20th 
century’s revolutionary attempt to negate Modernity and its capitalism, i.e. the October 
Revolution. Outlining the strategies and tactics of social-democracy, Lenin argued that by 
correctly applying the principles of Marxism one is inevitably led to the conclusion that every 
society should undergo  capitalist development, if it is based on commodity production and has 
economic contact with the “civilized capitalist nations”. He then continues to say that 
in countries like Russia the working class suffers not so much from capitalism as from the 
insufficient development of capitalism. The working class is, therefore, most certainly interested 
in the broadest, freest, and most rapid development of capitalism (Two Tactics of Social-
Democracy in the Democratic Revolution 45). 
According to these cases, modernity must not be regarded as a notion or order of things invented 
in a certain geographical region (the global North), and only then exported to the global South, 
which hosted its antithesis (traditionalism, or pre-modern thought). But what perspective, 
instead of a spatial geographic one, which has been proven to be at least problematic, should 
one consider to approach?  
Criticizing the commonplace definitions of Modernity, Foucault suggested – though vaguely – a 
way to approach Modernity differently. “Rather than seeking to distinguish the ‘modern era’ 
from the ‘premodern’ or ‘postmodern’”, writes Foucault, “I think it would be more useful to try 
to find out how the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has found itself struggling 
with attitudes of ‘countermodernity.’” (What Is Enlightenment? 39) Attitude is here the key term, 
by which he means “a mode of relating to the contemporary reality” (ibid). But to understand 
and apply it, one should consider Foucault’s life-long engagement with the theory of power, the 
interaction of forces, and diagraming them in order to approach that “mode of relating” to 
reality. In other words, Modernity should be considered as a power-relation, a permanent 




attitudes: a virtual geography of forces and intensities, rather than a historical geography of 
borders and national territories. 
Approaching Modernity from such a perspective, Hardt and Negri characterize it as a relation of 
power between a normative Eurocentric modern view and differing, and sometimes 
contradictory, anti-modern forces – a relation of power which is at work everywhere, with anti-
modern forces emerging from inside as well as outside of the so-called West. If it is the case that 
“where there is power, there is resistance …”, then the resistance against Modernity’s power has 
always been present. Thus anti-modernity is a force against Modernity, not of a pre-modern 
traditional attitude, and while it aims to negate Modernity, it still remains “inside” the modern 
power-relation. Strictly speaking, anti-modern force can only be defined through its negation of 
Modernity. 
 
2-1-3 “Alter-”: The significance of the prefixes 
The previous section discussed the Modernity’s power relation, i.e. the struggle between the 
modern and the anti-modern, through different instances of modernist critique against it. The 
use of prefixes before Modernity – anti and alter16 – comes from applying the Nietzschean 
 
16 It can be argued that at least another prefix is important to be discussed regarding the critique of Modernity: 
“post-”. The post-modern critiques are considered here in the category of the anti-modern. The reason is post-
modern critique, even in the form of post-colonial criticism, have been mostly engaged with the task of revealing 
the appearances of dominated ideologies and their repressive consequences: the Eurocentric discourses, the 
masculine normativity, critical Whiteness, and so forth. This act of criticism is highly necessary and immensely 
valuable, but it does not suffice (as we shall see later). In his notes on “Desire and Pleasure”, Deleuze writes that “I 
couldn’t agree with Michel [Foucault] more about an aspect I consider fundamental: neither ideology nor 
repression” (Desire and Pleasure 125). This statement does not mean that there is no longer ideology or repression. 
It claims that ideology is only an assemblage of power, among many other possible assemblages; and repression 
does not always explain the functioning of domination, so the analyst should consider the various assemblages of 
desire that can even, through fixation and reterritorialization on particularities, become fascistic. Desire itself is 
another name for constituent power (???).. This perspective makes way for an understanding of a possibility of 
creation in the face of obscurities of ideologies and highly repressive environment. It can explain the various forms 
of expression for resistance and struggle in the most disciplined and controlled spaces, which are usually considered 
deprived of the political (for example, the moments of creativity in Auschwitz itself, the desiring machines of North 
Korea, the everyday struggle of veiled women in the Middle East, and so on). In other words, going beyond the 




“dramatization” method on this concept, a typology of forces and a symptomology of their 
affects and affections17.  
From this perspective, the prefix “anti-” does not only refer to traditionalist conservative thought, 
which longs for a return to a lost unity, but also to a range of critical thought that has sometimes 
been called “modernist”, and is mostly associated with a leftist critique. This research deals 
almost completely with the latter. The former type of anti-modern forces has been strictly 
rejected by the thinkers of the other type as both reactionary and destructive, which means it 
destroys to bring back the old order. As an anti-modern critic, for example, Adorno described 
them as the “anti-modern particularities and blind arbitrariness” (Rensmann and Gandesha 11), 
longing for the lost unity, purity, and conservative values such as race, blood and religion – as if 
they would remind him nothing but Auschwitz. 
Therefore, anti- does not necessarily have negative value, although it refers to negations of 
modernity. Nevertheless, as the cases of modernist thought have shown in the previous sections, 
anti- itself divides to two subtypes.  
The first one is an Aufhebung dialectics, seeks to negate Modernity as its anti-thesis, but only in 
order to bring about a synthesis. The first two meanings of the verb aufheben, to pick up and to 
cancel, are in need of “something” (accusative), which means something recognized should be 
canceled as it is, only in order to exist in another, higher level. When Aufhebung is understood in 
such terms – which is not always the case with all commentators –, its application in the field of 
modern politics leads to socialist politics (seizure of State power, and making another State with 
a higher content), social democratic politics (accepting the obligatory shortcomings and try to 
 
re-appearances of white-male-heterosexual subjective discourses, of the main-stream media strategies, and of the 
Eurocentrist thought. 
Therefore, although so many other scholars (including Foucault) have preferred to remind the autonomy of “the 
other” to the West under the title of the postmodern, the term postmodernism is not persuading enough for the 
start of this research. It is true that postmodernist discourses work with the heterogeneity and fragmentations, but 
the heterogeneity there is only captured by static images crystalized around established institutions of power (see 
Früchtl 2010). In other words, postmodernism is the extension of modernity to its margins, coming after expansion 
of national markets and older imperialist systems, by referring to the cultural aspects of such developments.            




reform with a higher content) or identity politics (in which the social relations are fed with the 
higher content of one’s own identity). In none of those politics occurs a difference in nature, and 
as mentioned before, all are prone to new procedures of exclusion and homogenizing. 
Benjamin’s Author as Producer provides us with a critique of this modernist stance, by “indicating 
the decisive difference between merely transmitting the apparatus of production and 
transforming it” (4). To indicate this difference, he starts with changing the main question of 
materialist literary and art critique: instead of asking how an artwork stands “in relation to” (zu) 
the production relations of an epoch (Produktionsverhältnissen der Epoche), one must ask how 
an artwork stands “in/inside” (in) those relations. The question entails not an attention to the 
produced content (how “radical” and critical it may be) in the first place; rather, to the formal 
elements and the technics of their production, and whether they mark a break with pre-
established established relations of production. Criticizing modernist-leftist movements of 
„Aktivismus“ (Activism) and „Die Neue Sachlichkeit“ (The New Objectivism) for relying on 
production of critical content in the same bourgeois production relations, he sees such 
modernists as “reproducer[s] of the apparatus of production” (8). They don’t transform the 
existing apparatus, although they negate it in their stance zu dominant relations of production. 
They don’t place themselves in these relations, rather “sublimate” themselves into a vanguard 
group outside of the dirty world and “sublate” it into a different world yet with same relations, 
same apparatuses of production – different but not in nature. In the case of Aktivismus, this world 
is of an addendum of spirituality on capitalism.   
A more sophisticated case of this subtype can be traced in Derrida’s later work on the 
(quasi)concept of “The democracy to come” (la démocratie à venir). For Derrida, democracy is 
essentially self-destructive. Democracy, the rule of people, consists of demo- (demos or people) 
and –cracy, meaning rule and coming from arche, a word that Derrida extracts its authoritarian 
implications in Archive Fever; therefore, for it to be a rule, demo-cracy needs to rely on a form of 
authority, or sovereignty. A democracy without sovereignty, according to Derrida, is non-
existent. Moreover, democracy includes another self-contradiction by claiming both freedom 
and equality as its characteristics. For, according to Derrida, freedom of the individual, i.e. the 




then is that democracy is never achieved and we can only progressively go toward closest 
possible forms to it (see Derrida).  
Derrida’s later political perspective on democracy, though it criticizes modern sovereignty, 
presupposes all pillars of Modernity without challenging them. By rejecting any potentiality of 
non-authoritarian self-sovereignty of a people, he recognizes the modern hierarchical, organic 
organization of people as “nation” as the sole, natural possible form of organization. By confusing 
the individual and the singular, he reasserts the Enlightenment’s individualist freedom, that is the 
freedom of homo economicus. And by identifying equality with being the same, he recognizes the 
primacy of similarity, turning difference into a lack of sameness, and renouncing the potentiality 
of being equal and different. Benjamin’s critique then applies also to the way in which the later 
Derrida theorizes democracy. 
The second subtype of modernist thought, in contrast with the Aufhebung dialectics, is of a 
negative dialectics. As mentioned earlier, negative dialectics avoids any “identification of the 
non-identical” (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 29) as a compromise. It does not subl(im)ate the 
tension, the real antagonism of reality; rather, it keeps the antagonisms revealed and exposed, 
intensifying them, while it does not again let any ideology cover it, or any “false whole”, unity or 
seemingly homogenous identity hide it. Confronting with dualities that have the identical on both 
sides, negative dialectics does not have recourse to a synthesis; it is the non-identification of the 
non-identical. For “velleity binds the new to the ever-same, and this established the inner 
communication of the modern and myth. The new wants nonidentity, yet intention reduces it to 
identity; modern art constantly works at the Münchhausen trick of carrying out the identification 
of the nonidentical (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 29).  
For Adorno, in the case of modernist art, the new of the modern is “only a longing for the new” 
(Bernstein 57). This desire to create the new, while “each and every artwork works back on 
society as the model of a possible praxis in which something on the order of a collective subject 
is constituted” (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 350) turns art into a “placeholder for an absent 




Then, is it really an incurable pessimism, already accepted the fate of “an eternal recurrence of 
damnation” (Adorno, Minima Moralia 236), of a permanent despair without remedy? “The only 
philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in the face of despair”, writes Adorno, “is the 
attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of 
redemption” (ibid 247) – an echo of Walter Benjamin’s “organization of pessimism”, his 
“pessimism all along the line”, but not only to negate the order of the day and destroy its “image-
sphere”, but also simultaneously to contribute to the production of a new alternative profane 
“image space” (Surrealism 216-17). 
There is, therefore, a creation at work. As Holloway says, “non-identity can only be a force that 
changes itself, that drives beyond itself, that creates and creates itself” (Holloway 14). Here 
creation refers to an impossible production, a miraculous one, since the production is not a 
synthesis, a re-production; nor is it the old under the guise of the new. It does not happen in the 
existing relations of work, rather it is a product of the “non-work”, of being’s desoeuvrement 
(worklessness or lack of work), a creativity without subject’s control (Blanchot, The Space of 
Literature 35, 46). It is a production under alternative inoperative relations, a production of a 
miraculating-machine (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 11). 
The flash-like crossings through various thinkers with different – sometimes antagonistic –
theories in the previous paragraph, point together to a potential “leap” from pure negativity of 
anti-modern modernist critique to a beyond of Modernity’s power-relation; in other words, it 
marks an alternative power-relation, an alter-modern one.  
The aforementioned leap is perhaps best captured in Blanchot’s May 68 pamphlet, disorderly 
words (1995). Talking about the “most powerful characteristic” of the May 68 movement, he 
proclaims that the refusal of this radically affirmed break with existing powers, “without ceasing 
to be active refusal, does not remain a purely negative moment” and “goes way beyond simple 
negativity”, since “it is the negation even of what has not yet been advanced and affirmed” (200-
01).  
How could a “purely negative moment” negate what is yet to come as a constituted Power of 




power, i.e. a becoming simultaneously constituent of beings and also destroying them? Holloway 
is right in claiming that the restless Adornian non-identity creates, but only if it performs the leap 
toward the affirmative.  
The affirmative here is not of a solid, permanent being, like something with the stasis of a State. 
On the contrary, it is in constant mutation, a plastic chaotic field of immanent forces that founds 
the Nietzschean ontology, or better, ontogenesis. For the aforementioned leap is also the leap 
from Nihilism to the love of life, that is dramatized in the figure of “the man who wants to die” 
(Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life 81). 
The man who wants to die is a figure of negativity in the last stage of Nihilism that even negates 
negativity itself. By declaring that “better a nothingness of the will than a will of nothingness”, 
this figure performs a rupture from the destructive will to nothingness, only in order to destroy 
the negativity and makes space for the new affirmative; for a will to the nothingness of the will 
of nothingness turns against itself, making possible the leap from the last man to the beyond of 
mere repetition of the old. “And at this moment of the completion of nihilism (midnight), 
everything is ready – ready for a transmutation” (ibid). Hence, the introduction of the alternative.         
The significance of the prefix before Modernity, i.e. the difference between anti- and alter-, can 
be traced back in the first global cycle of performative politics mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter. However, to grasp this importance, there should be a quick reconsideration of the image 
mass media had been feeding the world in first years of 21st century, by defining this movement 
as anti-globalization. A movement so globally diffused, consisting of activists from Indian 
farmers, landless Brazilian and Iranian exiles to American anti-racists and West European 
performers and artists, is not against at least a certain meaning of globalization. It is true that this 
movement has been against the unequal globalization led by the so-called Global North 
corporations and nation-States and instructed through seemingly international organizations 
such as WTO and IMF, both infamous because of their imposed structural re-adjustments on poor 
countries, supporting post-coup d’état dictatorships and their neoliberal imposed policies, and 




movements could be summarized in this Zapatista slogan: “a world in which many worlds fit” 
(Conant). 
In fact, their proposals focus on alternative but equally global relationships of trade, cultural 
exchange, and political process—and the movements themselves constructed global networks. 
The name they proposed for themselves, then, rather than “antiglobalization,” was 
“alterglobalization” (or altermondialiste, as is common in France). The terminological shift 
suggests a diagonal line that escapes the confining play of opposites—globalization and 
antiglobalization— and shifts the emphasis from resistance to alternative (Hardt and Negri, 
Commonwealth 102). 
The ontological basis of this politics, as explained, could be summarized as “negation is not 
enough; creation is necessary.” However, the alterglobalization movement was widely 
stigmatized, particularly after “N30” in Seattle (November 30, 1999), as an anti-modern 
destructive fantasy of non-mature youth; those cynical and over-excited dreamers who do not 
know what they are doing. The ageist accusation is not much different from what Adorno recalls 
in a dramatic scene of Minima Moralia, when his first composition teacher, confronted by 
Adorno’s modernity18, advised him that “the ultra-modern” is not modern and “the new youth 
had, as he liked to put it, more red blood-corpuscles” (218). Even the traditional left, baffled with 
the new forms of protests, could not notice the break entailed in the contemporary performative 
politics.         
Considering the Autonomist shift of Marxist thought in Italy’s 60s and 70s, there is another way 
to understand the shift from antimodernity to altermodernity. Italy was the only country in which 
the May 68 movement could extend itself (Hardt, Laboratory Italy 6), not only in order to negate 
the then-established powers, but also to become “the negation even of what has not yet been 
advanced”. Militant-researchers in groups such as “Potere Operaio” (worker’s power) and 
“Autonomia Operaia Organizzata” (Organised Workers' Autonomy), among whom Mario Tronti 
and Antonio Negri became the main figures, conceptualized a reversal of Marxist political 
perspective through the autonomy of the non-identical. According to them, the course of 
 




capitalist development has not been a capitalist progressive force, or the result of its positive 
initiative. On the contrary, the establishment of capitalist system and its progress could only be 
made possible through the capture of the constituent power of dissent.   
Thus, for these Italian militant-researchers, the principle element of political determination  is to 
be found in the collective force of resistance and struggle, which causes the reaction from the 
side of capital. From this perspective, Fordism as the abstract management of labour was a 
reaction to the revolutionary movements of the 1910s the capture of its revolutionary spirit in 
order to assimilate it within the already existing constructions: the process of recuperation.  
Recuperation processes of Modernity and its capitalism does not prove the nonexistence of 
altermodernities, but it shows the temporary characteristic of emerging alter-modernities. “By 
reopening the question of recuperation”, writes Stevphen Shukaitis, “the inevitable drive to 
integrate the power of social insurgency back into the workings of capital and the state, we create 
possibilities for exploring a politics continually reconstituted against and through the dynamics 
of recuperation, to keep open an antagonism without closure that is continually composed and 
recomposed” (10). In other words, as the Blanchotian affirmative refusal becomes itself an 
“institution of power” (Disorderly Words 200), once the passage from the instituent to the 
instituted is completed. And in this instance one is confronted with another form of the modern 
rather than an alter-modern. 
That said, it may seem easy to negatively characterize the alter-modernities, barring what cannot 
function as altermodernities. For example, the so-called multiple modernities, such as Iranian 
Modernity or Chinese Modernity, each of them theorized by local intellectuals or western 
scholars, do not represent altermodernities. Contrastingly, they often offer unfortunate models 
for a combination of anti-modern peculiarities hostile to any modern humanist values (such as 
freedom of expression, legal equality, liberal women’s and minorities’ rights) and modern 
capitalist political and economic forms and a modern ambition for progress. As Slavoj Zizek points 
out, the contemporary capitalist ideology of free market is like an empty form that can absorb 




efficiently functioning in economic modernization and global market (Zizek, Capitalism with Asian 
values). 
To continue the discussion on minoritarian politics, one could characterize it in the same track, 
as an aspect of alter-modernities. Various armed (and unarmed) organizations which fight under 
the name of minorities’ cause, according to our analysis of constituted versus constituent power, 
do not have any difference in nature with the centralized government they are fighting with. The 
same State-form, with a highly hierarchical collective body, a vertical organization of power, and 
strict demand of obedience make them the new knot the master's whiplash. Functioning as a 
specialized vanguard group outside of their own people in general, they must even keep their 
distance from the rest of the population to be able to claim a kind of representation. Of course, 
differences in degree exist for the worse: in case of some groups such as Jeisho-al-Adl (the Army 
of Justice) which supposedly fights on behalf of the Balochi minority in Iran, the strategies of 
control and discipline are much more violent, and the gender inequality and exclusion of sexual 
minorities is far crueler than the central governments. These are, nevertheless, the differences 
already trapped in the paradigm of the same. They cannot create any alternative relation but can 
only reproduce the modern centralization of power with a touch of resentful anti-modern 
peculiarities. Therefore their relation to a central government becomes an oedipal one, like what 
Kafka described in the aforementioned piece of his letter to the father.  
Thus, negatively defining a minority politics is always a non-identical one: minority never assumes 
an identity. Minority is not only uncountable by the constituted Power, it also disrupts the already 
established relations, and more importantly, it creates  a language of its own in constant 
variation; a new form of expression and an alternative way of organizing the collective bodies, or 
in sum, a life proper to its permanent movement. For this very reason, “being-minority” is not 
the issue at stake, for there is no minority as a solid Being. The problem is “becoming-
minoritarian”: a process under which all identities are avoided, and performative 
experimentations for reaching an alternative “being-together” are conducted. When the 
protestors were shouting, “We are all German Jews”, “We are all undesirables” in May 68 
(Knabb), they were not claiming an identity for themselves, rather they were affirming minority 




In addition, what has been theorized by Nicolas Bourriaud as altermoden does not signify the 
aforementioned implications of its name’s prefix. As a well-known curator who forged the term 
“relational aesthetics”, Bourriaud curated the Tate Triennial 2009 with the title “Altermodern”. 
But the exhibition, its manifesto, and the subsequent publications by Bourriaud reveal that his 
understanding of alter-modern is not different from some branches of (post)modernist critique, 
and still subjected to the power relations constitutive of Modernity. Bourriaud insists that his 
altermodern is modernism reloaded, but a modernism which is “post-colonial” (Momus). It is 
evident that such a definition presupposes a good value for the adjective “post-colonial”, but is 
post-colonial really a good term in itself? The activities of multinationals as well as IMF and WTO 
in the countries of the global South exhibit another colonialism empowered by outsourcing cheap 
labour, imposing restructuring programs, and extracting resources with huge environmental 
costs. As Aniket Jaaware warns, there is a “risk in the concept of post-coloniality” which is “in its 
use” (509) as a name for a period in that colonialism is dead and wholly in the past. There is a 
post-colonial coloniality or a colonial post-coloniality. In one of the recent examples of such a 
situation, 40,000 Masai pastoralists have to leave their traditional lands, because a safari 
company based in Dubai is going to buy the land and turn it into a “reserve for the royal family 
of Dubai to hunt big game” (D. Smith).  On the other hand, Hito Steyerl argues how contemporary 
art is an accomplice in this postcolonial colonialism: 
What is the function of art within disaster capitalism? Contemporary art feeds on the crumbs of 
a massive and widespread redistribution of wealth from the poor to the rich, conducted by means 
of an ongoing class struggle from above. It lends primordial accumulation a whiff of 
postconceptual razzmatazz. Additionally, its reach has grown much more decentralized -- 
important hubs of art are no longer only located in the Western metropolis (Steyerl, Politics of 
Art: Contemporary Art and the Transition to Post-democracy). 
Isn’t the last sentence, “its reach has grown much more decentralized -- important hubs of art 
are no longer only located in the Western metropolis”, the core idea of altermodernism in 
Bourriaud’s optimistic – if not compromising – account?  
On the other hand, Bouriaud relates alter-modernity to “a globalized state of culture” which is 




There is no need to point to all critical theories criticizing the concept of culture as a tool for 
maintaining the established hierarchies, pre-defined places for different social positions, etc. At 
least, one can ask whose culture? In addition, alter-modernity is never an altermodernity, a 
globalized cultural hegemony (even if it has so many heterogonous elements inside as a state of 
culture). Heterogeneous, creative and non-representational, alter-modernity is a singularity. As 
Jean-Luc Nancy writes in Being Singular Plural, “the singular is primarily each one and, therefore, 
also with and among all the others, the singular is a plural” (32), and exactly like the singular 
which has always been referred to as singuli (the plural form), there’s no “One and the Same 
Alter-modernity”. Instead there are only alter-modernities, forming the network of being “with 
and among all the others”.  
This means artworks should be studied in a network comprising at least two levels of analysis: in 
their local contexts as well as global context, while Bourriaud easily rejects the idea of locality (as 
post-modern bric-a-brac) in favor of a globalized state he claims multiple, heterogenous and not 
western (Bourriaud, Altermodern: Tate Triennial 20). As he writes: 
If twentieth century modernism was a purely western cultural phenomenon … today there 
remains the task of … inventive modes of thought and artistic practices that would be directly 
informed by Africa, Latin America or Asia (Bourriaud, The Radicant 17). 
In front of this generous statement, one could ask what is the difference when an established 
European curator calls for this? Wasn't the modernist movement of cubism, for example, 
“directly” informed by African art, an artistic tradition which was imported by colonialism to 
France and other Western countries? Isn't today's curatorship importing African art by its post-
colonial colonialism and make western art directly informed by it? Why are most artists in an 
alter-modern exhibition western, or western oriented, and some works presented are similar to 
those travelogues or itineraries written by colonial literary figures, only this time in visual art 
mediums?19 
 
19 Darren Almond, for example, presented a set of long-exposure photographs of moonlit landscapes. A critic who 




But a negative elimination method or a proof by contradiction cannot present the functioning 
and affirmative characteristics of alter-modernities, or does not grasp the performative 
experimentations of minority politics. On the other hand, there is no single established alter-
modernity so that one can study it objectively and positively, and extract its features. The alter-
modernities emerge during their being performed, their process of performativizations, much 
more like a flash of lightning. The only way to grasp them is to enter into their dynamics, to 
analyze their performativity, and to approach the bodies that together make it possible.  
 
2-2 A Discussion on the Methodology 
 
“Occupying a motorway is no easy business”, wrote Charlie Fourier (a pseudo name for a member 
of Reclaim the Street [RTS]), “We’ve been planning this for about five months. Everything has 
been looked at in detail” (Fourier 51). He describes a RTS protest against the newly introduced 
neoliberal policies in July 1996 in London. After several months of planning, and undergoing a 
number of unanticipated accidents during the night of the action, RTS could set up a street party 
on a motorway in London, with a truck full of sand (for a children’s playground), a truck equipped 
with a sound system, and an unassembled 40 foot tower for dancing (ibid 53). In another event, 
two cars in a shopping street seemingly had an accident and their drivers got out and started to 
argue. After a short time, one of the drivers attacked the other’s car by a hammer, while the 
people/consumers on the sidewalk stood by and watched. All of a sudden, a few persons among 
the crowd joined the driver, spraying different colors on the cars and streets, while more than 
500 people joined the party with music and dance to reclaim the street (ibid 62).  
In the early 1990s, a new road construction program started in the UK and caused “a series of 
protest camps in remote landscapes, whose forms of action sometimes seemed strange to 
outsiders: someone showed up, furnished a treehouse and thus claimed ‘squatter's rights’; 
people dug tunnels under the construction sites, chained themselves to cement blocks and 
 
had traveled the world to take his pictures from places of ‘economic, historical and ecological significance’. There 




waited to be evicted” (Hamm). Of course, the protests could not stop the apparatus of capture20 
which was reappropriating the common space for the sake of State programs, but they did start 
a processual form of performative politics. 
 Not much later, this infrastructure project, which began outside of the capital came to London, 
as did the protests . What happened was “a months-long permanent performance in constantly 
occupied Claremont Road. Art objects were installed and rearranged as barricades as needed. 
Sofas, chairs and various other things found in living rooms were brought from private interior 
space to the public sphere of the street” (Jordan 137). Alongside this squatting act,  a network of 
rave parties emerged in margins of the city and took to the streets to joyfully oppose the new 
neoliberal policies acting on public space. Reclaim the Street inherited this strategy of road 
protests and rave parties in which artivists usually create an “ temporary autonomous zone” 
(TAZ) and keep it for as long as they can. In the level of strategy, this was the performativization 
of Hakim Bey’s idea of TAZ and Poetic Terrorism (PT). According to Bey, “PT is an act in a Theater 
of Cruelty which has no stage, no rows of seats, no tickets & no walls. In order to work at all, PT 
must categorically be divorced from all conventional structures for art consumption (galleries, 
publications, media)” (Bey 3). The idea was principally to create a TAZ in which bodies collide, act 
sovereignly, and would be able to establish their own alternative relations, rather than submit to 
everyday capitalist relations.  
In 1994, the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) was introduced in the UK according to which rave parties 
became illegal. This was a moment in which RTS formed consistently and activists reunited 
against the implementation of this law. According to one of them, it was even helpful to give 
them more strength and autonomy (Hamm). Reclaim the Street began forcefully as a project of 
reclaiming the common after CJA.   At a typical RTS event, a street would be reclaimed and 
occupied for a couple of hours  wherein people would organize and host  a party. In their agit-
prop, they asked: “Won’t the streets be better without cars? Not if all that replaces them are 
aisles of pedestrianized consumption or shopping ‘villages’ safely protected from the 
elements...The struggle for car-free space must not be separated from the struggle against global 
 




capitalism” (qtd. in Jordan 140). Connecting their struggle to the bigger yet to come movement 
of alterglobalization, they continued to assert: 
We are basically about taking back public space from the enclosed private arena. At its simplest, 
it is an attack on cars as a principal agent of enclosure. It’s about reclaiming the streets as public 
inclusive space from the private exclusive use of the car. But we believe in this as a broader 
principle, taking back those things, which have been enclosed within capitalist circulation and 
returning them to collective use as a common. (ibid).   
The creativity of RTS was contagious and spread among activists across the globe. RTS’ strategy 
had a constant presence on every Global Action Day, since it introduced play, joy and pleasure as 
well as dancing and performing into the new forms of resistance from the very beginning. In 
Birmingham, UK, the first Global Action Day in 1998, where the G821 held a meeting, “75,000 
Jubilee 2000 anti-debt campaigners make a human chain around the summit, and a Reclaim the 
Streets party blocks the town center with 6,000 people, many dressed as clowns” (Notes from 
Nowhere 2003, 134).  
RTS related itself to the dreams of the Diggers in 17th century England: the era of the embryonic 
bourgeois State. Diggers were fighting against the primitive accumulation through which the 
common lands were appropriated by the state and turned into so-called public property. The 
fenced lands, i.e. enclosures, became full of sheep as the sign of private property and closed off 
common land from the vast majority of people. As stated in the agit-prop of RTS, streets are 
today, they believe, the enclosed spaces.  
What was ‘the commons of the city’ in a mythic past, commonly utilizable space for discussions 
and exchange within a social community, has been removed from this use today. Whereas in the 
past it was sheep that led to the privatization of land, today it is cars that take urban public space 
away from use by the inhabitants (Hamm).  
 
21 The Group of Eight (G8) was a forum consisting of the first seven wealthiest, most industrialized nation-States of 
the world (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Canada, Japan) and Russia. After the 
Maidan Revolution in Ukraine and its subsequent civil war, Russia was excluded from the forum, and it is now again, 
like before 1998, the G7. G8-1 symbolizes the head of a global body, undergoing the globalization operation for a 




While it represented a rupture from previous forms of struggle and protest, RTS performativized 
a conception of the common out of a real problematic field that was from the beginning in the 
foundation of modern nation-states: the duality of the private and the public. The common as a 
concept exists in various texts of political philosophy, from the early modern philosophers who 
conceptualized it as the Divine natural given for all human-beings to modernist advocates of a 
non-institutionalized communism and contemporary theorists of post-autonomist Marxism who 
formalized common property as the produced wealth that belongs to “all” human being, in 
contrast to private property as the property of the non-governmental entities and to public 
property as the property of the State, exclusive for its own recognized citizens. Yet, outside of its 
textual crystallization, the common is here performativized as a societal relation, as a singular 
mixture of concept, percept, and affect, of art, politics, and thought. 
The following section deals with the notion of performativization as the methodological 
viewpoint of the present research, but it starts with a discussion over dramatization and the 
necessary reformulation of this method.  
 
2-2-1 Dramatization 
Dramatization as a critical method is Nietzsche’s invention. In The Birth of Tragedy (1999), 
Nietzsche founded this method through his discussions on Greek tragedy, and later developed it 
in his other works. The persistent existence of dramatization as a method in Nietzsche’s thought 
could enable Deleuze to claim that it was indeed, contrary to the prevalent commentaries on it, 
a systematic and coherent form of Thought (Nietzsche and Philosophy 52). Deleuze adds that 
dramatization is the “only method adequate to Nietzsche's project and to the form of the 
questions that he puts” (Nietzsche and Philosophy 79).  
It is often believed that Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy establishes a duality between Apollo 
(the world of reason and representation) and Dionysus (the chaosmos of sensation) in order to 
explain the supremacy of Greek tragedy and Greek culture, as a result of being in a perfect 




Nietzsche’s later works and his theory of forces would suggest a different way of reading  his 
conception of drama, and then dramatization.  
Trying to define the dramatist (the one who dramatize), Nietzsche relates the “aesthetic 
phenomenon” of becoming artist to the transformative power of a collective field of affects and 
affections, to a life among “crowds of spirits”; and thus, the dramatist is the one who “feels the 
impulse to transform oneself and to speak out of other bodies and souls” (The birth of tragedy 
and other writings 43).The  Dramatist is therefore a singularity of a multiple (one inside a crowd 
of bodies and souls), which is itself a multiplicity (speaks out of other bodies and souls). That is 
why for Nietzsche there exists something as the original phenomenon of drama, which is the 
experience of seeing oneself transformed before one's eyes and acting as if one had really 
entered another body, another character (ibid). 
But how does this singularity form itself, or how does a process of dramatization happen? It is 
here that Nietzsche implements his duality between Apollo and Dionysus, as if dramatization is a 
process of transformation, or rather formation, coming from the Dionysian pole to the Apollonian 
one, and as a result, a represented form of the Dionysian impulse becomes visible through images 
on the stage.  
In his transformed state he [the Dionysiac enthusiast] sees a new vision outside himself which is 
the Apolline perfection of his state. With this new vision the drama is complete. This insight leads 
us to understand Greek tragedy as a Dionysian chorus which discharges itself over and over again 
in an Apolline world of images (ibid 44). 
What is the Dionysian that transforms itself into the Apollonian? The latter, which Nietzsche 
describes as an “objectification of a Dionysiac state” (44), is already known to us: the world of 
images, of representation. But the Dionysian remains vague and mystified: on the one hand, it 
transforms into the Apollonian, which means it has already assumed a form; on the other hand, 
it belongs to the realm of instincts and is invisible, unknown, and in itself unknowable. It needs 
to be represented through the dramatization process; a process which in any case causes it to 





The clear and distinct is the claim of the concept in the Apollonian world of representation; but 
beneath representation there is always the Idea and its distinct-obscure depth, a drama beneath 
every logos (Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts 103). 
Therefore, the duality can be reformulated as another duality between the depth and the 
surface, the distinctness and the obscurity. From this viewpoint, it is right to claim that Nietzsche 
establishes an arbitrary essentialist duality; however, by considering his later Spinozist force 
theory, there is another version of Nietzsche’s dramatization. 
In a postcard to Franz Overbeck (1881), Nietzsche passionately writes: “I am utterly amazed, 
utterly enchanted! I have a precursor, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza” (The Portable 
Nietzsche 92). The most important point that is held in common between these two thinkers is 
their ontology. The Spinoza’s potesta and potentia distinction, i.e. the difference between 
constituted Power and constituent power, is not a simple opposition between two essences or 
two distinct substances. There is one and only one substance, Spinoza believes. Potentia as the 
affirmative affects and affections is ontologically primary in relation to the potesta22. The 
constituted Power is only a product of, an actualization of the constituent power. This view, 
which has been articulated in another way in the previous chapter, realized its concrete meaning 
in the Political Treatise (1883), when the supreme form of governance is absolute democracy (the 
rule of Multitude over Multitude) and every other form of governance, even in Absolute 
Monarchy, is considered first of all a result of the constituent power of the multitude. The same 
ontological stance goes with the Nietzschean apparent dualities: in the course of his thought, 
Nietzsche’s works ultimately dealt with an ontological difference between the active, affirmative 
forces and the reactive, passive ones, between superman and man, or creativity and nihilism. If 
dramatization is a process working on the difference between the Dionysian and the Apollonian, 
then one may consider this difference to be ontological, again between the active and reactive 
forces.  
 
22 For more clarification about potesta and potential, see Michael Hardt introduction, The Anatomy of Power, in: 
Negri, Antonio. The Savage Anomaly. Trans. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis, Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 




This is exactly what has been earlier conceptualized as the Nietzschean gap between the organic 
and the inorganic, or the significatory and the performative, since performativity and permanent 
becoming is ontologically primary in relation to the fixed signs and existing organisms.  
So, if dramatization is the process going from Dionysus as the figure of the inorganic world of 
becoming to Apollonian world of representation, then it involves different kinds of forces, 
working on this gap to produce an image out of the process of becoming. That is why Nietzsche’s 
dramatization as a method of critique consists of typology of forces and symptomology of their 
effects (in Spinozist reformulation, typology of affects and symptomology of their affections). But 
still a dramatist creates out of other bodies and souls and what is created here is the concept. 
The philosopher-dramatist intervenes with inventing a concept through her dramatization of a 
problematic. It is the reason why Deleuze, in the above quote, refers to “the claim of the concept 
in the Apollonian world of representation” which is dramatized out of an Idea (with capital I).  
Describing the method of dramatization, Deleuze has distinguished between three things to 
describe the method: Ideas, concepts and dramas (see Desert Islands and Other Texts 94-117, 
Difference and Repetition). Nonetheless, neither Idea is here Platonic, nor concept is Hegelian.  
Deleuze writes Idea with a capital I for a reason: it is always transcendental in relation to its 
determinations. But what is an Idea and in what way does it remain irreducible to Platonism ?  
“Ideas are essentially ‘problematic’”, writes Deleuze, “conversely, problems are Ideas” 
(Difference and Repetition 168). By characterizing Ideas as differential problems, Deleuze 
nominates the Idea as that common horizon, which embraces all lines of determination along 
which concepts of understandings form themselves and inscribe themselves in the 
representational order. Moreover, it is due to the fact that problematic-Ideas constitute the 
horizon, which encompasses a certain set of processes of actualization and concept formation, 
that Deleuze will further characterize Ideas as being, in themselves, undetermined; 
undetermined precisely because Ideas refer not to an object or the knowing-subject and function 
as that which renders actualization and concepts consistent within a single problematic field. Or 
what Deleuze calls a plane of immanence, which is defined as a transcendental field that does 




(Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life 25). Although it is an undifferentiated field which has 
indeterminacy as its chief characteristic, Ideas are subjected to a “transcendental empiricism,” 
which is simultaneously Deleuze’s method of critique and, as we shall see, another name for 
dramatization.  
With respect to the Idea as a plane of immanence, and according to Deleuze himself, if a 
transcendental critique remains  necessary,  it is due to the nature of the Idea, which is  “at once 
both immanent and transcendent” (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition 169). That is to say, a 
“problematic” (Idea) is not merely a formal problem: it is “the ensemble of the problem and its 
conditions”, the “problem-instance” (ibid 177). The problem connects itself with many other 
problems through differing itself from them and their concepts of the understanding, although it 
exists alongside them in a network. Therefore, the unidentified problems relate to each other 
through an independent differential relation – a function which makes a determination possible. 
Thus, the object of problematic-Ideas is “the differential relation,” which is itself  “a pure element 
of potentiality” (ibid 175). There are different series’ of problems all related to this differential 
relation inside the problematic, forming its conditions, and consist of non-representable 
singularities and becomings — i.e. the (inter)actions of the forces involved in the determining 
process. In other words, the conditions of the problems in a problematic have in themselves a 
way for determining a solution. They “progressively specify the fields of solvability in such a way 
that ‘the statement contains the seeds of the solution’” (ibid 180). The solution is then a 
determination of the undetermined problem, yet at the same time it is immanent to the 
problematic, already present in its conditions. In the terminology of philosophy, the solution is a 
concept created immanently in relation to Idea and this process of determination is called 
dramatization. Deleuze defines this process as follows: 
Given any concept, we can always discover its drama, and the concept would never be divided or 
specified in the world of representation without the dramatic dynamisms that thus determine it 
in a material system beneath all possible representation. (Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts 
98)  
This definition again highlights that the problematic-Idea is “a material system beneath all 




(determinate concepts of the understanding) but whose reality can be grasped by Thought’s 
apprehension of the differential relation that conditions and animates the totality of specific 
Problems, their determinate field of resolvability, and its attendant concepts. and  their series of 
determination.  
To summarize: The Idea as a problematic is undetermined as such, i.e. one cannot represent it as 
the empirical content of a determinate judgement or concept The conditions of the problem, 
however, make the Idea determinable, through a dynamic of differential relations; in the end, an 
individual concept is determined as a solution. The determining process of actualization is 
therefore an individuation of an individual (concept) out of the pre-individual state of the Idea.  
Thus, Ideas contain three moments simultaneously: the moments of the undetermined, of the 
determinable, and of the determined. The determined forms a transcendental point which is still 
immanent to the field of Idea, and that is why the critical method proper to this perspective is 
called transcendental empiricism. The transcendental is not the transcendent, for the latter as 
the thing in itself is external to the immanent field, a universal abstracted out of real 
problematics, a God standing over the material system. The transcendent does not exist; it is only 
a false solution for a problem whose statement has been formulated falsely, for if the problem 
was true, then the solution would be immanent to it. By contrast, the transcendental is only a 
possible actualization of the plane of immanence (Idea), a product of a certain dramatization and 
differential relations. It is exactly, according to Nietzsche and Deleuze, the biggest 
misunderstanding of the history of philosophy. Philosophers are often inclined to take a concept 
of the understanding as the transcendent, forgetting its historical and contextual dramatization, 
and therefore totalizing it as the Universal – such as the western modern values of Modernity as 
a system of regulations and norms, which had been historically dramatized in different contexts 
of the West and has since been taken as a Universal  truth.  
So, one should above all consider the determinability constituent of the Idea, which is the 
function of a differential relation and creates a concept. The differential relation is of pure 
potentiality, and the concept is an actualization of this potentiality, but not its sole actualization. 




Idea could be articulated differently, resulting into another actualization, another conception. 
These different articulations are what Nietzsche calls perspective, the relational constituent of 
the actualization process which is the set of dramas behind a concept. Idea is in the realm of the 
virtual (becomings, affects, desire, or the constituent power) which becomes dramatized in the 
field of the actual (beings, affections, pleasures, or the constituted Power). But there is no unique 
actualization for the virtual, since the virtual is the field of pure potentiality that can actualize 
itself into multiple transcendental objects of representation, or eludes the representation, 
remaining non-actualized. It is important to not confuse the virtual with the unreal. On the 
contrary, the actual is real because the virtual is real. There is no opposition or contradiction 
between these two terms, for the latter is the non-represented material becomings of the 
constituent power, which has been already shown as the ontologically primary process, while the 
actual is a product. It is the reason for the dual nature of the Idea as both immanent and 
transcendent, since Idea differentiates itself through its dramatization from the virtual, 
undetermined problems to the actual, determined solutions – both immanent in relation to each 
other.23  
The concept of “concept” is not here identifiable with its Hegelian type as a transcendent form 
that stands above the experience of consciousness and the course of history. On the contrary, 
the Deleuzian concept is an open-ended treatment of an Idea and exists in a transversal relation 
with this very Idea in a way that never transcends it. As a transversal, the Deleuzian concept 
therefore also has a vertical dimension in relation to the plane of immanence, which makes it 
transcendental. It is still in the same plane of immanence, in the plane of virtualities, but also 
expressed through actualization.  
Moreover, determinability signifies duration and localization. The dramas as differential relations 
are dramatizing and differentiating the Idea into concepts, as far as the differenciation of the Idea 
presupposes spatio-temporal dynamisms (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition 216-17). For the 
dramas are played on the stage of the world, in a local spatio-temporality. On one hand, “by 
 
23 For more information about the distinctions between the virtual and the actual, see Chapter IV in Deleuze’s 





virtue of the complexity of Ideas and their relations with other Ideas, the spatial dramatization is 
played out on several levels: in the constitution of an internal space, but also in the manner in 
which that space extends into the external extensity, occupying a region of it” (ibid). In other 
words, the internal milieu and the external environment of a conception or actualization should 
be determined through dramatization which itself begins from the material field of the 
problematic, in an existing condition of materiality.  On the other hand, dramas “constitute a 
time of actualization or differenciation no less than they outline spaces of actualization” (ibid 
217) and in this way, by working on the existing temporal relation, they form another temporality 
proper to this particular actualization.  
This is the two-sided ontogenesis of Deleuze’s dramatization method that dates back to Salomon 
Maimon, the marginal philosopher of Enlightenment. Following the Copernican revolution of 
Kant’s philosophy, Maimon criticized him with respect to the problematic of experience. 
According to Maimon, Kant simply presupposed the conditions of possible experience in reason 
without being able to explain how these conditions are themselves produced immanently. 
Another formulation for what we have just discussed: the conditions of the problem are 
immanent to it; the solution is immanent to the problematic. It led Maimon to search for a 
genetic method that would contain the process of creating the conditions and conditioning, 
which must situate difference rather than identity as the principle of thought. It is only difference 
that can explain a genetic condition. “This requirement - that conditions not be broader than the 
conditioned - means that the conditions must be determined along with what they condition, 
and thus must change as the conditioned changes” explains Daniel Smith, while reminding that 
“it is one thing to layout a general project like this; it is another thing to find a 'method', so to 
speak, capable of providing a way of thinking these conditions of the real” (Deleuze and the 
Production of the New 154). Performativization is exactly an attempt to “find a method”, where 
the drama and its stage, the problem and its conditions, are both conditioning each other. The 
only thing that returns eternally, the unconditioned, is the differential. 
The spatiotemporal dimension of performative actualization of altermodernities is the main 
subject of the following research and would enable it to propose a new perspective on dealing 




way, dramatization becomes a method that can refuse from reducing human or social 
phenomenon into static images in order to analyze them according to the already established 
knowledge, i.e. already existing concept of the understanding. It allows the critic to reveal the 
particular dramas behind such concepts in order to deprive them from their assumed universality 
and transcendence, while at the same time, it enables the critic to discover or invent new, 
alternative conceptions dramatized in social phenomenon, such as our contemporary radical 
performative politics, and analyze such phenomena outside of main-stream discourses.24  
On the other hand, the dramatization method as it is based on ontological claims, shows the 
specific meaning of Pragmatics in Deleuzian non-essentialist thought, for it demonstrates how 
ontology does not function as a tool for understanding “what Being is”; rather, as Todd May 
explains, is “to be able to take up a certain viewpoint toward the world in order to engage in 
certain ways of living” (T. May 294). Moreover,critique itself means knowing by changing, or as 
the Zapatista’s put it, “Walking, we ask questions.”25 One could even return to Marx’s famous 
11th thesis on Feuerbach (“The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point is to change it” (Theses On Feuerbach)), in which the philosopher does not suggest to 
leave theoretical and philosophical practice, rather to engage in a way of critical knowledge-
production that can only be possible via changing the world (see Mackenzi and Porter 36). It 
refers thus to the same claim that was made in the previous sections about alter-modern critique 
(in comparison to anti-modern one); a critique consisting of introducing the new and of 
dramatizing an alternative would only possible by way of a qualitative change with respect to the 
relations between the plane of immanence, the transcendental, and the empirical. This change, 
which makes room (and time) for the new, is already, according to its method of analysis, 
inscribed in the way the problematic as Idea is conditioned: 
 
24 Mackenzie and Porter (2011) introduced the dramatization method to the field of political science with the same 
reason. This research owes its methodological path to their attempt in order to use dramatization in the context of 
politics. 
25 This is a Zapatista slogan. Among other sources, it is mentioned here: Notes from Nowhere (ed.). We are 




The theory of problems is completely transformed and at last grounded, since we are no 
longer in the classic master-pupil situation where the pupil understands and follows a 
problem only to the extent that the master already knows the solution and provides the 
necessary adjunctions.  
In other words, not only does dramatization allow for an analysis of  human phenomenon, in field 
of politics for example, beyond the main-stream established conceptualization, it also allows for 
tracking the dynamism of an intervention by subjectivities beyond the constituted Power of the 
current sovereignty – that is, to search for alternative moments of organization of the collective 
bodies different from nation, of forces different from State, of performative arts beyond 
institutional art, and so forth.  
It is for this reason that dramatization is always said to be a practical activity. Moreover, for 
Deleuze, this kind of practical activity is in no way limited to  the activity of writing, philosophizing, 
or concept creation precisely because the subject of dramatization is the subject that transforms 
the world. Therefore, Mackenzi and Porter are right when they claim “that the dramatization of 
concepts is as likely, and perhaps more likely, to occur on the streets…There is nothing in being 
a professional philosopher that privileges these individuals in the use and dramatization of 
concepts […] The philosopher is the one who creates concepts and to create concepts means to 
create events. What is more, the philosopher need not be an individual; it could just as easily be 
a pair, a group or social movement. Any movement, for example, spurred to respond to an event 
by creating a new way of articulating their existence, a new concept … is a philosopher” 
(MacKenzie and Porter 68). It is under the light of this viewpoint that one should understand the 
Nietzschean dramatist; the one who “feels the impulse to transform oneself and to speak out of 
other bodies and souls” (Nietzsche, The birth of tragedy and other writings 43). To transform 
while speaking from within the common field of the problematic, situating itself in between  other 
bodies and souls: this is how a protest movement can be a dramatist. 
From this perspective, one can now return to Nietzsche’s initial figures of Dionysus and Apollo in 
order to destabilize his conceived duality in the Birth of Tragedy and transform it into an 




of dramatization. And yet, despite all of the critical promise of dramatization as method,  Deleuze 
would go on to denounce the method employed in Difference and Repetition and will claim that 
there indeed exists a qualitative break between this book and his later text, Logic of Sense. And 
after this alleged “break,” there is no official return to dramatization as method in Deleuze’s 
works. The next chapter speculates on the shortcomings of this method and introduces the 
performativization method as its modification proper to the post-performative turn in the 
existing literature. 
2-2-2 Performativization 
In 1979, Deleuze claimed that he changed his method after Difference and Repetition in which 
the main methodology was dramatization (cited from Mackenzie and Porter 44). However, in an 
interview in 1969, after writing the Logic of Sense, he describes his new book in light of new, 
modern problematics, since “for a long time we were stuck with the alternative: either you are 
persons or individuals, or you sink back into an undifferentiated sea of anonymity; Today, 
however, we are uncovering a world of pre-individual, impersonal singularities” (Desert Islands 
and Other Texts 143). However, Deleuze continues to characterize his own work as an 
engagement with the pre-individual, impersonal, singularities, since“there is a big difference 
between partitioning a fixed space among sedentary individuals according to boundaries or 
enclosures, and distributing singularities in an open space without enclosures or properties” 
(ibid). This is the same formulation as the foundational claim of dramatization: sedentary 
individuals, the products of actualizing the virtual or dramatizing the Idea, should not be 
considered as primary, transcendent, and whose existence remains independent from  the plane 
of immanence as genetic and structural principle of reality (doing so would amount to nothing 
more than rehabilitating the classical definition of Ideas given to them by Plato who viewed them 
as Absolute Forms with invariable essences). In other words, sedentary individuals are products 
of pre-individual singularities that have been actualized by virtue of the process of individuation. 
However,if this compatibility truly exists, why did Deleuze have to change his method? The rest 
of this section deals with this question by implementing the critical method of dramatization on 




As we have demonstrated in the preceding section, Nietzsche’s conception of dramatization 
presupposes a division between depth and surface. Although approaching it through the 
ontogenesis of constituent power has let us to claim otherwise, the division between the organic 
and inorganic is also compromised insofar as it dogmatically presupposes a distinction between 
depth and surface. Even when Deleuze defines the world as an egg, which is itself a theatre for 
dramatization, it is because the egg is an example of the non-individual inorganic that gives rise 
to an individual being by passing through the differential relations of embryonic growth: 
“Embryology shows that the division of an egg into parts is secondary in relation to more 
significant morphogenetic movements: the augmentation of free surfaces, stretching of cellular 
layers, invagination by folding, regional displacement of groups” (Difference and Repetition 216).   
Now, the image of the Egg has been used once before with the same implication in Georges 
Bataille’s Story of the Eye (1928). Moreover, and with respect to the image of the egg within 
postwar French theory, it is relevant to note that Barthes, in analyzing the metaphor of the eye 
in Bataille’s story, describes the text as a poem, rather than a novel, relating the former to 
virtuality and the later to reality. As Barthes writes  
the novelist’s imagination is probable; a novel is something that might happen, all things 
considered. It is a diffident sort of imagination (even in its most luxuriant creations), 
daring to declare itself only against the security of the real. The poet’s imagination, on the 
other hand, is improbable; a poem is something that could never happen under any 
circumstances-except, that is, in the shadowy or burning realm of fantasy, which by that 
very token it alone can indicate. The novel proceeds by chance combinations of real 
elements, the poem by precise and complete exploration of virtual elements. (Barthes, 
The Metaphor of the Eye, 240)  
In this passage, Barthes relates the distinction between the probable and the improbable to the 
one between the virtual and the real, which is, according to previous discussions on ontogenesis, 
a false establishment of a problem. The probable is an actualization of the virtual, which is 
entirely real as a process of becoming. Moreover, Bataille wants to write about the chaosmos of 




(as it seems), he wants to grasp sexual desire itself. However, the solid surface of the egg 
functions as a contour that separates the inorganic and the organic, as if there were two 
substances, separate from each other in two different levels of depth; as if there were an outside 
for the world of representation; as if the relation of production between the virtual and the actual 
were of a casual nature. This is certainly not true according to the ontogenetic claims of 
dramatization. The spatio-temporal dimension of dramas gives a reciprocal relationality between 
Idea, concepts and dramas in a way that Ideas as the real field of problematics are conditioned 
by previous established concepts, the existing conception of time and space, and the differential 
relations (dramas) acting on it. It is also inversely true about concepts and dramas, for each of 
them is conditioned by the other inside the immanent plane of the Idea.  
The contour of the egg symptomizes also a return to the equilibrium. The solid surface is formally 
where the chaotic universe of the inorganic enters a relation of equilibrium with the organic (i.e. 
the regulated world of representation). Through this surface, they can exist beside each other, 
no longer acting effectively upon each other. However, equilibrium is itself an actualization of 
the virtual, not an a priori condition of existence.  
The problem of equilibrium is indeed very important in the notion of dramatization. In The Birth 
of Tragedy, Nietzsche underscores the fact that the Greek word drama means “action” (43). 
Dramatization, from this viewpoint, is still a method engaged with action despite the fact that 
the action here is fundamentally theatrical: it is subjugated to a chain of causality and therefore 
produces a division between depth (of agency) and surface (of effects). Nietzsche did not 
problematize the submission of the dramatic to the textual, albeit his attempts to point to the 
inorganic world of performative movements; drama as text is where action becomes casual or in 
Hegel’s dialectics, is identified with negativity. Nietzsche ultimately interprets the chaos of the 
world with the dramatic text, restores it into a significatory state of equilibrium, and its world of 
abbreviated signs.  
Additionally, the form of the egg is symptomatic of actions that find themselves circumscribed 




embodiment of what Bataille’s calls “ unemployed negativity.”26 For Bataille was indeed a critic 
of making equilibrium the central element of theoretical analysis as it is the case with the whole 
tradition of philosophy before 20th century with some rare exceptions such as Nietzsche and 
Spinoza. “[Life] is constant destabilization of the equilibrium without which it wouldn’t be”, 
writes Bataille, claiming that life is beyond temporary equilibriums, disruptive of them, while 
simultaneously being conditioned by them. The two-sided relation of the virtual (life) and the 
actual (equilibrium) is affirmed without recognizing the necessary productive relation between 
those two that signifies a single substance of constituent power, crystallizing momentarily into 
established constituted Power. Instead, Bataille rejects the notion of equilibrium as substance in 
favor of a multiplicity of life’s forces disrupting the equilibrium. For Bataille, Life corresponds to 
the inorganic, which finds itself in an opposition with the organic equilibrium as two distinct 
substances. However, the limit between these two separate worlds should itself be a solid line, 
forming as the interface for equilibrium in the interactions between inner differential forces of 
chaosmos with outer regulated forces of representation’s world. And this limit is precisely what 
Bataille meant by the term unemployed negativity: an action of an exhausted actor who cannot 
act, or as Kafka would say, the great swimmer who cannot swim (Kafka, Fragments). It is a  non-
productive activity or non-productive expenditure, which does not produce anything, but only 
marks the difference between the world of representative actions and the world of inorganic 
movements. That is why Simone, in the Story of the Eye, “developed a mania for breaking eggs 
with her behind” (Bataille). The flow of the inorganic to the organic is disruptive of organic 
relations, emancipating the desire from being fixated on an object of pleasure into a chaotic 
queer desire, flowing freely between various sexualities. In the end, however, Bataille’s 
conclusion re-affirms Nietzsche’s ontogenetic claim such that his understanding of the 
movement from the inorganic to the organic are shown to be founded upon the formulation of 
a false problem, which  gives rise to internal oppositions and contradictions instead of pure 
differential relations.  
 
26 “If action is – as Hegel says – negativity, the question arises as to whether the negativity of one who has 'nothing 




To avoid such falsities, Deleuze modifies the conditions of the problem in his later work. He insists 
that there is a theatre of philosophy in which the textual is determined by the non-textual on a 
philosophic stage, yet he adds that he was not successful in his previous attempts (Desert Islands 
and Other Texts 144). A method of dramatization that does not return to equilibrium in the 
(textual) dramatic process may be conceived better by a detour into another field of knowledge:  
the study of thermodynamics. 
Initially, classical thermodynamics followed a similar principle as Nietzsche’s method of 
dramatization, for the chemical phenomenon as a result, according to thermodynamics, is 
motivated by differential relations (differences in intensity). The differential relations trigger an 
action (a movement of matter, a crystallization process) which leads to the individuation of a 
determined result. This relation to thermodynamics is of interest since one of Deleuze’s key 
examples for describing the dramatization method is the process of  crystallization. For example, 
a salt solution functions as the immanent field of Idea in which, because of differences in 
intensities, various differential relations (the dramas) start to work upon the solution and 
crystallize the determined, representable salt crystals (concepts) from within  the problematic 
field of the Idea (that contained them virtually). Contrary to its initial impulse, however, classical 
thermodynamics retains a conception of equilibrium as reality in order to analyze actual 
quantities (extensive variables) with the cost of cancelling the differences and presupposing 
constants. In other words, by assuming a closed thermodynamic system isolated from the plane 
of immanence, removing the undetermined in order to examine the determinable through the 
determined, accomplishes precisely  what Deleuze views as the function of  the  dogmatic image 
of thought: “partitioning a fixed space among sedentary individuals according to boundaries or 
enclosures.” (Desert Islands and Other Texts 143)Thus, classical thermodynamics becomes self-
contradictory, for it fails to acknowledge  that, according to its own principles, a closed system in 
the state of equilibrium could only exist as an effect of a particular thermodynamic relation, and 
thus would be unable to grasp the pure differential relation it is based on.  
Despite this internal contradiction, thermodynamics could modify itself in a way such that it 
would become capable of posing true as opposed to false problems. This contemporary 




explains, “the systems studied in this new discipline are continuously traversed by an intense 
flow of energy and matter, a flow that maintains these differences and keeps them from 
canceling themselves that is, a flow that does not allow the intensive process to become hidden 
underneath the extensive results” (“Deleuze, Diagrams, and the Open-ended Becoming of the 
World” 32). In other words, “far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics” examines the virtual (i.e. the 
problem as a non-representable singularity and the intensive process working within it). 
Moreover, by situating epistemic inquiry within an open system with a continuous flow of energy 
and matter, thermodynamics does away with any form of pre-determined boundaries, 
establishing a properly diagrammatic relation between itself and the world, unlike Bataille’s 
conception, which  simply retains the pure differential relations (the dramas of the constituent 
power) rather than any equilibrium or crystal of the representative order.  
In order to escape from its own self-contradictory falsities, dramatization has to follow a similar 
path as Thermodynamics, refusing the totaliation of concepts into a duality, which reintroduces 
equilibrium as the ground of dramatization. The dramatic is enclosed in the textual, being 
delimited by its boundaries in the closed system of writing – a system that claims self-reflexivity 
and total independence from the outside world. The dramatic emancipates itself from the textual 
equilibrium by releasing the body from pre-defined movements, or tearing the performative out 
of the theatrical. Here, instead of dualities, we are again confronted by a conceptual coupling 
with different ontological status: the dramatic-the theatrical are only actualizations of the 
performative-the bodily through a set of differential (or differenciating) relations.   
And it is precisely along this line of argumentation that Deleuze and Guattari will criticize the 
dramatic/theatrical in their treatment of psychoanalysis. In particular, it is Freud’s description of 
unconscious through primal scenes of sexual intercourse between Father and mother  that is the 
subject of critique, as it leads to the theatrical development of the oedipal complex: a stage set 
of symbols, always interpreting each and every mental disorder (neurosis and psychosis) by 
referring them to the familial triangle of father, mother and the son and its dramatic, pre-written 
inner movements. According to them, the unconscious does not constitute a theatre, but rather 




was an egg-theatre in Difference and Repetition, it now becomes  a deterritorialized land of the 
theatre of production: 
That is what the completion of the project is: not a promised land and a pre-existing land, but a 
world created in the process of its tendency, its coming undone, its deterritorialization. The 
movement of the theatre of cruelty: for it is the only theatre of production, there where the flows 
cross the threshold of deterritorialization and produce a new land. (Ibid 323) 
As seen in this passage, the method of  dramatization is still at work, but now in a qualitatively 
different manner. It is not a movement from the presupposed depth of the inorganic (the 
promised land) to the outer surface of the organic (the pre-existing land out of the promised 
land); rather, it is the topography of the surface – as the substance, the plain of immanence – 
and its permanent differential becomings and temporary transcendental actualizations, both pre-
existing and promised. There is no outside, but in the inside, in the field of immanence, 
production and destruction happens incessantly through differential relations between flows of 
desire (or forces’ interaction of constituent power). The only permanent element is the 
differential; intensive difference as the vehicle of change and movement, which is the properly 
foundational principle of Thermodynamics. And it is from this perspective that one must 
understand the peculiar type of pragmatics espoused by Deleuze and Guattari: pragmatics does 
not consist in the consideration of the usefulness or effectiveness of things without reference to 
their essence; rather, it consists, above all, of a refusal of essentialism, and an emphasis on the 
virtual and its productive functioning. Deleuze and Guattari’s “pragmatism” does not ask 
what/which objects are functioning; on the contrary, it asks how undetermined, yet 
determinable, differentials will come into a relation with each other in a determinate manner by 
virtue of the differential as that which produces something, gives rise to the individuated being.  
Thus, this dramatic critique of  dramatization as method performs a reversal of the relation 
between the theatrical and the performative, releasing the latter from the subjugation of the 
former and bestowing it with an ontogenetic status. Considering the theatrical bonding with the 
textual (i.e. the relation of non-sense/paradox to sense/good sense), it is easy to find the same 
movement in relation to  language. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari reassert that it 




critique of language (A Thousand Plateaus 77). On the one hand,  the primary function of 
language is not informative or communicative; rather, language primarily functions  in order to 
issue commands in order to act upon reality. On the other hand, the non-linguistic (which is 
outside of signification chain) rather than the linguistic (which is an element of signification) is 
the vehicle of language, of its movements and its variations. Here all of language’s statements 
are speech-acts and therefore, performative; but the performative is not in any case limited to 
the speech-acts. Remembering the Nietzschean inorganic world of the performative movements 
which in its turn gives rise to the world of abbreviated linguistic signs, one could argue that the 
performative is the pre-individual; it is both the non-linguistic and the linguistic, but also beyond 
that: the pre-linguistic.  
In this way, theatre turns into a theatre of production, a purely performative pre-individual 
theatre whose dramas are mutating active forces not determined images and written scenes. 
Thus, by folding onto itself and performing a self-critique, dramatization goes beyond itself, 
becoming a critique for the real as the virtual, where virtual means pre-individual, differential, 
and performative. From this perspective, dramatization does not necessarily go from the depth 
to the world of representation; it can trace the very performative relations as movements on a 
surface, or better on a plane of immanence that includes at once the non-representable, the 
representable, and the represented. It not only releases itself from representation as a false 
condition of the problem, but also shows that the represented is only one possible actualization 
of the performative. 
The performative turn in the arts shares the same critique of representation. Instead of a 
dramatic theatre of images and pre-written scenes, why not a performative theatre of differential 
relations, those movements that actually give rise to possible dramatic images? In his 
Postdramatic Theatre (2006), Hans-Thies Lehman argues that historically “the text as an offer of 
meaning reigned; all other theatrical means had to serve it and were rather suspiciously 
controlled by the authority of Reason” (Lehmann 47). Drama had been supposed as identical to 
the “text” in the history of post-primitive theatre, when the theatre was not anymore ritualistic 
but a means for representing literature. But as Lehman claims, the second half of the 20th 




the postdramatic theatre. This is again the performative break we have discussed before in arts 
and politics, but this time we may ask, whether there is a post-dramatic dramatization? 
The importance of the performative and its ontogenetic status in the aforementioned discussions 
could be re-affirmed by substituting dramatization with performativization (performatisierung). 
This is because the notion of performative includes in itself the notion of drama, and puts it in a 
non-reductionist framework. If the dramatic refers always to something outside of itself (which 
means if it is representational), then, as Judith Butler clarifies, “'performative' itself carries the 
double-meaning of 'dramatic' and 'non-referential.'” (Butler, Performative Acts and Gender 
Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory) 
The fact that performativization is not a representational method, or not a methodology working 
on representations, does not fulfil only an intellectual gesture;  its most important characteristics 
are equally significant when dealing with the 21st century’s global cycles of protests. From the 
very beginning, the contemporary performative politics and arts have rejected representation in 
both senses of the term. Politically, the alterglobalization movements and altermodern occupy 
movements refuse to engage in representative politics or trust in their national and international 
so-called representatives. Their own forms of organization are non-representational as they 
often evade the hierarchical organizations and assignment of protest leaders or group 
representatives. Their heterogeneous collective body that cannot be identified with nation, 
party, vanguards, industrial proletariat, and any other single identity shows another aspect of 
this non-representationality. Aesthetically, as it was mentioned before, the critique of 
representation dates back to the modernist movements, but it is strongest in the performative 
turn. Therefore, to analyze and criticize such social phenomena, performativization proves to be 
theoretically  proper with respect to our contemporary world. It poses the problem of the 
revolution correctly, not as a means for the seizure of constituted Power, establishing another 
State as a transcendent point of reference, rather as a problem of alternative social relations as 
those differential relations (performativizations) that generates, through their constituent 
power, the social forms. As Deleuze puts it, “The real problem of revolution, a revolution without 




active minorities in nomad space without property or enclosure” (Desert Islands and Other Texts 
145). 
It should be kept in mind that the real problem of revolution did not suddenly become what it 
has always truly been, being disguised by various theoretical distortions. Dramatizations and 
performativizations are conditioned by their time and space; so does the dramatizing and 
performativizing thought. Nor is there any conception of progress from an ignorant to a self-
conscious posing of the problem of revolution since it is the spatio-temporal dimension that is 
both conditioning and conditioned in relation to the Idea; and therefore, performativizations 
function in the existing spatiotemporal relations of the real problematic, only in order to make 
way for the alternative, to approach the new reality. This new reality in turn necessitates a new 
image of thought.  
As it was discussed before, social movements also think critically the new reality in their 
performativizations out of it – what Malabou terms “cognitive plasticity”27 (2008). The 
philosopher-movement thinks the Idea and working on the plane of immanence, it engages with 
a practice inside the chaosmos of the virtual, the chaotic interactions of becomings, affects, and 
forces. Chaos here does not have a negative value; on the contrary, it is “a degree of complexity” 
beyond the capacity of already determined concepts of the understanding (see Berardi, The Soul 
at Work 212). But as Deleuze and Guattari warn, “philosophical thought does not bring its 
concepts together in friendship without again being traversed by a fissure that leads them back 
to hatred or disperses them in the coexisting chaos where it is necessary to take them up again, 
to seek them out, to make a leap.” (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 203) There is 
always a momentary performativization which again washes away in the flows of the chaos. But 
when a philosopher-movement performativizes, it acts as a chaoid. A chaoid is an assemblage 
through differential relations that can cut through the chaos, place “a secant plane that crosses 
it” (ibid), and create an architectural composition, “a provisional organizer of chaos” (Berardi, 
 
27 What Should We Do With Our Brain?, Catherine Malabou. Translated by Sebastian Rand, Marc Jeannerod, New 




Felix Guattari: Thought, Friendship and Visionary Cartography 11). If this is the new image of 
thought, then what reality is it conditioning and been conditioned by? 
In describing the new image of thought involved in the speculation of reality, Deleuze argues that 
“the opposition between a pure universal and particularities enclosed within persons, individuals, 
or Selves” is no longer of fundamental importance. “We can't let ourselves be satisfied with that” 
he continues, “especially if the two terms are to be reconciled, or completed by one another. 
What we're uncovering right now, in my opinion, is a world packed with impersonal 
individuations, or even pre-individual singularities” (On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought 137).  
This new reality of a world  “packed with impersonal individuations” invokes a new image of 
thought, which proceeds according to the method of  performativization. However, the first step 
is to be able to track down these individuations or differential relations. The relations (as forces 
of constituent power) are abstract and free, for they do not depend on their terms. Moreover, 
these undetermined differentials are only determinable in relation to each other. In the 
terminology of calculus which is the mathematical study of change, “dx” is a differential which 
has no value in relation to x, when x has a determined value as C (f (x)=C), so that dx/x is 0. This 
is also true for dy in relation to y, when f (y)=C’. But dy/dx is a differential relation that although 
its differentials are independent from x and y, it has a value of itself as a relation free from its 
terms. In addition, dy/dx expresses the determinable moment of two undetermined differentials, 
as long as it is located in space and functions for a certain duration on that spatiality. In other 
words, f (dy/dx) is determined as a particular actual, when it functions on (x, y), supposing x in 
the domain of (A,B) and y in the domain of (C,D). An example can be the velocity of a bullet at 
the time of hitting a bulletproof vest: the bullet’s space and time no longer changes at the 
moment of impact, but the point of impact has a time-space value.28 
To show the spatio-temporality of a relational function, diagramming is necessary. To draw a 
diagram, with respect to the problem of performative politics and its altermodernities, is to chart 
altermodernities through their internal forces and movements. Each moment should be traced 
 
28 Deleuze writes: “We will say that dy/dx equals z, that is to say it does not involve y or x at all, since it's y and x 




with the different movements of desires and differential relations of those movements which 
lead to certain performativized alternatives. Deleuze explains the notion of diagram in his 
monograph on Foucault as an “abstract machine” which considers the “relation between 
forces:”, “Every diagram is intersocial and constantly evolving. It never functions in order to 
represent a persisting world but produces a new kind of reality, a new model of truth” (1988, 
p.34-5). Or, as Guattari conceptualizes it, diagrams articulate two aspects of performativizations: 
the relations between the incorporeal universes (the virtual) that are non-discursive, outside of 
signification chain, and their being is non-linguistic, with the enunciated assemblages (the 
actuals) that are signifying, communicating meanings, and discursive. 
It is by means of the diagram that we can theoretically grasp the new kind of reality that is 
enveloped within altermodernities.  Moreover, given that the diagram is set in the axes of time 
and space with virtual and actual dimensions; and considering the aforementioned two-sided 
ontogenesis; these axes are themselves subjected to variation during a performativization. 
Therefore, the diagram as an element of the method of performativization should consist of 
movements, which disrupt and transform thespatio-temporal determination of diagrammatic 
activity, and precisely because  altermodernities have, by definition, qualitatively different 
spatio-temporal paradigms.  
Thus this research takes performativization as its main methodology in a double meaning: first, 
it engages with the performativizations of altermodernities in the second global cycle of 21st 
century performative dissent politics, and to do so, it tries to performativize (yet on text, then 
more akin to dramatization as a possible form of performativization) the differential relations 
inside case studies, the new social relations they have succeeded to express between bodies and 
the spatiotemporality proper to them. These case studies will be the subject of the next section’s 
discussion. 
 





The case studies of this research, as it was mentioned earlier, belong to the second global cycle 
of protests, roughly from 2009 to now, as it has happened in Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, the United 
States, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Ukraine, and so forth. Among the cases, which are 
performativizations of alter-modernities, there exist different artistic groups and practices that 
joined the movement or answered its call. The very notion of art will thus be revisited in the 
course of discussing different case studies.  
One can object that how it is justified to draw examples from such a diverse “geographical” 
territories with different localities, histories, and cultures. However, it should be noted that a 
certain geography or spatiality of these various events is at stake here, which is of course not a 
historicized geography of borders, of nation-States. This certain geography is rather of intensities 
and forces, and as it will be immediately argued, has a historical dramatization of its own, which 
is different from the former conception of geography.      
 
2-3-1 The Drama of Communicating Intensities 
Ned Ludd was apparently a British weaver who in 1779 – according to narratives after being 
punished because of laziness at work – took up a hammer and broke two stocking frames in his 
sweatshop. When the protest movement of Luddites, consisting of peasants, craftsmen, 
industrial workers and the unemployed, emerged against the labour conditions and relations and 
the dominance of capitalists on production – embodied in the machineries of their workplaces – 
in the beginning of the so-called “Industrial Revolution”, all manifestos and declarations were 
signed under the name of Ned Ludd, from whom no one remembered anything but that moment 
of frustration. The protesters of the emergent working class, who called themselves Luddites and 
turned that angry unskilled worker of 30 years ago into their spiritual leader, would gather 
together under the cover of darkness and attack the factories to destroy the machineries. From 
a simple worker being wiped because of laziness, Ludd transformed in the slogans of this 
movement into the “King Ludd '' and “General Ludd”. Workers did not claim that Ludd was their 
king just like the way that George III, the official King of those times, was their king through his 




King was an assertion of the people as King, i.e. people’s re-affirmation of their own sovereignty 
and constituent power. The proper name of Ludd functioned as a “collective phantom” (Holmes) 
through the Luddite Movement, haunting the back alleys of British industrial cities in which the 
factory bosses had been confronting with crowds, each of them shouting with others that “I am 
General Ludd”.  
Proper names become collective phantoms in the course of a popular protest movement. Losing 
their strict link with the pre-ascribed individual meanings, they lose their identities only in order 
to fall again in the new history made by the movement. “Names reach humans in descending, 
that is, through historical transmission” (Agamben, Language and History 49). 
Benjaminian division between the language as such, the pre-Babel-Tower language of God, and 
the multiple human languages after the Babel Tower is indeed another formulation for 
Nietzsche’s organic-inorganic distinction, and it should be treated with the same caution and 
correction. Starting with the claim that being is coextensive with divine language, Benjamin 
characterizes the latter as the unspoken word of God, which is mute creation (On Language as 
Such and on the Languages of Man 70). The unspoken word is a sign in the divine language, which 
is not reduced to the level of human linguistic knowledge, and is identified with pure action of 
creation, just like the inorganic word presents the signs of bodily movements before being 
abbreviated in human languages. But this undetermined language (the virtual) constituent of 
being should be in a relation with determined human languages (the actual), a differential 
relation like dramatization that leads to its various individuations after Babel Tower. Benjamin 
calls this relation a translation. “The language of things [the mute divine words]”, writes 
Benjamin, “can pass into the language of knowledge and name only through translation” (71). 
Benjamin’s divine language is thus the pre-linguistic or non-linguistic performativity which is 
ontogenetically primary and gives rise, through translations, to different individuated and 
representational languages. But if we break the link between translation and representation, 
which was indeed already done by Benjamin himself in his later The Translator’s Task (2000), we 
can see how proper names function as phantoms in a protest movement, and refer to intensive 




Divine language communicates itself and the names are the moments of language’s 
communicability: not a communication of something through language, but a communication of 
communicability. The language as such then is not representational, since it communicates itself, 
its own movements, rather than communicating an object. Moreover, names are particularly 
important in this conception of language, since it has creative and receptive parts, contains 
simultaneously the nameless and the namable. Therefore, naming is a dramatization that 
individuates a human name out of the potentiality of communication, i.e. of the divine word itself 
which has the “unique union” (69) of the nameless (undetermined) and the namable (the 
determinable). Since “[there is no specific] name...to correspond to any person” (69), to any 
individual, therefore the human name is, therefore, pre-individual, singular and not necessarily 
representative; it is again an open field of communicability. Forming a language, these 
singularities are only meaningful when they come into a relation to each other. 
Similarly, in the course of a protest movement, names appear phantom-like, as a sign to translate 
(and to give name to) an intensive region of forces or the immanent field of constituent power 
and its intensities. If Ned Ludd took up that hammer and broke the machinery, his work was 
performativized and re-interpreted as the destruction of the embodiment of the capitalist 
relation to and subjugation of his labour power; and everyone who could recognize in herself this 
emancipatory constituent power – not Ludd as an individual, but as a singularity – and its 
intensive field of forces would become a Luddite by assuming his name. The singular intensities 
of individuals could communicate through the collective phantom of Ludd as the pure element 
of communicability and involve in a differential relation with each other. Thus, collective 
phantoms are  singularities which are in themselves plural: a singular multiplicity of singularities. 
This is another formulation for the two-sidedness of ontogenesis.  
Extending this perspective on all of the case studies, one could argue that different forms of 
struggles have resonance with and among each other, just like the singularities of a movement 
could communicate through their collective phantom as a field of intensities. The struggle has 
become global, yet is practicing in a local scale. The slogan of Reclaim the Streets, “the resistance 
will be as transnational as capital”, points to this resonance. If the Benjaminian translation as a 




the language in which children and sparrows communicate – then the names of movements serve 
as elements of pure communicability that refer to a geography of intensities akin to  them all.  
We have already seen how Occupy Al-Tahrir and Occupy Wall Street movements communicated 
with each other in the recent global cycle of protests. Protests in Madrid and Athens have 
inspired Wall Street, too, and then Gezi in Istanbul and Maidan in Ukraine followed the path. 
Here, as Benjamin emphasizes, the problem is not of the original and the copy, but a kind of 
kinship and “it is clear that kinship does not necessarily involve similarity” (The Translator's Task 
78). Rather, the communication comes from the differential relation between these movements 
in their geography of intensities. Just like Benjaminian translation liberating an independent 
relation between languages, translation of different movements into each other is a practice on 
a line of flight extending from various forms of struggles and creativity. Therefore, there is indeed 
a common language of truth as Benjamin asserts, whose names are different movements of the 
second global cycle. Accordingly, the different case studies are actually from the same geography 
of intensities, coextensive with this common language of truth in our contemporary spatio-
temporality. 
In addition, the communicability between these movements should be considered as a principle 
that open each locally situated movement to a global level. Each altermodern movement is a 
singularity in the immanent field of constituent power: on one hand, it is a singular multiplicity 
(or a multiple singularity, for it is situated in a two-sided ontogenesis) consisting of various 
singularities communicating inside it; on the other hand, it is a singularity in a network of other 
movements as singularities. As seen in the discussion of Jean-Luc Nancy’s writings, the singular 
had been always used in its plural form, singuli, in its ancient usage and “the singular is primarily 
each one and, therefore, also with and among all the others”. Strictly speaking, there is no single 
singularity, “because, in general, a singularity is indissociable from a plurality”. (Nancy 32).  
Therefore, the following research will take up those seemingly geographically separated case 
studies and analyze the altermodernities, which emerged out of their performativization. 
However, the abstraction of diagramming in performativization, or better, the abstraction of the 




generalizing conclusions. This would simply be another false formulation of the problem, since 
the abstract of the transcendental empiricist critique is above all empirical. It is local yet it 
communicates on a global level, as we already mentioned in previous sections. 
Performativizations of a performative politics necessarily deals with (collective) bodies in each 













3 Chapter Two: The Performative Event 
 
3.1 A Liminal Agency toward the Performative Event 
 
P, the Protagonist in Beckett's Catastrophe (1984 (1982)), is in the middle of the stage, standing 
on a black block, with a black dressing-gown, ankles exposed and his head bowed. The play itself 
is about a rehearsal for a main-stream theater production and whose character’s names signify 
the differing degrees of authority within the hierarchy of theatre, with D standing as director, A 
as assistant, and L as lighting technician. P, D, A and L seem, therefore, to represent the 
abbreviated names designated for different “subjective” positions, each on a different level of a 
power relation embodied in a game of gazes. Four codes in the (re-)codification of “theatrical 
territory.”  
In this way, Catastrophe  portrays the absolute authority of the director, with his gaze directly 
fixing at P, while A and L representing the other gazes aimed at P through D. Thus, there is an 
economy of the gaze that does not go beyond the stage, beyond the scene of representation. 
P is himself totally immobile, standing as a statue of flesh. His gestures are neither his own nor 
done by him, but made according to the orders and by the hands of A, with no agency of his or 
her own. And there exists another economy: the orders are produced in an economy of text in 
the form of A’s notes that textualize D’s subjective judgments.  
The theme of the play seems evident: a critique of representation by pointing to the authority of 
the dramatic text; the authority of the director, the subjection of the actor to the gazes of these 
authorities, and the calculated gaze of the audience/critics (who the director hopes that P’s 
performance “will have them on their feet”). But the ending sentences of the text, written inside 
brackets as stage description, bring this particular text beyond a mere critique of theater:  
[Pause. Distant storm of applause. P raises his head, fixes the audience. The applause 




The previously immobile P raises their head just after the theater finishes with that imaginary 
storm of applause, right after the representation apparatus finished its work. And P fixes the 
audience, while their gaze aims at a non-existing one.  
Here, the agency is displaced to the limits of the theatrical spectacle, where P inhabits a liminal 
position with a gaze toward the off-stage, as if off-stage was the place where the performative 
event would happen, external to the representative theater. This is even implied in the text, since 
Beckett writes these sentences inside the final brackets as stage description, on the limits of the 
text itself. In linguistics, the bracketed parts of a text – that give guidelines, extra hints, and extra 
explanations for reading it or addressing the audience – are called paratext. Gerard Genette 
conceptualizes paratext as that very locus of the text that connects to its exterior:“paratext is  … 
a zone between text and off-text, a zone not only of transition but also of transaction (Paratexts: 
Thresholds of Interpretation 2).”Beckett displaces the event into the off-stage region of the play 
through this use of  paratext. Here, those closed economies of text and gaze, order and 
subjection, through which theater is (re)produced are refused for an opening toward an 
indefinite event beyond representation; an event that is pointed to by a minimal and also liminal 
agency on the limits of representation.  
The gaze does not come from a pre-defined subject position of actor, from P, because the 
theatrical presentation, in which the term actor acquires its meaning, is already finished before 
the gaze. At the same time, that gaze remains still an action for the P of any possible theatrical 
production of Becket’s play. The liminal position is where the territorial codes are being 
decodified. With raising the head and fixing the gaze, P is no longer P, the code representing a 
low hierarchical position. P has come out of that power relation. 
Moreover, the gaze is not aimed at any pre-existing audience. It is a rehearsal and the salon is 
simply empty, but Beckett still writes that “P fixes the audience”. This brings us to the much-
discussed notion of political theater and “the missing people” or rather, “the people to come”. A 
notion that Carmelo Bene turned into his central perspective of creating theatre. “The people are 
missing”, says Bene,  since popular theater does not “represent” the people; rather “it anticipates 




141).  So if there is an indefinite, non-representational event of theater, a performative event, 
this event is also the event of constituting an audience, a people. One cannot presuppose 
collectivity: collectivity is itself constructed through the processes of an event, at the same time 
that it produces the event.  
There is also a reverse direction for reading Becket’s Catastrophe. It appears as a highly 
exaggerated play, mostly similar to a farce rather than a comedy. Farce, as a genre, deals with 
improbable situations and by the same token, the function of exaggeration in Catastrophe is to 
make an improbable theater: it empties theater of the performative, rendering it as a mere 
spectacle of representation, without any agency or subjectivity, and reduced to a set of textual 
guidelines and subjective orders. The result of which is a closed system that calls for the “storm 
of applause”, even though there are no real bodies sitting on chairs being affected by it. No 
transformations, no event, just a spectacle of entertainment.  
But there is no representation without performative processes. As we discussed in the previous 
chapter, each representation is one possible product. The performative is what produces, even 
if it turns into a static image. There exists no ideal, closed system that can seal off all lines of flight 
from its rigid order.  
So, the reverse reading of Catastrophe will tell us that any attempt to predict and manage 
everything in a performance or to reduce it to a mere spectacle or mere theatricality is doomed 
to fail. There exists no contradiction or duality between theatricality and performativity, between 
spectacle and event, rather a productive relation between them. The spectacle is always prone 
to be inflicted by the transformative power of the performative. Catastrophe presents an idea of 
a performative event by contrasting it to a representational theatrical happening. In the same 
manner, the following examples aim to shortcut this discussion into the social context. 
3.1.2 A Shortcut to the Social Context 
 
In June 2009, Iranian people started a decentralized protest movement that was marked by the 




month. June 15 became the event that marked a before and after, opening a space of dissensus 
that did not close on itself for several months. The protests were characterized by an intense 
creation of new forms of struggle and resistance that have been borrowed from artistic practices 
and carnivalesque organization: songs, graffiti, green color splashed everywhere on the streets 
and walls through various means, performances, poetry, and of course urban resistance against 
the State’s violence. Even in the days of mourning for the lives lost during the protest movement, 
participants were celebrating the “people’s victory.” 
In April 2, 2015, Tehran’s government and foreign powers reached an interim deal on Iran’s 
nuclear program that promised an end to economic sanctions. Immediately after the declaration 
of the deal, people rushed into the streets with balloons, pastries, and music. Young women and 
men danced together on streets with “illegal joyful music” in contrast to the strict rules of the 
Islamic Republic to celebrate the “government’s victory.” There was indeed a transgression of 
the law, but as Lacan reminds us, it was already inscribed in the law itself: Kant on the other side 
of de Sade.  
Although some media analysts hailed the nuclear agreement as an historical “event,” the 
differences between these two political happenings and their corresponding “performances” on 
the streets are self-evident. However, the self-evidence does not explain anything: how does an 
event work? What are the differences between the functions of a “cultural” event (belonging to 
the domain of the spectacle and representative Politics) and the pragmatics of a “performative” 
event? Considering Beckett’s Catastrophe, could we refer to the ideas of non-representationality, 
a “missing people,” liminal agency, and deterritorialization in order to differentiate the so-called 
social performances? 
 
3.2 Performativierung/Aufführung – Ereignis/Event 
 
Performativizations of a movement have their own chemistry. The differential relations of this 
process, as have been discussed in the previous chapter, would only be triggered by a difference 




individuation process in salt crystallization out of salt water solution (as Idea), there are also 
preconditions for the existence of this process: the thermodynamic instability of the 
crystallization point, even if there is a mechanical one. The difference in intensity, or energy, 
provides the necessary impulse for the differential movement to be triggered. This can be a 
supersaturation, a sudden density of dislocations, or the non-homogenous, striated inner surface 
of a container: disruptions, excesses, etc.  
In the chemistry of social movements, the condition of performativization is called an event. 
However, unlike the classical terminology of chemistry as a natural science, events are a 
precondition for performativization as long as performativization is a precondition for event, 
since the foundational ontology is a two-sided ontogenesis, and in the far-from-equilibrium 
social-human phenomena, the constant flows of desire are being crystallized and melted in 
different performative events as their performative points in which a change in nature occurs. 
The relation between performativity and event has been already established throughout the 
literature. Alain Badiou, for instance, calls “performance arts” as the contemporary “Event” in 
arts (The Event in Deleuze 37), which bears similar implications to Fischer-Lichte’s performative 
turn, for the latter is also a sign of simultaneous rupture and novelty in artistic practice and 
production. Referring to artistic exhibitions as events became especially popular after the 
performative turn in the arts, where bodily presence and movements of both the artist and the 
audience became relevant in the creation and exhibition of the works themselves; a popularity 
that has been transferred to the field of culture in general, though not with the same meaning. 
Moreover, in philosophy, the event has acquired a more general status, especially after Gilles 
Deleuze and Alain Badiou, and it refers to the emergence or creation of the new: events 
transform the pre-existing situation to make way for the new. 
The German language offers a way to think about the differences between event as a cultural 
happening and event as the creation of the new. While the former is the English word Event, the 
latter has its history of conceptualization in the term „Ereignis“. This usefulness becomes more 
apparent in relation to the performative event, given that the  German word for performativity 




while for performance it is the German word Aufführung that is used. Through using this term, 
the complex relationships between performance, performativity, event, and politics are clearer 
and more exact.   
In their co-written piece “Politics as Performance” (Politik als Aufführung), Christian Horn and 
Matthias Warstat believe that political performances should be regarded as performance in 
general, in terms of a collective and processual action-perception that has a performative aspect. 
The bodily co-presence, the particular spatio-temporality, the blurring of established structural 
borders between action and reception, and its uniqueness in terms of non-reproducibility under 
these terms are all mentioned as analytical points for a political performance. But these analytical 
points, they believe, already establish a relationship between political performance and event 
(Ereignis). In other words, event could be considered as performative (E. Fischer-Lichte, 
Performativität und Ereignis 396). 
Nonetheless, they warn that not all political “performances” are “performative” events, since an 
event -- understood in terms of the political -- entails "exceptional effectiveness or potency that 
stand out from everyday routine activities and open up potential for change" (ibid). The political 
performances of mass celebrations and huge carnivals in Nazi Germany did make a change, but 
by recoursing to an already established mythical past narrative and for the worst, not toward an 
alternative future. The highly mediatized politico-rhetorical performances of Obamas, such as 
president’s ironical play-acting with his anger’s translator or first lady’s funky dances, are all 
political performances but not performative events. The performative event has neither a 
defined past nor a predictable future: it occurs in a far-from-equilibrium social experimentation 
milieu.   
This relationship between eventness and performativity is clearly conceptualized in Fischer-
Lichte's analysis of Handke's "Offending the Audience" by Claus Peymann (Performativität und 
Ereignis 11-14). Staging an avant-garde text that aims to engage the audience actively, Peymann 
was finally irritated by audience members attempting to climb the stage and re-situate 
themselves in order to acquire the role of actors in the second night of performance – what 




change in nature. Peymann wanted to defend the borders that were becoming blurred through 
the performative aspect of the performance, although this aspect renders theater non-
representational.  
According to Fischer-Lichte, performativity makes us understand that theater is itself constituted 
through an event, an event in which "something between actors and audience occurs 
[ereignete]", and most probably, this something is what happens with the "relation" between 
actors and the audience: the auto-poetic process that was discussed before. Therefore, even if 
we deal with a representative theater, performativity remains ontogenetically prior. Far from 
affirming this paradigmatic transformation of the performative turn, far from affirming his own 
piece’s unpredictable intensive flows of counter-identification which turned the classic theatrical 
urge to identification into a non-identitarian desire for being active, Peymann tried to defend the 
already established territory of theater against the deterritorializing performative event.  
The event of the performative gives a few hints for an analysis of political performance, for it 
shows that something happens in the (social) relation between different groups of people who 
are pre-situated in different levels of a hierarchy of action and power. In other words, although 
the co-presence of bodies and the particular spatio-temporal determinations are constituent of 
the event, it is the event itself that produces its own people. Therefore, the people of the event 
can no longer be defined through the duality of actor/audience, of active/receptive, for it is 
precisely the people, which occurs (ereignet) in a given event (ereignis).  
It is true that a Publikum should exist in order for a performance to take place. But if a group of 
bodies construct a stage of their own and make a performance for no audience, but as an 
invitation for all to join the stage, then it would be incorrect to analyze this phenomena according 
to the  schema of actor/audience. In other words, a performative event deterritorializes the 
already established territory. To understand this aspect of the performativization, one can make 
a detour to see what a territory of theater (its stage) means, and through that, take an oblique 
look at the territory of political performance. This will make way for an understanding of the 
performative events in their singular contexts, as well as those singular collective bodies that 





3.3 Territories of Performance: Delimiting the Performative  
 
A woman is shown sitting on a chair in an airport. A man comes, sits in front of her, holding a 
newspaper which has the picture of the woman on its cover, saying that she is wanted by the 
Police. The woman seems surprised, not as much as when she sees her picture in the news on 
airport screen that she is a dangerous and unpredictable criminal on the loose. The scene goes 
on by a description of her appearance from the airport megaphones. She is shocked, shaking, 
and shouting that she hasn’t done anything. Two security police approach her with a silver 
suitcase; one of them asks her gently, “are you stressed?” “Well, yes, a little bit,” she answers, 
without even having this image in her mind that one of the security police would open the 
suitcase and show her the anti-stress Nivea Deodorant.  
The above Nivea advertisement is an illuminating example of how contemporary capitalism 
works and produces wealth. It shows two logics at work simultaneously: the shift from manual 
labour to affective immaterial labour which consists in exploiting the affective sensual capabilities 
and faculties of humans, and the affective logic of the true – the affective true which dominates 
not only the media and advertisements but also discourses of politicians29. In the former, 
advertisement exploits the affections and sentiments of a real person for the sole purpose of 
selling them a product. At the same time, it shows that product is not only based on the material 
conditions (and needs) of her body (sweating), but more than that, it is designed for her 
affections, her stress. If decades ago, Marina Abramovic could speak about a difference between 
 
29 The logic of the affective true could be described, following Brian Massumi, as a superlative futurity, like “it will 
have been real” Invalid source specified.. The example Massumi argues around is Bush speech about the war in Iraq 
in 2004, in which he said that although the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was not true, “we 
removed a declared enemy of America, who had the capacity of producing weapons of mass destruction, and could 
have passed that capability to terrorists bent on”. “Having the capacity” and using the perfect form in conditional 
sentence, “could have passed”, which show the premise is not real and the conclusion is less than a real possibility, 
are characteristics of the affective true: there is no possibility for this “fact” to be realized, because the condition 
was non-existent; but there is a pure potentiality which comes from the affections, the feeling of the infinite threat 
of terrorism in the air, and this affective potentiality effectively constructs the affective true. This is the case in 
Nivea’s advertisement, too. If she could have used the Anti-Stress Nivea Deo, she would not have feel any stress in 





theatre and performance, designating the false or the fake (in intra-human relations) to theatre 
and the true to performance, the Nivea advertisement and so many other similar situations blur 
the binary between these two, since they – like performance arts from Abramovic perspective – 
produce the conditions for real human relations to emerge, and at the same time turn these 
“real” human relations to commodities, objectified and ready to put in the cycle of capital 
production and accumulation. This is what Italian autonomist thinkers call the hegemonization of 
immaterial labour in which the “performance” has a central role. 
 
3.3.1 The Performative at Work 
Contemporary reformists and activists have been long talking about the transformations that 
happened through the new economic order inside social institutions. Terms such as 
neoliberalism, globalization, immaterial production, and cognitive capitalism have been brought 
into play to explain these institutional changes particularly after the 1960s.  
Inspired by Italian (post)autonomist thought, the focus has been on a transition that “is 
fundamentally from the hegemony of material labour to that of immaterial labour” (Negri, Logic 
and Theory of Inquiry: Militant Praxis as Subject and as Episteme 62). The hegemonization of 
immaterial, affective, and performative labour marks the distinction between what is called now 
Post-Fordism (related to Neoliberalism and corporate globalization) with Fordist mode of 
production in the first half of the 20th century, or in a broader sense, the difference between 
“formal” and “real” subsumption in Marx.  
Immaterial production is highly dependent on living beings and their affections. Exploitation, 
thus, needs thoughts and sentiments more than muscles in this era. Indeed, “the current passage 
in capitalist production is moving toward an ‘anthropogenetic model,’ a biopolitical turn of the 
economy” in which “the production of forms of life is becoming the basis of added value” (Hardt 
and Negri, Commonwealth 132). The production of forms-of-life, on the other hand, shifts the 
focus from disciplining and homogenizing the subjects and producing objects to the creation of 
“the world within which the object exists and … the world within which the subject exists” 




subjectification and the production of form-of-life becomes centralized. Mårten Spångberg, as a 
dance specialist, observes the same phenomenon when he writes, “One could say that the world 
has experienced a shift of focus from manufacturing, to production of goods, to performance and 
movement” (Spangberg 8). Thus, the most valuable contemporary knowledge is, borrowing from 
Lyotard, “performative knowledge.”  
Additionally, the Marxian concept of “general intellect” (Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the 
Political Economy (Rough Draft) 706) is often summoned to explain this capitalist transition. 
Writing about the future implications of scientific-technologic innovations and the importance of 
fixed capital, Marx argues that “the development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general 
social knowledge has become a direct force of production and to what degree, hence, the 
conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect 
and been transformed in accordance with it” (ibid). General intellect refers here to an open, 
always altering Whole of societal knowledge that not only is productive, but also invents forms-
of-life. In other words, general intellect becomes the hegemonic force of production in general. 
It is therefore not necessarily subjugated to capitalist production, although capitalist “apparatus 
of capture” (see Deleuze and Guattari 424-473) absorbs general intellect and turns it into a vital 
function of its development, leading many contemporary theorists to view the contemporary 
relationship between capital and society as “parasitic.”  “The general intellect has been 
increasingly seized by capitalist valorization in recent decades” (Raunig, Factories of Knowledge, 
Industries of Creativity 17), and thus various mechanisms of performative knowledge production 
are at work in order for contemporary “cognitive” capitalism to function and ever greater 
portions of the general intellect to be captured.  
The abstract terminologies of immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism find more concrete 
explanations in the critiques of neoliberalism after 1960s. The notion of precarity and its political 
interpretation in the term “precariat”, which is supposedly an alternative for the proletariat, refer 
to this actual aspect, where “precarity refers … to the labor conditions that arose after the 
transition from life-long, stable jobs common in industrial-capitalist and welfare-state 
economies, to temporary, insecure, low-paying jobs emerging with the globalization of the 




labour in third world countries, the immigration of workers from the global south to the global 
north, the mass displacement of refugees, precarization of residence, and so forth. 
Having entered forcefully into the lives of citizens, the precarity of neoliberalism thus extended 
itself to all aspects of life, into the very realm of human existence. While writing against the 
neoliberal transformations in educational institutions, Cote et. al., for instance, defines the 
neoliberal project as “a complex web of practices and institutions that have the effect of 
perpetuating and multiplying various forms of interlocking oppression” that is able to divide and 
manage the “populations” and brings about a form-of-life immersed “in capitalist exploitation 
and state-based, rational-bureaucratic control” (Cote, Day and Peuter 319).  
 
3.3.2 Territorialized Arts: The Creative and Culture Industries 
The main difference between Marx’s notions of formal and real capitalist subsumption is where 
the latter not only seized upon the production process and subsumed the constituent power of 
the multitude under its own “universal” logic of production, but also changed that very 
production process by its technological innovation and the seizure of General Intellect and 
performativity. Here lies the principle we brought about in the first chapter: “There is no outside 
to capitalism”. This fact implies that arts and artistic production have also transformed drastically 
during these historical changes. 
“Creative and Culture Industries” (CCI), coined not so long ago by policy makers, is a key-term for 
understanding these changes. The term has been accepted warmly by art institutions; and for 
the sake of it, there have been lots of cultural policies – introduced by the USA, European Cultural 
Committee and other international institutions – which also try to develop this industry in the 
Global South. 
One example of this exportation is “creative cities”, “a Central Europe Programme project in 
which five partner cities (Ljubljana, Genova, Gdansk, Leipzig and Pécs) collaborated to further 
develop and promote CCI potentials” (Mierovec and Kavas 24). Actually, CCI is very important in 




(GDP) and 3% of its employment.” In other words, as Mierovec and Kavas put it, “CCI are drivers 
of innovation with positive spill-over effects on the rest of the economy” (ibid 28). Indeed, CCI 
strategy in Slovenia as a non-developed eastern European country was quite successful: 4.4% of 
employment, 9.6% of all companies in there, and a GVA (GDP – taxes + subsidies) per employee 
which is more than the overall rate in overall economy (ibid). CCI policies are always effective for 
an economy with open borders for neoliberal market. Hito Steyerl addresses the same 
problematic when she is talking about the politics of contemporary art (Steyerl, Politics of Art: 
Contemporary Art and the Transition to Post-democracy): 
Contemporary art is no unworldly discipline nestled away in some remote ivory tower. On the 
contrary, it’s squarely placed in the neoliberal thick of things. We cannot dissociate the hype 
around contemporary art from the shock policies used to defibrillated slowing economies. 
What Hito Steyerl is referring to by using the term “shock policies” is the neoliberal economic 
policies which were mainly theorized by Milton Freedman and have been used in various parts 
of the world – such as post-coup d’état Chile, post-war Iraq, post-apartheid South Africa. Naomi 
Klein calls this “disaster capitalism” in her work The Shock Doctrine (2007).  
The main territory of CCI is the Global North (Western European Countries, North America, 
Australia and Japan). It is enough to walk in the stations of London’s Metro in order to see how 
advertisements about toothpaste, shampoo, chocolate and so on have been mostly replaced by 
posters advertising the latest performances, dances and movies. And not surprisingly this term 
was articulated by a British policy-maker from New Labour party. After New Labour took the 
government in 1997, the department of National Heritage was changed to the department of 
Culture, Media and Sport. Chris Smith, its new chairman, published a book very much associated 
with the party’s new policy on this issue in which he renamed cultural industries as creative 
industries and called for setting up a “creative industries task force” including many big names 
and important figures in British art scene (O'Connor 4). However, one cannot separate the rise of 
creative industries from Neoliberalism, since the history of creativity “cannot be considered 
independent from the institutions and forms of governmentality in which it takes place and which 




aftermath of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, neoliberalism. Since the implementation of 
neoliberal policies in the West has been historically attributed to Thatcher’s conservative 
government, the UK can serve as a good example for tracing the transformations in arts, 
particularly theatre and performance arts.  
 
3.3.3 Art’s Territory for Aufführung  
Before Thatcherism took hold in the United Kingdom, its Arts Council had a different perspective 
on funding arts, which can be defined, following Baz Kershaw, as a “humanist liberal” perspective 
according to which the “artist has something special to offer to society that transcends any 
particular political or economic regime” (Kershaw 42). The Art Council of Great Britain was 
formed in 1944, during World War II, under the name of the Council for the Encouragement of 
Music and the Arts (CEMA) to protect British Culture, but the name was changed to the Arts 
Council of Great Britain after a few years. Regardless of this change in name,  what persisted and 
served as the motor of its governing policies was the modernist idea of the supremacy of culture 
and art; a remnant of the Enlightenment’s humanist and liberal ideals. For instance, Roy Shaw, 
the chairman of the council from 1975 to 1982, “approvingly quotes Iris Murdoch’s dictum that 
art is ‘a training in the love of virtue’” (ibid). Consequently, by funding policies of the Arts Council, 
arts were supposed to be partly protected from the business sphere and were to remain not-for-
profit activities open for all. It was out of this perspective that cultural institutions were built for 
the sake of the bourgeois class as the supporting ground of liberal humanist ideas and historical 
context for producing this discourse around culture and arts.  
But after “the Iron Lady” took power in 1979, immense budget cuts and the deregulation of the 
market changed the nature of every sphere of society. Business models have been promoted in 
every “industry” since then and the Arts Council was no exception. William Rees-Mogg, the new 
chairman of the Arts Council, was himself a strong supporter of this transformation of the sphere 
of Arts and Culture into a business one with a strong corporate perspective. He had a good factual 
reason for this: “The arts have an excellent sales record, and excellent prospect. Customers are 




arts, are the “vanguard consumers of a new art renaissance” (Kershaw 37). Here again, 
considering Steyerl’s reference to contemporary art and contemporary capitalism, numbers and 
percentages, 1% and 99%, problematize both arts and its audience: what kind of art for the 99% 
camping in Zuccotti Park, how much (self-) excluded is this art from that “new art renaissance”? 
Although it seems that visual arts are more fitted within neoliberal policies and its spaces like 
cultural centers, museums and galleries, theatre and performance arts have never been immune 
and ultimately suffered the same fate. In the case of the UK, “the invasion of a new cultural 
economy into British theatre in the 1980s and 1990s can be clearly traced … under Thatcherism 
theatre became subject to increasingly market pressure” (ibid). This policy, on the one hand, 
directly turns performance into a commodity, or better, an immaterial commodity and the other 
hand, leads to the “degeneration of theatre art as a result of economic pressure” (Dombroski 96).  
The impact of new policies in theatre transformed it into a business with a strong focus on 
marketing. Like any other contemporary capitalist immaterial business model, the traditional 
boundaries between production and consumption are blurred in theatre and performance: 
theatre programmers first construct the network of consumers and then provide them with the 
commodities. There’s even the prestigious term “audience development” coined particularly for 
this process (Kershaw 46). Moreover, the dominant genres and productions are also referring to 
this change of perspective in theatre and performance: increase in musicals and fun 
performances, decrease in classical theatres, decrease in original works, and astonishing rise of 
adaptations.  
This problematic is by no means a contemporary capitalist one. The same attitude enraged 
Artaud, among many others, to “protest against the idea of culture” where according to him, 
“true culture operates by exaltation and force, while the European ideal of art attempts to cast 
the mind into an attitude distinct from force but addicted to exaltation. It is a lazy, unserviceable 
notion which engenders an imminent death” (Artaud 10). One can say, however, this 
commodifying attitude of corporate capitalist culture toward arts has been intensified after 




immaterial production. In such a way, a particular territory has been erected for the performance 
arts. 
A territory is a pre-defined space and time with pre-established codes to regulate its affairs. It 
comes out of a process of “territorialization”. For instance, performance is fixed on some spaces, 
time, and functions through territorialization carried out by creative and culture industries.  
The specialized space in which theatre and performance art are performed is theatre saloon or 
theatre building. This place is itself an embodiment of all territorial capitalist codes running in 
performance art field since the beginning of bourgeois theatre. In other words, “theatre building 
is not so much the empty space of the creative artist, nor a democratic institution of free speech, 
but rather a kind of social engine that helps to drive an unfair system of privilege” (Kershaw 31).  
When the Russian revolutionary avant-garde artists started their new forms of “eccentric 
theatre” and “the theatre of attractions” after the October Revolution, their dream was to tear 
down the boundary between spectator and actor, theater and everyday life, workers and artists. 
But as Raunig points out, “in the practice of Soviet theater around 1920, however, it was evident 
that the hierarchy of the spatial and social architecture of the theater thwarted the realization of 
these far-ranging goals.” 
Richard Schechner describes the hierarchical architecture of the proscenium theatre, a form 
developed from seventeenth to twentieth century, as a class-based architectural form which  
embodied all pre-established social values of its time in itself. Schechner’s analogy between 
theatre and factory serves as a consideration of conditions of production in theatre itself: 
Theater workers enter through a backstage door unseen by the ticket-buying patrons. This is a 
version of the industrial practice of separating the factory where goods are produced from the 
store where they are sold (Performance Theory 179).  
One could say that the description Schechner gives (the division between factory and store) is 
the division between buying and selling processes theorized by Marx in the first volume of 
Capital. This division leads to another one, which is between labour and leisure -- leisure as a 




consumption of goods. According to the latter division, “theatre is a place to go when work is 
finished; it’s not meant to be a rival of work” (ibid 183). This was true according to the production 
conditions of that time, with a strict separation between production and consumption, labour 
time and leisure time. But this border has been blurred in contemporary capitalism. Now, “the 
developing theatre estate is integrated to the disciplines of late capitalist consumerism, 
paralleling the spread of shopping malls, heritage sites and other tourist venues” (Kershaw 32). 
This space of touristic consumerism provides its consumers with a “pleasurable submission” (ibid) 
like a proper café, or a fancy restaurant, to make them digest the foods provided for their hungry 
souls. Schechner, for his part, is not unaware of this difference: “The proscenium theatre is a 
model for capitalism. Today, as capitalism evolves into corporate capitalism, new kinds of theatre 
arise. Cultural centers and regional theatres are examples of corporatism” (Schechner, 
Performance Theory 183).   
But the theatre building is not equal with the territory of theatre. The territory of theatre has 
certain socio-political functions: (1) theatre as a process of audience training: it means how 
audience should perceive certain things.; (2) theatre as a system of cultural production that aims 
to shape the formation of society in terms of class, gender and race; and (3) theatre as a method 
of spatial indoctrination or a system functions to embed values in audience (Kershaw 31). 
From this perspective, theatre has been subjected to many critical discourses so far. For example, 
Gramsci accused bourgeois theatre of promoting “white slavery” (Gramsci 306). Moreover, 
according to him, “the great social import of theatre consists in its capacity to provide occasion 
for collective intellectual recreation” and now it’s designed for profit (Quoted in Dombroski 1986, 
95). He believes that the most popular plays of his time, “written and staged to satisfy the tastes 
of the middle class”, had a very definite political function: to preserve the status quo and produce 
consensus. 
Louis Althusser shares almost the same concerns with Gramsci. Althusser considers classical 
theatre as a state apparatus which tries to maintain the existing order through the process of 
identification (Althusser 15). One can even refer to Lefebvre’s conception of theatre “as a space 




that too often work against the interest of [the] majority” (Kershaw 31). Bourdieu also criticizes 
theatre from another point of view which is closely related to other criticisms. According to him, 
“theatre produces ‘a miracle of predestination’ through which different groups – playwrights, 
actors, critics, audiences – are constructed according to hierarchical principles” (ibid). The theatre 
which serves as a guardian of hierarchical capitalist order is itself organized hierarchically.  
To summarize, here, the elements of the theatre-as-territory, one could ask the following 
questions to find out a way to consider these criticisms: how to not exclude the audience from 
the theatrical means of productions (flesh, communication, signs, space)? How to not restrict the 
produced theatrical value among a certain range of privileged audience? How to not cooperate 
in capitalist value production? How to not reproduce the hierarchical organization anymore? 
These are the possibilities that open up through the performative event, either in a theatre piece 
such as Peymann’s or in the streets.  
The solution that has  usually been given for avoiding the effectiveness of embodied socio-
political values in the space and time of theatre is that of  having active participants or committed 
performers and artists. On the one hand, Ranciere’s critique of Brechtian theatre would reveal 
the problem of participatory theatre, since Brecht, in trying to propose certain higher values and 
ideas and heighten the awareness of masses, presupposed himself as being on a higher level of 
knowledge and power in relation to those masses he wanted to liberate (The Emancipated 
Spectator). On the other hand, “the active occupation” of theatre as a territory which is marked 
by all those capitalist values cannot be liberating on its own, since the subjective, performative 
action is already limited by the context in which they perform that action. 
Gramsci, in spite of criticizing the theatre which helps to maintain the established order, uses the 
term “theatre of struggle” in a strategic conceptual context as a way to reach the victory for those 
“who are apparently inferior to enemy” (Gramsci 271); in other words, theatre of struggle is way 
to achieve hegemony for the people. The use of theatre as a term here points to the importance 
of theatrical actions and reactions in a society, or one could say it’s a reference to a struggle at 
the level of political “representations”, both of which can lead to the realization of  hegemony 




performance machine with other social, desiring machines, a problematic that will be further 
discussed. 
 
3.3.4 Politics’ Territory for Aufführung 
The term “performance” acts as a bridge between different realms: from politics to arts to 
linguistics to management, from theatricality to performativity, from ritual to the social. The most 
important – and perhaps the most confused – oscillation of this term happens nonetheless 
between the virtual and the actual, whose connection corresponds, according to our previous 
discussions, to the relation between the performative and the theatrical. Particularly in Butler, 
performance becomes the repetitive “a reenactment and reexperiencing of a set of meanings 
already socially established”, a “ritual social drama” (Gender Trouble 178) that constructs the 
social identities and consequently, social segregations. In this fashion, Butler borrows Turner’s 
notion of ritual and turns it into a “normative performance” (J. MacKenzie 223) which belongs to 
the realm of an already constituted power. Butler warns that this performance-based identity 
“that regularly conceals its genesis” (Gender Trouble 179) characterizes it as a product of a 
performative process – i.e. the theatrical as the subjection of the performative to the already 
socially established meanings. On the other hand, a performance-oriented reading of identity 
makes way for considering that concealed genesis, that hidden performative dimension which is 
beyond the representational and identitarian theatricality of social performances; and in this 
way, it makes thinking toward altermodernities possible. Thus, there exists something as 
established territories of politico-social performances that, like the artistic territories, have been 
constantly contested and surpassed.  
 
3.3.4.1 Against the Vanguardist Trap 
From this perspective, the modernist avant-garde's view shares the same problematic with 
vanguardist revolutionaries: they are both still caught in the apparatus of representation. The 
territory of theatre is in the end a territory of representation delimited through textually 




trying to transform this territory through different means, acted as its progressive, self-aware 
representatives that can define its path toward emancipation and teach it to the people. It was 
their self-contradiction, for they also became the source of inspiration for the activists of 
performative radical politics in 60s and 70s. One of the most famous figures of Yippie movements, 
Abbie Hoffman, characterized “The Museum of the Streets” as the space of radical politics. “For 
us, protest as theater came naturally”, he writes, depicting “guerrilla theater” as “the oldest form 
of political commentary” and referring to Artaud as a theatre avant-garde who called for a “new 
poetry of festivals and crowds, with people pouring into the streets” (Hoffman). 
The same goes with the vanguardist revolutionaries who considered themselves not only as the 
progressive, self-aware representatives of the oppressed masses, but also the inventors and 
preachers of a new social performance toward salvation. They, too, are still sources of inspiration, 
as we often hear activists mention Lenin, Luxemburg, Bakunin, and so on. The inspiration, 
nonetheless, does not go beyond showing respect for old revolutionaries and the reason lies in 
the radical difference of contemporary movements with their predecessors.  
Two of the main aspects of the contemporary performative politics, as discussed above, has been 
its communal character and its autopoietic feedback loop, both resulting in a non-hierarchical, 
“headless” bodily organization. The altermodern performativization thus keeps its distance from 
party politics as well as State politics, even if this party claims to be progressive or revolutionary 
(Leninists, Stalinists, Maoists, Trotskyists, and so forth).  
Although this aspect of performative politics started in May 68, it has become hegemonic in post-
2000 protest movements, due to the long artistic and political experimentations with 
performativity after the 60s. Even in May 68, vanguardist ideas were still prominent and 
powerful, and they were sometimes transformed into authoritarian forms of being-together in 
„transgressive“ patriarchal communes such as Otto Muehl’s Friedrichshof or else, their believers 
found their way into the highest ranks of political or economic elite against their initial impulses 
– Jerry Rubin for instance, whose path started from the countercultural Yippies and ended in 





As a playwright, novelist, poet, filmmaker (in sum, as a dramatist) and an official member of 
Communist Party who always made art for the dispossessed and the poor, Pier Paolo Pasolini’s 
reactions, denouncements and appraisals to his contemporary performative movements of 60s 
and 70s in Italy and the United States, I believe, exemplifies the still-emergent characteristics of 
performative eventness.  
In an infamous, highly dramatized poem, “I Hate You Dear Students”, Pasolini showed an 
unexpected, and strange, reaction to the violent clashes between protesting autonomist 
students and police in the streets of Rome. As an official member of the official Italian Communist 
Party, as a romantic lover of the rural tradition in Southern Italy, as an eccentric artist, it was not 
surprising that Pasolini would not immediately support non-hierarchical, extra-parliamentary 
autonomist movements that werecriticizing Party politics of all kinds. However, to support the 
attacking Policemen (as true commoners) against the defending students (as bourgeois middle-
class “spoiled children”) was considered by many as a banal, unethical, senseless provocation. 
The sociological class-related observations of Pasolini as an official party intellectual were 
outdated and wrong, and no longer carry any historical significance, as they have been proven 
wrong through decades of the precariat performative resistance and struggle. The comments 
came from Pasolini’s vanguardist point of view; the one who rejected the students’ offer to join 
them on the ground in order to know them better. As Simona Bondavalli writes, “[Pasolini] and 
fellow intellectuals, continued to talk about young people and to them, more than with them” 
(Fictions of Youth 151). That is why, according to Bifo, Pasolini “did not understand the meaning 
of the student movement of ‘68”. Pasolini did not figure out the fast-changing character of class 
compositions and similar to his fellow Orthodox Leninists, considered students as privileged 
middle-class children who have been separated from the real economy in their ivory tower of 
Academia.  Consequently, he did not find any “class element” in the student movement: “You 
are their children,/their hope, their future; if they reproach you/they are certainly not preparing 
a class conflict/against you! if anything,/the old civil war”.  
This story was in no way historically unique; rather, it is still repeating itself absurdly till our times. 
When the People’s Global Action (PGA) called for its first global resistance carnival on 16 May 




streets of more than 30 cities in that day, the reaction of all “professional politicians”, whether 
right or left, was the same. May 98 was a perfect timing for the first appearance: thirty years 
after 68, May was conceived in terms of its global significance as both the G8 and the WTO had 
meetings, respectively in Birmingham, United Kingdom and Geneva, Italy. The WTO’s Second 
Ministerial meeting was aimed to discuss the so-called Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI); a set of rules which could deregulate foreign investment and oblige less developed 
countries to violate the rights of their people, mostly workers and farmers, in exchange for 
greater foreign investment. This was accentuated by the fact of the G8’s simultaneous meeting 
of eight of the world’s most powerful countries, all of whom would directly benefit from the 
MAI’s  corporate-friendly rules. But the PGA organized the global action days in this month in a 
very novel way, precisely because the PGA itself was neither a party, nor a formal organization, 
but a network: “While the PGA does not define itself as an organization, it holds a distinctive 
organizational philosophy based on decentralization and autonomy. It has no head office, no 
central funds, no membership, and no representatives” (Notes from Nowhere 2003, 96). In 
Birmingham, RTS threw a street party in the center of the city with 6000 people dressed as clowns 
and blocked the whole functioning of the city, while 75000 more protestors formed a human 
chain around the summit building. In Geneva, 10000 marched through the city and big, 
sometimes violent clashes happened (Notes from Nowhere 2003, 104). In this first global action 
day, through the massive street protests and NGOs’ active interventions, MAI was defeated and 
never passed. That was the first public appearance of a new collective subject,  replete with 
theatrical costumes and props, dressed as clowns or comic book characters, singing or playing 
music, dancing and partying in the middle of huge streets, performed the very joyful nature of 
protesting against what they saw as a cold-blooded, irresponsible, unequal, and sad “corporative 
globalization”.  
Due to the PGA’s novel organizational nature and their spectacular use of performance art and 
theatrical tools, the events on May 98 baffled authorities, mainstream media and even traditional 
leftist parties. “‘Who ARE these guys?’ wondered the Financial Times after the defeat of the MAI” 
(ibid, 66). Even some years later, after other events in Seatle (99), Washington (2000), Quebec 




referring to British political commentator Hugo Young who “attacked the ‘herbivores’ behind 
anti-capitalist protests for making ‘a virtue out of being disorganized’, while the head of the 
World Wildlife Fund referred to us in Genoa, as a ‘formless howling mob’”(ibid). The spokesman 
of Europe’s Transnational Police Agency (Europol) also commented that “we don’t consider them 
terrorists.... We’re not yet sure how to even label them” (ibid) and another media commentator 
described the idea of the movement as a must “to go back to stone ages […] to destroy the 
industry and everything”. 
Pasolini the Italian director was among the skeptics of the youth movements, but later he 
changed his mind. His trajectory in dealing with the emergence of new forms of struggles and 
new collective subjectivities is illuminating. 
An agitator and avant-garde provocateur, Pasolini is still an artist of extreme contradictions and 
paradoxes. Although he didn’t accept the student’s invitation to join them in the protest, he 
praised American intellectuals who “threw their body into the fight”, pointing already to the 
performative significance of new forms of struggle (Bondavalli 151). For him, the United States 
could only function as the birth-place of this contemporary form of creative dissent, for which 
Pasolini suspiciously puts the adjective “new” inside quotation mark, since Italy has already the 
revolutionary language of official Communist party:  
Look at /the Americans, your adorable contemporaries, /with their foolish flowers, they are 
inventing /a “new” revolutionary language! /they invent it day by day! /but you can’t do it because 
in Europe there already is one:/can you ignore it? /yes, you want to ignore it […] abandoning the 
revolutionary language /of the poor, old, official Communist Party of Togliatti /you have adopted 
a heretical variant of it /but on the basis of the lowest jargon/of sociologists without ideology (or 
of the bureaucratic daddies) (qtd.in Bondavalli 152) 
Ideology has been the main critique of official leftism against the contemporary 
performativizations of dissensus. Even after the 2011 Occupy Movements, traditional leftists 
lamented that “‘the streets are full but the churches are empty’ […] in the sense that, although 
there is a lot of fight in these movements, there is little ideology or centralized political 




modernist ideological insistence and anti-modern critique of modern ideologies have been both 
discussed, where ideology should itself be considered as a particular actualization or 
arrangement of differential forces in the society, and not vice versa. But making the similarity 
between the ideologue and the priest exhibits the very centripetal forces of the Orthodox Leninist 
struggles; those repetitive normative performances that do not contain any difference in nature, 
since all of them logically tend toward the constituted Power of the State. “Every time desire is 
betrayed, cursed, uprooted from its field of immanence, a priest is behind it. The priest cast the 
triple curse on desire: the negative law, the extrinsic rule, and the transcendent ideal” (A 
Thousand Plateaus 154), wrote Deleuze and Guattari, thinking about the same forces. They 
identified “the Center or the Signifier” as the “faciality of the despot” which necessitates the 
church or the temple and the palace as the space proper for “the priests and bureaucrats” of the 
State apparatus, pointing to the inclusive modern structure of arborescent thought not only in 
Major politics, but also in Major literature and arts working inside, as Guattari would say, the 
tyranny of the Signifier. However, an apparatus – dispositif – is not only the instrument of the 
rule and oppression of the Signifier, but is also the immaterial compositions of those lines that 
categorize and produce the necessary bifurcations and segmentarity of the current order of 
things; a problem that we will soon return to it.  
Coming out of the mentioned paradoxes, Pasolini later recognized the new nature of his 
contemporaries’ movement and described them as “something fluid and indescribable” although 
“extraordinarily democratic and fascinating” (Bondavalli 157). The very force of the Italian 
autonomist movement drew the artist of the poor to itself, and saw Pasolini eventually  
cooperate with Lotta Continua (Continuous Struggle), “a leftist organization that mixed Marxism, 
Maoism, and anarchism with a generous helping of Christian radicalism”; so much so that Pasolini 
gave up his previous insistence on ideology and accepted that “the priority of these young 
militants is passion and sentiment” (Bifo, Pasolini in Tottenham). The fluidity and indescribability 
he recognized in 1969 has been a constant characteristic of the performative event in the 
interconnected fields of art and politics. In contrast to the traditional theater, where 
spectatorship meant sitting fixed on the seat and fixated on the stage, performative art events 




offered the same fluidity to its crowd, against the rigid identities of people and/or masses, and 
the same freedom of movement to the protestors who are not anymore beholden to the 
authority of either the Party or the union. In the same manner, whereas the traditional theater 
could be described by dramaturg-playwrights, commentators, reviewers and critics in their 
textual endeavors, performance arts proved to be too non-representational (thus open to 
contingency and difference instead of being all planned) to be describable.  
After the Seattle protests of alterglobalization movement in 1999 against the WTO summit that 
resulted to the shutdown of the summit and cancellation of talks, these same characteristics 
baffled the security officials who were unable to take over the situation by means of their 
outdated strategies of oppression against urban struggle. To understand the new “monster”, the 
Pentagon commissioned the RAND Corporation, a policy consultation think tank,  for the purpose 
of producing a study  on Carnival Against Capital. The study (Arquilla and Ronfeldt) described the 
movement as “the NGO swarm”, pointing to its fluidity, and warning about the governments’ 
difficulty to deal with such an organizational character, “because it has no leadership or 
command structure and ‘can sting a victim to death’” (Mittal), shedding light on its non-
representationality. 
For someone such as Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, himself an active participant in the Italian autonomist 
movement, , and in spite of all his false observations in I Hate You Dear Students, Pasolini was 
still seen as someone who could still forecast the maladies of centripetal forces of the 
vanguardist, of “followers of the Leninist Faith … in power”; those who “were only fighting for 
power, were only aiming at taking power from the hands of their parents”, those who “accepted 
and justified the concentration camps of Joseph Stalin, the crimes and lies and oppression of the 
Soviet nomenklatura … and hailed the proletarian dictatorship as a step towards the bright future 
of socialism” (Pasolini in Tottenham). This cannot apply, as Bifo insists, to “the entirety of the 
movement”, but it shows the tensions inside the movement. In other words, the autonomist 
movement had another inner movement that was fighting against the vanguardist ideas, 




These antagonistic forces define the limits of a political performance, drawing the correspondent 
diagram where the performative events are responsible for destroying, outflanking, and blurring 
them. If the theatre avant-gardes reproduce the territoriality of theatre albeit failing in their 
attempts to surpass its limits, the vanguardist do the same regarding the representational 
territory of politics and its corresponding performances; a territory that can be called major 
politics. 
Major politics forms itself around the molar identities: there should always be a homogenous 
nation, people, Volk, citizenry, for a major politics to function (Thoburn 8). These collective 
identitarian bodies, although necessarily crossed by multiple lines of flights and heterogeneities, 
function as (non)audience for the modern acting of sovereignty and governmentality, calling by 
them, becoming hegemonized as we discussed in chapter two.  
The molar functions of hegemonization, nonetheless, do not work in a linear way, bestowing the 
same status to all spectators of the major political performance. “Whether we are individual or 
groups, we are made up of lines and these lines are very varied in nature”, wrote Deleuze and 
Parnet, designating these different natures by lines of rigid or molar segmentarity and lines of 
more supple, molecular segmentarity (Many Politics 124). The first type produces “clearly 
defined segments, in all kinds of directions” to inscribe the molar identities through families, 
armies, schools, professions, etc. The second type of lines is where the constituent forces, the 
desires, start their creations and becomings: molecular versus the molar movements of the 
former. Regarding our previous discussions on Potesta and potentia, there is no contradiction 
here; rather, the second type of lines are curvy, broken, in-between lines of performativizations 
that can crystalize in the first constant, delimited line-segments that are by definition bounded 
by two distinct end points.  
The molecular lines subsist underneath of the molar segments that delimit the territory of major 
political performances, the performances of governmentality. Here, both meaning of the 
performance, in art as well as in management, mixes with each other, since the societies of 
control and the contemporary capitalism, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, has their 




if the performative event is disruptive of the already established limits of the performance stage, 
then differential relations of performativizations are the molecular lines of events. In order to 
see how the major political performances and performative events can be differed from each 
other, a critique of “social performance theory” – a theory that is blind to this very differentiation 
– would be helpful. 
 
3.3.4.2 The Spectacle and its Political Performance 
Not all political performances [Politische Aufführung] are political (and aesthetic) events 
[Ereignis]. This differentiation was re-asserted in the previous chapter through the notions of 
major/minor politics, corresponding to molar segments and molecular lines.  
The recent and emerging field of Cultural Pragmatics and Social (or cultural) Performance theory 
seems to neglect this difference, flattening all antagonistic forces in a generalized theory of 
performance in societies, that stretches itself from time immemorial and its mythical simple 
societies to our contemporary so-called highly complex society. This sociological analysis borrows 
ideas from classical theater studies, based on the modern categories of actors, audience, signs, 
and meanings, considering the social performances “analogized systemically to theatrical ones” 
(Alexander, Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy), and mixes this 
with Saussurean linguistic methodology, in the sense that the performances’ significations can 
be studied through the duality of Langue/Parole, i.e. diachronically and synchronically. The 
mixture assumes an evolutionary tone, with  characteristics typical of Hegelian historical 
narratives, where the simple societies with their simple rituals become more sophisticated and 
develop cultural performances that are ritual-like.  
Despite its constant reference to the “performative” (and contemporary performance studies), 
Jeffrey C. Alexander’s conceptualization as the main theorist of Social Performance do not get 
near the main conceptual differences that the performative turn in arts and politics created after 
the 1960s. The first presupposition behind this conceptualization is the existence of an already 
provided stage on which “an individual or collective actor must be able to communicate the 




(Alexander, Performance and Power), providing a modernist and representational definition for 
performance where “the systems of collective representations … background every performative 
act” (Alexander, Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy 33). Based 
on modernist binaries, the model for performance obtains a rigid structural character in which 
all elements, all possible dramatizations, are already defined in order to provide Alexander an 
“analytical model of social performance safely in hand” for analyzing “earlier societies” as well as 
contemporary “social developments” of “performative action” (ibid 32). There is no contingency 
involved in such a performativity; in fact, this performance can be accomplished “by becoming 
an actor in a script” (Alexander, Performance and Power 2), in a pre-written dramatization which 
makes no room for the fluidity of the performative subjectification processes. The notion of 
performativity is here conceptualized from a pre-performative turn perspective, identified with 
theatricality, subjugated to the textual-dramatic, and in such a way that “like any other text, 
these collective representations, whether background or foreground, can be evaluated for their 
dramatic effectiveness”30.  
Performance here is nothing but the Butlerian normative performance that constructs rigid 
identities, with a crucial difference: in Butler, performativity disrupts performance, bringing 
about a non-discursive alternative that resists mere identities. By contrast, in Alexander, there is 
no difference in nature between these two sides. Alexander founds its theatrical perspective on 
Marjorie Boulton’s definition of theater as “literature that walks and talks before our eyes”. It is 
not surprising that Boulton gives such an Aristotelian, classical definition of theater, enslaved to 
literature and writing in general, since she writes mostly in Esperanto, a language that is itself 
constructed according to a universalist idea of the One against the multiple. This theorization 
thus has nothing to do with what we have called in our previous discussion the performative 
radical politics, or the performative event (as Ereignis).  
The simplification process of this sociological theory, which claims to be a theory on “the 
performative”, reaches its height by putting the major politics of the established order and the 
minor politics of the protest movements beside each other: social performance theory does not 
 





even separate dissensus from consensus, State politics from grassroot politics, medialized 
spectacular happenings in the level of governments from bodily co-presentation against the 
main-stream apparatuses of representation. For instance, in another text in the seminal 
collection of essays by social performance theorists (Alexander, Giesen and Mast, Social 
Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual), the Clinton/Lewinsky affair 
become an example of “event-ness”, confusing four concepts of Performativität, Aufführung, 
Event, and Ereignis by using them interchangeably.  
Therefore, social movements are considered as social performances that function as an umbrella 
term covering almost every kind of happenings in the field of politics. The scholars with this 
perspective would consider indifferently social campaigns against and for Clinton, Obama 
electoral campaign, Chinese cultural revolution, Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Gezi, the Egyptian 
revolution, as all belonging to the same category of social performance (Alexander and Mast, 
Introduction: symbolic action in theory and practice). But as Saul Newman rightfully points out, 
the occupy movement involves “the creation of autonomous spaces and relations rather than 
the representation of identities [or messages] to power” (Occupy and Autonomous Political Life 
93). 
In my interviews about Gezi Park protests with Turkish activist-artists, they expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the mainstream analytical perspective of performance studies on the recent 
social movements that does not, in its analysis, differentiate between various occupy movements 
in different local contexts. In a lecture in Berlin, Turkish art critic Süreyyya Evren also insisted that 
the creativity in Occupy Gezi cannot be compared similarly with the creativity in the Global North 
contexts such as Occupy Wall Street. Although Evren did not elaborate any further, the point 
seems fairly clear: there are different problematics as ideas, different performativizations, 
different molecular lines of flight, and thus different subjectification processes at work when one 
looks at the respective occupations in Istanbul and New York.  
In his lecture in the same conference in Berlin, Alexander analyzed Obama’s 2008 election 
campaign not only in relation to the Occupy Movements after 2011 regardless of their singular 




peasant revolution and cultural revolution decades before all these movements as well. For him, 
these performative actions are all measured through certain structural criteria of success such as 
theatrical identification, emotional catharsis, receiving and accepting “your symbolic projection” 
as inevitably passive observers. a performativity which is paradoxically not processual, but result-
oriented, which means a non-performativity, or any other concept rather than performativity. 
What is more, these theoretical confusions, says Alexander, have been made and ultimately 
justified as the necessary means for erecting “a systematic, macro-sociological model of social 
action as cultural performance” (Alexander, Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between 
Ritual and Strategy 31). And herein lies the problem: one cannot study the micro-social processes 
in daily life and particularly in social movements with a macro-sociological model that adapts the 
perspective of the constituted Power, of the molar segments and major politics; and precisely 
when one must necessarily assume an other methodology which affirms, with Spinoza, that even 
the rigid Potesta of an absolute monarchy is the product of the fluid potentia of the multitude.  
In social performance theory, just as it is with Modernity’s social projects, reduction and 
homogenization go hand in hand. First, all the performance stages are homogenized. It is not 
important how the stage was constituted, whether it was preexisted or autonomously created 
by the collective body. Nor is it considered where and when the stage erected, i.e. under what 
conditions and limitations for a social performativity.  
Even in Austin’s philosophy of the performative, one should consider the conditions of a 
performative utterance, or better, to see how it works. When Austin refers to the criteria of 
success as part of his pragmatics, it is not a utilitarian pragmatics. The performative utterance 
should change the reality in order to be a successful performative utterance and this 
transformative power comes from its ability to establish new (social) relations – as in the case of 
his famous example, the relation of marriage between two individuals. In Alexander, on the other 
hand, this criterion becomes the success of manipulation: make others believe what you believe 
or you want them to believe. It is a shift from the terrain of constituent power of performativity, 
its transformative power, or better, of performativizations, to the terrain of ideology, that is a 




Moreover, the bodies are also homogenized under social performance theory. Even if we think 
in terms of audience and actors, there are different layers of spectatorship from which various 
groups try to make a stage for their performance.  
Let us consider Occupy Wall Street as a social performance against the State’s spectacle. There 
are those who are already considered as legitimate actors of the dominant socio-political scene, 
the so-called 1% and the professional politicians. The citizenry as a whole, the so-called 99%, 
function as the spectators. However, there are various inner barriers inside the citizenry, 
categorizing the citizens with their proximity to higher ranks of power relations’ hierarchy. From 
the color of the skin to sexuality, age, profession, ethnicity, and so on, all of which affect one’s 
role as spectator who shares in the performance to the extent that they are distinct from those 
who personify its representative function. Like a usual performance involving food sharing in an 
established theater salon, only the spectators of the front seats will enjoy the full experience by 
tasting some of the provided material.  
 
3.3.4.3 Dispossession, the Poor and the Inner Borders of Publikum 
The more distanced spectators of the molar political scene are more dispossessed, poor, 
marginal, or subaltern; all designations that come out of contemporary political theory to give a 
name to the unnamed in societies. However, these are not pure victims of a monstrous system, 
but possess the power of constituting the being, the potentiality of flight and creativity. In their 
book on the performative in the political, Butler and Athanasiou (2013) establish a link between 
the transformative power of the performative and dispossession. While they do not forget to pay 
attention to the sufferings and oppression in the case of imposed processes of dispossession on 
different minorities and populations, dispossession brings about another implication in their 
analysis: the dispossession of molar identities due to and during performativizations in events, 
the dispossession that establishes a distance between itself and the State’s apparatuses of 
spectacular performances. They are dispossessed of any agency in the theatrical spectacle of 
major politics, although being mentioned as part of political programs, not unlike P. in the 




indebted, who rose in number after the 2008 Crisis, or the Black Lives – their gaze upon the limits 
of State’s representation may as well show the direction of the people to come. 
Nonetheless, Butler and Athanasiou’s concept of dispossession is linked with the concept of 
“loss” and “lack” in psychoanalytic discourse, where – as previously discussed – the ultimate link 
between subject and subjection remains intact. Adopting our own perspective in the research 
presented here, the ontogenetic primacy of the affirmative and constituent forces over the 
negative, Hardt and Negri’s notion of the multitude of the poor proves helpful. Here, “the poor 
is defined by not lack but possibility”, which is productive with its own creative forces, but 
virtually not reproductive of capitalist production, since “the poor, migrants, and ‘precarious’ 
workers ... are often conceived as excluded, but really, though subordinated, they are completely 
within the global rhythms of biopolitical production” (Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth xi). 
Although they define poverty as a characteristic of the multitude in opposition to property as a 
definitive element of Modernity’s sociality, they as well insist that this opposition “should be 
understood in terms of ... the forms of subjectivity produced”, where the poverty of the 
multitude names a production of social subjectivity that results in a radically plural and open 
body politic, opposed to both the individualism and the exclusive, unified social body of 
property”. The poor–those who are not really allowed in the game of spectatorship– migrate 
through the molecular lines of performativizations against the major spectacle and its conditions, 
and against its territorialization.  
In the case of the occupy movements, this multitude of the poor breaks into four “figures of the 
subjectivity”, the Indebted, the Mediatized, the Securitized, and the Represented, whose 
creativity brings about the characteristics of altermodernities (cf. Declaration 2012).  
(This breakdown and its corresponding analyses in the book, however, could be read as too 
eurocentrist, where there is fear of a fatal theoretical mistake: neglecting the differences 
between local contexts and their idiosyncratic singularities, between their singular bodies and 
major political spectacles, thus between their territories of the molar theater of the spectacle 




The salon is anyway too small for the 99%: there are even people, like the “illegal” immigrants or 
the homeless, who are not counted by the State of the situation among the respectable citizens. 
Thus, to say one cannot generalize the actor and the audience of a social performance is not 
enough: the mere existence of the unrepresented paperless asylum-seekers, immigrants, and 
homeless people beside the middle-class intellectuals and artists, the precariat, and the indebted 
in Zuccotti Park delegitimizes the use of generalized actor-spectator terminology that flattens all 
the differences between bodies, of any structural territorialized conception of theatrical 
performance, and consequently, of social performance theory of Alexander and his colleagues.  
The active appearance of such groups in Occupy Wall Street is a dynamic that cannot be 
accounted for by virtue of  Social Performance’s methodology, or any other methodology that 
fails to observe the performative processes of this event. And contrary to the Social Performance 
perspective, the global heterogeneity of Occupied parks and plazas cannot be treated as similar 
and therefore comparatively theorized with  the Clinton affair or Obama’s re-election campaign: 
they are different in nature.  
Differing in kind and not in degree, one is forced to confront the fact that even the most humble 
of analogies between the OCW movement and other Occupy movements is quite simply  
untenable. For example, despite the fact that Israel had its own occupy movement in 2012,  its 
domestic Arab population stayed out of its tent cities despite their being the most un-
represented minority in Israelisociety. Therefore, the questions that must be posed are as 
follows: how do the bodies of an occupation perform the idea of being together? How does the 
relationship between different bodies transform there in comparison to the dominant sociality? 
How do they recreate their temporality and spatiality through their performativizations? 
The inner borders of a performance Publikum, and in a more general sense, of the public itself, 
have been one of the problematics that contemporary performance artist-activists have engaged 
with in different projects. Noteworthy here are the Hawaiian Diggers, a guerrilla theatre group in 
Hawaii,  who dealt with the paradoxes of the public in a long-term processual project in their own 
manner. This project consisted of planting papaya seedlings near a fence bordering a privatized 




afterwards. Without getting into the specifics of their processual piece, it is worth underscoring 
the paradoxes these artist-activists found in the notion of the public: 
The public comes to be understood as the group that already has access to private property where 
they can conduct all the other activities that life demands: sleeping, working, having sex, growing 
food. All those things that are banned from public space. For those without private homes or 
reliable access to food, or for those performing activities prohibited in public, “public space” 
becomes a zone of criminality (Chan and Sharma 181). 
Nonetheless, taking a macro-perspective and thinking through the rigid segments in social 
performance theory has already enabled us to see better how the territory of performance from 
the perspective of major politics is territorialized, which in turn makes the cartography of its 
deterritorializing and transgressing forces easier.  
Social performance theory illegitimately incorporates another element from contemporary 
performance studies; namely the disappearance of the duality between authenticity and artifice, 
or the real and the artificial, in order to justify its macro-perspective by rejecting any difference 
in nature between minor politics of performativity and major politics of the spectacle. Alexander 
and Mast claim that “the signified, no matter what its position in the manipulated field of cultural 
production, can never be separated from some set of signifiers”. Such a statement amounts to 
saying that there are no strata or unequal positions inside the field of cultural production such as 
those mentioned in the case of theater buildings, or in that of Occupy Wall Street, or indeed 
anywhere else in society. By way of this axiom, Alexander and Mast reject the ideas that point to 
the society of spectacle. “Commentators as Baudrillard announce, and denounce, the 
contemporary interplaying of reality with fiction as demarcating a new age,” they write, “one in 
which pragmatics has displaced semantics, social referents have disappeared, and only signifiers 
powered by the interests and powers of the day remain” (Introduction: symbolic action in theory 
and practice 6).  
The disappearance of social referents does not signify incurable pessimism in politics as much as 
it signifies a paradigmatic, historical rupture between the disciplinary societies of industrial 




capitalism. Additionally, it implies that representative politics and the politics of representation 
are themselves dissolving under the weight of theoretical and practical crises, making the way 
for the best or the worst, as we have seen in the performativizations of occupy movement and 
joyful immanent politics, or in the incessant destruction machine of identity politics in 
contemporary civil wars. All these considerations, therefore, refute Alexander and Mast’s claim 
that “we are ‘condemned’ to live out our lives in an age of artifice, a world of mirrored, 
manipulated, and mediated representation” (ibid 7).  
Now, with the detailed critique of Cultural Pragmatics and Social Performance theory, we know 
what does not work as a performative event and falls within the realm of major spectacular 
performances. These are theories that  conceive of an autonomous, open, collective body, with 
all its heterogeneities, differences, and minoritarian practices, in terms of a “static contradiction” 
between those who act and those who receive, between the communication of a meaning and 
the acceptance of that meaning, between the subject of enunciation (or here, main 
figures/actors) and the subject of statement (or here, script). There is, however, no relation of 
production between these two contradictory poles: in this semi-Hegelian theory, the two 
already-existing opposing poles exist and whose synthesis is simply the result of a more primary 
relation between opposing generalities.  Therefore, there is always a macro-sociological stage for 
a molar politics based on competition (and there is a huge difference between competition and 
dissensus). The past of a social performance here is always the same territory of spectacular 
theater, with its rigid territorialization; its future, depending if it is successful in persuading others 
to identify with its own identity, remains as nothing other than the same spectacular theater, 
only now with different actors or limits.  
A performative event cannot be a social performance of this kind: being performative, there exists 
a productive relation, an ontogenesis, between the bodies and their stage, that establishes 
transversal relations among the different layers of spectators, actors, the excluded, the 
marginalized. As an event, there should be something “ereignen” in the social relations, bringing 
about an alternative present by going back to the future (the temporalities of performative event 




Speaking about the 2014 Maidan Revolution in Ukraine, Badiou argues that the European 
mainstream media have tried to represent the movement as a “static contradiction” (A Present 
Defaults). In this static image reproduced by mass media, the Ukrainian movement does not live 
its singular past, nor does it have a future; because its future – joining the European Union – is 
already a predefined past; an actualized historical drama. Therefore, static contradiction finds 
itself overdetermined by conditioning binaries such as West/East, liberal democracy/monocracy, 
market freedom/socialist Iron Feast; and its actors play their role to communicate a meaning as 
referents.  
But the production of images, as a function of what Lazzarato calls “capitalist expression 
machine” (Struggle, Event, Media), is itself an aesthetic procedure that initiates its own molar 
subjectifications. And yet, a (re)productive relation remains enveloped therein: , even if some 
narrative considers it a static contradiction, there are biopolitical subjects reproduced by these 
processes to maintain the established order. This is the function of major political performances 
or its theatre of the spectacle. It is not detached from  daily life, but is reproductive of daily life  
inside already-existing limits. 
The cases of the “Artistic Hundred Group” and “Student Assembly” in Maidan Revolution are 
particularly helpful in this regard. Regarding the former, the “Artistic Hundred Group” was an 
initiative that was shaped by the movement itself, as a sign of loyalty or fidelity to it and whose 
name was a direct reference to the  one hundred separate ways of organizing bodies in the square 
(there were around 100 initiatives in the Civil Council of Maidan that were practicing being-
together and direct democracy). Perhaps most importantly, the “Artistic Hundred Group” 
believed that the organization of Maidan’s collective body should not be crystallized in any 
organic or hierarchical structure.  
Maidan was indeed full of assemblies. “Student Assembly,” one of Maidan’s biggest formation, 
had organized movie screening, lectures in Maidan’s Open University, various theatrical and 
musical performances, and protests against existing higher education. But above all, they were a 
group living in an occupied administrative building, “where according to the police's estimation 




oppressed, a “Theater for dialogue”, alongside an autonomist and non-hierarchical organization, 
for the purpose of intervening in the civil war. Their organizers describe the collective body in 
Maidan as a body consisting of “anarchists, Cossacks, reenactors of historical events, Nationalists, 
Nazis, leftist intellectuals, Labour union leaders and active members, professional politicians, 
NGO workers and leaders, human rights activists, contemporary artists and just artists...”31. As 
one can see, these events do not let themselves be reduced to any homogenous spectacle. There 
is a complexity to the internal dynamics proper to the Maidan Revolution due to the 
particularities of the historical and material context of Ukraine in 2014; a complex dynamism that 
cannot be grasped by either main-stream media narratives or by Social Performance Theory. 
Deterritorializing and transgressive, the performative event marks a rupture from the established 
territory by tending to its threshold, while simultaneously moving toward an alternative 
organization of forces – the direction of P’s gaze in Catastrophe. 
Here we come back to our initial differentiation between the molecular and the molar, the virtual 
and the actual, the performativizations and the crystals. They are not in contradiction with each 
other, rather presenting us with a productive, and ontogenetic, relation.  
Although we can distinguish aesthetically and performatively which acts are not participants 
within the performative event, we still need to see its function and how singular 
performativizations of each singular event, particularly for our main cases of different Occupy 
Movements. These moments, as Pasolini recognized, are fluent and indescribable, yet immensely 
democratic. These characteristics, therefore, suggest an aesthetics proper to the performative 
event. 
 
3.4 Aesthetics and the Performative Event 
 
 
31 The quotations are derived from my interview with an Ukrainian artivist who participated actively in the 
movement. Further problematization of this heterogeneity that includes Nazis is presented in chapter three, in the 




Considering the concrete usage of the term “event” for the production of the new in art and 
politics, it is not surprising that the performative event has been conceptualized via different, 
even sometimes antagonistic, perspectives of critical thinkers under the rubric of an aesthetic-
political happening. In other words, according to Whitehead for example, each event is 
aesthetical when it works on time/space, folds onto them and folds them; and it is also political, 
because of the participation, or partaking of bodies in these time/space relations, transforming 
them and being transformed by them.  
Aesthetics nonetheless brings about different implications in each theoretical endeavor on 
performative events which should be considered with their convergent and divergent lines of 
thought. However, in almost all of them, there is a reference to art, or better artistic practices, 
as a constituent element in eventness. Deleuze once wrote about Proust that “thanks to art, 
instead of seeing a single world, our own, we see it multiplied, and we have as many worlds at 
our disposal as there are artists, worlds more different from each other than those that spin 
through infinity” (Deleuze, Proust and Signs 187). When the Zapatistas declare their will toward 
a world in which many worlds fit, it is hardly far from such aesthetics.  
3.4.1 Event as Aesthetic Dislocation 
In October 1968, just a few months after the ‘events of May’, Gerard Fromanger and Jean-Luc 
Godard set up some red plexiglass bubbles on a street in Paris. The ordinary life in the street, all 
minor confrontations among people and between them and the space with their speeds and 
slowness, whatever that was happening in the streets, were reflexing in a distorted way on those 
bubbles. Passersby gathered around the plexiglass bubbles and Godard started filming their 
reaction toward the installation. After a short while, police suddenly intervened, smashed the 
bubbles and arrested the artists. We may wonder: what triggered such a violence reaction from 





Figure 1 - Godard and Fromanger red plexiglass bubble in the street. Image Extracted from the film ArtVille by Claude Yvans, 
201632. 
 
Related to, and yet different from, Godard and Fromanger’s installation is Khaled Hourani’s 
project, Picasso in Palestine. On the basis of a loan request made to the Van Abbemuseum by the 
International Art Academy Palestine in July 2009, and following extensive research, the painting 
Buste de Fern me (1943), one of the most iconic works of the Van Abbemuseum's collection 
travelled to Ramallah, where it was exhibited in a specially constructed room inside the IAAP, 
June 24 to July 20, 2011. Picasso in Palestine laid down a challenge to art institutions, insurance 
companies, transport agencies, and diplomats, but most of all illustrated the Palestinian 
population's struggle for recognition and a normal life in the occupied territories. Picasso 
represented a normality in the state of exception, another dislocation, which was faced by strong 
opposition from Israel’s government. Even more telling here is the works place within the history 
of the traffic of art objects to and from zones of occupation and exception and the passage of a 
painting from one occupation in 1943 to another in 2011; from the Nazi occupied Paris to Israeli 
occupied West Bank, Ramallah.  
 





Figure 2 – Picasso in Palestine: Picasso’s “Buste de Femme” in International Academy of Art Palestine in Ramallah, 2011. Photo 
by Charles Esche33 
Yet another example belongs to a period of popular protests against Vladimir Putin, the president 
of Russian Confederation. The protest happened in 2012, when the occupy movements were 
spreading throughout the nation and even reaching extending itself to its continental borders. 
During these popular demonstrations against Putin, a puppet demonstration took place in the 
Siberian city of Barnaul, after a regular demonstration for fair elections was forbidden by the 
police. The demonstration of around 250 toys from Kinder eggs, Lego figures, toy soldiers, stuffed 
animals, and toy cars was met by police intervention and permission for more public 
demonstrations was refused on the grounds that these toys were produced mainly in China and 
were, therefore, not “Russian”. 
In light of these examples, it is perhaps Jacques Rancière’s theory of aesthetics and distribution 
of the sensible that proves to be the most helpful. For Rancière, aesthetics does not primarily 
mean the study of the beautiful. It originally comes from the first critique of Kant, the Critique of 
Pure Reason, in which aesthetics is related to a priori conditions of sensual perception, which are 
space and time. Ranciere borrows this concept, and extends it to art theory via third Kantian 
Critique, the Critique of Judgment. He defines aesthetics “not as the theory of the beautiful or of 
art; nor is it the theory of sensibility. Aesthetics is a historically determined concept which 
 




designates a specific regime of visibility and intelligibility of art, which is inscribed in a 
reconfiguration of the categories of sensible experience and its interpretation” (Rancière, 
Thinking between Disciplines: an Aesthetics of Knowledge 1). 
 
Figure 3 - Puppet demo in Barnaul, 2012. Photo by RFE/RL’s Russian Service34 
On the other hand, molar society is formed by rigid segment-lines, those hierarchies that place 
each subject in a pre-defined space and time. This hierarchical sensory system is the relation 
between aesthetics and politics, or as Rancière puts it, “a well-ordered society would like the 
bodies which compose it to have the perceptions, sensations and thoughts which correspond to 
them” (ibid 9). In other words, aesthetics here should be “understood in the Kantian sense – re-
examined by Foucault – as a system of a priori forms determining what presents itself to sense 
experience” (The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible 13). Consequently, 
Rancière introduces another term: the distribution of the sensible. This term refers exactly to 
those positionings in space and time which constitutes a society and its regime of visibility and 
intelligibility and specifies which objects and subjects should be seen, heard and thought of; or 
in political terms, who should be counted: 
I call the distribution of the sensible the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that 
simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define 
 




the respective parts and positions within it (The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the 
Sensible 2). 
In the realm of art, however, Rancière speaks of an aesthetic revolution, in which aesthetics 
appears as “a ‘finality without end’ [finalité sans fin], a pleasure disconnected from every science 
of ends” (Thinking between Disciplines: an Aesthetics of Knowledge 5). This aesthetic revolution 
interrupts the existing distribution of the sensible, intervenes in it, and redistributes the sensible 
in a way that invisible and inaudible subjects and objects could be seen and heard; where the 
objects and themes which have been excluded from the realm of art are included via a 
redistribution of the sensible, which abolishes the historical and material hierarchy between 
genres and the senses (or in political terms, uncounted people will be counted by an aesthetic 
revolution). For Rancière, this process of redistribution is characterized by a dislocation, 
understood as the introduction of specific phenomena within a regime of space and time whose 
internal logic actively prevents its appearance in the world. To make the invisible visible, is, if 
nothing else, the political dimension of aesthetics par excellence.  
And this is how Godard and Fromanger’s simple performance in Paris became so threatening and 
elicited an excessive, if not absurd, response on the part of the police. They dislocated their 
installation or performance from galleries or theatres – where a performance is supposed to be 
performed -- into tense streets of Paris after May 68. This is how the performative event becomes 
performative dislocation. A dislocated performance always transgresses the limits of the theatre 
as territory; that is to say, performative dislocations are acts of deterritorialization. And it is 
precisely by grasping the that dislocated performances could provide an answer to those 
questions which were presented in the previous section.  
Given the demonstrable limitations to theatre’s territorialization, an exodus from theatre 
buildings – which are the embodiments of established values – seems necessary. Kershaw 
correctly warns us that “it doesn’t matter much that we might have a critical attitude to these 
ideologies [represented by theatre]; the fact of their use is in part an animation of the values 
inscribed in the architecture” (Kershaw 51). Hence, acts of the performative unfold within the 




performance artists alike, and precisely because “art is political because it shapes a specific 
sensorium, suspending the ordinary coordinates of space and time that structure the forms of 
social domination” (Rancière, Artists and Cultural Producers as Political Subjects). 
To locate the eventness of a happening or an artistic practice on the social aesthetics, that is 
spatio-temporal relations, presents another important characteristic of performative events: 
their processual being. Neither static contradictions, nor still images; rather, processes, 
differentials, performativizations are constituent of events. But this entails another aspect in the 
event that Rancière does not consider. This overlooked aspect marks another problem in the For 
what is overlooked within the Rancièrian theory of dislocation is its indifference to singular 
contexts, which is the condition of possibility for analyzing three examples from France, Palestine 
and Russia with the same abstract, conceptual framework. 
3.4.2 The Aesthetic Production of the Creation 
If we consider the Marxian formulation that “capital is a social relation”, then we can say that the 
Occupy movements were collective experiments, not only in exiting the globalized capitalist 
social relations particular to their local context, but also in temporarily creating new social 
relations through performative forms of politics. That said, we immediately encounter the limits 
of Rancière’s redistribution of the sensible via dislocation presupposes the already-existing 
spatial relations, and therefore aims only to disrupt, redistribute, and ultimately work inside 
them. What if the established relations can be altered, and give way to an alternative? Rancière 
does not include any ontogenetic, productive relation between the bodies and their spatio-
temporal relationality in society; therefore, performativizations of political events are not 
considered in it. While it may be the case that “Being is made in the event” (Hardt and Negri, 
Commonwealth 63), the ontogenesis proper to performativized political events is two-sided; i.e. 
events function “in a way that bumps ‘being’ straight into becoming” (Massumi, Parables For The 
Virtual 5). It is here where artistic practice situates itself: coming from the present through 
experimenting with it, putting the being into becoming, creating the new, performing another 
experimentation, and so on. “Art has this strange prophetic function: it is made in the present, 
from the materials at hand, but calls out to something else”, writes Sullivan on the contemporary 




constructive ruptures - that are not necessarily held within art but that nevertheless effect a 
deterritorialization of subjectivity” (Sullivan 98). Therefore, aesthetics find another implication 
here, “in the sense of the production of the creation of something” (Lazzarato, Grasping the 
Political in the Event 15).  
“The production of the creation” means triggering alternative subjectification processes that 
make creation possible; and creation is always the production of the new, or in our particular 
historical context, of altermodernities. But as we have seen, the major hegemonic mode of 
production has already put immaterial and performative faculties into work. “Subjectivity itself 
has become the most important objective in capitalist societies” writes Guattari, insisting that 
non-discursive, performative basis of subjectivity is attacked by capitalist forms of living 
(Lazzarato, The Aesthetic Paradigm 174). This is the reason that the aesthetic character of the 
event, according to Guattari, contains the inevitable rupture, the flight, from the dominant 
regime that makes space (and time) for the new; “something happens - a molecular event, a point 
of indeterminacy” (O'Sullivan 96).  
We began this chapter with the delimitations of the performative not only in the creative and 
culture industry, but also in the new industry as a whole. Art as a separate field is already 
integrated into the world market and movements of globalization. Nonetheless, the efficacy of a 
performative event lies exactly here, too. “If artistic techniques appear to play a more and more 
important role in the processes of subjugation, they must also be mobilized for the processes of 
subjectivation” (Lazzarato, The Aesthetic Paradigm 175). It is in the assemblages between the 
artistic to the social and the political, which connects to each other through aesthetics, we can 
find the real implications of performative event. 
The ethico-aesthetic paradigm purports to locate art's 'creative potential' transversal to every 
domain, characterizing and traversing 'political' experience. 'Art is not just the activity of 
established artists but of a whole subjective creativity' which traverses the most diverse domains 
and milieus, 'the generations and oppressed peoples, ghettoes, minorities' (ibid). 
It is this transversality that goes through all bodies, bringing the bodies of the poor onto the 




is required for this operation to work”. Therefore, this aesthetic creation amounts to the labour 
of the poor, all those who are disinterested, either in furthest seats of major political performance 
or excluded from it, all those who mark the paradoxes of “the public”, where part of the 
performativizations of the event is creating alternative (social) relations of production. Hence, 
the aesthetic production of creation. 
3.4.3 Arts-Politics: Machinic Assemblages 
This research redefines artistic and political processes of subjectivation and creation in terms of 
its own method, by referring to a potentia that is able to transform the time and space, and 
creates its own common body. Therefore, what is here called performative in art and politics 
resonates with Benjamin’s conceptualization of critically political art and literature in regards to 
the author as producer: such an art/politics should transform the dominant relations of 
production imposed on it by capitalist system. Updating Benjamin’s modernist perspective, one 
should consider the colonial and post-colonial relations of production in each singular context, 
that invalidates the very ideas of modernity and modernism in relation to our research. Under 
this light, we are dealing with non-representational artistic practices that challenge not only the 
representation regime of art, but the regime of representation that persists by virtue of the 
functioning of political institutions.  
 
Chantal Mouffe, for example, argues in favor of a supposedly radical reformism, which engages 
with institutions in order to transform into actually existing democratic institutions. Hence the 
reason for Mouffe’s critique of the Occupy movements for their lack of engagement with existing 
institutions and intervene in the style of SYRIZA in Greece, or Podemos in Spain. On the other 
hand, various art groups and collectives engaged in the movements by making an exodus from 
institutions. Many of them warn against the dangers of Mouffe’s views. Especially when, 
according to Hito Steyerl, contemporary art is inherently related to contemporary post-colonial 
capitalism (Steyerl 2010). This danger has been called democratism: the peaceful coexistence 
between different cultures and ideologies in a manner that best ensures the continued existence 




the democratist doctrine, art has become one of its primary tools of legitimization: art exactly 
embodies the "freedom" that democratist rule claims to bring to the world.  
 
Possibly the ultimate example of art as democratist propaganda is a notorious CIA funded project 
during the Cold War, the "Congress for Cultural Freedom," which among other things was tasked 
with globally promoting the works of American abstract expressionist artists in response to the 
pictorial regime of socialist realism as the officially sanctioned art of the Soviet Union. From the 
perspective of the CIA’s “Congress,” abstract art is free art. 
First of all, democratism, through its permanent display of culture in the form of art, industrial 
progress, and even conquered people, aims at proving its capacity to engineer "peaceful 
coexistence" between different cultures and ideologies... Second, democratism's display of global 
peaceful coexistence is based on the fact that its engineering structure, formed by colonial 
capitalism, is not questioned or subverted itself, which would result in the immediate introduction 
of martial law or other "states of exception" in order to guarantee the continuation of 
democratism's rule. And thirdly, this engineering structure is defined by a continuous overlap 
between governmental forces and private ownership. (Staal, Progressive Art 60) 
A more recent example is the "critical" theater group Orkater and the author Arnon Grunberg, 
who joined the Dutch troops in Afghanistan in 2006 (ibid 62). Both are known as critical cultural 
producers who have translated their experiences in Afghanistan to expose the ambiguities and 
paradoxes of war, the discrepancies between the home command and the war on the ground. 
Interestingly enough, it is not in spite of, but precisely because of this criticality that they were 
tolerated by the military. By their mere presence, the artists prove the success of democratism 
as an exported product: its transparency and self-critique extend to the point where war is being 
criticized even while it is being waged. However, this critique never brought the war to an end. 
 
On the other hand, there is the enduring legacy of the PublixTheatre Caravan and its Volxtheatre 
Favoriten—a project that began in Ernst Kirchweger Haus (EKH), an autonomous squat in Vienna 
whose squatters were a group of autonomists, anarchists and Kurds. The performances of this 
agit-amateur-theater group consisted of free adaptations of classic dramatic works, operas in 




seeking, and so on. Their performative works were done without director, by collective processes 
of decision-making, while the group was open to other interested outsiders. Volxtheatre left its 
EKH immobile stage once the far-right party FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) was deemed to be a 
legitimate political organization, thereby allowing the FPÖ  to enter into a coalition government 
with other conservatives. In response, a mass movement broke out in order to oppose its racist, 
xenophobic discourses, wherein Volxtheatre initiated a mobile strategy by setting off theater 
caravans for nine days of street celebration in nine different cities. And in order to further the 
groups experiment with performative practices, Volxtheatre shifted their focus away from 
protesting against the national policies to intervening at the transnational level, thereby 
becoming what is now known as the Publixtheatre Caravan, whose first tour started in May 2000 
in support of asylum seekers and against Europe’s migration policies.  
 
As part of the preparations for the battle against the 27th summit of G8 in Genoa, the 
PublixTheatre Caravan, with participants from 10 different countries, traveled through Austria, 
Slovenia, Germany, and Italy, to places where borders could be problematized and migrant 
policies be challenged, and oriented itself toward the events which alterglobalization movement 
was planning to perform in Salzburg (against World Economic Forum [WEF]) and Genoa (against 
G8) (See Müller 2002). In a move against its abstract machines that dominate over the field of 
expression and the production of images, the Caravan broadcasted daily reports on the tour via 
mobile phone, the Viennese independent Radio Orange, and through online reports published 
by independent media web pages and activist mailing lists. With respect to the events that 
transpired in Genoa of that year, police arrested the whole caravan. In the wake of a court case 
that was highly covered by mainstream media, the Caravan found themselves frustrated by the 
fact that their image was appropriated by mainstream media, which shaped court proceedings, 
which ultimately led to the Caravan’s announcement of their dissolution.  
 
As we have seen in previous sections, the real subsumption of the creative faculties within the 
logic of capitalist accumulation appears as the fate of those involved in processes of artistic 




that the modernist notion of artistic autonomy and its privileged critical position toward 
industrial production – because of its different regime of production – have been long gone. But 
it does not mean that autonomy of the processes of artistic creation, its singular subjectifications, 
and its virtual forces in envisioning a world of many worlds are gone. Instead, art should be seen 
as artistic machines that have the capacity to construct machinic assemblages with other social 
machines: either the technical machines of semio-capitalism, or the desiring or performative 
machines of social movements. 
Machine here, however, does not refer to either technological innovations or new-age cyborgs. 
The word machine derives from the Latin word machina which means “machine, engine, military 
machine; device, trick; instrument”. This very Latin word is itself a derivation of the ancient Greek 
mekhane which refers to “device and means”. Mekhane is in the same family with mekhos 
("means, expedient, contrivance") coming from the root magh which means “to be able, have 
power” (that in the old English has its relation to the verb “can”). The etymology of the word 
shows that machine originally did not refer only to the mechanical or technological things and 
tools, but to device, expedient and contrivance as well.  From the vantage point of its etymology, 
it is clear that ‘machine’ had an immaterial as well as material connotation. And as Gerald Raunig 
has helpfully reminded us, the main two fields of application for the word in antiquity were 
theatre (as theatre machines) and war (as war machines). 
However, the various meanings of machine, from its use as a concept in texts and discourse in 
general, became limited in the 16th century. In the 1540s, according to the Etymology Dictionary, 
machine was defined by the dominant discourse as referring to a “structure of any kind”. This 
meaning became even narrower in the mid-17th century, when the term referred to a “device 
made of moving parts for applying mechanical power” and was applied as "apparatus, appliance 
and military siege-tower”. As Raunig, in the 17th century “there was a proliferation of metaphors 
of man as machine, of the state as machine, of the world as machine” (Raunig, A Thousand 
Machines 19-20); machine as universal metaphor for a purely utilitarian and functional order, on 
both of the micro and macro levels. The main impulse of this conceptualization of machine as 
purely functional and utilitarian could be related to the increasing speed of development and 




machines – which can be easily seen in the emergent genre of science fiction that time – complete 
this drama.  
In the second half of the 19th century, there was a revival of the immaterial connotation of 
machine and is perhaps best seen in a famous section of Marx’s Grundrisse, “Fragment on 
Machines”. In this text, Marx explains the development of machines in the history of the 
development of fixed capital and its relation to the “general intellect”. For Marx, the machine 
became qualitatively different from a simple tool, for while a tool can be used by an individual 
worker as a means of production, a machine is the objectification of skills and knowledge, and 
dominates workers via a regime of social subjection. In this fragment, the machine is described 
as an independent entity which consumes energy just like workers who consumes food: machine 
has a “soul of its own” (Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Political Economy (Rough Draft) 
693) and dominates workers to the extent that they become cogs in huge machinery. Therefore, 
Marx’s analysis means that “the modes of subjectivation and socialization are certainly not to be 
regarded as the outside of machine (and thus to be constructed as machine metaphors) but 
rather as enclosed in the technical machinery” (Raunig, A Thousand Machines 22). Moreover, 
Marx’s definition of the machine as an “automaton consisting of numerous mechanical and 
intellectual organs” (Grundrisse: Foundations of the Political Economy (Rough Draft) 692), shows 
that machine embodies both the material and immaterial labour, where the latter is the 
knowledge and skill embodied in it. In Capital (1986), Marx again returns to the development of 
machinery as fixed capital. He conceptualizes the machine as a means for producing surplus value 
and optimizing the workers’ exploitation (see Raunig, A Thousand Machines 2010, 22). Crucially, 
throughout these texts, two aspects of machinery are revealed. First,  “social subjection” as a 
relation wheerin individual workers are relegated as parts of a larger whole, the centrality of the 
labour of individual workers is supplanted by the objectification of the collective skills and 
knowledge upon which the machine depends for both its existence and its productive function. 
The other one is machinic enslavement, which is the subjugated intellectual labour of those who 
invent, modify and run machines. 
Deleuze and Guattari, in particular, returned to this concept of the machine and developed it 




of Post-Fordism. Deleuze and Guattari were critical of Marx’s theorization of the machine 
because of on one hand, his linear evolutionary methodology which goes from the human to the 
tool to the machine, and on the other hand, his anthropomorphic and anthropological viewpoint 
on machines, which led him to analyze and understand machines in terms of human 
characteristics. The main perspective that Deleuze and Guattari develop in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia could be summarized via two primary points: there is no contradiction or 
dichotomy between nature and human, or nature and culture/industry; and the whole society is 
organized by and through machinic assemblages. They give a new conceptualization of machine 
to not only use the previous development in the concept but also make a conceptual rupture 
which, as it shall be explained further, was a result of the performativization of May 68: “A 
machine may be defined as a system of interruptions or breaks. These breaks should in no way 
be considered as a separation from reality; rather, they operate along lines that vary according 
to whatever aspect of them we are considering.” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia 36). 
To be sure, this definition remains ambiguous. They clarify their definition further by adding that 
a machine “is related to a continual material flow (lzyle) that it cuts into”. This continual flow can 
be material: for example, a flow of milk that connects mother’s breast machine to child’s mouth 
machine. Or else, it can be immaterial: a flow of transgressive desire that connects performance 
machine of Living Theater to revolutionary machines of alterglobalization activists.  
Thus, the important aspect of the machines is that they function only in relation to other 
machines. For example, the mouth machine of a child plugs into the breast machine of its mother: 
it breaks the flow of milk. But on the other hand, the mouth machine will plug into the digesting 
machine of the child and it gives a continual flow to this machine. Therefore, “every machine is a 
machine of a machine. The machine produces an interruption of the flow only insofar as it is 
connected to another machine that supposedly produces this flow” (ibid).  
Machine, thus, is primarily a communication factor. The question about the machine “is not a 
question of essence, but of the event, not about is, but about and, about concatenations and 




Machines 19). When we define machine as an intersection of flows, then the problem is no longer 
the essence of the machine as such but its connections and disjunctions: how different machines 
plug into each other and form different assemblages, bring about new machines, and so on . 
Unlike Stelark’s performativizations of the Idea of the machinic, Deleuze and Guattari show how 
the machine is neither a mere prosthesis attached to the human nor its replacement, and it is 
not a celebration of human-machine such as cyborgs. The machine is a matter of assemblage.  
Looking from the perspective of artistic machinic assemblages, the question is no longer “what 
is a political art” or “what is a political performance”; rather, it is a question of how performance 
machines, political machines, revolutionary machines, artistic machines, and so forth relate with 
all its others, plug in and out from each other, and form different assemblages. Consequently, 
the critical autonomy of aesthetics and arts assumes an altogether different meaning from that 
of its modernist conceptualization; a transformation that Pil and Galia Kollectiv, for example, 
point out in an interview:  
There has been much writing in recent years suggesting that with the cooptation of creativity into 
post-fordist labour, art loses its autonomous critical position. We would argue against this 
position because it is precisely the collapse of such boundaries that allows artists to operate in 
solidarity with workers in other fields, opening up new prospects for political engagement. It is 
because it is not autonomous that art can be critical (Kollectiv). 
Machinic assemblages, whether they be artistic, political, or social, harbor within themselves the 
potentiality of a creation, whose processes of deterritorialization confront the majoritarian and 
spectacular-political performance with an aesthetics of the capacity for creation particular to 
machinic assemblages themselves. With the help of artistic practices, machinic assemblages pose 
“the problems of the construction of 'being-together' and the modes of political subjectivation” 
(Sullivan 176). Polyphony and heterogeneity, processual creativity, autopoiesis, and communal 
being-together: these are the constituent elements of the aesthetics of the performative turn. 
And it is in light of this aesthetics of the performative event that we can grasp the liminal practices 
that occured within the machinic relation between arts and politics, by those who become well-




3.4.4 Limits and Transgression: the Performativization of Deterritorialization 
For a discussion on artistic practices in performative politics, we go back to the PublixTheatre 
Caravan. Performed without any director overseeing their works, the Caravan’s works were 
realized via collective processes of decision-making while maintaining an open relation to 
interested outsiders (Müller). Rejecting the vanguardist perspective, while Volxtheatre Favoriten 
did not make theatre for the immigrants, thereby representing their interests, needs, or 
subjectivities; rather, it made theatre with and among them. Moreover, to a certain extent one 
could say that there was a pre-existing atmosphere at EKH, which encouraged a heterogeneous 
population in terms of nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, language, and even political views. Within 
this context any collective experimentation there necessitated inventing practices that were 
devised to specifically deal with a non-identitarian and non-hegemonic body. That said, 
Volxtheatre, or any of its individual performances, is not in itself the performative event. Through 
its machinic assemblages, it functioned as a performative collective body that perpetually 
situated itself with respect to the evental processes, always in alteration and becoming, changing 
tactics and deterritorializing the stages it contributed to their creation, and thus forming 
assemblages with other fields (social and political) by means of performative aesthetic practices.  
Further on its course of performative practices, while the shock of Carnival against Capital in 
Seattle was still reverberating, Volxtheatre changed the focus from protesting against the 
national policies to intervening on a transnational level. Volx-theatre became Publix-theatre: 
“one world, no nation; Anarchy instead of Austria” (Müller) and under such a slogan, the first 
tour started in May 2000 in support of asylum seekers and against Europe’s migration policies. 
The performative practices designed to blur the boundaries, shared the communal affects, and 
triggered their own singular autopoiesis: 
Provisionally occupying public space to temporarily put on a different play, with Publix-Kitchen, 
propaganda radio, street duets, hocus-pocus and pie fights, among other means, demanded from 
the travelers not only being able to deal with the organization of an everyday life rich in conflicts 
in a constantly changing large-scale collective, but also permanently flexible situation-related 




As it was mentioned before, as part of the preparations for the battle against 27th summit of G8 
in Genoa, PublixTheatre Caravan, with participants from 10 countries, traveled through Austria, 
Slovenia, Germany and Italy, and in a move against the dominant expression machine and its 
image production, Caravan broadcasted daily reports on the tour by mobile phone and the 
Viennese independent Radio Orange as well as online reports to independent media webpages 
and activist email lists. “The broadcasts were … an important aspect of the strategy of self-
determined representation and offensive visibility. The wish to sovereignly create the images of 
the caravan, in contrast to images from spectacular media machines and in contrast to 
clandestine political strategies …” (ibid 225). Contrary to what the social performance theorists 
believe, the appropriation of image and its construction in what Baudrillard called “hyperreality” 
wiped out the classical distinction between original and copy, presence and simulacra. The 
performative event, then, is a way to disrupt this projective apparatus through aesthetic creation.  
Having been arrested in Genoa and forced to work under the post-9/11 conditions, the 
PublixTheatre Caravan changed its strategy again and focused more on media art to engage 
differently in the struggles around migration policies and border violence. The new project, 
“NoBorderZone”, was to expand the possibilities of virtual networking (Müller) by organizing the 
2002 Noborder Camp at Strasbourg. The Noborder Camp lasted from July 19 to July 28 and saw 
the participation of 3000 artist-activists from different countries. With the novel and singular 
form assumed by the Camp alongside the experience of this form of collectivity on the part of 
the artist-activists in attendance, can serve as an abstract, we discover a prototype or model for 
the Occupy Movements of 2009. Essential to the idea of the Camp was its performative protest 
against racism and security measures implemented by European countries; especially after 
September 11, when EU member states hindered and blocked the movement of both activists 
and immigrants within the European Union’s borders (September 11, 2001 marked a drastic 
intensification in security aspects of globalization): “Where the ‘enemy’ was previously perceived 
as an external one, now there is a blending of this external ‘enemy’ and a new ‘dangerous class’ 
within the nation-state” (Raunig, Art and Revolution 243). 
In order for the EU to identify this new type of enemy, international security measures not only 




blacklist to move freely in the Schengen area; they also developed internal borders, checking the 
people regularly in trains, buses, metros, and according to Etienne Balibar, separating groups of 
people from one another (Raunig, Art and Revolution 245). Therefore, an intensive segregation 
and separation among different actors happened through an omnipresence bordering 
procedure. If a performative political event transgresses limits, it sure needs to deal with all these 
external and internal borders.  
At the same time that the EU was reinforcing its internal and external borders, a very bold internal 
critique was circulating among the activists. After Seattle and Genoa, the narrativization of these 
events by mainstream media outlets gave a picture of alterglobalization as One Movement. A 
process of hegemonization of different heterogeneous groups, demands, ideas and practices was 
put to work, the performance projected as spectacular theatre of violence and destruction, and 
simultaneously neglected all other protests in non-western countries. This image of One 
Movement could endanger the whole idea of intercontinental networks, altermodernities and 
the affirmation of differences in parallel actions (see Hardt, Porto Alegre: Today’s bandung? 
2005).  
It is against the backdrop of the spectacular narrative of the existence of one, singular and 
homogenous, movement, that we can grasp how the artistic practices of the Noborder Camp 
inaugurated a shift in organizational tactics, which were themselves devised in response to these 
issues. The Camp was erected not only to protest against, and resist, the establishment of 
borders, but also to reaffirm the heterogeneous multiplicity of all the movements of 
alterglobalization and the existence of altermodernities beyond any hegemonization. The 
artivists of the camp did not allow this performative act to be represented by mainstream media, 
and the Publixtheatre Caravan, Indymedia, and Radio Orange/Helsinki covered the event using 
the terms and practices immanent to the movements themselves. On the other hand, there was 
no submission to any utopian perspective of a world without borders. According to Raunig, “the 
concrete practices of the noborder network do not aim so much at an elimination of borders, but 
at strategies of thematizing, making visible, performatively opening borders” (Raunig, Art and 




Artivists chose Strasbourg for performatively opening borders for two reasons: first, the location 
was a “highly contested Schengen border” between France and Germany that has changed its 
nationality five times in the last 500 years (Kuemmer), and second, the Schengen Information 
System (SIS), the database including all those who applied for asylum and who are in the black-
list, is located in this city. Furthermore, considering the proliferation and intensification of 
internal borders that delimits small territories of performance for different groups, the Camp’s 
three thousand international artists and activists were supposed to live together in a “ten-day 
laboratory for creative resistance and civil disobedience” that made their performativization of 
daily life a vital aspect of the whole experience. 
Daily life in the camp was organized into different “barrios'', which were arranged around a 
kitchen, a toilet block, a garbage collection point, and a discussion area. The distribution of the 
participants among the barrios was free and changeable and was by no means intended to 
reproduce a distribution according to countries (Raunig, Art and Revolution 257). With 
workshops, exhaustive discussions, and hot debates, the landscape of camp seemed to be 
chaotic: “If anything, this microcosmic model of a ‘functioning anarchy’ was an instance of how 
the actions and energies of the ‘multitudes’ might translate into concrete realities on a day to 
day basis in a possible future away from capitalism” (Sengupta), writes Shuddhabrata Sengupta, 
an Indian participant in the camp.  
Happening on a literal contested border, this performative event worked on different types of 
limits, and transgressed them inside its own autonomous stage as well as outside it. There is a 
dialectical approach to the relation between law and transgression that puts the transgression of 
law already within the remit, or logic, of the law itself, whereby every law can only be established 
around its exception. From this perspective, Bataille’s concept of transgression is a decidedly pre-
Kantian one (for example, see Zizek, The Parallax View 2006, p 95-6). The presupposition behind 
such a claim is a conception of transgression as surpassing the established limit, going from one 
identity to the other, from inside to the outside, which leads to nothing but the expansion of law 
and the establishment of new limits in order to transgress them again. This dialectical perspective 
sees limit as a contour, as an absolute definite line, a rigid segment, which separates the inside 




There is a non-dialectical conception of limit, however, which doesn’t see it as a definite line or 
contour, but understands limit in the paradigm of power as a zone of force35. The limit of a thing 
is the termination, or ending, of a mode of existence that is predicated upon its powers of its 
indefinite expansion. The borderline of a forest, its limit, is never a linear set of trees marking the 
place when inside is finished and outside begins; rather the intensity and density of forest 
gradually diminishes until there is no forest anymore. Limit, in this sense, is not a line but a region 
or a zone. Thus, not pointing to a line segment to show the exact location of a limit; rather tending 
toward the limit.  
From this perspective, transgression of a limit does not mean surpassing a linear limit, a 
movement to an outside that reiterates and demarcates another inside. In the same manner, 
transgressing the law does not simply mean disobeying the law, which amounts to submitting 
again to the rule of extended law after transgression. Rather, the limit is always a threshold 
toward which the molecular, differential lines of performativization tend in order to 
performatively render the threshold as open. “There’s always a border, a line of flight or flow, 
only we don’t see it, because it’s the least perceptible of things. And yet it’s along this line of 
flight that things come to pass, becomings evolve, revolutions take shape” (Deleuze, Negotiations 
45).  
Thus, the performative event is located on the very borderline, and its transgression “does not 
overcome the border to make it disappear, it is the gesture that changes the border inside it:  a 
change that does not consist in the absolute division of identities, but in enabling a flowing space, 
in which differences oscillate, collide, process” (Raunig, Art and Revolution 252). Seen under this 
light, we can say that the Noborder Camp was an experimentation with the limit, on the limit, 
toward the limit, and for the purposes of transgression: transgressing the limit as that which 
separates not only different geographical places, but also individuals and groups in the same 
geography, even boundaries separating colored from white, and Eastern from Western among 
those very artivists. There is no utopian illusion for flattening all the particularities, but to 
performatively open them toward each other, making machinic assemblages and constructing 
 




common performances in these border-zones. In other words, it was the immaterial flow of a 
transgressive desire that connected the performance machine of PublixTheater Caravan to the 
informatic machine of Indy Media through the abstract machine of NoBorderCamp. 
Altermodernities emerge inside and outside of these unique assemblages of performative events. 
Deterritorializing and transgressive, the performative event marks a rupture from the established 
territory by tending toward its threshold, while simultaneously tending toward an alternative 
organization of forces. In Sullivan’s words, “there are always two faces to any given assemblage 
in this sense, one looking inwards, one looking outwards; a principle of cohesiveness and one of 
escape; an autopoiesis and an allopoiesis” (Sullivan 96). And in light of the Janus-faced nature of 
assemblages, the question we are forced to confront is the following: ‘How do you escape?’ 
3.4.5 Autopoiesis and Allopoiesis 
On 25 June 2010, many people in Alexandria wore black, went to the coastal line that extends 32 
km along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and stood there in silence, with their back toward 
the city and their face looking into the horizon of the sea. Each individual kept five meters 
distance with the other to get around the emergency law of Mubarak’s government that banned 
gatherings of more than three people. It was as if, with their back to the city, thousands of people 
in a long chain along the seafront were leaving the old order and setting off on a journey through 
the plane of immanence (something akin to  Foucault’s description of the mad journey on the 
ships). It was as if the people were reenacting the Ancient Egyptian Exodus drama, where the sea 
was parted, and the enslaved people escaped the rule of the tyrant.  
The event was the first mass appearance of dissensus that triggered by the brutal murder of 
Khalid Mohamed Said under police custody on 6 June 2010 and led to a series of protests that 
finally, on 25 January 2011 (the so-called National Police Day in Egypt) toppled down Mubarak’s 
long-time autocracy. The movement in June 2010 named itself as “We Are All Khalid Said” ( کلنا
 Like what we have said about the case of Ned Ludd, Khalid Said became a proper name .(خالد سعید
that distinguished between the zone of constituent forces, enriched by people’s 
performativizations of alternative social relations and performances in Alexandria and later Al-
Tahrir Square, and the constituted Power of the State, its police forces, and its “good” relations 




What happened on June 25th, 2010, has often been described as a “flashmob” or “smartmob”. 
The stage of this contemporary form of performance is the metropolis. If immaterial labour 
functions through new communication and information technologies, flashmob is the direct 
product of implanting these innovations in performance art; and through combining them with 
“performative bodies, and social machines, they form new assemblages offering new methods 
of living, performing, and communicating within society” (Walker). There is no individual artist 
who creates something for the gaze of viewers; in this collective cooperation of present bodies, 
performers are usually commoners taking part in a simple performance, who appear suddenly, 
perform the flashmob, and disappear again. A flashmob swarms, disrupts, disappears. And as a 
political form, it was indeed not the invention of Bill Wasik or the result of his “boredom” in 2003, 
as he boldly claims (Wasik 19). The form had a tradition in rave parties and Hakim Bey’s TAZ -- 
that we discussed in chapter two – and then, various performative political expressions during 
the Global Action Days from 1998 to 2003. However, to make an assemblage between bodies 
and new communication technologies made it a potentially powerful form of political expression; 
powerful enough that even before the first arranged flash mob could happen in Claire’s 
Accessories in New York City, police intervened and closed the shop’s doors. It thus gained 
popularity soon. In Detroit, for example, a group of queer activists organized the 'Detroit Guerrilla 
Queer Bar', “which targets a local straight restaurant or bar for 'swarming' on a designated night” 
(Hewitt).  
But one should be careful in describing the flashmob as a performative political form of 
expression. Considering the capitalist (re)territorialization of the performative – discussed in the 
beginning of this chapter –, not surprisingly flashmobs are now mostly used in marketing and 
advertisements. Wasik himself pointed out that the flashmob is now a phenomenon of 
consumerism and hipster culture. “In fact, the flash mob, which dates back only to June 2003, 
had almost entirely died out by that same winter” he harshly comments, “despite its having 
spread during those few months to all the world's continents … it was, in its very form …intended 
as a metaphor for the hollow hipster culture that spawned it”. (Wasik 2006, 56) 
The one-hour flashmob or smartmob in Alexandria, however, cannot be included in such a 




attacked by WTO and IMF policies and their neoliberal Western-friendly dictator/decision-maker, 
bodies of the youth who were suppressed by police brutality, of the mothers whose children 
went missing, and various technologies of communication: not only online social networks, but 
also via older means such as word of mouth; although later, after the revolution, the media could 
represent it as a carefully curated performance by a single curator who worked for Google.  
An Egyptian director from Alexandria described the event for me, of which she made a short 
video clip and uploaded it under pseudonym, as a performative No to the government. “Imagine! 
Thousands of people wearing black and standing in front of the sea. And if you consider the 
geography of Alexandria, that it is basically a narrow city extended all along the coast, it becomes 
stronger”, she said, and continued to explain the government “cultural performance” to counter 
this event. The municipality organized a festivity that day in the honor of the city of Alexandria. 
The carnival happened in front of the coastal line, with huge trucks and banners practically hiding 
the people in black who, a few meters further close to the sea, were standing silent with their 
back toward the established sociality. The exodus is contagious; it needs to remain unheard, 
untouched, and unseen.  
Exodus is not only a refusal of current sociality; for it also has a creative side that, through its 
performative aesthetic practices, leads to the production of alternative subjectification 
processes. The historical drama behind this concept dates back to the biblical drama of the Jews, 
who escaped from the Egyptian pharaoh’s army, crossed the Nile and went to the desert. That 
was the beginning of their nomadic mode of existence, which for centuries did not turn into an 
immigration – such as Hijrat in the beginning of Islam – to another permanent settlement. 
Reflecting on the meaning of “being Jewish” according to this historical drama, Blanchot 
considers “the exigency” of being Jewish as “the exigency of uprooting; the affirmation of 
nomadic truth” (Blanchot, Being Jewish 230). Nomads do not root in any firm ground, but are 
always in displacement, changing ground, and refusing to establish their constituent power as a 
permanent constituted power: they refuse the State-form. According to Blanchot, nomads refuse 
to be fixed, “to plant oneself in the earth, to establish oneself through a pact with the 
permanence that authorize sojourn and is certified by certainty in the land” (Blanchot, Being 




more important aspect of nomadism is its affirmation of constituent power, or what Blanchot 
calls “making people”. Exodus can make the collective subject, just like the biblical exodus which 
made “of the slaves of Egypt a people” (ibid). 
The difference between a negative exodus and an affirmative one can be described by the 
difference between the immigrant line of flight (or line of deterritorialization) and the nomad 
line. The immigrant line is an escape, a deterritorialization which is nonetheless relative and it 
goes from point A to point B, passing through sub-territories in the Territory -- i.e. the apparatus 
-- but not the Territory itself. The nomad line, rather, is passing through and in between points 
“leads the movements of deterritorialization into a current” (Raunig, A War-Machine Against 
Empire). The nomad line is offensive; it opposes power everywhere immanently by giving way to 
desiring machinic assemblages, and develops its constituent power. In other words, exodus is a 
machinic assemblage between two constituent processes: autopoiesis and allopoiesis. The first 
one signifies a self-making that aims to give birth to an alternative sociality, one that is unknown 
to the existing system. 
That said, let us not romanticize any concept: nomadism has also been re-appropriated, very 
similar to flashmob, in the hipster culture and all creative and cultural industries that set the 
urban youth as their target consumer demographic. But the nomadic journey that started on 25 
June 2010 brought about its own people that could overcome the highly centralized, hierarchical, 
violent, and corrupt Potesta of their situation and its corresponding social relations (or 
aesthetics). One may ask then, how did it restore itself through the military coup in 2013? The 
possible answers lie in the problem of temporality, which will be taken up in the next chapters. 
For now, what must be attended to within the performative process are those that explicated 
itself against the backdrop of the established social order by moving through a sea of virtual 
socialities that can be performativized in a processual performative event.  
3.4.6 In/corporeal Transformations 
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze defines event as a "pure effect" (p.1), which happens as a 
conjunctive operation on the temporal disjunction between past and future and therefore, eludes 




a disjunctive conjunction of disjunction, since future and past are in a disjunctive relation in the 
present. Such is the paradoxical nature of an event. But it still works on another disjunction too: 
the disjunction between fixed beings and infinite becomings, between the limited and the 
excessive. From this perspective, the event appears as the moment when what is excessive 
surpasses that which is limited (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense 3), thus actualizing a process of  
deterritorialization. 
The event is paradoxical in another sense, too: it is simultaneously a conjunctive operation on 
seemingly disjunctive elements, as well as a disjunctive operation on the imposed unity of the 
current state of affairs. The latter is an interruption in the (re)production of order, while the 
former is a production of the new. Thus, one may say that event is a paradoxical force of 
production: a productive anti-productive happening, a work of the poor. Yet, if there is a 
disruption and a creation, an autopoiesis and an allopoiesis, what does really change throughout 
a performative event and how?  
In a letter penned on his 40th birthday, Benjamin recounts a Hasidic-Jewish “saying about the 
world to come”: 
Everything will be arranged there as it is with us. How our parlor is now, it will be in the world to 
come; where our children sleep now, they will sleep there in the world to come. What we wear 
in this world, we will wear that in the world to come. Everything will be like here – only a little bit 
different. So it is with imagination. It is only a haze that imagination extends over the distance. 
Everything may stay there as it stood, but the haze seethes and everything beneath it transforms 
itself imperceptibly (In Der Sonne 419-20).  
An imperceptible transformation is what the world to come means that nothing remains the 
same imperceptibly, molecularly, although we will wear the same things and arrange our rooms 
in the same way. And following Benjamin, Arditi argues for a similar quality of performativity in 
Occupy movements, writing that their performativity “designate an activity that is already 
changing things here and now, ... by pursuing ‘enacted utopia’ [or the imagined world-to-come]”. 





During and after the Al-Tahrir Occupation, a graffiti of two small astronauts appeared on the walls 
of Cairo, depicting humans floating in outer space, among many other graffitis portraying pop 
figures such as Batman, Joker, or Ghandi. Due to their emergency function as revolutionary 
propaganda, such urban art forms cannot be exactly explained as metaphors or symbols; rather 
they reveal a trajectory of experimentations with “performative” politics, trying to create what 
Shukaitis (2009) calls “poles of imaginal recomposition” (Shukaitis, Imaginal Machines: 
Autonomy & Self-Organization in the Revolutions 82). This recomposition of affects and affections 
acts as a medium of exodus from the current imaginary affective system of sensibility. And it 
plays an important role in the performativization of altermodernities, which should be able to 
differentiate themselves from the already existing social sensibility.  
 
Figure 4 – Astronauts in Cairo: graffiti appeared in 2011 Revolution in Cairo, Photo © Soraya Morayef via 
https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/ 
The Association of Autonomous Astronauts (AAA) is another example of such experimentation 




continued militarization of space through programs such as Star Wars” (Notes from Nowhere 
2003, 92). The Association acted not as an affinity group or an organization, but as an umbrella 
name under which many groups in a network-based horizontal association joined forces. On the 
one hand, the activism of AAA was defined by a struggle against both the exclusive access to the 
outer space on the part of corporations and the military; and on the other hand, by orienting 
itself toward outer space, they tried to form an immaterial imaginal exodus: 
We really don’t think it’s worth going through all the effort of getting into space just to live by the 
same rules as on Earth. What attracts us to space exploration is the possibility of doing things 
differently. We are not interested in finding out what it’s like to work in space, to find new ways 
of killing. We want to find out what dancing or sex feels like in zero gravity (Association of 
Autonomous Astronauts flyer for J18 Carnival Against Capital, 1999). 
To imagine another daily life, the artivist groups of AAA have been engaged in mail art, 
psychographic activities and radical performance arts. Like the Publixtheater Caravan, they soon 
joined the alterglobalization movement and extended their activities to political organizations 
(Shukaitis 92-4). On June 18th, 1999, AAA joined the Carnival Against Capital with members 
wearing space suits while confronting London’s police forces. And immediately after this 
confrontation, they started the “Space 99: Ten Days That Shook the Universe” festival in order to 
continue their anti-neoliberal activities through performative resistance. In the end, when they 
could no longer find any function for the notion of outer space rather than its increasing 
commercialization, they, then, completed their logic of exodus by enacting their premeditated 
dissolution. One could claim that such immaterial, imaginal recomposition have been so far, the 
biggest accomplishment of two recent contemporary global cycles of protests, where – as recent 
cases of Greece and Rojava showed us – imagining another sociality is no longer merely a slogan 
on banners of “another world is possible”, but a lively discussion in all sectors of society.  
When Deleuze defines events as “pure effects”, he considers them as being completely “ideal”, 
where the ideal is understood in terms of Deleuze’s theory of the Idea as Problematic. That is to 
say, for Deleuze, the ideal belongs to the realm of the virtual, whose main characteristic is an 




it, the event “is ultimately that which has just happened and that which is about to happen, but 
never that which is happening” (The Logic of Sense 8).  
To demonstrate the “incorporeal” nature of events, Deleuze draws upon the Stoics’ thesis that 
asserts that where bodies can be considered as causes, events are to be understood as 
incorporeal entities or pure effects (ibid 4). Incorporeal pure effects have no cause, while they 
are essential to bodies and the result of the mixtures of bodies. They do not exist; they rather 
subsist, and as incorporeal effects, they are located at the surface, “on the skin”, and are not to 
be found in the depths of the body (ibid 5). It is for these reasons that Deleuze defines events as 
completely immaterial and “out of matter”, such that even “their spatio-temporal realization in 
a state of affairs is real and imperfect...an accident”. Events are not “substantives or adjectives, 
but verbs”.  
These definitions, however, remain insufficient ones insofar as they are inflicted by dualities such 
as “real and ideal” (whereas he himself insists that virtual is more real), “inherent and accident”, 
and the presupposition behind them amounts to a static opposition between the virtual and the 
actual. The same critique of dramatization applies here to the conception of processual event in 
the Logic of Sense: the secret duality of depth/surface and the corresponding equilibrium is still 
present albeit being contested, and the performative event is still subjected to textuality and 
theatricality. Deleuze indeed establishes a relation between event and language, where language 
not only fixates and delimits, but also "transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite 
equivalence of an unlimited becoming" (3). Here event dismantles the functions of fixation and 
identity (the loss of proper name (3)), both pillars of the established state of affairs, but the non-
linguistic, which in relation to the actuality of meaning, of the linguistic, belongs to the realm of 
virtuality should function as the constitutively ontogenetic element of events themselves. Instead, 
Deleuze’s perspective seems to neglect the productive relation between the virtual and the 
actual, bringing them into relation through mystical stoicism, while, in the same book, making 
the claim that “the virtual refers to that which is creative, productive and transformative (a 
transcendental field of difference)” (146). The virtual, the realm of performative relations, of 




Moreover, Deleuze’s insistence on the ideal aspect of events, its pure incorporeality, leads him 
to say that, since there is always a question persisting in the answers (where there will be no 
proper answer for a given Question and no singular solution to a Problem) any realization or 
actualization is doomed to be imperfect in relation to the ideal to which it corresponds. Close to 
Derrida's modernist concept of a democracy to come (whose critique we have already seen in 
prior sections), this is a duality not unlike Plato’s distinction between the Ideal and the Real, since 
Deleuze – as he claims himself – only overturns Plato in The Logic of Sense, and thereby remains 
within the territorial coordinates of Platonism itself.  
The aesthetic aspect of the event in Guattari; the non-semiotic, non-signifying creative processes 
of subjectification; reconceives this relation of production between the virtual and the actual, of 
the corporeal and the incorporeal (although this aspect – as we have discussed in chapter two as 
well as here – is virtually present in Deleuze’s methodology). It was “by Guattari's critique of the 
imperialism of semiotics based on signification” that “the popular conception of being political 
conceived as the being of language (Ranciere, Virno, Butler etc.) is radically called into question” 
(Lazzarato, The Aesthetic Paradigm 176). But if this perspective follows the line of the virtual, the 
non-linguistic, and its productive capacities, then it must, by definition, be understood in terms 
of that which is incorporeal. And as expected, we find, in A Thousand Plateaus,a conception of 
the non-linguistic, which becomes the agent of incorporeal transformation that produces 
corporeal transformations via its having become a Body without Organs with its own regime of 
production (the creativity of the dispossessed or the poor). Deleuze and Guattari express what is 
now understood to be the two-sided ontogenesis proper to the relation of the corporeal to the 
incorporeal  as follows: 
The paradox gets us nowhere unless, like the Stoics, we add that incorporeal transformations, 
incorporeal attributes, apply to bodies, and only to bodies. They are the expressed of statements 
but are attributed to bodies. The purpose is not to describe or represent bodies; bodies already 
have proper qualities, actions and passions, souls, in short forms, which are themselves bodies. 
Representations are bodies too! If noncorporeal attributes apply to bodies, if there are good 
grounds for making a distinction between the incorporeal expressed "to become red" and the 




body or state of things is the "referent" of the sign (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 
95). 
The bodies are not necessarily representational or representative. On the contrary, 
representations are themselves bodies. Considering the ontogenetic relation between the virtual 
and the actual, bodies have a virtual dimension that can and/or cannot crystallize itself in the 
realm of representation. And it is this ontogenetic link that is made visible in the proper names 
that belong to an event.  
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze insists that signification, denomination, and manifestation -- where 
proper names belong the category of denomination – are not characteristics of the event. On the 
contrary, the event is the interruption of signifying, denominating, and manifesting processes. 
And despite Deleuze’s claim that “proper names alone form properly material singularities” (The 
Logic of Sense 13), the event should, in the end, eliminate the proper name that is inevitably tied 
to that which persists as its personal or identical elements.  
A productive contrast to Deleuze’s theory of the event in The Logic of Sense, is found in A 
Thousand Plateaus, where the proper name becomes more complex insofar as “abstract 
machines”–those connecting points of different desiring machines–“have proper names (as well 
as dates), which of course designate not persons or subjects but matters and functions” (A 
Thousand Plateaus 142). Here, events are the liberated (and liberatory) semiotic and are 
composed of indefinite articles, proper names and infinitive verbs, such that it is only via this 
semiotic that events are “expressed or expressible” (The Logic of Sense 12). And while it is true 
that events eliminate a proper name (tied to an identity), but only in order to bring about 
another, this time non-identical, proper name. A proper name that expresses “a ‘primary 
intensity’ [in order] to distribute difference” (The Logic of Sense 39). Al-Tahrir, the square of 
government, diminished and revived as a name for a certain region of forces. Or rather, in a more 
complex fusion of identitarian and non-identitarian directions, Khalid Said, who was killed under 
police custody in Alexandria, revived as a proper name in a popular movement where people 
were shouting: "We are all Khalid Said". His disrespected, disfigured face became the respected, 




Introducing the term “performative”, Austin ironically, but obsessively, comments in a footnote 
that similar to “performatory,” a term that he used before, “performative” is still an ugly word, 
but one of which he is forced to make use of. The very term of the “performative” becomes 
necessary since it was the only word, says Autsin, that could convey the particular meaning he 
had in his mind. Moreover, as he goes on to claim later in his text, it is a term whose “etymology 
is not irrelevant”, too (Austin 6-7). If one takes this marginal obsessive comment to its logical 
conclusion, what becomes clear in the close anatomical observation of the word is the following: 
“to perform” means then to accomplish or to move forward in a double movement of shape-
making, precisely because while ‘per-’ etymologically refers to “through” and “forward”, ‘form’, 
with its connection to Morpheus (the god of metamorphoses that appears in dreams), refers to 
both a physical shape and a dreamlike figure. Thus, from within the perspective of the 
performative, “to perform” is to further, via the accomplishment of its act, the dual process of 
figurative and bodily constitution and dreamlike incorporeal construction. In this double 
movement, we know that the performative presents its transformative power (Fischerlichte), 
given that “transform” is itself composed of ‘trans-’ + ‘form’, where trans signifies a beyond. The 
performative event comes out of bodies, of their mixture, but it goes beyond the already existing 
body of its social milieu and brings about another body. In the following chapter, we will deal 













4 Chapter Three: From the POV of Bodies  
 
4.1 An Introduction 
 
It was a familiar scene in Occupy Wall Street (OWS) to see dollar notes attached on protestors’ 
forehead, mouth and other parts of body, or to see theatrical expressions depicting or mocking 
the American systemic desire for money. It was not only a protest against actual institutions of 
financial capitalism, rather a critique of its very idea: the reduction of everything, including 
human bodies, to money.  
Money becomes the only measure of social production [and] so now we have an 
ontological definition of money as form, lifeblood, internal circulation, in which is 
consolidated the value constructed socially in the whole economic system (Negri, Marx 
and Foucault: Essays). 
In October 2017, Reuters news agency published a report about a new profitable trade: the body 
trade. It was about an American company, Science Care, that made a fortune selling dead bodies. 
And to maximize the profit, it selected McDonald’s Corp as its business model. “Science Care 
founder Jim Rogers aimed to provide customers with the same cuts from cadavers no matter 
which Science Care branch handled the order” (Shiffman and Grow), reads the report, explaining 
how each of those cut bodily parts are being sold at a fixed price.  
It is too literal an interpretation for Klossowski’s Living Currency, where he argues that “humans 
themselves that are used as currency, a living currency, and they can function as currency 
because they are sources of sensation, emotion and pleasure.” (D. W. Smith, Klossowski: From 
Theatrical Theology to Counter-Utopia 1) It also presents a dark dramatization of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of socius, a huge bodily plane of social (re)production into which organs are 




The suppression and exploitation of body for generating capital has been a long-time critical 
discourse, at least since Karl Marx’s theory of value and labour. The body of the worker became 
the center of industrial production, but in different conditions from the labourers of previous 
production regimes. The worker was a Vogelfrei: his body was released from the fixed anchor 
point of the land (unlike the peasants); and it was also freed from the total control of the slavery 
relations. Unlike the enslaved body, worker’s body was not a property as a whole, and it was not 
subjected to the sovereign power over death.  Decoupled from natural and authoritarian chains, 
worker’s body was going to be disciplined and managed.  
Critical theory argues that body is not natural, nor given. Body is always a historical body, 
constructed in a particular context, always changing and never a constant. As Foucault writes, “it 
is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, 
through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances.” (Nietzsche, Genealogy, History 
87). 
Bakhtin explains how capitalist bourgeoisie used court’s purist ethics of body for imposing a 
certain performativity on bodies; a performativity that ensures individualism, and its 
corresponding sealed and contained body. It is against this “illusional” body that Bakhtin 
conceptualizes the grotesque body36. A management of bodily flows and a suppression of 
excessive behaviors, one may say, to keep the efficiency of body in terms of production and 
reproduction.  
Another formulation of such a view on the relation between capitalism and body came from 
Wilhelm Reich. For him, capitalist system needed to repress sexuality and sublimate it into a work 
ethics and therefore, it managed to performatively and discursively prevent the overflows of 
impulsive forces through a “body armour” (see Reich, Character Analysis 1990 (1933)).  
Norbert Elias even goes further back, to the origins of modern Western discourses, and figures 
such as Erasmus, to show how pedagogues were making a certain code for raising the children 
 
36 “The grotesque body […] is a body in the act of becoming. It is never finished, never completed; it is continually 
built, created, and builds and creates another body. Moreover, the body swallows the world and is itself swallowed 




of nobilities as civilized, working on their bodily techniques and behaviors; the same ethics that 
provided the basic backbone of modern social moralities. In his book The Civilizing Process, Elias 
explains that in the process of civilization, the civilized human habitat becomes the one that is 
cleansed of every trace of the human body’s physical existence, particularly its excesses (2000 
(1939)). But modern disciplinary and tight control over bodies has had its side effect. In fact, such 
a control came “at the cost of fragmentation, of losing the experience of a whole body open to 
its world, replaced with feelings of a mental or personal essence divided from the automaton it 
must inhabit."37 (Burkitt 131) 
However, the regime of production that started with turning worker’s muscular energy into 
capital has undergone radical changes, as we have discussed in earlier chapters. Marx himself 
predicts a kind of socialization of the labour:  
production loses its private character and becomes a social process – not formally, since 
production is social in every exchange because of the absolute dependence of the producers on 
each other and because of the necessity of representing their work as abstract social labour 
(money), but in real terms. Since the means of production are used as social means and thus not 
through ownership by individuals but through their relationship of production, so too labour is 
carried out on the social scale. (Marx, Capital Volume III qtd. in Negri, Marx and Foucault) 
Labour’s socialization results into a deterritorialization of factory into society, and subsequently, 
a multiplication of control mechanism for bodies. The new technologies transform bodies and at 
the same time, alternative bodies start to emerge. As Negri argues,  
Social cooperation in production (which in other times was produced directly by capital) has 
achieved a degree of autonomy. Capital has become a financial power, engaged in the capture of 
surplus value that is ‘socially’ produced. Around this highly centralised process there develop 
antagonist moments of self-valorisation that are radically independent and that economic and 
political power attempt to hold together and to subject to capitalist despotism (ibid). 
In those moments of performative self-valorization, new collective bodies are creating and being 






but to confront with the question of body – the social body that acts as the subject of such 
transformation. As Negri puts it, “the body is at the centre of the research, of the diagnosis, and 
of the dispositif of action ... subjectivation as an action that operates on being and (collectively) 
transforms it” (ibid). 
In contrast to New Yorkers who protested against the reduction of bodies into living currency, 
the protestors in Egypt came with pictures of a disfigured body. Khalid Saeed whose body was 
brutally destroyed in the hand of Egyptian police became the name of the collective body 
appeared for the first time in Alexandria, shouting “we are all Khalid Saeed”. Months before that, 
Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence started its “torture diary” project.  
Complaints arrive daily: An 18-year-old man was beaten in a police station and thrown off a third 
floor balcony. Another man was punched and flogged. Earlier, a family was dragged to the police 
station, where the father was beaten and the women were threatened with rape (Naggar). 
Egypt’s torture diary is a symbol of another relation between the government and the bodies, 
according to which the body is forced to total obedience through unbearable police brutality.  
Police, as Foucault says, is modern state’s fundamental agent for creating the consciousness of 
the reason of state (raison d'etat) and inscribing the code of the everyday signs (which we explain 
later) on the surface of the body; or as Reich would say, putting the body armor on the social 
collective bodies. Police provides the State-sponsored technologies of the self, through creating 
a conscious “self” according to the raison d’etat.  
But the biopolitics that Foucault conceptualized has developed a micro-power network of control 
over the disembodied organs of social bodies. The contemporary societies have developed a 
subtler regime of control and increasingly harsher apparatus of surveillance through new digital 
technologies. Body has also undergone radical changes. 
Thus, the collective bodies of contemporary occupy movements resist different layers of control 
and discipline depending on their local context, while they also resist a globalized trend of 




In this chapter, we will delve into the problems of body and discuss the altermodern bodies that 
were performatively created during occupy movements. We show how the modern body is 
conceived with the principles of identity, homogeneity, unity and verticality, and its interaction 
with other bodies is based on imitation, linguistic communication. We then argue that this 
imagined body’s total closure is presupposed as the natural state, where healthy condition is 
thought to be a natural, pure state, free from alien, external elements – in philosophical, medical, 
cultural as well as political discourses. That is why a whole apparatus of medical, psychological 
and religious practices and discourses helped the modern centralized state to reproduce this 
imagined body, while the modern philosophy empowered it and the colonialism was in need of 
it. The natural modern body for a state is thought often in the same manner, and is called nation. 
The limits or figural contours of this body are identity-based and consequently exclusionary. 
In both molar and molecular levels, both for nations and singular bodies, we will explain how 
body is actually porous and heterogenous prior to inscription. The summary of our discussion is 
best formulated in Elizabeth Grosz’s definition of body as “indeterminate, amorphous, a series 
of uncoordinated potentialities that require social trigerring, ordering, and long-term 
‘administration’” (Space, Time and Perversion 104). 
The administration of body is always necessarily incomplete and incapable of imposing a total 
control. Therefore, we will discuss how the performative disrupts body’s organic pre-defined 
organization toward a non-hierarchical, alter-modern body. The discussion will move through 
various inter-related thinkers, with a particular focus on Klossowski’s Nietzsche. Through him, we 
argue for a constituent bodily power that presents itself as the capability to connect, to affect/be 
affected, in a way that all connected bodies are intensified and no domination is emerged out of 
it. If health can be redefined as such an increase in power (with no ressentiment is at work and 
no reactionary force involved that could upset one end of the relation, weaken it and make 
dominion), then what can an altermodern body do? 
 





4.2.1 What is there to see in a body? 
P., the protagonist of Beckett’s Catastrophe, was trapped in an economy of gaze, and we 
discussed his subjection to the gaze of text/director as well as the calculated gaze of 
audience/critics whom director hopes P “will have them on their feet”. It was also mentioned 
that how P.’s gaze toward the off-stage in the end escapes the theatrical economy of gaze.  
Throughout the research, we explained theatricality and performativity through the difference 
between actuality and virtuality. It was argued that theatrical is produced by performative, and 
as a product, it is a reproductive of the dominant regime of production and organization.  
But when it comes to body, theatricality is far more nuanced than that. Through Klossowski, we 
will discuss how bodily performative forces are producing simulacra on the surface of bodies. 
Theatricality is above all about the surface of bodies. Therefore, considering already discussed 
theory of body, theatricality is a two-sided interwoven regime of the seeing and the seen, which 
not only affects the perception of body, but also is being affected by it.  
The body of the actor produces a way of seeing, and the audience see through that body: not 
only the world, but also themselves, both as seeing and seen bodies. The actor’s body is also a 
body exposed to the gaze of audience, under their affective swarming, and is being shaped on 
the stage. When theater inner limits are surpassed in a performative piece, this two-sided process 
of seeing/being seen is intensified and turned into an autopoietic feedback loop. 
Theatron is a seeing place: but seeing and touching, eye and flesh, are entangled as Merleau-
Ponty shows in the Visible and the Invisible. Elsewhere, Merleau-Ponty explains this 
entanglement with looking at a work of art and writes:  
I would be at great pains to say where is the painting I am looking at. For I do not look at it as I do 
a thing; I do not fix it in its place. My gaze wanders in it as in the halos of Being. It is more accurate 
to say that I see according to it, or with it, than that I see it (Eye and Mind 132). 
The seeing/the seen dynamics is complicated by a number of analytical factors. It is not a 
anthropocentric endeavor as Merleau-Ponty’s focus on an inanimate “thing” to explain the two-




Merleau-Ponty body and the world are not “separate things”; rather, they have a chiasmic 
relation.  
It is also not in a paradigm of signification and meaning; rather, it remains a bodily relation. Even 
the language is, for Merleau-Ponty, a product of the body:  
if we were to make completely explicit the architectonics of the human body, its 
ontological framework, and how it sees itself and hears itself, we would see the 
possibilities of language already given in it (The Visible and The Invisible 155). 
Moreover, it should not be viewed as a universal process for every pair of eye. The situatedness 
of the body in the world makes it a body with a history: the facticity of the body, as one may say, 
that comes in a form of “inheritance”. This inheritance, as Foucault shows, “is granted through 
specific social practices” and “social practices are where the power is”. Therefore, many 
aesthetic, social and political elements, specific to singular contexts, construct the process of 
seeing that couples at least two bodies together.  
Seeing and being seen is on the other hand a condition of politics, as Hanna Arendt formulated 
through her discussion of the public space, the space of coming into appearance. The space of 
politics is where everybody can see/be seen and listen/ be heard. The state, as we have discussed, 
does not have a regime of equal seeing and listening. The governmental discourse is a framing 
with a regime of light and sound; just like a movie, only those elements in the frame, with light 
and sound equipment over them, are visible and audible, effecting a hierarchy among bodies. 
What disrupts this hierarchical regime is the performative: the bodily yet invisible and muted 
forces that disrupt the established organization of a naturalized collective body. 
Theatricality, as we discussed in earlier chapters, is mostly about this hierarchical interpretation 
of seeing and hearing. As Susan Broadhurst and Josephine Machon explains, theatre as a theatron 
functioned as “a prosthesis of eye and ear that privileged the ‘objective’ senses of sight and 
hearing through which it structured the vision of the audience” (Sensualities/Textualities and 
Technologies xx). But as theatre transformed into its contemporary life, it has opened toward 





The common place of seeing and hearing is always political in character. And it made theatre 
political as well. Even the classical theatre “is also one through which consensual and idealized 
notions of polis, citizenship and community were produced” (ibid). With the contemporary 
theatre, politics subsists in the form, and “the idea(l) of a common place that might be produced 
through the interaction of bodies, texts and technologies remains.” (ibid. xi)  
Yet in contrast to the classical conception of theatre and its claim to a rational and quasi-objective 
experience, the performative arts try to becomes sites of “immersive sensual/sensory 
experience, an experience which is always produced between bodies, texts and technologies”, 
while these three are “no longer isolated as elements but are distributed, diffused and 
disseminated through performance.” (ibid. xii) We discussed how the contemporary movements 
made use of theatrical means, and why a performative turn in radical politics has also happened 
since 1960s.  
In the performative event, the collective body is a mixture of human and non-human bodies, 
texts and technologies. It is a time-space of non-representational appearance. However, the 
dynamics of the seeing/the seen and its feedback loop functions as the most important 
organizing principle of this event. It is less about the bodies being seen than the present future 
which can be seen through them: through how the collective body has been shaped, how it 
disrupts the hierarchical regime of lights and sounds, and how its bodily forces are reshaping the 
social relation. In other words, we can only see what these movements envision through their 
collective body and what these bodies envision.  
In this section, we will try to see these bodies, see through them, and how they differ from the 
naturalized ideas of body. All these problems will be discussed through a Nietzschean theory of 
body, which comes through a certain tradition of thought with figures such as Pierre Klossowski, 
Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.  
Nietzsche’s philosophy proved to be insightful for this chapter, as he himself have developed a 
theory of seeing through bodies: perspectivism. Perspective is the frame of perception, of seeing 




Nietzsche, The Body and Culture, interpreting for Nietzsche is “to have a body and to be a 
perspective”.  
On the other hand, perspective is itself a bodily notion; it emerges as a phantasmic obsession 
related to an impulsive force in bodies and as body consists of a multiplicity of impulsive forces, 
there are multiple perspectives and multiple ways of seeing:  
There are various eyes, even the Sphinx has eyes, and consequently there are many kinds of 
“truths” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 291). 
The impulsive forces construct the singularity – or as Nietzsche puts it, “idiosyncrasy” – of any 
body. More than being relativist, arguing for a difference-less multiplicity, Nietzsche’s statement 
about “various eyes” can be seen as an invalidation of those discourses that claim universality 
and timelessness and consider all different bodies under a homogenous imagined body of 
“nation”; and as a critique on State’s imposed discourses and limits of performativity that 
hierarchizes bodies. After all, Nietzsche views the State “as the coldest of all cold monsters” that 
“even lies coldly” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra 32).  
When Gilles Deleuze calls for “new eyes” and “new ears” to track the invisible and inaudible 
forces, he refers to the same point. There is no necessity for an exclusionary, hierarchical and 
freedom-hostile established discourse to be taken as granted.  
For Nietzsche, body is the surface on which multiple perspectives exist and confront each other. 
“The body is a battleground”, as Barbara Kruger puts it on one of her works. And the collective 
bodies in contemporary occupy movements could show, through their radical performativity, 
that what this battle is about. 
 
4.2.2 The Nietzschean Body 
In earlier chapters of this research, Nietzsche’s philosophy and its 20th century French revival 
functioned as a reference point for developing a more nuanced conception of performativity and 
a methodology for approaching performative phenomena. Nietzschean theory of performativity 




Nietzschean idea of body is particularly important for this research, when it comes to the analysis 
of collective bodies that have been engaged in contemporary performative events, and 
particularly the occupy movements. These movements show, as we shall see in this chapter, that 
the conventional collective bodies of socio-political analyses (nation, people, mass) do not 
represent the multilayered heterogeneity of those collective bodies inside performative events. 
Moreover, the Nietzschean paradigm gives the possibility to criticize the idea of a natural body. 
Embodiment from this perspective is not only a concept that implies that there is a biological 
dimension to comportment, but embodiment is also a phenomenon that depends on other 
related concepts and thus on cultural context.  
Body may seem like an essence, or like what philosophers now call a natural-kind term 
(like water, heat, or gold). But I see the concept of the body in Nietzsche as more like 
money, or love, or power, or justice phenomena that depend on their concepts and on 
culture.” (Klossowski, Living Currency 58) 
Even in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, who had an undeniable inspiration for the coming thinkers 
of body, the naturalization of body has its foothold. Merleau-Ponty presented a critique of 
mind/body duality and argued that body is the locus of Knowledge, but on the other hand, he 
considered this body “as having a telos towards rationality and explicitness”. That is why for 
Foucault, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze are indeed opposite in respect to their theory of body. For 
Merleau-Ponty, Foucault believes, “the body-organism is linked to the world through a network 
of primal significations” (Theatrum Phliosophicum 219). It comes from an originary perception of 
world that marks its effect as organism on the human body. For Deleuze, the network of life 
consists of human and inhuman elements and actors, and organism is just a hierarchy of forces 
in a certain body that comes not from any originary source, but as result of a contingent 
articulation that is now solidified.  
Therefore, the following paragraphs will present the Nietzschean idea of body and try to develop 
and extend it through existing literature from an individual level into a more social, collective 





4.2.2.1 Nietzsche and the Impulsive Organization of the Body 
In the second chapter, we referred to an “inorganic” dimension of bodily acts in Nietzsche, 
especially to show his distance to the dominant organicism that swept over the Europe in 19th 
century (see the section on Nationalism). But one cannot ignore traces of biologism in Nietzsche. 
Indeed, an inorganic Nietzschean body seems a problematic claim, particularly when he asserts 
that  
powerful organic principle seems essential to me because of the ease by which it incorporates 
inorganic substances. I do not see how this finality could be explained simply by intensification. I 
believe rather that there are eternally organic beings (qtd in Klossowski, Vicious Circle 28). 
Here, it seems for Nietzsche the organic is an encompassing structure that has the ability of 
incorporating the inorganic without being destroyed, an eternal structure that is too powerful to 
be defeated by the invasion of the inorganic. Note that relative to each organism, the inorganic 
is those excluded elements. They do not have a place in the organization of the organs which is 
called organism. This is the main conceptual backbone of all organicist theories of nation-states 
that turn a blind-eye to threats of social and ethnic cleansings and genocides for protecting the 
nation as organism. Hence the Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche. 
As we explained in earlier chapters, the way to surpass the duality of organic/inorganic in 
Nietzsche is to consider a productive, ontogenetical relation between them, as organic being one 
possible organized product of inorganic, performative, and differential forces. According to Scott 
Lash, Nietzsche himself was in a way critical of such duality: 
In art, Nietzsche contrasts bodily and nonbodily values. He criticises his early work (in The Birth of 
Tragedy) as inscribed in a 'two-world' conception, as an 'aesthetic justification' - or 'aesthetodicy' 
- in which a 'will to beauty' is counterposed to the ugliness of this world (Genealogy and the Body). 
Klossowski’s reading of Nietzsche is a way to avoid the trap of organicism. According to his 
reading, there is an “intensive impulsional body” giving rise to the “extensive organic body”. The 
former is what remains mostly incommunicable within the organic body, nonetheless forms its 
very structure. As Smith puts it, “the extensive organic body finds its sufficient reason in the 




without organs,” (Klossowski: From Theatrical Theology to Counter-Utopia) to which we return 
later. 
By discussing consciousness and language through Nietzsche’s texts, Klossowski shows how he 
goes beyond from a preference for the absolute organic and its simple opposition to the 
inorganic. To shatter the organic/inorganic duality, Klossowski’s Nietzsche argumentation 
undermines other dualities between mind/body and consciousness/unconsciousness. The 
ontological target of this theoretical attack is the principle of identity (as it is inherent to the idea 
of “self” or “ego”) and the notion of a universal, homogenous and natural body: 
The body is a product of chance; it is nothing but the locus where a group of individuated impulses 
confront each other so as to produce this interval that constitutes a human life (Klossowski, 
Vicious Circle 21). 
According to Smith, Klossowski refers to many notions in Nietzsche by the term “impulse”; 
notions such as ‘drive’ (Triebe), ‘desire’ (Begierden), ‘instinct’ (Instinke), ‘power’ (Mächte), ‘force’ 
(Kräfte), and ‘impulse’ (Reize, Impulse) itself. He uses the term “impulsive forces” in a Leibnizian 
way to show that there is no duality between impulsive and physical forces, since Leibniz defines 
force as the sufficient reason of movement. On the other hand, Leibniz sees such forces as 
differential, because they not only create difference, but also their function is conditioned by the 
presence of difference. There is movement when there is difference. 
We discussed how these differential forces represent the performative in Klossowski’s Nietzsche. 
For Nietzsche, as we said, the performative signs cannot be totally absorbed in the discursive: 
Every movement should be conceived as a gesture, a kind of language in which (impulsive) forces 
make themselves heard. In the inorganic world there is no misunderstanding, communication 
seems to be perfect. Error begins in the organic world (ibid. 35).  
Error is not simply a negative term in Nietzsche, as he always maintained that error is the vehicle 
of thought. Here, however, it refers to the actualized notion; notions that taken as granted, 
eternal and originary: “'Things', 'substances', 'qualities', 'activities' - we must guard against their 
projection into the inorganic world. These are the errors of species, through which organisms 




forces (that need a language of gestures to be heard), rather silence them (and should be 
guarded against). “Our beliefs in 'the subject', 'truth' and the categories of logic have no objective 
validity”, Scott Lash writes, “we hold these beliefs insofar as they function towards the expanded 
reproduction of bodies.” (Genealogy and the Body 13). The organic is thus sustained by the 
actual, and the stability of the organism is sustained by concepts that cannot absorb the 
inorganic. How does an organism survive, why should impulsive forces be silenced? 
To reach that point, Klossowski focuses on the concept of “everyday codes” or the “code of 
everyday signs” in Nietzsche.  The everyday code functions as the element that generates the 
dominant meanings and significations. Externally, it is the translation of the dominant societal 
forces into the realm of representation, particularly language; and internally, it is the specific 
“coding filter” that comes out of the impulsive hierarchy of consciousness. As Klossowski puts it, 
“in as much as the exteriority is installed in the agent by the code of everyday signs, it is only on 
the basis of this code that the agent can make declarations or state opinions, think or not think, 
remain silent or break its silence.” (Vicious Circle 37) 
There is a vicious circle in the process of expression through such a code, because “body wants 
to make itself understood through the intermediary of a language of signs that is fallaciously 
deciphered by consciousness”, while “consciousness itself constitutes this code of signs that 
inverts, falsifies and filters what is expressed through the body”. For this very reason, one should 
differentiate between two kinds of expression: the expression that comes from an already 
established subjective position, which uses “the everyday signs”, and a performative expression, 
which is not only expressive, but is above all creative. It is a production that not only its process 
is its expression, but also it produces signs for its singular form of expression.  
The everyday code gives the structure to a set of forces according to the dominant norm. It has 
a close relation with the concept of discourse on one hand, and the axiomatics of Deleuze and 
Guattari on the other hand. They also used coding in the same manner, where to code something 
is to make it enter certain definite relations. A rigid coding of a flow or a force make it less able 




hierarchical and vertical organization of impulses; the organism. Understanding, culture, morality 
- all are based on the code of everyday signs (ibid. 40).  
In terms of individual body, the homogeneity of the codes of everyday signs forms the self, a 
homogenous agent proper to the conscious and unconscious divide. Nietzsche approaches the 
question of body through impulsive forces (and the language of gestures) and their interaction 
with the dominant external forces (and the language of everyday signs) in order to destabilize 
such divide. For him, the former is not simply the opposite pole of the latter. He gives priority to 
the performative (sign as gesture), which is not coded by the everyday signs and contains the 
differential forces of the inorganic, but has produced such signs as its own abbreviation for the 
organic:  
The contradiction is not between the ‘false’ and the ‘true’ but between the ‘abbreviations of signs’ 
and the ‘signs’ themselves. The essential point: the creation of forms, which represent numerous 
movements, the invention of signs for all types of signs. (ibid. 43-44) 
Therefore, Klossowski defines the only “authentic” form of communication as the exchange of 
bodies “through the secret language of corporeal signs” (ibid. 69). What we outlined as the 
perfomativization method is a way to approach that aim of capturing the movements of 
performative signs. As Klossowski puts it, “it is not a matter of destroying what Nietzsche calls 
the abbreviation (of signs) by signs themselves - the encoding of movements - but of retranslating 
the 'conscious' semiotic into the semiotic of the impulses.” (ibid. 50) 
Deleuze and Guattari also consider the sign as “a position of desire”. Through their idea of socius 
(which will be explained later), they argue that the first signs are “the territorial signs that plant 
their flags in bodies”:  
And if one wants to call this inscription in naked flesh "writing," then it must be said that speech 
in fact presupposes writing, and that it is this cruel system of inscribed signs that renders man 
capable of language, and gives him a memory, the spoken word (Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia 145). 
The conscious self is not only a product of the everyday code, but also a symptom of its effect on 




impulses in a body. This chaos would be hegemonized and reduced by a movement in which an 
impulsive force gets the upper hand, dominates the other impulses and makes a hierarchical 
order in the body. This hierarchical order is organism; a vertical organization in which the head 
rules the other organs, defines their proper actions, suppresses their individual impulses and 
makes a hegemonic closed whole.  
Following this process, what is called self or agent takes form in the psychological construction 
of human body. Agent is itself the product of this contingent vertical organization of impulses 
and also the guardian of this organization, continuing to reproduce it permanently. “[The human 
being] always believe itself to be in its own body”, writes Klossowski, “but its own body is only 
the fortuitous encounter of contradictory impulses, temporarily reconciled" (Vicious Circle 28). 
Moreover, the word “impulse” signifies “desire” for him too (ibid. x). In this so-called natural 
organic body, the free flow of desire is then blocked and interrupted by a ruling authority of a 
dominant impulsive force and the agent it formed. From this point of view, the problem of 
organization is the problem of the head.  
This is not an isolated chemical process in an individual body, as we have seen. The code of the 
everyday signs effects the self, shapes the conscious and defines the head as the locus of 
decision-making, knowing and commanding. The moral values, the cultural norms, the bodily 
technics. Through the code of the everyday signs, Klossowski brings this institutional level into 
the analysis: 
consciousness and unconsciousness, which are derived from what is responsible or irresponsible, 
always presuppose the unity of the person of the ego, of the subject - a purely institutional 
distinction, which is why it plays such an important role in psychiatric considerations (ibid. 30). 
The code of the everyday signs makes what Deleuze and Guattari defines as the encoding or 
territorialization of the body possible. If brain is considered the master in the perceived vertical 
hierarchy of human body, and only then comes the heart, hands, foots and finally the genitals, 
similar organization can be found in an imagined collective political body. In the “natural” or 




privileged classes, the middle classes, the poor and the non-represented come next and they 
should follow the commands of the head for the organism to survive. 
Moreover, the contemporary capitalism has multiplied the codes of the everyday signs, as it 
allows and promotes “expressions” of differences that focuses on individuals and their 
personalities. Indeed, these differences are difference between identities, not differentiating 
lines of subjectifications: they all subjected to the same logic of consumption and consumer-
subject positions. The examples of such codes are multiple sub-cultures that even if started as 
rebellions against the establishments, are now identities integrated and consumed in it: punk 
culture, nerd culture, goth culture, nomad culture, skin-head culture and so forth. Each “type” of 
collective bodies signifies a homogenized group of people and a certain code of the everyday 
signs, even if they have different “characters”.  
We can summarize our discussion on the Nietzschean body till now in the following points:  
● The body cannot be presupposed as a natural given. As Nietzsche writes in The Genealogy 
of Morals, the body is a thousand folds process.  
● The body cannot be presupposed as a unity. It is a plurality or multiplicity of impulsive, 
inorganic forces. “The alleged unity is not a given, but is only ever to be achieved (and 
inevitably only incompletely, as a fictional or imaginary unity)” (Hoy 21). 
● The unity of a body results from a relation of dominancy. It is where the relation between 
dominant and dominated forces plays out its drama. “As a plurality of these forces, the 
body is a multiplicity that is unified only insofar as some of these forces dominate others.” 
● There is no given conscious subject or a presupposed self. “The subject is never at one 
with itself, but always involves a plurality of bodily forces.”  (Hoy 21) 
● The subject is always constructed in a situation. In other words, “the Nietzschean position 
recognizes the situatedness of the agent and the challenge of creating integrity in the face 
of conflicting demands and perspectives.” (Hoy 20) 
● As such, the body is always a political issue. Its construction comes from a certain political 
performativity.  “Nietzsche’s novelty is to construe the body as like a political organization 




● And in the final analysis, there is no permanent domination, only a permanent struggle 
for domination. “If the various relations that compose a body were charachterless in 
themselves, this unity could be guaranteed for an eternity. this is not the case. all relations 
are subject to qualifications” (Buchanan 82). 
 
4.2.2.2 The Survival of Organism 
A process of suppression should exist in order for a self/agent to form. The unconscious should 
be limited to a theatre of images and abbreviated signs that the conscious could page through 
and reach their real meaning, while it rather resembles, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, to a 
factory that produces and changes the terms of interaction with the real – hence the psychiatric 
power.  
The conscious and its concepts are necessary, according to Nietzsche, for the survival of 
organism, for its reproduction. But any organism is on one hand only a possible organization of 
the inorganic body and on the other, is riddled with the impulsive forces that cannot be captured 
by its conscious level. Therefore, the conscious that is defined by the everyday code and defining 
the self has become the guarantor of organic homogeneity. In other words, “the body that is 
grasped by the consciousness ‘adopts only those reflexes that allow it to maintain itself for this 
cerebral activity just as the latter henceforth adopts the body as its own product’". (Vicious Circle 
27) Therefore, consciousness functions as a filter that only passes the impulsive forces yielded to 
the dominant one. “The body through the consciousness that grasped it”, writes Smith, 
“dissociates itself from the impulses that flow through it.” 
Klossowski explains the generation of the conscious agent by way of intensities. Here again, the 
affinity between Nitzsche and Spinoza makes such reading possible. Intensity for Spinoza is the 
affect that a body causes itself. In other words, it is an active force of the body, where the body 
causes its own affect and its action is not separated from its own force nor from its own value 
that is the product of the evaluation process (see Buchanan 87). Klossowski uses the concept of 





“The philosophical line of demarcation does not lie between body and soul”, Klossowski writes, 
“but rather between our impulsional forces, which are incommunicable, and the expression of 
these impulses in consciousness, language, and rational and economic norms, which 
fundamentally falsify the nature of the impulses.” (Vicious Circle 20). For Klossowski, the soul is 
the space for the free interplay between the impulsive forces, where a certain relation between 
these forces forms a tonality. The tonality of the soul, as he calls it, is “a fluctuation of intensity”. 
Intensity is the product of a force or set of forces (power) that are acting and provoking. An 
intense experience, for example, consists of external forces affecting the internal impulsive 
forces, putting them inside a certain relationship, causing what Klossowski calls the “rises and 
falls”. This organization of impulsive forces, these rises and falls create intensities, but for the 
inorganic impulsive intensity to be communicable, it should turn back on itself, repeats itself and 
imitates itself in order to “become a sign”.  
A sign is first of all the trace of a fluctuation of intensity. If a sign retains its meaning, it is because 
the degree of intensity coincides with it; it signifies only through a new afflux of intensity, which 
in a certain manner joins up with its first trace… But a sign is not only the trace of a fluctuation. It 
can also mark an absence of intensity - and here too, a new afflux is necessary if only to signify 
this absence! (Vicious Circle 48) 
Such a process makes a drama out of affects. Its signs or intensity’s significations are nonetheless 
“like the figures that rise to the crest of a wave, leaving behind them only foamy froth” (62). But 
as we said earlier, if they are dissociated from the sea of impulsive forces through the coding 
filter of the conscious self, the identity, they form an agent that continues to reproduce itself. 
The drama becomes a static image.  
Here again the Spinozist distinction between the power and the Power emerges in the discussion 
of impulsive forces and the conscious agent through the distinction Klossowski makes between 
the power and the will to power.  
Power resists everything, except that it cannot resist itself. It must act - as long as it is not reacting, 
it must provoke in order not to be provoked. This is why there is 'will' to power: power was itself 
as power, and cannot not will itself. Now there is a degree beyond which the will disappears in 




represents a degree of accumulated and accumulating force - produces the agent, in accordance 
with its rises and falls. (ibid. 68) 
Power means here the certain relation between the forces and the ability of them to affect and 
be affected. Negri formulates such affective definition of power as “an action on the action of 
the other” (Marx and Foucault: Essays by Negri). Not a reaction, but an action that creates value, 
a difference.  
It also explains that a reactive force, a force of the solidified identity does not act or provoke, but 
only be used in the already existing hierarchy of organism in order to contribute to its survival. 
On the other hand, the will to power concerns the conscious agent, while the power itself 
produces both consciousness and its agent.  
Interestingly, the State or parliament are often described as the consciousness of the nations, 
where nation is the main imagined collective body under the State as head. A case particularly 
repeated in the post-colonial governments in the South, where the State takes the role of 
promoting the “national consciousness”. The national consciousness is considered by many 
commentators as the first step toward the construction of a nation (see Khalidi). 
The (post-)colonial national consciousness gives rise to a hierarchy of impulsive forces in the 
nation as collective body. It renders some forces unrepresented or under-represented inside the 
head of the nation, which is the State.  
 
4.2.2.3 Imagination and the Nietzschean Body 
In the earlier chapters, we discussed about the possibility of bodily transformations in 
performative events. We distinguished material and immaterial transformations that affects 
collective bodies, inspiring other forms of organization in them. Immaterial transformations, we 
discussed, are in relation with the imagination that is provoked in such movements. 
Nietzsche’s theory of the body presents a way for conceptualizing imagination and its relation to 
the organization of the body. It explains why on one hand the imagination of national collective 




hand, alternative poles of imaginal recomposition contribute to the transformation of such 
collective bodies. To formulate this, Klossowski uses concepts of “phantasm”, “simulacrum” and 
“stereotype”.  
Phantasm comes from the Greek phantasia (appearance, imagination), and in Klossowski, it 
refers to “an obsessional image produced within us by the forces of our impulsive life”. Or as Lash 
formulates it, “thought produces phantasms which have primal appendages, in a theatrical vein”, 
where “body thinks through phantasm” (Genealogy and the Body) and philosophy becomes – as 
Foucault famously said – a theater.  
The aforementioned process of coding has an important role in the production of these images, 
because “every living being interprets according to a code of signs, responding to variations in 
excited or excitable states. Whence come images: representations of what has taken place or 
what could have taken place - thus a phantasm.” (Klossowski, Vicious Circle 36) 
A phantasm is a product of a tonality of soul, of an organization of the impulsive forces. 
Therefore, it can be caused by the intervention of alternative affective forces, or by the 
reproduction mechanism of the reactive forces. In any case, it is still not a conscious element, 
until it is willed by the conscious agent.  
For the impulse to become a will at the level of consciousness, the latter must give the impulse 
an exciting state as an aim, and thus must elaborate the signification of what, for the impulse, is 
a phantasm: an anticipated excitation, and thus a possible excitation according to the schema 
determined by previously experienced excitations. 
Here comes Klossowski’s second concept, simulacrum, that is the willed reproduction of 
phantasm, while phantasm itself is a product of a tonality of the soul that at the same time, 
produces the willing agent. This reproduction can take several forms, artistic or else. In any case, 
Klossowski explains simulacrum through an imitative process, as “the actualization of something 
in itself incommunicable and nonrepresentable”. Phantasm is thus an idea that could be 
performativized in many ways, conditioned by and conditioning the impulsive, differential forces 




The simulacrum, in its imitative sense, is: the phantasm in its obsessional compulsion (Klossowski, 
Living Currency 8). 
The obsession is the error of species to sustain the organism. If the obsession fades away, a 
phantasm could give way to other phantasms, forming another set of relation that results into a 
different simulacrum.  
As we have repeatedly asserted, the code of the everyday signs, the dominant language of the 
structure has already conditioned the production of such simulacra. The process of 
performativization is already happening inside a predefined territory of performance. And a set 
of axioms – former simulacra that gotten worn-out – and a corresponding coding process try to 
limit its differential forces for the survival of organism. 
Stereotype is the name that Klossowski assigns to the code of everyday signs. All inventions of 
simulacra “always presupposes a set of prior stereotypes.” On a common-sense level, 
stereotypes reproduce the existing hierarchies in a collective body by assigning specific 
characteristics to people with different genders, sexualities, ethnicities and backgrounds. “The 
beliefs attach themselves so to speak to our sense organs, to the 'surfaces of bodies'”, Lash 
writes, “thus the T doesn't think, but bodies think through the T.” (Genealogy and the Body) 
Such explanation of phantasms and simulacra resembles the concept of fantasy in psychoanalysis 
and connects the theory of body with a theory of imagination. Criticizing the individualist analysis 
of fantasy, Deleuze and Guattari argues that “fantasies are group fantasies”. According to them, 
group fantasies are a product of a desiring collective body that “assembles [together] social 
production and desiring-production.” (Anti-Oedipus 142) Desire in them, as we discussed and will 
return later, amounts to the constituent power of what Klossowski calls the impulsive forces. 
So in another level, the simulacrum refers to an image of thought, being produced by a collective 
body.  
Earlier, we discussed how collective bodies in social movements, through their 




can be thus overthrown in a performative event, and substituted by an alternative one that make 
possible a thinking proper to its thinking body.  
The concept of simulacrum helps us to trace back the representations of social movements into 
its performative, non-representational level of active/reactive forces. When we are confronted 
with the new forms of protest movements, the different forms of their simulacra (as Smith says, 
literal, plastic, conceptual, pictorial, …) enables us to track the impulsional, i.e. performative and 
differential forces that give rise to them. They are the signs that the collective body of a 
performative event create, its own language. And they explain to some extent what kind of a 
body has created them. 
They also form an imaginal pole for the construction of an alternative imagination. Through 
alternative fantasies for a new life – “another world is possible” is an important slogan in the 
contemporary movements –, the perceived limits of performance will be surpassed toward a new 
political performativity. 
The distinction between new, alternative simulacrum and the worn-out one, i.e. stereotype, gives 
another formulation for the distinction was made in the previous chapter between the 
performative event and the political spectacle. We argued there that a performative event is 
singular, and as a repetition it always repeats the difference, while the spectacle is a repetition 
of the same, belonging to the realm of the identical. The latter belongs to the order of 
general/particular dichotomy, while the former is an active relationship between the singular and 
the universal, where the universal is an affective phenomenon (to be explained in the following 
sections of this chapter).  
Klossowski categorizes certain concepts in Nietzsche to clarify the concept of singular. For him, 
the singular contrasts the gregarious and the two form the most basic typologies of bodies. The 
latter comes from “what Nietzsche calls the ‘herd’, which reduces its singularity to a common 
denominator, and expresses only what can be communicated” (D. W. Smith, Klossowski: From 
Theatrical Theology to Counter-Utopia 6). While the singular is unexchangeable, unintelligible, 
mute and non-linguistic, the gregarious is exchangeable, comprehensible, communicable and 




to anything that contributes to the conservation of the species, to the endurance of the herd, but 
also to the endurance of the signs of the species in the individual” (The Vicious Circle 60). 
In terms of consciousness and the unconscious, the singular belongs to the latter, as it remains 
unexchangeable and non-linguistic. This idea is further developed in Deleuze and Guattari 
schizoanalysis, where the unconscious is unrelated to negation, indifferent to personal identity 
and independent of linguistic expression.   
The political connotations of Nietzschean terms such as slave morality is problematic, as we 
already discussed. To empty it of its sinister references to colonialism, slavery and white-
supremacy, it is necessary to define it based on active and reactive forces. The singular as the 
unconscious is not a product of simple negation – which is the case for Nietzsche in his erroneous 
reading of Hegel’s master/slave dialectics – but an affirmation of constituent power and as such, 
it extends the limits of its own being. It is a performative element that does not stay inside the 
pre-existing limits of performativity. On the contrary, as Lash argues, “slave moralities which are 
non-bodily in content, attach themselves to weak bodies or groupings or weak bodies, because 
they function in their expanded reproduction. … Such moralities are life-destroying, however, for 
the species.” 
Returning to Klossowski, the singular is a simulacrum of a specific tonality of the soul that breaks 
down the gregarious stereotype of an organic body. As Smith puts it, the stereotype “express the 
gregarious aspect of lived experience in a form already schematized by the habitual usages of 
perception and thought.” But in the same manner that stereotype is a product of phantasm’s 
performativization and a worn-out simulacrum, the herd is also the crystallization of a singular 
state that tries to reproduce itself eternally against the invasion of the new.  
Singular Gregarious 








Table 1: Typology of Bodies in Klossowski – the Singular/the Gregarious 
The individual is not in itself singular. Singularity is a mode of an organization of impulsive forces 
and “an individuality's capacity could never exhaust the differentiated richness of single 
existence.” Klossowski calls this singular state an “idiosyncrasy” which is an assemblage of 
impulses (Vicious Circle 71). It is precisely because of this point in Nietzsche/Klossowski theory of 
body that we can extend it to the realm of collective bodies, where the assemblage is machinic 
assemblage and the code is a machinic function that can put different bodies inside a certain 
relation. The political importance of Nietzsche’s theory of body comes from this fact, since the 
multiplicity of forces exists in the body renders it being uncontrollable, even in the presence of 
modern and contemporary multilayered apparatuses designed for its suppression.  
To summarize again our discussion, I will explain here shortly how Nietzsche/Klossowski’s theory 
of body connects with the next section on volk and nationalism and gives a way to analyze the 
contemporary movements challenging it.  
The nationalist governmentality, as we will see, tries to impose a certain relation between 
different groups and collective bodies in its territory. It operates through a code, a machinic 
function that cause a hierarchy of power, a certain formation of forces based on a relation of 
dominance. It is a relation coming out of some complex dynamics between class, gender, 
ethnicity and sexuality. It includes certain collective bodies, put them on different power 
positions, and excludes some, judging their bodies as spendable. The nation is imagined and 
performativized through phantasms created in the body and it becomes a stereotype. Not only 
the nation as the organic national body, but also the national identity results from this formation 
of forces, and the State, the protector of this identity and the consciousness of the nation 
becomes its conscious agent. It also starts a hygienic apparatus to maintain that organization, 




Yet on the other hand, the machinic function of a new code, a new image of thought emerging 
through the differential forces of performative event could change the machinic assemblage of 
political bodies, envisioning what we have called altermodernity.  
How the body changes, what a body can do: we will come back to these question in this chapter.  
 
4.2.3 Affect and the Body 
“All of these movements ... shared one thing in common: online and offline solidarity shaped 
around the public display of emotion” writes Papacharissi38 (Affective Publics: sentiments, 
technology, and politics 6), referring to the affective publics that formed by the protest 
movements. A public display of emotion: this brings us to the realms of affects. Emotion is 
different from affect: affect is indeterminate, not far from idea that needs dramatization to 
become concept, and is virtual; but emotion is a definition of an affect in terms of anger, 
indignation, joy, … 
Writing about the queerness in Gezi, a Turkish scholar writes that “in the intermixing of bodies, 
signs, objects, voices, stories, and emotions, movement solidarity renews existing ties and 
spawned new intimacies and affection” (Zengin). Massumi calls this affective solidarity a 
“belonging in becoming” (Parables For The Virtual 79).  
From this perspective, Papacharissi idea should be read reverse, so that the emotion become the 
product or dramatized concept of the solidarity. Therefore, correcting Papacharissi sentence, one 
should write: a public display of emotion was the performativization of an affective solidarity. It 
reminds one of the famous Guevarian phrase that “solidarity represents the affection of 
peoples”. 
Flowing in-between the bodies in the squares, the affects and affections transformed, even if 
momentarily, the organization of a collective political body in contrast to what was given as 






The body, according to the above discussion, can be considered as a multiplicity of impulsive 
forces. The will to power follows the formation of a conscious agent in an exchange with the code 
of the everyday signs, and a chaotic field of power precedes that definite state. That power, as 
we mentioned, is the power to affect and be affected, itself a product of affectivity between the 
internal and external forces.  
Referring to Nietzsche’s theory of body, David Couzens Hoy argues that the subject is affective in 
Nietzsche. He also points to the emergence of consciousness and the process of signification: 
In The Will to Power, Nietzsche asks “Who interprets?” and then answers: our “affects.” That is, 
affective modules that come into play before consciousness are already at work in configuring 
how we will experience the world. Significance is contributed by affective processes prior to 
conceptual or cognitive processes. The data flow that is being processed is not a given that carries 
its meaning on its face, but how significant it is and how it is to be construed is always already 
interpretive. (Critical Resistance) 
Nietzsche continues to argue that subject is itself a result of interpretation, thus of the bodily 
organization of impulsive forces. Interpretation is itself a form of the will to power and “exists 
(but not as a being, but as a process and a becoming) as an affect” (ibid). 
Then the affection makes the subject, as much as the subject experiences the affection. As we 
discussed before, the interaction of impulsive forces results into differential relations that cause 
signs, phantasms, and simulacra. Deleuze also argues that “drives” are differential relations 
between active (affirmative) and reactive (negative) forces, internal and external to the individual 
body. For him, these differential relations affect the body, and the subject, itself an effect of 
those relations, experiences them as affections and passions. Affections and passions are then 
experienced as emotions, feelings and inclinations by the conscious agent (Ian Buchanan 75). This 
two-sided relation, which we explained as an ontogenetic relation, is explained by Spinoza’s 
couple-concept of affect/affection and its relation to passion. 
The power of a body is its capacity to affect and be affected. If a body is affected by another body, 
it experiences an affection that in its turn, produces an affect, enables it to form another relation 




with other bodies. As Deleuze puts it, “relations are inseparable from the capacity to be affected” 
( (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 218).  
Affect is on the other hand the rise or fall of intensity, as Klossowski would call it, and since the 
impulsive forces are constituent forces of body, any rise or fall in the power means a rise of fall 
in body’s capacity to exist.  
Deleuze and Guattari also define affect/affection relation in terms of “a pre-personal intensity 
corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an 
augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act” (Massumi in A Thousand Plateaus xvi). 
Here, affect/affection relation translates also to the realm of force, where there are two basic 
affect-affection relations: happiness or sadness. 
The three basic affects in Spinoza are desire (appetite), joy or happiness, pain or sadness. Desire 
would be later interpreted differently, as the constituent power (potentia) by his late 
commentators, but happiness means an increase in the capacity to exist and sadness amounts to 
a decrease in it. Emotions are the results of such experiences.  
Spinoza defines a mode in terms of a relation between affect and affections: every body 
that produces an ‘affection’ in my own body at the same time produces a rise or fall in my 
capacity to exist, an ‘affect’ that is experienced as a joy or a sadness (D. W. Smith, 
Klossowski: From Theatrical Theology to Counter-Utopia). 
Unlike affect/affection, a passion is less connected with an active relationality, although it can 
arise its own affect/affection in connection with other bodies. Passion comes from the Latin pati, 
meaning to suffer or to endure. It is indeed something that “happens” to an already existing 
subject, it is experienced by it “passively”.  
Affects are differential relations, and as such, they are autonomous. As we discussed in earlier 
chapters, a differential relation is not conditioned by its terms; rather, it is floating in-between 
points. Affects are then virtual; they need bodies to be performativized into certain modes and 





we know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its 
affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the 
affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to 
exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful 
body (Deleuze and Guattari 257) 
At the same time, they are performative, as the relation between performative forces of bodies. 
Affect is material, though virtual and indeterminate; it is, according to Deleuze, based on the non-
cognitive perception of a situation that leads to a modification of the body which triggers the 
emotion. Therefore, emotion comes in the end of the process of affective production: the affect 
is situational and contextual, singular to its context, and it traverses bodies while bodies interact 
also on the flow of affect. Then an affection is produced in the flesh which can rise to the emotion 
as the dramatized affect. 
Focusing on the affects, Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of the impulsive forces goes beyond 
Nietzsche/Klossowski’s seemingly individualist approach39. For Deleuze and Guattari, bodies are 
foldings in the social flesh; there is no interiority sealed away from the exteriority, instead there 
are foldings of the immanent plane.  
In order to undermine dualities such as personal/social and individual/collective, Deleuze and 
Guattari introduce affect as an impersonal, cooperative and performative force. This is part of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt to replace aetiology (cause/effect relation) with ethology 
(action/affect relation). As Ian Buchanan explains,  
(a) ethology involves a change in direction - unlike aetiology it looks forwards and not 
backwards; (b) ethology entails a new conceptualization of the body - unlike aetiology it 
looks outwards and not inwards (79) 
 
39 Klossowski’s reading of Nietzsche is not centered around the individual as long as it formulates “the self” as a 
contingent, temporary organization of impulsive forces. As one of the so-called philosopher of the community, 
Klossowski’s main political strategy is to empty the imagined a priori interiority of the human, the destruction of the 
self. As such, he comes in a trajectory of thought that extends from Nietzsche, Bataille, Artaud, Blanchot to Nancy, 
Agamben and so on. However, his focus on the inner experience and the concept of idiosyncrasy of individuals makes 




From an ethological perspective, affect is defined as the capacity of a body to form relations. The 
affective relations are differential, performative relations as we discussed before; they are “the 
virtual links between bodies that a body can form” and they become actualized “when they are 
connected to a body, but they do not initiate anything themselves” (Buchanan 81).  
As it was discussed in earlier chapters, the differential, performative relations are not subjugated 
to fixed terms. Not only they flow in-between points, they generate such points in their 
interactions; in the same manner that a conscious agent emerges in a human body as a fixed 
point of reference. However, Deleuze and Guattari conceptualization of the body does not 
presupposes it – as Klossowski does not – and the body becomes “an a posteriori product of 
newly connected capacities” (Buchanan 75). Virtual alternative bodies are awaiting their 
moments of performativization. 
But if the affective relationality has the trans(per)formative power to alter the body, then it could 
be seen as a disease from the perspective of the dominant Power. The dominant Power always 
seeks to maintain its corresponding organism by eliminating the elements of change. That is why 
Deleuze believes that disorder, marginality, and anarchy present the habitat for affect. 
From this perspective, the potentiality of a new collective body is already present in the contexts 
of nation-states, where there is already an imagined, presupposed national collective body. 
Giorgio Agamben formulates this potentiality with a distinction between “the people” and the 
people. “The people” is the imagined collective body of a state, or of a sovereign rule, whereas 
the people is what stays non-represented by that authority, retaining the potentiality of 
challenging such homogenizing rule.  
Moreover, the ethological perspective offers us a typology of bodies based on their affects, their 
capacity to relate with other bodies, and the actions come out of such affective relationality. In 
other words, it does not categorized bodies according to the principle of identity, but of 
difference. That is why “a racehorse is more different from a workhorse than a workhorse is from 
an ox” (Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand Plateaus 257).  
Thus, one cannot even simply national collective bodies in the same category because they are 




communicated by the word nation. The only way to observe those is to track their performative 
simulacra, their pathological symptoms and the ailments of their organisms, to equip our 
methodologies with – as Deleuze would say – new sensual organs in order to listen to the unheard 
and to read the unwritten and to see the unrepresented. Before that, nonetheless, we have to 
understand the way they sustain the organism, organize and reproduce it. This brings us back to 
the code of the everyday sign. 
 
4.2.4 Recording and Inscription: the Machinic Function of the Code 
The code of the everyday sign functions as a means to impose a certain organization of forces on 
the body, and turn it into a homogenous, normative entity. As we said, it is the morality, culture, 
dominant discourses and norms of a society and it contributes to the production of phantasm 
and thus, simulacra and stereotypes.  
For Deleuze, phantasms are “constituted at the interface where society [the code of the everyday 
signs] meets human bodies” (Lash 7 – additional explanations are not in the original). As we 
remember from earlier discussions, there is no duality of depth and surface for Deleuze, who 
quotes Vallery that “the skin is the deepest part of the body”. Therefore, phantasms are indeed 
inscribed on the surface of the body. They are the “incorporeal materiality” (see chapter two) of 
the bodies, and as phantasms, they are performative images: product of an organization of 
forces, but productive of further simulacra. Phantasms are points or knots that trap the flow of 
desire. The easiest example of a phantasm as an obsessive image would be the “face” of a lover 
in an intimate relationship; regardless of lover’s bodily presence, the other lover sees that face, 
as poets have written for centuries, in everything. And most probably, her/his body would remain 
close to other human affections for a while. As Lyotard explains, phantasm “grips the wild 
turbulence of the libido” (J. F. Lyotard)40.  
 
40 Lyotard: “The phantasm here is not an unreality or a dereality, it is 'something' which grips the crazy turbulence 
of the libido, something it invents as an incandescent object, and which it instantaneously adds to the band traced 




On the other hand, as we discussed in the previous chapter, “colliding, mingling and separating” 
bodies create events. Events are the performative forces that are created on the surface of 
bodies, interact with phantasms, transform them and invent a new image of thought and an 
alternative imagination. The forces of the exterior are not only of the dominant, gregarious type. 
A performative event produces its own bodies, while it is created by those very bodies. For 
Deleuze, the constituent power of such performative events is desire. The body is the battlefield 
for the struggle of active (productive) forces of the constituent power and the reactive 
(reproductive) forces of the dominant Power. 
The body for Deleuze is a product of connected capabilities and the surficial inscription of 
phantasms and events. So it has for its own a plane of immanency where such processes are 
happening. Skin could be that, but it seems that flesh is what constitutes such bodily immanence 
for Deleuze. He borrows it from Merleau-Ponty: 
it is the flesh that, at the same time, is freed from the living body, the perceived world, and the 
intentionality of one toward the other that is still too tied to experience; whereas the flesh gives 
us the being of sensation…flesh of the world and flesh of the body … are exchanged as correlates 
(qtd. in Carmen and Hansen 19). 
The being of sensation is “the block of percept and affect”, the forces constitutive of the body, 
which Deleuze sees inherent in the concept of flesh. Flesh is the body prior to organism. 
The aforementioned social flesh in Deleuze and Guattari has the same status vis-à-vis the 
collective body of the society, or rather what has been imagined of it. It is a space where the 
phantasms, simulacra, stereotypes and events have been inscribed on it, through the code of the 
everyday sign and/or the performative forces. Two terms, socius and body without organs are 
used by the two co-authors of Capitalism and Schizophrenia to conceptualize such social flesh.  
Socius is the locus of social production and reproduction; it functions as the surface on which the 
coding of the body happens. It embodies the transcendental principles of the social order, those 




Socius is formed through the machinic function of the code that plugs different organs into its 
flesh. As explained, there is nonetheless a struggle between desire and the dominant hierarchy 
of the organism, and thus socius’s prime function “has always been to codify the flows of desire, 
to inscribe them, to record them, to see to it that no flow exists that is not properly damned up, 
channeled, regulated”. The code becomes the most important means of machinic enslavement41. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, earth is the foundational ground of all productions and reproductions; 
just as it was the main thing to be affirmed in Nietzsche in his fight against Western metaphysics. 
Redefined as a generic, undifferentiated and abstract notion, earth becomes the plane of 
immanency on which all the processes proceed. The first territorialization happens on the earth, 
dissects it into the different units by the workings of a territorial machine. Socius thus emerges 
after such territorialization, as the particular earth of each society for its production and 
reproduction. As the authors explain, 
[socius] is a founding act-that the organs be hewn into the socius, and that the flows run over its 
surface-through which man ceases to be a biological organism and becomes a full body, an earth, 
to which his organs become attached, where they are attracted, repelled, miraculated, following 
the requirements of a socius (Anti-Oedipus 159). 
The different machinic syntheses on the socius are not always directed toward production or 
reproduction. The desiring machines could destroy the already existing machinic assemblage, 
removing the organs grew and/or plugged into the socius and pushing it toward its limits 
designated for controlling the desire. The body without organs (BwO) emerges at such a stage (to 
be explained in next sections). 
The socius is however not an ahistorical entity. It changes according to the context it is built in, 
the particular codes of the everyday and the zeitgeist. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari offer 
a historical typology of different machinic assemblages. Problematic as it has certain traces of 
eurocentrism, orientalism, linearity and romanticizing primitivism, the important point for us is 
how they relate certain socius types to those social machinic assemblages: body of the earth for 
 




the primitive societies; body of the despot for barbarian despotic states; and body of capital for 
capitalist states.  
This level of analysis is still too abstract, as it cannot grasp completely even the singular contexts 
in the Western Europe and the North America. In A Thousand Plateaus, they use the concept of 
minority to explain the difference between for example, a Spanish majoritarian collective body 
and a Basque or Catalan minoritarian collective body. Both are seemingly recourse to the same 
phantasm of national identity, while the former occupies a higher, inner-colonial Power position. 
As the requirements of our performativization methodology necessitates, we will go into each 
singular context of “national” collective bodies in the coming sections.  
Nonetheless, Deleuze and Guattari relates the submission to the socius with Nietzsche’s theory 
of consciousness and the self: 
Nietzsche says: it is a matter of creating a memory for man; and man, who was constituted by 
means of an active faculty of forgetting, by means of a repression of biological memory, must 
create another memory, one that is collective, a memory of words (paroles) and no longer a 
memory of things, a memory of signs and no longer of effects (Anti-Oedipus, 144) 
The difference between these two memories are the difference between the abbreviated signs 
and the performative signs. In another word, the memory of words comes when the stereotypical 
phantasms attach themselves to the surface of body, coming from the code of the everyday. 
While the performative intervention in the organism populates its body surface with new 
phantasms, resulting into a memory of effects. Thus, there is no individual body in so far as the 
social necessities and the hierarchical values impose its organization of forces. It is always a 
matter of collective body and a collective memory. As Bakhtin says, all enunciations are collective 
enunciations.  
As we referred in the Introduction, Bakhtin also focused in a way to explain the bourgeoisie’s 
socius. For him, the modern individual body was historically constructed in a way to close on itself 
against any contamination from other bodies. According to him, the court ethics extended into 
the society at large with the bourgeois rule; an ethics that was obsessive with bodily excesses, 




idea of a grotesque body, whose characteristics are excess, leaks, contamination and openings. 
The grotesque challenges the normative by undermining the foundational survival technique of 
its organism: body closure.  
Commentators of Bakhtin’s analysis in his book on Rabelais often presupposes a contradiction 
between the classical immured body and the pre-modern unregulated body. Such a duality is 
however already based on a modern perspective and a modern understanding of regulating the 
body. More important is Bakhtin’s focus on the repertoire of practices that started to be imposed 
by a central state; practices that according to him, were deliberately segregated from everyday 
life42 and have been founded on morality. Morality, as it was discussed, is itself a hierarchy of 
impulses, a set of forces and respective values, and the machinic code for organization that made 
the immured organism possible. Its primary function is to establish “and order and hierarchy 
among the impulses” (Klossowski). The society was through this new bodily organization 
becoming a flesh that power could productively invest in, molding its new bodies/subjects.  
The molar recoding of a body, as in the case of the organic social body, is in effect “the 
organizational model applied to the body (Massumi, A User's Guide to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia 192). 
Even if modernization could globalize what Bakhtin was describing as the immurement of the 
body, the analysis stays Eurocentric. The repertoire of immurement is contextual, as any other 
repertoire of social bodily practices, depending on the particular code of the everyday sign in 
different societies and cultures. Marcel Mauss’s notion of techniques of the body focuses on this 
repertoire only in order to explain “the ways in which from society to society men know how to 
use their bodies.” (Techniques of the body 70) 
Mauss uses the latin habitus instead of French habitude in order to explain the social nature of 
the habits, since the former translates into “the acquired ability” and “does not designate those 
metaphysical habitudes, that mysterious ‘memory’” (Although for Mauss memory is a purely 
psychological term, we saw before how Deleuze and Guattari, through Nietzsche and Klossowski, 
 
42 For an argument about this point, c.f. Michael C. Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England, 




introduced another conception of memory, one that is closely tied with the idea of the code and 
the organization of body’s impulsive forces).  
Through the discussion on the technique of body, Mauss implicitly presents a non-subjective 
theory of imitation, too. For him, the techniques of the body are communicated through the 
imitation, but this is an imitation “that could be superimposed on that of education”, and the 
education becomes effective by the presence of authority over the subject: 
The action is imposed from without, from above, even if it is an exclusively biological 
action, involving his body (Mauss 73). 
Mauss’s analysis does not challenge the notion of the individual, even if he asserts that the 
difference between the techniques, as he sees them, are not that much between individuals than 
between societies. His bodily notion of habits nonetheless shows some similar aspects with the 
Nietzschean perspective. The non-subjective imitation is also an interaction of forces, where 
authority, the condition of its occurrence, translates into a relation of domination. “Habits are 
socially or culturally constructed”, writes Brian Massumi, “but they reside in the matter of the 
body, in the muscles, nerves, and skin where they operate autonomously” (Parables for the 
Virtual 236), they are frozen affectivities. A change in the habitus thus brings a change in the 
socius. 
So, there is a memory that Mauss refers to only implicitly and is different in nature from the 
mysterious memory he attributes to the metaphysical thinking. Not only a memory that resides 
in the body, an embodiment, but also a memory that is created through the body. The code of 
the everyday sign is a machinic function, and as such, it transforms as the time passes and the 
bodies change shape. The body is not only a passive receiver. It possesses an active 
transformative power, the capacity to form relations, the performative forces of affectivity. It is 
effected by and it effects the code of the everyday sign. It resists the Power from without, while 
its physiognomy changes under the effect of the same Power.  
Therefore, to maintain control, the dominant Power should transform respectively, and 
consequently the code undergoes the same. Klossowski gives another formulation for this point: 




the perspective of the dominant Power, this only means one thing: the necessity for perpetuation 
of control. 
It is in this perpetuation that the memory, as Nietzsche believed, is constructed. A memory that 
is emerged out of the systemic workings on the body. Foucault adopts this point as the central 
thesis for Discipline and Punishment.  
According to Foucault, disciplining and punishing the body as “outlaw” creates a memory for not 
only the offenders, but also for society at large. Tracing the memory on the surface of the bodies 
in the Western nation-states, he shows how each historical period corresponds to a different 
strategy of constructing such a memory that “exists at the level of the unconscious” and “is at 
the same time an agent of social control and functions in the interests of social reproduction” 
(Lash). Foucault argued that the classical governmentality directly and brutally engraved the 
memory of law on the bodies, whereas the modern governmentality – based on the model of 
panopticon – replaced the negative function of discipline and punishment with a more positive 
one – one that formed and transformed the bodies proper to the modern economic regime. In 
the modern era, the gaze of the supervision and the medical, psychological discourses penetrated 
the soul, where soul should be understood in its Klossowskian meaning, the playground of the 
impulsive forces.  
In any case, this coding cannot be done with the negative and suppressive function of police 
violence.  
We discussed shortly in the introduction to this chapter that police, as Foucault says, is modern 
state’s fundamental agent for creating the consciousness of the reason of state (raison d'etat) 
and inscribing the code of the everyday signs (which we explain later) on the surface of the body; 
or as Reich would say, putting the body armor on the social collective bodies. Police provides the 
State-sponsored technologies of the self, through creating a conscious “self” according to the 
raison d’etat. 
From the state’s point of view, the individual exists insofar as what he does is able to introduce 
even a minimal change in the strength of the state, either in a positive, or a negative direction.  




Foucault shows that police had a specific meaning between the 16th to 18th centuries, a utopic 
one that underlies the later academic and institutional interpretations: “the specific techniques 
by which a government in the framework of the state was able to govern people as individuals 
significantly useful for the world” (ibid 154) 
Turquet de Mayenne, to whom Foucault refers, considers police as a force to “foster civil respect 
and public morality”. For him, Police has to manage life both positively and negatively, and 
therefore, it must “branches out into all of the people’s conditions, everything they do or 
undertake”. For this early thinker of the modern state, “the police’s true object is man” (ibid 155-
56)  
Referring to Delamare, another early thinker of police for the modern state, Foucault reaches the 
ultimate formulation of police function: “life is the object of the police” (ibid 157). This positive 
aspect of a force that is usually associated with negative forces of punishment and suppression 
consists exactly at inscribing the code on the surface of bodies; a must for the reproduction of 
the modern (i.e. vertical, individual and sealed) body:  
the main characteristic of our political rationality is the fact that this integration of the 
individuals in a community or in a totality results from a constant correlation between an 
increasing individualization and the reinforcement of this totality. (ibid 161-62) 
The total control on bodies was an illusion, and once the police institutions were established, the 
actual police force had to become a purely negative one, only suppressing bodies in order to 
conform them with the right-wing utopic ideas.  
In the Western democracies, the police direct violence against the citizen bodies has been scaled 
down, especially since 70s. It has persisted and still persists in very high levels against the non-
citizen bodies, from the poor and the homeless to the refugees43.  
 
43 For a report on police brutality against the poor and the homeless, c.f. BRE’s (pen-name for a homeless activist) 
autoethnographic account, “Hard Livin’: Bare Life, Autoethnography, and the Homeless Body” in Constituent 
Imagination; edited by David Graeber et al. AK Press: Oakland, Edinburgh and West Virginia; 2007, pp. 223-241 
Regarding violence against refugees, multiple reports have documented and strongly warned against the use of 
police violence in France against refugees in Calais. For example, c.f. The report by the Refugee Rights Data Project 




But in many post-colonial nation-states, especially those with the experience of the Arab Spring, 
direct police violence against bodies has not even been pushed into the dark corners.  
"If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be 
tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear and never to see them again, 
you should send them to Egypt," the Former CIA officer Robert Baer said in 2004, six years before 
the Arab uprisings started (Ashour). 
This is why the destructed bodies of Khaled Mohamed Saeed, Neda Agha-Soltan, Hamza Ali Al-
Khateeb, Ali Jawad al-Sheikh, and Mohamed Bouazizi turned into the symbol of revolutions in 
Egypt, Iran, Syria, Bahrain and Tunisia.  
This does not mean that countries such as Egypt and Syria are ruled by a classical regime of 
sovereignty. As Foucault makes clear – and we will discuss it later – old regimes are always still 
present in the new regimes and obtain new strategic functions through machinic assemblage 
with the new regime. Contemporary middle eastern nation-states are also control societies, 
highly advanced in high-tech surveillance technologies, with more visible residues of sovereign 
rule and disciplining law.  
According to our earlier discussion, the transition from disciplinary societies to the societies of 
control distributed the Power in a micro level, micro-managing the organs plugged into the 
socius.  
The man who enjoys the full exercise of his rights and duties has his whole body marked under a 
regime that consigns his organs and their exercise to the collectivity (the privatization of the 
organs will only begin with ‘the shame felt by man at the sight of man’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
Anti-Oedipus 144). 
The late capitalism of control societies necessitates the privatization of the social. Fordism could 
save capitalism because it started to make the flows abstract and the organs disembodied. The 
abstraction of the management of the labor-power was simultaneous with the abstract style of 
radically political painters such as Kandinsky, for whom the abstractness could also allow for a 




contributing to the so-called international revolutionary movement. The universal abstract was 
a false promise, as it could not see its rootedness in the Western culture and account for the 
southerners of the universe. But in any case, “intersubstitutibility, homogeneity, relentless 
quantification, and exchange mechanisms” were the necessities that pushed capitalism toward 
more abstractness, and “an over-valuation of the individual is required to compensate for the 
massive collective disinvestment that takes place in the social as a result of the inexorable growth 
of the processes of abstraction” (Surin 260). 
Floria Sigismondi’s collage video clip “4 Tone Mantis” reflects this process of 
abstraction/atomization and its consequent disembodiment and dissection of organs for the sake 
of socius. Her experimental video shows how the organs of atomized, interiorized individuals – 
who look homogenous under the effects of the exterior – are dissecting and flying toward a giant 
machine, in the form of a 4-tone praying mantis, and assembled for the continuation of 
reproduction. 
In order to summarize, let’s proceed with a few points: 
● The social body is constructed by the code of the everyday sign, while it transforms the 
code constantly. The code is a machinic function, as long as it plugs the body into the 
socius.  
● The socius is the social flesh, and the coding happens first of all on its surface. 
● The code sets up definite limits of performativity for bodies for the sake of a national 
collective body. 
● The body is a historical and social product, it has always a collective dimension, and as 
such, it is transforming constantly. Therefore, the constituted Power feels the necessity 
to set up a permanent mechanism of creating a memory on the surface of the body in 
order to maintaining its desired physiognomy.  






4.3 The Biopolitical Body 
 
The coding, as we have seen, brings about a hierarchical, homogenous organism as long as it 
effects/imposes a certain organization of impulsive, performative, and differential forces of the 
body.  
In one of the most nightmarish dramatization of its kind, Franz kafka describes a process of coding 
and disciplining body in his In the Penal Colony. The story captures brilliantly the transition 
between, in Foucauldian terms, the old regime and the modern regime, from the classical direct 
engraving of law on the body to its disciplining and spiritual capture via the gaze. In a yet deeper 
level, it could function for the idea of coding and inscription in general, bringing to light a body 
that is not totally captured by the code.  
The story has four main characters and a central apparatus: the condemned man, an 
insubordinate soldier who is going to be punished; the traveler, witnessing the punishment as a 
foreigner; the officer, the judge and the executioner of the military verdict; and a bored soldier 
standing beside the punishment apparatus.  
The apparatus is indeed very interesting. It has a moving bed, an inscriber and a harrow which is 
traditionally a tool for smoothing out the surface of the soil. The bed moves and the harrow 
penetrates the surface of the body for the inscriber to inscribe the code. The entire process of 
the punishment is this inscription. The inscribed code is the law that the man is violated, although 
it remains a code hard to be decoded for the foreign witness. The code of the everyday sign that 
shapes the body (and is shaped by it), as Mauss would say, is culture-specific.  
The convict does not know his own sentence, nor does he sense he is convicted. The officer 
justifies it by saying that “it would be useless to give him that information. He experiences it on 
his own body.” (F. Kafka, In the Penal Colony) 
The penal colony serves as another spatial metaphor of the governmental law by Kafka. It is an 
old space of dominion that relies on its permanent self-reproduction, as it is guarded by the 




interpretation, but are also the key-holders of the authority, of the arche – against the 
intervention of decoding and deterritorializing forces. As the officer says: 
The organization of the entire penal colony is his [the already dead Commandant] work. We, his 
friends, already knew at the time of his death that the administration of the colony was so self-
contained that even if his successor had a thousand new plans in mind, he would not be able to 
alter anything of the old plan, at least not for several years. And our prediction has held. 
The attempt to keep everything as it is, conserving the status quo, does not refer to a lack of 
transformation. If we have defined the bodily power as constituent power in this chapter, its 
theoretical conclusion is that body cannot be controlled or closed down totally; rather it evades 
and transforms by its interaction with the forces from without. Therefore, the apparatus of 
capture should always reform and transform itself to adopt with the outlaw body. Referring to 
Klossowski again, “the body is constantly being modified so as to form one and the same 
physiognomy.”  
Another paradox of the law’s function on the body emerges in Kafka’s story: the claim on legal 
action’s transparency, while the law itself remains a mystified code. The process of inscription is 
done with transparency, the officer explains: “to enable someone to check on how the sentence 
is being carried out, the Harrow is made of glass… And now, as the inscription is made on the 
body, everyone can see through the glass.” 
The act of the punishment, the inscription of the law due to its violation is transparent; however, 
the law itself which comes from a certain impulsive dominion cannot be transparent. The code 
cannot be decodified; otherwise, the flows will evade it.  
“Read it,” said the Officer. “I can’t,” said the Traveller. “But it’s clear,” said the Officer.” “It’s very 
elaborate,” said the Traveller evasively, “but I can’t decipher it.” 
We will later come back to this story to show how it dramatizes the resistance of the body against 
inscription. As we said, Kafka’s Penal Colony dramatizes the passage from the classical 
governmentality to the modern one. The former has the power to put its subjects to death; a 
negative function that comes as an extension of the sovereign’s body (“the old commander made 




And it needs it to be a public spectacle; a characteristic that faded away in the time of Kafka’s 
story: “The whole society—and every high official had to attend—arranged itself around the 
machine. This pile of cane chairs is a sorry left over from that time.” The penal colony as it is in 
the present time of the story is itself a sorry left over. The diagram, designed by the old 
commander, does not grasp the complexity of the new forces emerging through the time. The 
one is rapidly multiplying itself. The power is transforming into a network with several central 
nodes. As the officer says, “for they are made up of many heads”. The sovereignty paradigm 
changes into the modern governmentality and the networked power start to asserts its effect on 
constructing bodies, on shaping and managing life, instead of only negating it and commanding 
death.  
The Penal Colony does not end with emancipation. Its follow-up may rather resemble a world 
like The Trial or The Castle: no visible head of authority, an individualized law, and a more 
“spiritual” system of discipline. P. in Beckett’s Catastrophe is the body under a regime of 
discipline that shapes its gesture, keeps it constantly under different layers of gazes, and allocate 
it to a predefined position. 
Foucault called the new bodily-focused governmentality biopolitics. The contemporary 
discussions of biopolitics always starts with Foucault’s introduction of the term in his “Society 
Must Be Defended” (1975-1976).  
Foucault considers biopolitics as the political rationality proper to modern nation-state which 
supplements another rationality, that of the sovereignty: latter as "the let live and make die" 
verdict and former as "the let die and make live" verdict. And racism comes as a mediation that 
guarantees the dominancy of sovereign verdict on biopolitical verdict in totalitarian regimes. 
However, biopolitics first use as a term dates back to the beginning of 20th century, when 
Eugenics became a biomedical and political discourse and biopolitics appeared “in the context of 
organistic and vitalistic theories of the state” (Wilmer and Žukauskaitė). It seems to maintain 
some of its initial implications in the contemporary times, even when Foucault starts to discuss 




rearticulation of sovereign power; governmentality as a new form of power; and racism as a 
strategy to exclude the surplus of economic overproduction. 
Eugenics became institutionalized after Francis Galton’s Darwinist reading of social evolution. He 
argued that a management of population by promoting the reproduction of valuable groups and 
decreasing the reproduction of the expendable crowds gradually forms the ideal nation, without 
poverty and weak trends. All must be beautiful, and eugenics shrinks “all” to the point that only 
the well-born is included in it.  
The eugenic policies remained as part of official institutionality well into the 20th century, and it 
was influential in the Western Europe, Northern America, Brazil, Russia, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, 
etc. However, many thinkers believe that eugenics is inherent in the structural form of the State, 
mostly through keeping a medical discourse on the body. Even Foucault calls “biological notions 
such as degeneracy, inferiority, and purity” as elements of a statist racist discourse “rather than 
ethnic because of the obvious ways in which the state uses it to justify practices such as 
segregation, apartheid, and even genocide” (Hoy 79). 
As a term, State comes from Pre-Indo-European root “sta-”, similar to Persian “-stan” (-ستان, 
“country”), referring to what stands, what is. Greek “státis”, in particular¸ means a standing still. 
On the other hand, stásis also refers to a long history of civil wars. The Greek were fighting to 
show who the real aristocrats are, those eugenic people proper to rule. Coming from Arete 
(excellence) and aristos (the best), aristocrats means the best people, which according to Platonic 
thought are allowed to impose their authority. 
Beside the Greek eugenia, there are two other Greek terms that sit at the center of bipolitcal 
theories. Through Gorgio Agamben and Hanna Arendt, biopolitics has been linked to a bodily 
dichotomy of bios/zoê, the first one a form of life (a life formed in terms of a singularity) and the 
latter a bare life (a life dispossessed of its singularity, of its form). The former belongs to an 
individual body that its contours are well-protected by a nation-state, and the latter, bared of its 
citizenship, is a fragile body, a body open to the horrors of the outside, misshaped, malnourished 




a name both for a body and a subject position; biopolitics in its turn reserved for the zoê, another 
subject position defined only negatively in face of Power, striped of any affirmative agency. 
The notion and function of biopolitics has gone far beyond its Foucauldian definition in 1970s. 
And as time passed by, a discursive confrontation developed on both parts of the word "bio-
politics". The biological life can be conceptualized from contrasting perspectives, one that 
presupposes it as the natural, homogenous, and based on the duality between the self and the 
other, and one that considers it an assemblage of different beings, multiple and heterogeneous. 
It can be formulated politically as bare life, charged with the history of its suppression, 
dispossessed of any autonomous constituent power, or it may be viewed as an affirmative field 
of struggle, where its poorness translates into its virtual creative forces. Politics brings the same 
discursive conflict into play, posing this question that how it should be defined in an era where 
the political is reduced to the economic, and bodies are increasingly captured as exchangeable 
commodities, over which the decision about worthfulness and worthlessness, desirablity and 
disposability is valid. Can we still save politics for a collective liberatory practice among bodies, 
so that biopolitics as a term would represent a virtual field of emancipatory biopolitical practices? 
And all these problems seem to find their different approaches in a much older discussion on the 
negative and the affirmative, the destituent and the constituent. 
The critics of Arendt and Agamben’s focus on bios/zoe duality has long accused them of turning 
a blind eye to the issue of race and colonialism. According to Fabián Henao Castro, for example, 
Arendt and Foucault were negligent toward the very racial aspects of the Ancient Greece as the 
imagined origin of the Western Modernity, – “the 'color lines' of antiquity, which distributed bios 
to the Greeks and zoê to the non-Greeks” (239). He criticizes Arendt in particular for conceiving 
the singularity of life only in terms of bios.  
On the other hand, Castro believes that they also overlooked colonialism in general, as he argues 
for a direct inherent connection between modernity, colonialism and racism that invalidates 
modernity’s project in the final analysis. According to Castro, this critical perspective, present in 




biopower, produces "a new depoliticized subject", a disposable population that would be left to 
die, by simple destruction of their livelihood conditions.  
Much like Castro, Ronit Lentin also argues about the racist as well as colonialist roots of 
modernity’s political project. While referring to Agamben's State of exception, she formulates a 
similar critique against him by adding Fanon beside Agamben. For Lentin, Agamben's negligence 
of colonialism and the state of exception can be best observed in colonized parts of the world, 
which are – unlike western countries – in permanent suspension of law, living for decades in the 
normality of exception. “While neither Foucault nor Agamben directly theorized colonialism in 
the context of biopower” writes Lentin, “settler-colonialism is intrinsic to biopower, the product 
and process of a colonial world” (278).  
Although both Castro and Lentin criticize the eurocentrism of Arendt, Foucault and Agamben, 
they maintain a difference in conceptualization of the body politics. While Ronit maintains an 
affirmative decolonial ethics, Andrés Castro remains more on the side of the negative, where the 
transformation in biopolitics is merely “from the bio to the necro”. 
For Castro all the movements of the exploited social flesh are under the control of biopower. 
Nonetheless, prior to and simultaneous with this brutal actuality of suppression, there exists a 
geography of creative forces in resistance and struggle, to which Castro refers only in passing in 
the very end by pointing to “the speech that only the subject who is deprived of speaking rights 
can perform, the speech that troubles the ancient division between bίos/logos and zoê/phone” 
(250). 
A speech of those who cannot speak; a speech of the subaltern, as Spivak would put it. The 
subject-body that Castro calls for is prior to the state’s inscription of law and the functioning of 
the code on its surface. An impossible speech, one may say, following Klossowski:  
Is everything that is singular, incommunicable and unexchangeable (that is, everything that is 
excluded from what we call the norm) not only condemned to muteness, but also condemned to 
disappear…? Or on the contrary, is everything that conforms to this norm the result of a process 




where their diminution leads to a compromise that forms a representative type which, because it 
is average, is also mediocre (Vicious Circle 77)44 
For Lentin, this is a reason to argue that the colonized or those who are suffering apartheid 
cannot be merely contained in the negative. Lentin does not find the "bare life" as an adequate 
notion for designating those people; this term, she believes, neglects their transformative 
subjective power through the decolonial acts of resistance.  
4.3.1 The Technos-Body 
Since 1990s, the contemporary movements have been characterized by an increase use of 
technology. Twitter for instance came out of alter-globalization activists’ initiative to increase the 
speed of communication and to establish alternative mass media outlet independent from 
governments and big corporations.  
Twitter became a big corporation itself, but since 2009, it has still been functional, beside 
Facebook, as an important means for organization of protests. In Occupy Movements in the 
West, the image of protestor equipped with smartphone and tablet captured the popular 
representation in the media. And the wide-spread use of these social networks for organizing, 
communicating, and promoting protest events made some commentators to dub those 
movements as “twitter revolution” or “facebook revolution”.  
There is a fundamental misunderstanding and reductionism in such naming. It confuses a process 
with a simple means of organizing. The performative events happened in a certain actual time-
space by the collective bodies, and not in virtual reality through avatars. But the important role 
of such virtual communication technologies in effecting those collective bodies may call for a new 
definition of body, or rather life itself. Rosi Braidotti’s post-humanist project is an attempt in this 
direction (see Posthuman Affirmative Politics).  
 
44 Such a speech is another aspect that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony cannot capture. For them, the 
expressions (of demands) are already given. But there are those whose first demand is the ability to demand, the 
ability to express. They are condemned to muteness and their speech is not an expression, but also a creation that 





Braidotti’s conception of zoē as affirmative has similarities to Lentin’s idea of a decolonial 
subjectivity. Braidotti conceptualizes a Deleuzian “bίos-zoē-technos-body” in order to undermine 
bίos/zoē duality by adding technos to the pair and constructing a biopolitical paradigm of pure 
immanence regarding life and body: a technos-flesh, if one wants to update Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of flesh. 
Technos however does not only refer to new high-techs, but also to the way that the inhuman 
couples with the human in an aesthetical body. As they lived in small self-styled tent cities, the 
collective bodies in occupy movements exhibit such machinic articulation with plants, animals 
and things in their immediate surrounding45 in addition to the aforementioned new-age 
communication technologies.  
A scientific-artistic collective in Australia, the SymbioticA, deals with the new technos-flesh and 
its corresponding conception of life, its fragility and impersonality. Their work deals with Semi-
Livings, those “fragments of organisms taken out of their original context, reduced life into parts” 
(Catts and Zurr 135). They set up special laboratory environments to sustain these fragile pieces 
of -living flesh through intensive care. They invite their audience to observe this process and 
touch the ultimate impersonality of the technos-flesh. 
Through their art experimentations with semi-livings, they are "purposely recontexualizing 
fragments of life within their milieu and giving them agency or a ‘voice’ to unsettle and bring back 
their visceral ‘aliveness’" (ibid 143) Although they reproduce the lab environment for 
experimenting with fragile, fragmented life forms, their work become critical by being "non-
utilitarian, non-instrumental, and frivolous" (ibid 135) 
The apparent paradox of SymiotecA Lab artistic practice, i.e. working with semi-life while 
criticizing the technological approach to life behind them, is indeed the paradox inherent to 
biopolitical and immanent struggle against the control mechanisms of biopower. As Catts and 
Zurr formulate it, “resistance for us expressed through getting wet and messy with life” (152). 
 




The SymbioticA artistic work witnesses to the material contextually of life. As they assert, the 
notion of a human body has been already challenged by new advanced technologies and genetic 
research. Criticizing the notion of body as a whole, they consider each living body as an ecology 
which is made of human-non-human assemblages. Regarding this biopolitical oppression of life, 
their work tries to show how life defies human and technological control. They call for an 
alternative biopolitics "that goes beyond the human-animal distinction, and deals literally with 
bare life". (ibid 137) 
Nonetheless, technos machinic articulation with flesh has not always been a positive turn and 
many scholars point to its dark side in the current regime of biopower. James Harding for example 
recounts a third century legend of Cosmas and Damian –  two Christian physician brothers who, 
according to myth, transplant a foot of a black man (a slave or an Ethiopian) to a Roman 
nobleman – in order to dramatize a certain relation of power in the contemporary biopolitics and 
its digital surveillance technologies: the relation between the White Northerner and its cultural 
other, a relation that allows for a global economy of organ transplants to find its donors in the 
South as well as an apparatus of capture that appropriates parts of our data without our consent 
(Harding). 
To approach the performative dimension of the new technical, biopolitical body, Harding 
discusses the "rules of right", or simply put, the "terms and conditions" by which we are allowed 
to engage in certain social functions such as profession. Distinguishing them from the "codes of 
conduct", Harding argues that rules of right refer to "a willing submission to systems of 
surveillance and oversight" (175). This submission is then shaping our performative acts which in 
turn shape our identity in a way that enable us to conform with societal power relationships. We 
must conform with excessive surveillance and providing multinationals with pieces of our data in 
order to be functioning members of society. 
The code of the everyday signs and its machinic functions have transformed accordingly in the 
digital age, becoming what F. J. Colman calls bio-code (Colman). This transformation in turn 




For Colman, body is still a "political site" in the era of "digital biopolitics". But he defines it as a 
"living capital body" (lcb), particular to the contemporary capitalism. Although similar rigid lines 
of segregation such as gender, age, color and etc are still active in defining this new "imaged 
body", lcb is a particular designation proper to the current biopolitics of capitalism, where the 
body is digitalized and its coded image functions in a data field "where all movements are 
monitored". (Colman 189) 
Trying to situate lcb in biopolitical discourse, Colman starts with bio-identity cards and the double 
digital data of body that is stored and used for identity check and restrictions on movements. 
"Your body is an information image", writes Colman, indicating how this information image 
sanctions or prohibits the movements of certain lcbs based on the randomness of the facticity of 
their birth place. According to Colman, each lcb is carded and bio-coded. This coding, on the other 
hand, determines which exits and entrances are provided for certain lcbs. 
Through these arguments, Colman shows how the production of lcbs is actually "the process of 
biopolitics at work". In other words, lcb is a biopolitical being in the age of digital informatics that 
is embodied in different bio-identity materials and will be enabled through data portals in 
different fields of biopower such as State power, global economy, reproduction and 
consumption. (Colman 192) 
Since lcb as the imaged body depends on the historical image of life, Colman argues by referring 
to Donna Haraways that how the digitalization has transformed the analog proletariat worker 
into a working body linked with several digital mediations. She points to the processes that make 
the image of life visible by the "technological mediation of the real" (Colman 197). In other words, 
if we connect Bergson with Foucault as she claims, then "we can articulate the matter of the 
biopolitical body whose fate is linked to its contemporaneous technology" (Colman 197). This 
body as "technology-image" is produced by those technologies that are mostly dealing with 
security, controlling and monitoring human movements by its digital bio-encoding. 
Even if her depiction of lcb production, its treatment and corresponding technologies seems 
pessimistically dark, she concludes with the potentialities of biopolitical resistance and struggle 




the code becomes defunct. For Colman, it is still possible to seek "the potential for ... some relief 
through non-participation in the consumptive practices of capital", where the non-assimilated 
and non-integrated value of the lcb could be activated against capital. (Colman 199) 
The global north appears to head toward what Colman conceptualizes here – much more than 
the global south, even if Colman does not agree – and thus, the occupy movements should be 
seen as challenges to the capitalist transformation of bodies into lcbs. Indeed, with their unique 
style of living together and sharing labour, work and food, they have tried to cancel the 
functioning of the machinic code. 
4.3.2 The Government of Things 
The assertion of a new flesh coupled with technos necessitates an alternative that Thomas Lemke 
finds in some “promising areas of research that have so far regained little attention” (Rethinking 
Biopolitics 58), but would be able to transform the notion of biopolitics according to the 
contemporary condition. 
These areas include the studies on matter as active, forceful, and plural rather than passive, 
inactive, and unitary as well as new literature on the “bioeconomy” which deals with the 
systematic relationship between neoliberal capitalism and changing concepts of life and the 
emergence of a biotech industry. As Lemke argues, the focus should be on a different definition 
of government, where “to govern means to govern things” (59). 
Although the new materialists accused Foucauldian thought as being anthropocentric, Lemke 
argues that the idea of the government of things – which Foucault introduced through Guillaume 
de la Perrière – can be counted as a defense on his side. Because the government of things relies 
on “a sort of complex of men and things” in a milieu that hosts the interactions of human beings 
with other beings in an interrelated network.  
We have discussed earlier the Merleau-Ponty’s idea of flesh, which he considers as an Element, 
as the matter of the world46: 
 




To designate it [the flesh], we should need the old term “element”, in the sense it was used to 
speak of water, earth, air and fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the 
spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being 
wherever there is a fragment of being. The flesh is in this sense an “element” of Being (The Visible 
and the Invisible 139).  
The new materialism develops such a concept further to present a conception of body and life 
that shares the same vision with Lyotard’s aesthetical body that includes things, humans and 
animals (to be explain later). The government of things also considers the apparatuses of capture 
working on such a heterogenous body – a whole system that depends on categorizing and 
hierarchizing different forms of life. 
Through the biopower’s codification of bodies into “appropriate bodies” and “inappropriate 
bodies”, Audronė Žukauskaitė refers to the foundational gap in the concept of human itself and 
the discourses on humanity, where the non-human is put on the lower level in the hierarchy of 
being. Here, the biopower establishes mechanisms such as “humanization of animal” and 
“animalization of human” (Žukauskaitė 74) and sets up an apparatus to capture the non-human 
forces in general. Analyzing such mechanisms necessitates a fundamental shift of perspective 
through the philosophy of the impersonal. For Žukauskaitė, such a philosophy functions as a 
strategy to break down the categorizations of different forms of life in order to revive the notion 
of the government of the things. On the side of struggle, this shift translates into all technics and 
strategies of becoming imperceptible in order to re-affirm the heterogeneous multiplicity of the 
living (ibid 85). On the side of theory, Žukauskaitė suggests a biophilosophy in order to re-thinks 
life in terms of pure immanence, multiplicity and progressive differentiation, instead of referring 
to transcendental principles for theorizing it (89). 
Eugene Tacker directly engages with the problem of a contemporary biophilosophy that could 
rethink life and its politics. Thacker presents a trinity of foundational elements for all 
conventional perceptions of life: “soul, meat, and pattern.” (Biophilosophy for 21st Century 123) 
In this trinity, soul is the organizing principle of life, meat is its brute matter or clockwork 
organism, and pattern is the way that life self-actualizes in time. The three elements form a 




of thought about life which its dualistic method “posits a central universal, external principle of 
organization that culminates in the living” (Thacker 124) and at the same time, managing the 
boundaries of articulation between human and non-human, living and non-living. It is coming 
from an organicism that was criticized earlier through Klossowski’s Nietzsche.  
Instead of such conventional, centralizing western thinking of life, Tacker argues for a philosophy 
that considers “life at the peripheries...extrinsic life, a life always going outside of itself, 
peripheral life...” (125) Thus, rather than seeking for the essence of life as philosophy of biology 
does, biophilosophy tracks the transformations of life and its multiple becomings. It is a 
cartography that draws out “the network of relations that always take the living outside itself” 
(Thacker 126). Thus, biophilosophy works on the level of ontology whereas philosophy of biology 
is an epistemological endeavor. And it deals with life in its vulnerability, precariousness, and crisis 
points, i.e. with a life that needs “care”. That is why Braidotti describes her project as an approach 
toward “an ethics that respects vulnerability while actively constructing social horizons of hope” 
(39). 
 
4.4 The Patchwork Body: the Machinic Function of “and” 
 
When we consider extending our theory of the body to the level of performative event – a field 
of politics one may say – then it is not only its encodement, but also the imposed organization 
and its manner of linking that concern us. The link is what constructs the actual collectivity. 
As we explained parts of this problem before, we avoid repeating the unnecessary. The main 
problem is that of homogeneity and heterogeneity: the body is heterogenous, not only is a so-
called “individual” level, but also more evidently in the case of social collective bodies. The 
dominant political regimes however have been based themselves on an idea of the homogenous 
body, one that is been called “nation”, and in smaller scales, conventional “communities” with 
harsher and more rigid nation-like hierarchies and centralization of authority. As Deleuze and 
Guattari famously claim, the central process of coding bodies in such a formulation is 




Critical political theory has always sought a way to find another collective body, one that is able 
to effect transformation. However, one part still retains the playground of the identity principle, 
seeking for alternative homogenous, or homogenized collective bodies and the other part insists 
on the element of difference, of heterogeneity.  
After the already-existing socialist regimes became the subject of widespread criticism, such an 
inquiry seemed even more urgent. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy (2001 (1985)) was a response to such an urgency. They also witnessed the new forms of 
contemporary movements and criticized them for the lack of what they have called hegemony 
and warned against the naiveté of non-representational politics and especially the Occupy form, 
the main subject of this research and the reason makes studying their theory an interest of this 
work.  
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe tried to conceptualize a new definition of 
hegemony as “a political type of relation”. The hegemonic relation is constructed around a 
master signifier: 
the category of point de capiton (nodal point, in our terminology) or master-signifier involves the 
notion of a particular element assuming a `universal' structuring function within a certain 
discursive field — actually, whatever organization that field has is only the result of that function 
— without the particularity of the element per se predetermining such a function (xi). 
The whole discourse of hegemony is based on the presupposed Hegelian duality of 
particular/universal, while the Hegelian negativity, here in form of antagonism, does not resolve 
itself in any higher synthesis. “There is no cunning of reason”, they write, “nor is there any kind 
of supergame that would submit antagonisms to its system of rules” (xiii).  
Laclau and Mouffe accept the existing heterogeneity in the society. For them, the heterogenous 
elements are differential positions within the dominant order. While they remain particularities 
vis-à-vis the proclaimed universality of the state, particularities could enter an equivalential chain 
with each other only in order form a hegemonic body of politics like the State’s body through an 
independent relation of hegemony among each other. In our terminology, the opposing 




into an organism, itself playing the role of the head/ the conscious agent and guarantees the 
verticality of the organization.  
only one particularity whose body is split, for without ceasing to be its own particularity, 
it transforms its body in the representation of a universality transcending it (that of the 
equivalential chain) (ibid).  
For the hegemonic relation to be established, there should be first a relation between different 
elements of a particularity, and then a relation of equivalency between different sets of 
particularities in an equivalential chain of signification. It is only then that a hegemony among 
different equivalent elements can form around a transcendent point of reference, an empty 
master-signifier that can be filled with a particular body. Laclau later asserts that the hegemonic 
relation is the condition of politics, making hegemony from “a political type of relation” to “the 
political type of relation” – or in other words, politics is the business of vertical bodies. 
Laclau and Mouffe do not consider a pre-organic social collective body, a social flesh, and thus 
do not engage with theories of organization per se. They presuppose the organism, and analyze 
the social body through what has been inscribed on it; the events, phantasms and the code of 
the everyday sign which, in their analysis, is called the discourses. As there is no non-discursive 
dimension of analysis, there is no performativity in the sense of a differential force that disrupts 
the organism through affectivity.  
On one hand, they found their theory on the “structural undecidability” as the very condition of 
hegemony, and contingent articulation as the only form of articulation that can only 
retrospectively seems historical necessity. On the other hand, they presuppose the overarching 
Structure of the organism, where Master-Signifier is the head and the homogenized 
particularities in a chain of equivalency form the rest of the body, and introduce it as the sole 
form of politics. They believe that the hegemonic dimension is constitutive of the subjectivity of 
historical subject.  
I believe that such a contradiction comes, among other reasons, from a misunderstanding of the 
body as a construct: the hegemony theory does not presuppose the idea of body as the ground 




main plain of analysis. That is why the politics of hegemony necessitates the representative 
mechanisms in order to explain the counter-state collective body of its people.  
Laclau explains this representational apparatus with a theatrical argument through the idea of 
the will. Similar to how we defined will as the product of an organization of forces, Laclau 
recognizes the “constitutive role of representation in the formation of the will” but considers the 
conscious will as the agent of change. For him, representation brings the will to different stages, 
and therefore, “the function of the representative is not simply to transmit the will of those he 
represents, but to give credibility to that will in a milieu different from the one in which it was 
originally constituted”. He also argues that the active participation of the representative as an 
actor of a stage for formulating the popular wills, let’s say through her/his own phantasms, adds 
something to the identity of the represented. The arguments are true, as long as one does not 
challenge the foundational concepts, will and identity, which have been presupposed by Laclau. 
As we argued, the fundamental break comes when the organization of the forces, the relation of 
dominancy, which is the guarantor of the verticality, is collapsed. After all, we know the 
differences between the projects of capitalism and soviet-style communism, but we witnessed 
how both systems based themselves on centralized, vertical organization of their societies in the 
most abstract level of analysis.  
The story is again a story of the head (in Laclau and Mouffe, the empty master-signifier position) 
and the body. We have argued and will argue that the vertical body is not a natural given, but a 
particular, contingent product. Although the authors of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy first 
insist on the contingent nature of the linkage in a collective body, they forget to explore the other 
virtual, political linkages and fell in the trap of a head-top naturalized body. The way the added 
surplus homogenizes the counter-state hegemony in their theory is much like the way the 
modern state set up its own hegemony: 
Hobbes establishes the spatial metaphor of sovereignty for all modern political thought in his 
unitary Leviathan that rises above and overarches society and the multitude. The sovereign is the 





On one hand, the central topic of the following research is perhaps what has been most neglected 
in the theory of socialist hegemony, i.e. the non-hegemonic, seemingly chaotic process that may 
lead to a hegemonic relation, when the master-signifier of the State is collapsed and the 
discourse (the code of the everyday signs) and its chains of signification is “out of joint”, swirling 
around as if the head of the imagined national body has already disappeared. This is the most 
creative phase of a movement, when its performative forces are at work without a totalizing state 
apparatus capturing and covering them.  
Being an active participant and an activist in the field of knowledge production, I witnessed such 
a reality myself during the 2009 Iran’s popular Green Movement. It started with one single fact: 
“around three million people in the street.” It became the headline of many news agencies on 
the night of Monday, 15 June 2009; but this was not merely a piece of news, but rather an event 
that marked the before and the after in our lives. A fraudulent election resulted in a street politics 
of millions, and we witnessed again how the traditional discourses of the Left were at least 
challenged and how their discursive boundaries between binaries such as 
reformist/revolutionary praxis have been blurred. We entered into a chaos, in which the semiotic 
flows of society suddenly faced the absurdity of the abyss on which they had previously fixated 
– an abyss appeared after the disappearance of the signifier of an eligible State. Being de-rooted 
from the territory of representative order, the semiotic chains started to flow in all directions, 
and a hot pot of social experimentation took shape. In the middle of these processes of 
experimentation, “we” happened to meet each other. Through different connections among 
thrown-off individuals, a machinic assemblage of a chaoid functioning in the domain of our 
collective life emerged. However, if a chaoid is a machinic assemblage that can cut through the 
chaos and create an architectural composition, “a provisional organizer of chaos” (Berardi (Bifo), 
Felix Guattari: Thought, Friendship and Visionary Cartography 11), what was really the chaos 
then? 
Chaos is “a degree of complexity which is beyond the ability of human understanding” (Berardi 
(Bifo), The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy 212). Chaos is the name designated to 




says, “every signification remains a function of Chaos, out of which meaning is generated” 
(Vicious Circle 62).  
Besides the disappearance of the transcendent signifier of a legitimate representative order, the 
chaos we are talking about emerged through the forceful introduction of the new in the context 
of Iranian politics after the 1979 revolution: a massive refusal of the governmental rule in the 
margins and undergrounds, and an attempt to make the unheard voice of the non-represented 
audible. This chaos, which followed the new, was a creative deterritorialization performed by a 
temporary collective subjectivity; it was a degree of complexity that was beyond the pre-
established existing collective intelligence of Iran’s society, and it could only indicate that a new 
mass intellectuality is to come. 
On the other hand, the hierarchy of organic political body forms inequalities in terms of power 
and makes the exploitation possible. A revolutionary or egalitarian political project should 
oppose this kind of body and propose another organization which can create an alternative body. 
The neglected virtualities in the problem of linkage, as Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony 
formulates it, are again the vital point.  
The problem of linkage is a problem of relationality: how can different people, actors, things be 
connected in a collective body, so that a relation of dominance does not emerge to form an 
imagined unified organic body, one that necessitates exclusions and cleansings, closures and law-
constituting violence?  
During and after the Green Movement, I was in one of many new collectives emerging in Iran, 
mostly Tehran, who searched for new possibilities of organization and collectivity in light of the 
ongoing popular movement. As a group, we had certain forms of organization in front of us. The 
majority of groups engaged in the revived activities of the left in the 2000s, even among student 
activists, were practicing party politics or identity politics with hierarchical forms of organizations 
proper to these forms of politics. Many of the activists still believed in a kind of vanguardist 
schema, according to which intellectuals should lead and educate the proletariat in the struggles 
for a revolution. Naturally, revolution was imagined as a spectacular event, conditioned by the 




But the collapse of the verticality during the movement opened the collective body to new 
experiments. New activists could see the presence of sexism, ageism, and hierarchical 
bureaucracy in previous political groups and a distaste, a Stalinist distrust against the bourgeois 
nature of “art”. Their inability to create new forms, the impotency of their aesthetics which was 
a reproduction of the mainstream, was the main reason for the failure of their egalitarian 
projects. The cure for this malady, the movement revealed, was on the one hand to do away with 
any kind of illusions about vanguardism, and on the other hand to engage in the time-consuming 
hard forms of transversal organization and try to create and invent new forms of struggle and 
collectivity, and alternative forms of knowledge production: to affirm the aesthetic and 
performative side of the politics, as the movement in large had done. Collectives like us 
emphasized the openness of a network-based organization, and instead of considering only “the 
economy of distribution of the product” (in this case, our texts, translations and artworks), we 
concentrated on “the internal economy of our group”: how to not be hierarchical, to not 
reproduce the present social relations inside our group, and to not let any form of unequal power 
relations take shape through differences in experience, age, knowledge, gender and so on. 
The collective body on the streets presented us with a heterogenous body, incontrollable as 
much as ungraspable: Islamists besides queers, liberals beside leftists, women in chador beside 
militant feminists, clergies beside atheists, and nationalists beside human right activists. The 
hegemony was not there, although it appeared by the intensification of suppression and mass 
arrests only because some forces had more access to mainstream media when the grassroots 
media could not function anymore.  
In contrast to the hegemonic body, where all its heterogenous, differential parts are said to be in 
a chain of equivalences, and the non-integrable parts simply excluded, I call the body of the 
contemporary movement a patchwork body. It is a proper body to the patchwork space of such 




In the moments of headlessness, where the collective phantoms47 are haunting the nations, there 
is no master-signifier to form the conscious agent and homogenize the collective body. The code 
of the everyday signs is defunct, and the flows of desire escape the apparatus of capture and 
control. The previous machinic assemblage of technical machines on socius, where all social 
organs are plugged into, dissemble and the reproduction halts. The productive and reproductive 
connections are lost, and the new desiring machines are plugging themselves into the social flesh, 
and therefore, the immense power of the affectivity of new impulsive forces is intensifying the 
movements across social bodies.  
It is a moment of paradox. The performative event is a paradoxical force of production: a 
productive anti-productive happening, a work of the poor. For Battaile, anti-production, for 
Blanchot, worklessness, for Deleuze and Guattari, miraculous production on the body without 
organs (BwO). Here the problem of time, space and bodies come together in the performative 
event.  
BwO is a complementary concept for socius. When socius reaches its limits in a time of 
revolutionary movement – a movement that transforms the conditions of productions – it 
surpasses itself into the non-organic condition of BwO. BwO is not body without any organ; it 
rather signifies a body freed from the so-called natural organization of organs in an organism, the 
vertical body, and it exhibits a set of transitory organs, traversing the whole body, emerging and 
disappearing. BwO is swarmed. When the dominant coding of the body does not function, and 
the productive organs are plugged out of the socius, then it becomes an empty body without 
organ from the perspective of the system – since it does not anymore reproduce. But the 
miraculous production, the production under an alternative relationality, is also at work – to 
which the system is blind as it does not recognize the emerging alternative relations and the 
creativity of the poor48 (we will return to this discussion later).  
Thus, the differential, impulsive forces (of various social groups) produce their own performative 
simulacra, breaking down the stereotypes, engaging in numerous social machinic assemblages. 
 
47 For the discussion on the idea of “collective phantoms”, c.f. the discussion on the names of these movements, in 
“The Drama of Communicating Intensities”, Chapter 2.  




Different transitory organs start to grow, with their own non-hegemonic, non-homogenized 
regimes of production. Each part of the social body has now a color of itself. It looks like a 
patchwork that each segment affirms a different design, while all collectively protest against the 
impositions of styles, aesthetics, relations, and positions of the head. 
As part of their argument for the political urgency of a theory of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe 
criticized Jean-Francois Lyotard for his particularism. They believed that Lyotard’s conception of 
the collective body consists in “a plurality of incommensurable language games, whose 
interactions can be conceived only as tort, makes any political rearticulation impossible”. A 
former Trotskyist, Lyotard changed his political philosophy with May 68 to affirm an emerging 
new image of thought he recognized in the libidinal and performative powers of that event. 
Regardless of his actual political theory, Lyotard pointed to the very problematics that the politics 
of hegemony can approach only by eliminating it and prioritizing an equivalential chain. For 
Lyotard, the social body of politics should be analyzed in terms of a bodily mode of aesthesis, 
which for him represents an autonomy from the law (see Curtis). Bodily mode of aesthesis is 
when the body is swarmed with new simulacra, coming out of an openness and energized 
affectivity: what Lyotard calls the libidinal body – a body he witnessed its short-lived burgeoning 
in May 68. 
The libidinal body tries to resist the inscriptions of the law, and its own creativity (the power of 
impulsive forces) produce simulacra that push away the stereotypes from the surface of the 
body. What remains is a patchwork body. It is not an organic body and cannot be reduced to a 
verticalized “volume in Euclidean space” (Curtis 260), with perpendicular axes. The libidinal body 
creates excessively in all dimension, and it has no rigid contours-limits between an inside and an 
outside; its only limit is its power of receptivity, and “various things such as books, food, images, 
as well as words, machines and even sounds can be charged with libidinal investment and 
therefore become areas of the body.” (ibid) 
With such a bodily perspective in mind, the politics of Lyotard includes an aesthetic, performative 
aspect. It is a practice that “deals with the contingency of links between incommensurables”, 




keeps a relation of incommensurability. Looking back to the horrors of World War II, Lyotard 
considers “the linkage between phrases of heterogenous regimes” (The Differend 29) as the 
unavoidable problem of politics (xiii)49. Unlike the hegemonic relation, an articulation should exist 
that gives equal positions of power to differential positions of signification, without 
homogenizing all those differences under a master-signifier head. Equality and freedom versus 
equality and exchangeability.  
Lyotard believes that to link is necessary, but how to link is contingent (ibid). Therefore, the 
hegemonic relation is not the only real political link, and potential forms of linkage can happen 
in politics; or rather, as Beasley-Murray asserts, “there is no hegemony and never has been” 
(Posthegemony: Political Theory and Latin America ix).  
This is a teaching of performative turn in arts as well. Performance is based on the contingent 
link that can emerge between those present in it; it blurs the roles of actor/spectator in order to 
set the conditions for a possible affective relation that can relate different bodies regardless of 
their conventional theatrical role. An affirmation of chance, an a-subjective experiment with 
freedom through contingency; it almost always remained on a level of spontaneity, although 
there have been experimentations with molecular forms of organization. Among the cases 
mentioned in this research, one can refer to Publixtheatercaravan. This is the type of organization 
we witnessed in Occupy Movements, one that is not imposing a certain structure, but forms a 
flexible, self-organized and heterogenous patchwork body. That is why Publixtheatercaravan, as 
we explained before, was an attempt at plugging a performance art machine into the BwO of a 
revolutionary machine.  
The contingency of linkage is a symptom of singularity. As we explained before, it was this 
affirmation of contingency that marks the difference between the performance arts in 1960s-70s 
with modern avantgardes of theatre. As Ranciere argues in The Emancipated Spectator, the 
modern mentality consisted of engineering the affect, pre-organizing the desired linkage of 
audience, in other words, trying to play the head for the headless collective body of audience: 
 
49 Lyotard writes: “By showing that the linkage of one phrase onto another is problematic and that this problem is 
the problem of politics, to set up a philosophical politics apart from the politics of intellectuals and of politicians. To 




the authority of text/author/director set the direction of the affect, which was usually conceived 
in terms of conscious elements (raising awareness or inducing self-consciousness). That was a 
repeatable act, and its singularity was not in its performance and its collective character, but in 
the higher, individual authority: the Brechtian was the name of the singularity. The performative 
disrupted this vertical theatrical body: a performance is singular, as its body, and both are 
contingent. The body of a performance is not also limited to humans, but can consists “various 
things such as books, food, images, as well as words, machines and even sounds can be charged 
with libidinal investment and therefore become areas of the body.” (Curtis 260) The same bodily 
mode of aesthesis that Lyotard finds in his libidinal politics.  
Nonetheless, affirming the contingency has become the necessity of the new image of thought. 
The attempts at homogenization and modern rational, vertical bodies has resulted in most 
irrational disasters and excessively nihilist destructions. The contingency of linkage does not 
mean there is no organization of the body possible. As we already argued, the new image of 
thought that emerges simultaneously with the patchwork body constructs new performative 
rules for an organization, but an immanent one – not a head, not even a thousand heads, but 
immanent.  
Performance arts can also inform us about the nature of an immanent organization. Erika Fischer-
Lichte defines it as autopoiesis, “consisting of the mutual interaction between actors and 
spectators” through a feedback loop, that “brings forth the performance”.  
The notion of the artist as autonomous subject creating an autonomous work of art, 
which each recipient may interpret differently but cannot change in its materiality, 
evidently no longer applies here. (Fischer-Lichte 163) 
Head has no specific, higher function anymore. And the body of the performance, freed from its 
hierarchical divisions and stereotypical theatrical code, remains open and heterogenous with an 
immanent organization between differential expressions in equal power positions. The linkage 
remains necessarily contingent.  
Pointing to the performative character of contemporary movement, Michael Hardt and Antonio 




characteristics of what they call “the multitude” is according to Beasley-Murray its autopoiesis. 
He defines autopoietic multitude as “a set of mobile singularities contingently aligned through 
immanent interaction” (Beasley-Murray 250). Although Hardt and Negri consider capitalism as 
an “autopoietic machine” (Empire 34) that “lives off the vitality of the multitude” (Empire 62), 
but their discussion of creativity and autonomy of multitude makes it another type of autopoietic 
machine, one that couples with allopoiesis. 
Autopoiesis comes from the constituent power of performative, impulsive forces, or in other 
words, in the capability of the body in affecting and being affected. When the forces are not 
subjected under the vertical organization, they subsist in the bodily mode of aesthesis, an 
openness of affectivity.  
Autopoiesis should not be confused with an isolated process of self-making. Autonomy itself does 
not translate into a self-retreat or an illusion of an access to an external, pure space of struggle; 
on the contrary, it is created by a collective action that produces non-subjugated alternative 
subjectivities in relation to each other – an autonomy that only functions with a heteronomy. 
Regarding this fact, it was argued in Chapter 3 that autopoiesis also comes with allopoiesis in the 
performative event: in other words, the collective relationality emerging in occupation 
movements does not only autonomously constitute itself (autopoiesis) but also constitute an 
alternative system regarding the established order and structures (allopoiesis).  
Writing with reference to recent “time-spaces” of collective struggles, Donna Haraway defines 
this dynamic as “sym-poiesis” to emphasize on togetherness (sym-) instead of making (poiesis) 
while adopting a perspective of the government of things. For her, the machinic assemblages 
between the human and nonhuman have made them inextricably linked in myriad forms of 
practices. But these practices are experimentations of living together in order to create 
sustainable, non-hierarchical ways of collective existence (what is referred to as experimental 
futures), particularly on a damaged earth that a horizon of a livable future is increasingly fading 
away (see Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene 2016).  
That is why for Hardt and Negri only multitude is the proper body/subject of the constituent 




a performative endeavor, as it doesn't just produce goods and services, but also “cooperation, 
communication, forms of life, and social relationships” (Hardt and Negri, Multitude 339). 
The renewed interest in Bakhtin’s theory of the carnivalesque comes from this idea. In the bodily 
mode of aesthesis, the open body is a grotesque body from the point of view of the dominant 
power: ugly, excessive, open, porous, non-homogenous, threatening and ungraspable. The 
carnival is the organizational art of the grotesque body: without permanent hierarchization, open 
to different flows, threatening to the established order, and joyful.  
Activists and participants in other contemporary movements share the same experience in terms 
of a heterogeneous collective body and a chaotic creativity in absence of hegemony.  
I had few conversations with a performance artist, who works as a mime, contemporary dancer 
and a theatre of oppressed practitioner. Nina Khodorivska was in the square during the 
occupation. She also lived in an occupied building from 27 January till 18 February 2014, and in 
an occupied Ministry from 21 February to 1 March 2014. She was the coordinator of Student 
Assembly which prepared cultural programs for an occupied administrative building, “where 
according to the police's estimation a thousand individuals lived together”. This assembly had 
organized movie screening, lectures in Maidan’s Open University, various theatrical and musical 
performances, and protest against existing Ministry of Science and Education.  
When I asked about her experiences as an individual and as an artist who lived in Maidan tent 
city, she replied: “I liked to perform what I imagined about collective living. However, it's very 
true that people tend to like this collective equal co-habiting so much that they forget that the 
world is still not like that everywhere. And we have to fight for making it like this.” This was a 
fight of a heterogeneous body of multiple non-vertical organizations:  
Civil Council of Maidan (platform for collaboration of around 100 initiatives, consensus decision 
making, many really serious guys, professional politicians not allowed, inclusive treatment of 
newcomers), Student Assembly (I was a coordinator of it), secret tent council (existed from time 
to time, mainly to provide tents with autonomous heating and feeding, so that the dwellers don't 
have to depend on the “headquarters”, appropriated by party politicians), The Library of Maidan 




books for the protesters to read), The Open University of Maidan (invited cool lecturers on all 
kinds of topics to lecture at the square, and later – in the huge hall of our occupied building). 
One should not also forget the “Artistic Hundred Group”. Hundred in their name was a reference 
to one hundred separate ways of organizing bodies in the square. They also believed that the 
organization of Maidan collective body should not be crystallized in any organic, hierarchical, and 
persisting structure. 
There were various performances during the movement, and even now after it, happening in 
form of guerilla theatre and theatre of the oppressed by autonomist and non-hierarchical 
collective art groups. And also, individuals like “The Piano Extremist” were playing piano in front 
of riot police lines, and living among others in the occupied buildings. Or a famous unknown 
guitar player who played in different occupation spaces during the movement to cheer up people.  
Mohammad, a current PhD researcher in Germany and a former organizer of Anti-Capitalist 
Muslims share the same story. I met him in the beginning of 2014, before he had to come out of 
the country in 2015. For him and his group, there was no dividing line based on identity between 
the bodies of the movement that is now called the Occupy Gezi. When the Anti-Capitalist Muslims 
were organizing Iftar in Ramadan for protestors in the street, giving free food to everybody and 
praying with fellow Muslims at the same time, the other groups – leftists, anarchists, greens, 
football fans, … -- protected their ritual or food ceremony by forming human shields around 
them. 
There is but always a problem in these heterogeneous bodies.  
The problem of linkage comes back in all the contemporary post-performative turn political 
movements. The highly flexible, democratic characteristic of their collective body, unleashed 
from the military disciplines of vanguard parties or the hierarchies of traditional party politics, 
could be inviting for those political ideologies that do not share the basic values of equality and 
freedom with other protestors and militant groups.  
When Nina describes the people in Maidan, she names all of them: “anarchists, cossacks, leftist 




and leaders, human rights activists, contemporary artists and just artists, reenactors of historical 
events, nationalists, and Nazis”.  
When Mohammad explains that identity was not a basis and everybody was there, this 
“everybody” includes ultra-nationalists, who have a bloody history with minorities such as Kurds 
or Armenians50.  
Nor was Iran’s Green Movement, as I experienced it, always a pleasant mixture of bodies. In Iran’s 
2009-10 massive demonstrations, the nationalists with their xenophobic discourse against Arabs 
and other minorities were there, just like Nazis came out in Maidan. 
Hito Steyerl (The Articulation of Protest) refers exactly to this point by criticizing the widely 
acclaimed Seattle alterglobalization event in 1999, where anti-modern, anti-European and ultra-
right nationalist fractions and parties appeared among the protestors. Reflecting on the nature 
of this “and”, she asks that whether this and is neutrally accumulative of “all” voices and images 
and then, paradoxically, makes a homogenous undifferentiated mass, or rather is a selective 
machinic assemblage which forms a radical heterogonous minoritarian multiplicity based on 
difference.  
There are certain types of “and” that could put the heterogenous pieces of a movement together: 
an idiorhythmic, selective and, which we discussed before through Barthes, and an accumulative 
and, which juxtaposed anything indifferently.  
These two functions are always mixed in contemporary movements. 
If the accumulative “and” is adding indifferently, it acts as the reproducer of the established 
order, trying to subject all the heterogeneous elements to a resurgent dominant homogenizing 
Power, since Power is already internalized and reproduced by some other added elements in the 
chain, those who are in closer seats to the main spectacle of molar Politics.  
But if an accumulative “and” is a function of reproduction apparatus, and a hegemonic relation 
also goes toward the same direction, how else do people connect in a contemporary protest 
 




movement? How could a selective organization be free from forced, violent exclusionary 
processes?  
The idiorhythmic “and”, I argue, functions through the new image of thought. The movement, its 
collective heterogenous body thinks, and it thinks headlessly, as it develops new phantasms and 
simulacra, populating the surface of socius with them, transforming the social flesh and pushing 
it toward its limits, disorganizing and reorganizing it.  
We have already argued that body is a product of connected capabilities and the surficial 
inscription of phantasms and events. Therefore, with the performative event at work, and the 
code of the everyday signs defunct, the performative simulacra of a movement populate the 
surface of its body, functioning as the connecting points between different bodies within the 
socius.  
In such a process, some performative rules become a means of selective organization, since not 
all ideological groups could find themselves obeying such open, polyvocal and non-hierarchical 
rules or following what they see as either useless and absurd or excessive and deviant.  
Such performative rules that result from the new image of thought function as a type of game 
rules. In a game, rules are the conditions of a certain performance, a certain movement; they are 
not actively dividing or categorizing different bodies and limiting access based on hierarchical 
positions of power. They create a situated necessity out of a contingency. In a Fantasy Role 
Playing game, for example, a character enters in a situation, and the only limit to its movement 
is the limit of its power; its physical and spiritual power that has been digitized based on 
contingent criteria that could be increased during the events in the game: either happy 
affect/affections increase your bodily power and your protecting shield, or a sad affect/affection 
decreases your physical and spiritual health. Limits are defined by differential forces, not through 
rigid lines of various identities.  
We need to recognize those performative rules and other performative simulacra in order to see 
the alternative forms of bodily organization in Occupy movements. Otherwise, the only theories 





Greece organization in the squares and the further attempts at maintaining an open collectivity 
is a good case to think about performative rules. In “people’s assemblies” in Syntagma square, 
every night up to 4000 participants attended the meetings for 40 days. On one hand, the process 
of decision-making with such a high number of actors looked very hard, if not impossible, at first 
glance, and on the other hand, Golden Dawn neo-Nazis were among the protestors in the 
beginning and their history of cooperating with police and security service agenda by attacking 
immigrants, refugees and left-wing political activists presented a real danger to the cause of the 
occupation.  
As the movement tried to define itself as non-hierarchical, non-exclusionary and 
heterogeneously inclusive, a simple act of “throwing them out” was not an option. Therefore, 
occupiers had to invent new forms and tactics in the people’s assemblies to avoid integrating 
xenophobic and ultra-right-wing elements from the decision making. So an amazing form of 
organization emerged with establishing certain rules of performance.  
First, everybody could speak about anything they wanted. Second, the speakers could not claim 
representing any bigger group or organization. Third, political (representative) parties were not 
allowed to promote their agenda, as people wanted “all of them out” and rejected the very 
mechanism of representation and outsourcing power to higher hierarchical positions. Fourth, the 
speakers were chosen by lottery, and nobody could claim a right to speak over others. Fifth, the 
speakers were limited to 2-minutes speeches, so that the time could distribute equally. Sixth, the 
moderators were also chosen by lottery for each round of discussion, so that nobody could obtain 
a higher symbolic power. Seventh, there were corridors for speakers to walk toward the 
microphone. Seventh, hand sign system and people’s mic – that we come back in the following – 
were adopted to facilitate the meeting proceedings.  
It was a system that worked and by these very simple rules, the neo-Nazis self-excluded 
themselves from the occupation, as they could not tolerate this radical egalitarian and 
democratic procedure.  
The bodily techniques that have been developed in the contemporary movement show another 




discussed through Mauss and Klossowski, the code of the everyday signs is an important part of 
our cultural bodily technics and a machinic function of its organization, while the code is itself 
constitutive of and constituted by the dominant image of thought (phantasms). A new image of 
thought, and new sets of simulacra created by it, could develop certain bodily technics: this time 
for a different communication and organization. 
My first encounter with the depth of this sign system was during an interview with an 
autonomous, anarchist collective in Berlin, mostly cultural workers turned to be activists, and 
one of the first working groups of a short-lived Occupy Berlin.   
The group that I met was a small one, consisting of seven to eight members. Among them, there 
was a young Russian-German activist who experienced the Occupy Wall Street and returned with 
inspiration and knowledge from New York to Berlin and joined others at the beginning of protests 
against the financial capitalism in Germany’s capital. After that, the group started to make more 
connections with other autonomist and activist groups, mostly outside Germany, to educate itself 
on others’ experiences. They also participated in Occupy Oranienplatz refugee movement and 
helped with organizing aid groups for legal consultation, teaching language and other related 
issues.  
As an important part of their work, they used to present their ideas for moderating general 
assemblies and organizing decision-making process. For them, it was an urgent cause: 
moderating a general assembly of very different groups and individuals in a way that no single 
force could dominate and form a head, overarching the collective body. A difficult task I would 
say after I witnessed the organizing meetings of O-Platz. The collective body is heterogenous: a 
mixture of different non-white immigrants from various backgrounds and cultures, some 
speaking English, some French, and only a few German; and then German activists, some from 
the traditional left, used to disciplined work schedules and a definite set of goals and a 
hierarchical mechanism of decision making, and some from the new generations, anarchists or 
anti-fascists, with their own methods of organization, non-verticality, playfulness and 




generations. Any dividing line based on language, age, gender and skin color had to be avoided 
so that the crystals of hierarchy could not reproduce themselves among activists.  
The body language becomes an important way of communication. This sign system developed 
through years of experimenting with non-hierarchical, non-party politics and it was based on 
simple movements of hands. There are signs for showing support, agreement, dissatisfaction, 
critique and even blocking some ideas. They can form, in agreement, a semi-dance of swirling 
hands and in disagreement, a performance of rotating hands, calling for a change in speaker or 
in subject. There are certain rules for processing such commentaries. For example, a block can 
make a delay in decision until it is resolved; moreover, there is no representation allowed and 
nobody could speak in place of a larger number of people, unless there is a meeting designed for 
such a thing. More importantly, simple hand signs could give more ease and confidence to 
refugees with limited knowledge of English or German for giving their initial ideas over the 
proposals. And the silence of words accompanying such gestures is more inviting for an active 
participation of non-native activists with bodily signs. 
Other sets of techniques such as “people’s mic” seem to be in line with the heterogenous body 
involved in protests. When somebody speaks at a corner of the encampment or in the general 
assembly, the listeners repeat his words toward the others behind them and the process 
continues. However, it is not a disciplined performance. While some are repeating the words, 
and moving their hands in agreement, others can protest with the different hand signals, showing 
live commentary on the speech. And of course, a people’s mic could filter the divisive rhetoric of 
the nationalists and xenophobes.   
These performative rules and bodily technics could be more visible in Occupy movements in 
European and North American countries. Those protests met with police violence, but not as 
brutal as the police violence in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Syria, Iran, and other similar countries.  
Moreover, although one could argue that financial capitalism was the main target of occupy 
movements that emerged on a global scale since 2011, they targeted different entities in each 
country. In the US as well as Europe, the protests raged against the financial centers, banks and 




the protestors believed the government is occupied by the capitalist elite. In Egypt and Tunisia 
for example, mass impoverishment and the mechanisms of dispossession were closely tied with 
inequality, police brutality and crackdown of freedom; consequently, the main target was post-
colonial states that have had long tried to construct their imagined nation-states by 
implementing neoliberal economic policies on one hand and establishing a fearsome apparatus 
of suppression on the other hand.  
Therefore, any analysis of such movements should be capable of explaining the transformations 
in the imagined nations as dominant collective bodies, the disruptions on its conceived 
homogeneity, and the alterations in the dominant time-space – the habitat of the imagined 
collective body.  
 
4.5 The State and the Body 
 
When the different social uprisings started to appear in a global scale in the end of 2000s, 
theories tried to understand their particular logic of dissipation and repetitions. There were those 
in cultural and performance studies who brought up the notion of imitation or mimesis, and 
others from the same disciplines who recourse to a more biopolitical, affective concept: 
contagion.  
There are no two cases of similar reactions to even most common viruses such as cold. When the 
virus comes, the transformations and changes through the interaction of immune system with it 
are all interdependent on the singular network of relations inside a particular historicized and 
disciplined biosphere, a human body.  
The affective intermingling of forms and aesthetics among the contemporary different 
movements follows an immaterial-viral logic of contagion. While imitation and mimesis both 
presuppose a universal-ideal image, inherently Eurocentric, and become trapped in the 
apparatus of representation, the logic of contagion is more about the internal dynamics of those 




What is being repeated? How repetition, as a spatiotemporal concept, can be conceptualized 
through viral contagion? If there is a new political collective body, a new social flesh, appearing 
out of such uprisings and struggles, how do these bodies, each in their own singular histories of, 
and with their own singular geographies of, intensities and forces react to the viral contagion? 
How do they deform or transform? How will the new social relationality intervene in and re-
create the space and time in such a repetition? A symptomology of these bodies under the affects 
of contagion could show another aspect of repetition versus its representational 
conceptualization. 
The emergence of multiple civil wars in the post-Arab Spring Middle East and their corresponding 
organization of social bodies do also symbolize the two types of repetition: a repetition for the 
new and of the difference, and a repetition of the old, in this case the never ending post-colonial 
processes of nation-State makings and its appropriate “national” identities. So, if this typology of 
collective bodies through repetition can be held, then our discussion should go into each of them. 
I discussed before how modernity is tied with colonialism and how modernization process made 
the Nation-State a hegemonic form, making it the ultimate globalized model for organizing 
societal collective bodies. Nation is by definition a hegemonic whole, flattening the differences 
in the heterogeneous common body of a territory. But in each context, the processes of nation-
making and their corresponding body is different. Even the designated names from different 
political fractions show different traditions of imagining this collective bodies: nation, volk, 
people, masses, multitude, etc.  
The notions of community and collectivity must be confronted critically in the discussion about 
self-organization. For the notion of community should not be presupposed here, because this 
term historically refers to a homogenous, united whole, opposed to the bourgeois individualistic 
society. Challenging this conception of community, the critical contemporary treatment of the 
term (for example, in Agamben’s Coming Community) links the new community to an open whole 
of singularities. The altermodernities challenge both the modern and conventional/traditional 




Performativizations of a performative politics necessarily deals with (collective) bodies in each 
local context. For example, one cannot simply use the same talking points for collective bodies 
of Middle-Eastern Arab Spring and North American Occupy Wall Street. Although the flow of 
immigrants and refugees through globalization blurred the boundaries between these collective 
bodies, one cannot neglect their different conditions. For instance, the trajectories of al-ghomia 
and al-Sha’b (nation in Arabic) and Mellat (nation in Farsi and Turkish) are closer to the romantic 
conception of volk in German or people in the state discourses of existing socialisms (as in the 
People’s Republic of China) than the individualist contractual conception of nation. In a similar 
manner, Umma in Islamic movements is not completely identifiable with community, people, or 
mass in other political discourses. Therefore, a discussion over the bodies of different so-called 
cultures will be necessary to face with this difficulty.  
So, questions remain: which body does performativize? How is this body historically conditioned? 
How does temporality transform itself during performativization? 
With the analysis of nationalisms, the Butlerian idea of repetitive performance as the core of 
identity enters a new level. Rather than focusing on individual performances, it argues how a 
nation-state starts its own lines of subjectification through the nationalist project. In other words, 
the nationalist project “suggests” a certain, limited, exclusive and exclusionary set of 
performances through homogenizing a populist, racist and sexist discourse. The authority of the 
state expects all individuals to “imitate” these performances.  
In the following, I will focus on the theories based on imitation for explaining the collective body 
construction throughout different countries relevant to this research. I will discuss the idea of 
Volk, since when it was imagined by the romantic movement in Germany under the influence of 
French revolution, it had deep influences on intellectuals in the Middle-East, Turkey, Iran and 
Arabic speaking countries. And afterwards, the performative contagion and the disruption of 





4.5.1 Imitation, Nationalism and the Colonial Divide 
About imitation and mimesis, we as theatre studies scholars know enough. The concept is 
originally based on the principle of identity, functions in the realm of cognitive consciousness, 
brings forth similarities, and the difference are always secondary in relation to the identical. It 
works in the logic of generality and particularity. In the following, we will show how the general 
idea of a nation is suggested by Western commentators, from which many non-Westerns 
imitated their own nationalisms.  
The word nation came to English from the Old French word nacion, which in turn originates from 
the Latin word natio (nātĭō), literally meaning "birth", itself going back to the well-known root 
word *gene-, the origin. “Soil and blood”, one may say, are already implicitly present in the 
nation’s meanings.  
But the concept was determined (especially in the connecting point between liberal French and 
Anglo-Saxon thinkers and the influence of German enlightenment movement) through the idea 
of a social contract. By entering a contract with the State as the central power, individuals 
willingly transfer their right to rule in order to form the nation. When the romantics, themselves 
inspired by French revolution, started to use the term Volk through/instead of the borrowed term 
nation, the implications were different. 
 
4.5.1.1 “Volk vor dem Tor” 
In the early Scene of “Vor dem Tor” in Goethe’s Faust (Part One), Dr. Faust talks about Volk at 
the gate of a village in a Sunday holiday. He describes the village as “des Volkes wahrer Himmel”, 
Volk’s true heaven, where he feels himself as human, or as he puts it, “Hier bin ich Mensch, hier 
darf ich’s sein” (“Here I may be so, am allowed to be so”). 
Volk refers in this dramatization to the lower-class people, commoners, who rank socially lower 
than Dr. Faust whose arrival to the village resonates with the romantic idea of returning to the 




In the scene called “Mitternacht” (Midnight), he repeats again the experience of being a human, 
this time by standing “before Nature”.  
The Volk, the village, the nature: this link shows us how volk (as well as nation) is considered the 
natural organization of bodies. In such a natural environment of volk only a cultural (as opposed 
to natural) urban Faust could feel his true identity. 
Another mechanism of Volk-construction is also discussed in Faust, which relates to its 
hegemonic and unified characteristic. In the village, one burgher says that wars are the main 
discussion in Sundays as in Turkey, under the sovereignty of Ottoman empire in the time of the 
play, “die Völker” (different volks or nations) fight each other to the death (“Nichts Bessers weiß 
ich mir an Sonn- und Feiertagen/ Als ein Gespräch von Krieg und Kriegsgeschrei,/ Wenn hinten, 
weit, in der Türkei,/ Die Völker auf einander schlagen”). 
The implied contrast of a peaceful cafe’s conversation about war inside a territory for only one 
volk and “volks” fighting each other to the death in another territory, Turkey, speaks for itself. 
The peace seems to result from the lack of difference and heterogeneity in the village, where 
only one Volk lives. And it also entails the simultaneous construction and rejection of the other, 
here Turks. “We” of the villager is defined as contrast to the Turkish “other”, an important 
imperial rival to the “east”. One should not forget that the city of the new Volk is closed off with 
walls in Faust’s imagination. 
And yet another mechanism emerges in Faust that is related to the previous one. Faust ultimate 
wish is the construction of a volk between the land and the sea, “nicht sicher zwar, doch tätigfrei” 
(“not safe, admittedly, but actively free”). Contrary to other romantic dramatizations of Volk, like 
that of Johann Gottfried von Herder, Goethe’s Faust does not recourse to biology or common 
ancestry for this new imagined Volk. The Volk is constructed by the common experience of 
danger from the sea. On one hand, this vision directly links the construction of Volk to colonial 
dreams of that time, with ships bringing “richly and colorfully laden with the products of foreign 
parts of the world” (“reich und bunt geladen/ mit Erzeugnissen fremder Weltgegenden”). On the 
other hand, it relates the construction of a people to the very idea of “resisting the danger” to 




As Goethe is considered, particularly through Faust, a bridge between so-called “classicism” and 
“romanticism”, Herder has been categorized the philosophical figure connecting the 18th century 
Enlightenment and the romantic thought of 19th century in Germany. If Kant’s Enlightenment 
advocates an individually focused cosmopolitanism, Herder’s political ideal seems to be more a 
localized Volk, reterritorialized inside a national, original territory. Many believe Herder to be 
“one of the earliest theoretical advocates of nationalism generally and of German nationalism in 
particular (see Alfred Apsler; Brian King; Fox). 
The transition from the 18th century cosmopolitanism to the 19th century nationalism is another 
double movement of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The colonial endeavor was a 
deterritorializing force which helped in envisioning a new order, although the negligence toward 
colonialism and its corresponding divides, especially along the color-lines, show the limits of 
those cosmopolitanist claims. However, the intensification of imperial competitions on one hand 
and the impacts of the French Revolution on the other brought about a movement of 
reterritorialization based on coined national identities. 
Herder has commentators who defend him against the accusations of racism and antisemitism; 
and of course, he has fierce critiques who made him infamous as the father of racial thought, if 
not racist thought. The third category of references to him are done by pseudo-researchers of 
the White supremacism in form of glorification and inspiration for a white ethno-State.  
Even if we limit ourselves to the defenders of Herder against its Nazi reinterpretation and 
implementation, he emerges as a thinker of a linear evolution.  
Herder, the romantic Goethe and others came after them broke away with the universalist 
promises of enlightenment. The particularism was on the rise, as the nationalism was fermenting 
on the European soil. The imperialist competitions and the total war of revolutionary France – as 
we will discuss further – revealed the failure of an illusionary promise of a cosmopolitan 
egalitarianism, unaware of its colonialist inheritance. As Nietzsche would write later, “since 
Copernicus man has been rolling from the center toward X.” (The Will to Power) 
That is how the metaphysics of the origin coupled with an organicism based on a raw, sentimental 




The Newtonian physics was replaced by an evolutionary biology, either based on botany or body 
anatomy and immunology. Organism replaced mechanism as the explanatory metaphor of the 
world.  
Then it is not surprising that political philosophers of 19th century got interested into medical 
discourses about human body. In the beginning of 20th century, when the term biopolitics first 
entered the Western discourses, it was in the context of organistic and vitalistic theories of the 
state: they define state in terms of a living being with its proper collective body (Volk, nation, 
people). It is illuminating to take a look at a few titles of such works: Karl Binding's zum werden 
und leben der Staaten; Eberhard Dennert's der Staat als lebendiger Organismus; Edward Hahn's 
Der Staat, ein Lebenswesen; Rudolph Kjellen‘s Grundriss zum einem System der Politik; Jacob von 
Uexkuell‘s Staatsbiologie: Anatomie, Physiologie, Pathologie des Staates and Morley Robert's 
Bio-politics: an essay in the physiology, pathology and politics of the social and somatic organism 
(Wilmer and Žukauskaitė). 
For Herder too, ethnology and botany are the same in their methods, as “the botanist cannot 
obtain a complete knowledge of a plant, unless he follows it from the seed, through its 
germination, blossoming, and decay” (Herder 38). 
That is why both Herder and Goethe saw the perfection of the human in presence of a volk: “Ein 
Mensch, der sein vaterländische Gemüt verlor, hat sich selbst und die Welt um sich verloren“ 
(“He that has lost his patriotic spirit has lost himself and the whole world about himself”)  
In “Three Critics of the Enlightenment”, Isaiah Berlin sums up this idea referring to Herder: “to 
be fully human, . . . one must belong somewhere, to some group or some historical stream which 
cannot be defined save in the genetic terms of a tradition, a milieu and a culture” (198). 
Herder’s ideas thus can be summarized in this equation: the national is the true. Although there 
are attempts from Herder and other early thinkers of the volk to present pseudo-scientific 
justifications for a theory of race by using organicism and biology, the emphasis on the true and 
the soul proves the importance of sentiments and affections for them in constructing a collective 




show how nationalist ideas and their corresponding practices are most likely to be transmitted 
through affects, rather than a willful, free, subjective imitation of what has been seen.  
On the other hand, both Goethe and Herder, at the dawn of industrialization and the emergence 
of urban proletariat, found their idea of the Volk on the peasants, creating a divide between volk 
(peasants) and the rabble (workers). “There is only one class in the state, the Volk (not the 
rabble),” writes Herder, “and the king belongs to this class as well as the peasant” (qtd. in Brass 
279).  
As Goethe himself warns, “too much inquiring after the sources of things is dangerous. We should 
rather concentrate on phenomena as given realities” (qtd. in Treitler 90). That is what we set to 
do with the imagined volk and its realities, more than its utopist ideas and source-searching in 
the form of beautiful prose.  
The king ruling the peasants in the imagined society of “only one class” translates to One-Party 
governments (one nation, one state, one party) in reality. This form of governmentality took 
control of power after nationalist movements and revolutions ended into formation of new 
nation-states. A few examples from our area of research would be the modernizing periods in 
Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Tunisia. The exclusion of the workers from the volk 
also shows the difference between “socialisms” in rightwing national-socialism and leftist 
socialism and the reason that the latter became the immediate ideological enemy, falling victim 
to the early suppressive attempts by the former. These are important facts that help us later to 
see the mechanisms of constructing a collective body in non-western contexts. 
For Herder, a volk emerges out of an organic development, starting from an originary time and 
space. His platonic idea of a Volksgeist measures the truth of the volk through its distance to the 
originary territory. The Asiatic volks, for example, were shaped by the sun and the desert, and 
the Western ones by the rain and the river. The more distance a volk has from its national milieu, 
the furthest it is from its own truth. This idea functions as the grounding of his negative 
observation and comments on the Jewish volk. “The poor nation was dispersed into the world,” 
he writes of the Jewish people, “thus most of them formed their expression according to the 




better not think” (Sikka 175). And when he was writing on the misfortunes and mistakes in the 
semi-biological evolution of Jews, a volk of the Orient, they were segregated in Germany, living 
in Ghettos and not enjoying a full citizenship status until 1896 (see Apsler).  
It is true that Herder was not an advocate of German Supremacy over all other races, but his so-
called “cultural nationalism” that defined volk through a vast idea of culture became militarized 
not so long after him.  
Nietzsche also relates nationalism to the German romanticism. “The nihilistic consequences of 
the ways of thinking in politics and economics,” he writes, “where all ‘principles’ are practically 
histrionic: the air of mediocrity, wretchedness, dishonesty, etc. Nationalism. Anarchism, etc. 
Punishment.” and a few lines below, he strikes with this conclusion: “Art and the preparation of 
nihilism: romanticism (the conclusion of Wagner's Nibelungen).” (Will to Power) 
Nietzsche’s choice of words constructs a dramatic reference: “histrionic” principles, German 
romantic art and the total art of Wagner, all bringing the same things into mind: drama, theatre, 
and stage. If nation is originally imagined, as Benedict Anderson argues, then the simultaneous 
rise of nationalism and of dramatic theatre, both with their own ideas of homogenous collectivity, 
the New Man, catharsis and spiritual purification, and the top/down dynamics of 
directors/actors/spectators, gives another meaning to the relation between 19th century 
romanticist art and the politics (which is said to be nonexistent, as the romantics were the 
advocates of art for the sake of art). Moreover, it is argued to the point of exhaustion that theatre 
functions as a way of collective bonding, and the so-called “national theatre”, in colonies as well 
as mainland, was charged with the responsibility of imagining a national identity, and of a 
mythical past for it. And as for the political spectacles, we already discussed it in earlier chapters. 
The performative as it is defined in this research deterritorializes the limits of the national identity 
as it could be set by the theatrical imagination; it calls for alternative imaginal points of 
reconstruction. And it disrupts the imagined homogenous collective body by bringing the 
differences and gaps inside it to the foreground. In addition, it breaks away with the classical 
concept of imitation, inherent in all such analyses where it comes to the relation between the 




we need to see the particular mechanisms of this national imagination in each singular context 
in order to escape the reductionism we have criticized so far in other commentaries on the 
occupy movements and the Arab Spring.  
 
4.5.1.2 The War and the Nation 
Another 19th century Kantian, Carl von Clausewitz connected German Enlightenment and 
Romanticism from a very different aspect, around the concept of a volk’s war against imperial 
aggression. “Clausewitz claims that the defensive war of resistance mounted by a people shows 
that a new power (Potenz) has arisen which is the ‘people armed’ or Volksbewaffnung that now 
confronts the ‘armed people’ of the French Republic/Empire” (Caygill 19). 
The emergence of German nationalism as a reaction to the French Revolution and Napoleon 
military adventures has been widely acknowledged; and even Clausewitz theory of war and 
resistance has been commented under this light. On one hand, Clausewitz traced back how a 
revolution could turn against the political, becoming a total war against the other. He 
“contemplated the possibility of a political logic (revolution) capable of actualizing a military 
energy of sufficient intensity to consume and destroy the political itself, a movement exemplified 
for him in the transformation of revolutionary into imperial France.” ( Caygill 20) A new kind of 
warfare, too, where a “total mobilization of people” into war for the defense of their revolution 
– what has been called “mass nationalism” (see Cederman et al) – constructs a new type of army. 
On the other hand, he saw in the resistance of the Spanish volk a new kind of warfare that is 
based on the “capacity to resist… as the sum of material means along with the moral will to resist 
the enemy.” (Caygill 16)  
As David A. Bell argues in his “The First Total War” (2007), it was during the people’s wars against 
French army that war became a totalized experience, being able to transform societies into new 
ones. Those wars led to the rise in nationalism, the liberation movements in Latin America and 




The difference between those two forms of warfare outlines in a way the difference between 
two forms of nationalism: an offensive, colonial or imperial one and a resisting, defensive or 
indigenous one. This is a reduction of many different experiences, only for the sake of simplicity, 
but these two generic forms mix with each other in national territories – where a dominant class 
suppresses other minorities, becoming offensive – and each has been performativized into 
multiple different collective bodies based on its particular context.  
The defensive nationalism repeated itself in many parts of the world; the repetition, however, 
seems to be based for many commentators on a repetition of the identical, or better, an imitation 
of the west. 
4.5.1.3 The Resentful West, the Resentful East: A Tale of Twins 
Howard Caygill links Clausewitz’s idea of resistance against the imperial army through Volk’s war 
to the idea of the ressentiment in Nietzsche:  
Clausewitz seems to have settled on a distinction between positive war – aimed at destroying the 
enemy’s capacity to resist – and negative war aimed at eroding or exhausting this capacity. With 
this Clausewitz arrives at an insight which will reappear in Nietzsche’s aligning of resistance and 
ressentiment in the Genealogy of Morals (28). 
Bringing the Nietzschean concept of ressentiment into the discussion of Volk’s wars have certain 
consequences: there are new Masters and the Slaves are seeking justice resenting them; the 
resenting resistance aims to take over the place of the Masters, therefore imitating their 
creativity; and there is a certain glorified past that has been destroyed or subjected to a change. 
Although Caygill tries to develop a notion of pure resistance through ressentiment, it is hardly a 
neutral concept in Nietzsche.  
An interesting dramatization of ressentiment comes in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 
‘It was’: thus, is called the will’s gnashing of teeth and loneliest misery. Impotent against that 
which has been – it is an angry spectator of everything past… That time does not run backward, 
that is its wrath. ‘That which was’ – thus the stone is called, which it cannot roll aside. And so it 
rolls stones around out of wrath and annoyance, and wreaks revenge on that which does not feel 




everything that is capable of suffering it avenges itself for not being able to go back. This, yes this 
alone is revenge itself: the will’s unwillingness toward time and time’s ‘it was.’ (111) 
This is a drama in which, according to many – mostly European – commentators, the colonized 
and the colonizers played its roles. These roles break down themselves formally into the dual 
power positions in Nietzsche’s political thought: “In order to come about, slave morality first has 
to have an opposing, external world, it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order 
to act at all – its action is basically a reaction” (On the Genealogy of Morality 20). 
Daniel Chirot formulates such a position on nationalism very clearly: “All the types of nationalism 
which developed in the late 19th and 20th centuries, most should resemble Russian and German 
nationalism based on ressentiment more than the Anglo-American, more liberal type” (Modern 
Tyrants). 
Considering the Nietzschean conceptualization of ressentiment, then the claim that many forms 
of non-Anglo-American nationalism are all based on ressentiment means that they come out of 
reaction. As it was discussed before, a reactionary force for Nietzsche is a force separated from 
its effect and value; it does not take the initiative, but imitates and instead of an increase in the 
power (as power to affect and be affected), it decreases that capacity. As Nietzsche writes,  
When ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: The ressentiment of natures 
that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, And compensate themselves with an imaginary 
revenge. While every Noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave 
Morality from the outset says no to what is “outside”, what is “different,” What is not itself, and 
this no is its creative deed. (ibid) 
This implies a Eurocentrist presupposition in the idea of resentful nationalism: the lack of 
creativity, thus of subjectivity in Nietzschean terms, on the side of the colonized. The only 
creativity is of the Master and the Slave is a bad copy maker. Or as Chirot would put it, “almost 
all, certainly most of the new nationalisms that have been developed in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries have been based partly on jealous admiration for and resentment of 




It also results to a total closure against the other. If the power is basically the power of affecting 
and being affected, then resentful nationalism minimalizes this power, and its way of pursuing 
its aim comes with the hatred of the other, saying “no to what is ‘outside’”, all the while assessing 
itself against it. A double bind, if you wish, as we have discussed thoroughly in the discussion 
about anti- and alter-modernity.  
The dynamics between the East and the West, particularly between the Ottoman and its Western 
neighboring empires gives another aspect to the discussion of ressentiment. Various scholars 
pointed to the resentful discourses of Renaissance against the Turks, often based on a division 
between Christianity and Islam (see Anievas and Nişancıoğlu; Sayyid). A divide that later was 
retrospectively called “the Eastern Question” and is still functioning in the (post)colonial 
discourses.  
In “Creating East and West”, Nancy Bisaha argues that the initial phases of constructing a modern 
European identity can be found in Renaissance humanism long before colonialism. According to 
her, the battle of Constantinople and the cruel stories of the rampage and pillage met with all 
sorts of reactions from the West, but on the discursive level, “humanists as a group” created a 
“highly developed sense of Europe as the cultural superior to the East” (Bisaha 6) in their rhetoric 
on the Turks and Islam.  
Renaissance Europeans battled fears that a hostile, Islamic enemy to the East could at any 
moment destroy their world. (Bisaha 2) 
The first instances of a modern metaphysics of origin implemented for the sake of constructing 
an identity during war. The Pope Pius II for instance called the fall of Constantinople a "second 
death for Homer and a second destruction of Plato." Humanists repeatedly labeled the Turks as 
“barbarians” who rolled back the achievements of Western civilization after defeating the Greek 
just at the end of what they themselves were calling the “dark ages” (ibid). 
If ressentiment should become the pillar of identity-construction, then its early European 
manifestations must not get lost in the eurocentrist narratives of the emergence of nationalism; 




seventeenth century did Europeans begin to believe that the ominous Turkish threat was slowing 
down” (Bisaha 3).  
The fear as well as the feeling of superiority is not dead. Neither today, nor back in the era of 
Romanticism. It is not unrelated to the fact that Ottoman Empire had been historically 
constructed as the other, that Herder conceived Slavs as a volk that one day would be the real 
power in Europe, since they will have adhered to Christianity and to their idealism. A belief that 
made Herder an intellectual father figure for Pan-Slavism. 
 
4.5.1.4 Whose Nationalism, whose subjectivity? 
The formulation of nationalism based on ressentiment and imitation finds its way also to other 
analyses, even when they defend the liberation struggles against colonial rule. 
Tom Nairn talks about the second generic form when he puts nationalism solely in the context of 
uneven global capitalist development and local economic inequality. For him, the “irrational” 
elements of nationalism came out of a reaction to Modernity’s colonial domination and invasion 
by western powers (see Cocks, Passion and Paradox 111-132).  
As a Scottish under English sovereignty, Nairn does not see authentic culture or technological 
advance in the heart of nationalism (unlike two other seminal figures that we will discuss shortly), 
but the destruction of the colonized way of life. Nonetheless, it seems that he could see the 
dynamics of imitation in such a nationalism when he writes about the “nationalism’s inherent 
schizophrenia: its material determination and mythological self-interpretation; its glorification of 
a rural past and pursuit of an industrial future; its alternating impulses of emancipation and 
coercion.” (Cocks 114) 
The (post-)colonial nationalist collective body is a modern naturalized nation, a symptom of 
similar phantasms and imitated stereotypes. Numerous (post-)colonial States used and are still 
using colonial-era laws to shape their nations with a brutality similar to former colonial masters. 




cultural event deemed “threatening” to the moralities, i.e. the colonial-inspired code of the 
everyday signs.  
As an example, one can turn to Uganda that has intensified its crackdown of LGBT community 
just in 2017 – a community “abnormal” for the nation, an anomaly in its so-called natural 
collective body. In the beginning of December 2017, for instance, police raided queer Kampala 
film festival and shut it down after one night. This was one of the last suppressive acts that came 
after a series of other events targeting queer audience had been shut down, such as the entire 
2017 annual Pride Week festive events, such as parades, fashion shows, education workshops 
and so forth. All these suppressions have been based on a colonial-era law prohibiting “carnal 
knowledge against the order of nature” with possible sentences of up to life in prison (Human 
Rights Watch 2017). 
Benedict Anderson (1991 (1983)) for example famously explained how nations were imagined 
through the nationalist movements, rather than emerging as a necessary product of sociopolitical 
conditions. But if the Western societies imagined their own, the South copied their imagination 
in their nationalist endeavors.  
The imagination of the nation is of course not a purely immaterial endeavor. As Anderson argues, 
there are certain materialist transformations that made the emergence of such a homogenous 
collective body possible, which for him is based on “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Imagined 
Communities 7): cultural commons such as language and arts, technological advances such as 
“print capitalism”, and elite’s propaganda of their own nationalism through mass media. On the 
other hand, he was convinced that patriots are fighting not due to their hatred of the other, but 
out of their love for the nation. However, is one allowed to consider “nation” as separate from 
the State, or even based on Anderson’s analysis, would it be possible without a centralized state 
to propagate the national bond? How could a national bonding remain horizontal? Has not the 
love for the country already presupposed a hatred of the other? And Anderson’s love of the 
country – is it not similar to Herder’s patriotism?51 What about those who were citizens of other 
 
51 For another differentiation, based on the distinction between patriotism and nationalism, see For Love of Country: 




nation-states, but fought alongside Isis on one front, or with Syrian Kurds on the other one? We 
already discussed the shortcomings of this view in early chapters of this research. 
The notion of imitation plays a big role in the eurocentrist imagined imagination of the South. 
Chirot’s analysis of Arab nationalisms is a typical case of such use: “Arab intellectuals travelled 
the familiar road of those exposed to the Europeans: first resistance, then acceptance and a wish 
to imitate, followed by a growing awareness of the contradictions between their own culture and 
the Western Enlightenment” (Modern Tyrants). 
Partha Chatterjee’s well-known critique of Anderson’s imagined community, “Whose imagined 
community?”, questions the Eurocentrist imitation approach to Western and Eastern 
nationalisms. His question is simple, but right to the point: “If nationalisms in the rest of the world 
have to choose their imagined community from certain ‘modular’ forms already made available 
to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?” (Chatterjee 216) 
Although Chatterjee’s critique embarks rightfully to invalidate such perspective, it recourses to a 
dubious idea of an authentic cultural identity. In other words, it starts from the presuppositions 
and principles of Western theorization of the nation, of its Volksgeist in order to posit a true 
alternative. The identity becomes the principle of thought, where the difference should have 
been the perspective. 
The paradoxes of nationalist imagination could be captured in the suggested dynamics by 
Meltem Ahiska (2010), a Turkish academic who worked extensively on national archives and radio 
broadcasts in Turkey. According to her, there is a dynamic between an occidental Orientalism 
and an oriental Occidentalism: a longing for Western style of progress and industrialization and 
an insistence on national and cultural superiority; criticizing the colonialism and exercising 
colonialist power against minorities inside national territories; criticizing Western culture and 
politics and imitating its political forms and institutions. The trap of occidental-oriental dynamics 
emerges when the separation between the form and the content of Modernity is legitimized. As 
 
up in the aforementioned quote of Herder that “he that has lost his patriotic spirit has lost himself and the whole 




if a nation could adopt the form of modern governmentality and inject its “own” culture-specific 
content into it.  
To escape the traps of already existing analyses of nationalism was the reason we initially 
referred to Clausewitz. The national collective bodies that are going to be discussed in this 
research are formed in different nationalist movements, through singular historical and 
geopolitical contexts. The anti-colonial or other forms of liberation movements in them, 
however, have been seen mostly nationalist, analyzed through the lens of classical imitation, 
ressentiment and reaction. This is not true, as we discussed in many parts of this research, and it 
makes the task of a researcher who is basically inquiring the disruptions of these national 
collective bodies harder and more complex. On one hand, it is true that there is a certain 
imitation, a copying of Westerners’ way, in the makings of non-Western nation-states. On the 
other hand, there have been multiple, heterogenous forces involved in those movements, each 
resisting the dominant Imperialist Power in its own way, contributing to (or subtracting from) the 
common emancipatory power, even if they had been finally dominated by a single impulse 
toward the nation-state. The nationalism comes after the people’s resistance, as its conclusion, 
or its dramatic product on the stage. Before it, there is a chaos of forces, interacting with each 
other against the colonial dominion.  
That is why Clausewitz’s idea of a Volk’s War seems a flexible, yet historically viable approach to 
the question of nationalism. The Volk’s War leads to a national unification and is based on the 
capacity to resist “as the sum of material means along with the moral will to resist the enemy” 
(Caygill 16). 
A Nationalist movement then, at least in its initial form before consolidating the ruling power, 
has been the sum of different material and immaterial means to resist, which includes culture 
and technology, poetry and politics, theatrical and performative actions, nation-state making 
process or confederalist struggles, peaceful and violent resistance alike. One of these means, one 
should note, is the openness toward the contagious ideas of resistance and struggle, and the 




of eurocentrist imitation, but also of a more affective imitation, a sort of contagion, to which we 
will come back later. 
It is the final relation between all these heterogenous forces that form the face of that 
movement. Such a formulation of nationalist collective bodies is also in line with our foundational 
theory of the Nietzschean body. As we explained before, the body is the product of an 
organization of impulsive forces, and its affective capacity to form relations with other bodies. 
Looking at the body through the idea of affect, we found a way to categorize bodies not based 
on the principle of identity, but of difference: “a workhorse is closer to an ox rather to a 
racehorse”. In the same manner, we cannot simply put all national collective bodies beside 
together in their histories of emergence, governance and suppression, only because they are all 
being called by the same name, the nation. On the contrary, one needs to analyze their affects, 
their capacity to form relations between different societal bodies, and the organization of 
different forces inside them. 
This explains how various Arab uprisings, due to their performative and theatrical use of national 
symbols and rituals, seemed to become both anti-nationalist and nationalist, using the flag of the 
country and protesting against its very reference, the nation-state. Tunisian revolution was an 
obvious example of such cases, where the national flag became the most visible symbol of the 
movement – but a national flag that stays as a heritage of Ottoman rule and the crescent and the 
five-pointed star on it represent respectively the unity of Arab-speaking people and Muslims. As 
one scholar notes, “during the protests, the flag was not a nationalist symbol but rather a 
patriotic one” (Coelho, The Arab Spring in Tunisia - A semiotic perspective); a symbol of a popular 
will against the nation-state that claims its representation. Another scholar considers the flag in 
Tunisian revolution as a marker of “banal nationalism” that can create a political assemblage 
between different groups for “effervescent experiences” (Hawkins 47).52 
 
52 One should not neglect the different strategies regarding flags in the Arab Spring, nor should one approach this 
problem without a proper critical point of view. Because flags in the post-colonial Arab Republics and their later 
protest movements can talk about different nationalist or patriotic sentiments as well as sedimented historical 
structures. In Egypt, flag had the same function as Tunisia, although not with the currency or ubiquitousness. 





There is another aspect in a Clausewitzian definition of nationalism that makes it proper to the 
research. Although nationalist theories presuppose the “nation” as the perspective of a collective 
body in such movements, Clausewitz volk’s war starts with a heterogenous, swarming collective 
body: “According to our representation of People’s War, it must be like a foggy or cloudlike being 
that will never allow itself to be concentrated into a resistant body, otherwise the enemy will 
apply an appropriate force to this kernel, and destroy it … it is however necessary that this fog 
condenses at certain points and forms threatening clouds from which powerful bolts of lightning 
can emerge” (qtd. in Caygill 26). 
Swarming is a keyword of the literature on the contemporary movements and the organization 
of their collective bodies. This heterogeneous organization of a collective body, of a people, has 
long been imagined conceptually in critical theories. For example, writing particularly about the 
alterglobalization movement in the beginning of 21st century, Nikos Papastergiadis refers to this 
collective body as a set of clusters: 
Clusters composed of a diverse range of individuals and groups. Clusters do not assume the forms 
of institutional political bodies. They are fluid and relatively open-ended. Critics often confuse the 
amorphous structure of a cluster with the presumption that its members lack conviction and that 
it cannot generate a sustainable momentum. This failure to recognize the shape of a new political 
movement is further compounded by the judgement that fragmentary alliances and tactical 
gestures are the signs of the absence of politics (Papastergiadis 18). 
Although the notion of “cluster” can capture here some vital characteristics, it is unable to explain 
how all these clusters form together a big open-ended whole, when it comes – as in the case of 
Tunisia, Syria and Egypt – to a total reimagination of nationhood. The relation between these 
different clusters, the way they connect to each other, should be also considered. 
We referred before to Roland Barthes lectures, “How to Live Together?”, and his fantasy of a 
collective body. This fantasized collective body is a being-together of singularities, which at the 
same time have their very own autonomous character. Barthes calls this particular relationality 




The pattern of a fluid element … an improvised, changeable form. In atomism, one manner in 
which atoms can flow; a configuration without fixity or natural necessity: a “flowing”…in short, 
the exact opposite of an inflexible, implacably regular cadence (Barthes, How to Live Together? 
7-8). 
Barthes thus speaks of a being together of idiorrhythmic singularities, without any domination of 
one on the other. This is the relation not only inside, but also between the “clusters” of 
contemporary movements.  
Therefore, the collective body of the contemporary movements is a body of different bodies, 
with idiorrhythmic relations among these different bodies. Not so much different from 
aforementioned concept of multitude in Negri and Hardt: 
Multitude is a form of political organization that, on the one hand, emphasizes the multiplicity of 
the social singularities in struggle and, on the other, seeks to coordinate their common actions 
and maintain their equality in horizontal organizational structures … Multitude is thus a concept 
of applied parallelism, able to grasp the specificity of altermodern struggles, which are 
characterized by relations of autonomy, equality, and interdependence among vast multiplicities 
of singularities (Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth 110-11). 
These imagined collective bodies are all forming a difference from the imagined nation. They 
disrupt it, yield it and transform it into another organization that, albeit its temporariness, shows 
the performative dynamics of the event.  
A Clausewitzian perspective on Volk’s war also fits with our discussions on the machinic 
assemblages between different elements in a collective body; and as it relies on the capacities of 
resistance – that can increase with connections between human and various inhuman elements 
– it provides a compatible model with the perspective of the government of things. In the case of 
Occupy movements, we called this collective body a patchwork body, proper to a patchwork 





4.5.2 Nations to the East 
The vanquished always want to imitate the victor in his distinctive 
characteristics, his dress, his occupation, and all his other 
conditions and customs. The reason for this is that the soul always 
sees perfection in the person who is superior to it and to whom it 
is subservient. It considers him perfect, either because it is 
impressed by the respect it has for him, or because it erroneously 
assumes that its own subservience to him is not due to the nature 
of defeat but to the perfection of the victor. If that erroneous 
assumption fixes itself in the soul, it becomes a firm belief. (Ibn 
Khaldūn 116) 
These words of Ibn Khaldun, the Muslim forerunner of sociology and demography have been 
haunting the reality of many Muslim majority countries in the modern times. As Chirot argues, 
“by 1900, almost all of the non-western world was either directly colonized or indirectly 
controlled through interference and coups” (Modern Tyrants). 
Although I will try to show the official discourses of the nation-making in some countries of 
interest for this research, I cannot go in detail about how the nationalist ideas went all the way 
to the Middle-East. The rise of a pan-Turkic political movement is a phenomenon of the 19th and 
20th centuries and was in part a response to the development of Pan-Slavism and German 
nationalism and Greek nationalism in Europe. Pan-Turkism in its turn inspired Pan-Iranism in Asia. 
One should not forget economic relationship between Ottomans and Germany in Ottoman’s 
weakest period just before dissolution, between the Republic of Turkey and Germany, Iran and 
Germany, Germany’s Baghdad railway project, its connection to world war I and II, the Sykes-
Picot colonial agreement, and the Pan-Turkist Turkestan legion organized by Nazis against the 
soviet. All these historical dramas have a life of their own, but the focus here is more on a 
historiography of Statist discourses that contributed to the emergence of a homogenous national 
collective body (see Karpat 17-18; Kohn 160; Landau).  
Milla, Mellat or Millet (ت
ّ
 is an Arabic term used as “nation” in both Farsi and Turkish, while (مل




In Turkey, Millet has been used for a long time to designate governmentality strategies in relation 
to collective bodies. However, the contemporary Millet has a different meaning than the idea of 
Millet in Ottoman’s Nizam Melli.  
To understand the imagined unitary collective body behind this term, let us then refer to the 
historical drama of its significations. In its ancient Quranic meaning, Millat means a particular 
way or path that people take it, or better imitate it from their leader. It has a similar meaning to 
Din or Sharia, both also meaning way or path, with a decisive difference.  
While there are compounds referring to a Din of God (دین هللا), or a Sharia of God (یعه هللا  Millat ,(شر
is not used in any compound as a Mellat of God: Mellat is always of a leader, a path that a leader 
dictates. Mellat shares also the same root with Emla, meaning “to dictate”.  
That leader could be a prophet of monotheistic religions, such as Mellat of Ibrahim or Mellat of 
Muhammad. On the other hand, Quran distinguishes between a Millet of believers and a millet 
of infidels. In other words, if Din is The way of God, Millet is only a way of some leader that can 
seek legitimacy from different sources, including God. 
The ambiguity in the original meaning can thus be formulated like this: Millat is a way of leader 
that a people has embraced, but that way for believers always comes from God and that leader 
serves as his prophet. Millat is the bridge between the profane of the governmentality and its 
sacred, the worldly norms of a tradition dictated to and imitated by a people and the divine laws 
legitimating them.  
Millat then is originally very different from Volk. While the latter presupposes a unity in language 
and culture, Millat of Muhammad for instance surpass the geographical, cultural and linguistic 
borders in favor of a unity based on the faith.  
In Ottoman, where “volks are fighting with each other”, Millet witnessed a history of different 
significations that builds a bridge between its religious, premodern meaning and its modern one. 
Tanzimat marks the turning point in this history. 
After the conquest of Constantinople (today’s Istanbul) by Sultan Mehmed II, Ottoman Nizam 




nations”, each Millet kept a considerable level of autonomy, not only in culture, language, 
religion and rituals, but also in its judiciary and governing procedures. In fact, Ottoman’s system 
of nations was not systematic, but a loose structure of bigger and smaller centers, adhering to a 
militaristic and economic central power. Even different Millets did not have an overarching 
structure to homogenize each of them into a whole.  
Nizam Melli was of course not a democratic confederalism or anything close to such a modern 
concept, but an imperial construct, result of an incessant expansionism on the part of Ottomans. 
Interpreters however points to Nizam Melli as a pluralistic and multicultural governance. It is a 
disputable claim nonetheless to use (post)modern concepts of pluralism and multiculturalism for 
an Empire that its attempt in modernization led to its disintegration.  
Indeed, Nizam Melli used retrospectively on the eve of Ottoman’s modernization period in order 
to refer to a mythicized Mehmed II rule. It was supposed to pave way for the beginning of large-
scale, ambitious and centralizing structural reforms called Tanzimat. 
Tanzimat was a reaction to an increasing rise of nationalist resistance movements against the 
empire, particularly the Greek War of Independence. Nationalist ideas for Greek independence 
was formulated by those intellectuals who were under the influence of French Revolution, 
German Enlightenment and the subsequent romantic nationalism (see Ozturk; Aviv; Salem; 
Ágoston and Masters; Karpat). 
With Tanzimat, the modernization started on this motto: reason, science, progress (Salem 32). 
The project was to form a nation-state, with a sense of national identity and a centralized power 
structure as a State. The national identity formed itself around what later was called Ottomanism.  
Millet appeared in this period as a modern translation of nation, or rather Volk. Nizam Melli 
became official and the mythical narrative of the existence of such a system, dating back to Sultan 
Muhammad II, legitimized this modernizing turn. Subsequently, new governing and judiciary laws 
were written for each of the previously relatively autonomous territories of different Millets – 




Tanzimat had different turns in itself, failed and was taken upon again, but the result was an 
intensification of rebellions in different parts of Ottoman Empire, a transition from Ottomanism 
to the construction of Turkish national identity and in the end, the fall of empire and the 
emergence of the Turkish republic.  
During those decades, the biopolitical and medical connotations of nationality came into the 
highest level of international official discourses, when the Ottoman Empire was labeled as the 
“sick man of Europe”53. The colonial powers were discussing about the “Eastern Question” again, 
this time in order to heal a “man” who “has fallen into a state of decrepitude” (de Bellaigue). 
The subject position of the Westerner was deemed to be much higher than the Easterner. It was 
not sometimes even believable from such a subjective perspective that Ottomans had the ability 
to imitate the Western technics of governmentality which they did so since the beginning of 19th 
century. Fatma Müge Cöcek and M. Sükrü Hanioglu have shown for instance that the use of 
statistics, in particular census, have started since 1831 despite the wide ignorance of such 
practices in Ottoman Empire. In 1885, Samuel Sullivan Cox, the United States representative 
suggested the sultan to make use of those methods. However, the Ottoman State had been 
conducting census decades ago, and as Cöcek and Hanioglu argue, it “adopted Western statistical 
knowledge to develop a modern state administration and at the same time, to control the 
emerging civil society” (106). 
Ottomanism, first attempt at a national identity for a centralized state in the Middle East, 
implemented Islam as one of its most important pillars. After that, Islam became one of the pillars 
of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism and some late trends of Turkish nationalism and Iranian 
nationalism for construction of modern national identities. However, the fundamental 
differences between the conception of collective body in premodern Islamic rule and its modern 
versions in (post)colonial era cannot be denied, even if the same word, Millet, is used in both 
times to signify that.  
 
53 The sick man of Europe started with designations of the Ottoman Empire, but didn’t end there. After Ottoman, 
many other European countries, including the United Kingdom and Germany was once being called the sick man. 




According to the aforementioned discussions, one cannot ignore the agency on the side of these 
“Eastern” nationalism and reduce it to a pure imitation out of ressentiment. On the other hand, 
the dynamics of reaction and imitation must as well not be ignored, particularly in the discourses 
and practices of its often-dictatorial States that took on themselves to “modernize” their 
countries and form their nations. Nationalism had an important role in these dynamics. It was a 
material means of resistance, from a Clauswitzian perspective, but also became a material means 
of inner-colonialism, when the established governments turned against the minorities in their 
regions, trying to impose a type of bonding that was non-existent prior to the modernization era. 
As Salem argues,  
Before the nineteenth century, politics in Arab-Islamic society was largely a matter of religion and 
dynasties. The political system ‘made political rather than cultural claims on the subjects. Loyalty 
to the sultan, payment of the tribute, and respect for peace and order were the main demands of 
the state, any infringement of which would incur its anger’. Increasingly intimidated by and 
impressed with the West, however, several Western influenced Arab and Turkish writers became 
convinced that national patriotism was the secret of Europe’s success. (31) 
Therefore, while nationalism(s) of the Western Europe and their political form of the nation-state 
emerged out of the collective struggles, its transmission and enactment in other territories had 
a more complex dynamics, resulting into different ideas and organizations of a national collective 
body. 
It is interesting how different nationalist sentiments and movements emerged in reaction to each 
other in the regions more to the East and which particular perspective of a nation became 
dominant in the following republics after that. Countries such as Greece and Turkey that have 
been mentioned in the research are among these cases. 
 
4.5.2.1 “The Successors”: From Greek Nationalism to a National Collective Body 
Herod Atticus Theater, an ancient theater build in 161 A.D., serves as the main venue of Athens 
Festival. It was renovated in 1950s, as part of a cultural heritage central to the idea of modern 




The paradox was that the guardians of Greek identity did not allow modern Greek pieces to be 
performed in Herod Atticus. In 1964, however, the Greek Tourist Organization organized a 
nation-wide contest for the best modern Greek play to be performed there and The Successor, 
out of 68 plays, won the competition. 
The Successors by Vangelis Katsanis was an adaptation of Oresteia trilogy, written in a highly 
lyrical prose, and therefore “served to assuage the conservative mentality of some Greek 
government officials, who, for years, served as the self-appointed watch-dogs of the sacredness 
of the Herod Atticus Theater… The gods of the old Greeks could rest at peace; their ears would 
not have been defiled by unfamiliar and unholy sounds.” (Valamvanos 31) But even this play 
could not make it to the stage of Herod Atticus Theater. Behind the failure of this drama lies a 
historical drama of failure. 
4.5.2.1.1 From Enlightened Individual to True Volk 
The observations of Vangelis Katsanis about The Successors points to the official and Statist idea 
of a Greek nation that put into play after the independence from Ottoman Empire. The Greek 
nationalism testifies to Anderson’s argument that the final product of nationalism was the Elite’s 
version of it. As Kitromilides explains, “the national awakening of modern Greeks was the work 
of a group of cosmopolitan Greek intellectuals. These men, infused with the culture of the 
Enlightenment, belonged sociologically to the cosmopolitan European intelligentsia of the 
eighteenth century” (The Dialectic of Intolerance 7). 
Like most other cases, the intellectual elite were usually based at those cities functioning as 
centers of commerce, as the roads of transferring ideas and goods were the same. The material 
basis of “the national awakening of modern Greeks” was provided by the wealth of an elite 
merchant class.  
The case of Greek nationalism brings forward a crucial question: was there a link between the 
colonial-ignorant cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and the particularism of romantic 
nationalism?  
As commentators argue, the transmission of the ideas of the Enlightenment into modern elite 




identity. According to Kitromilides, “neohellenic nationalism was the eventual product of the 
gradual opening up of the culture of Ottoman Greece to European intellectual and political 
influences in the course of the eighteenth century.” (6) 
Thus, it is not surprising that neohellenic nationalism was often based on the aforementioned 
old Eurocentrist Imperial feeling of cultural superiority over the Turks, or in general Muslims. The 
only difference between the initial liberal nationalism with the final official State version of it was 
in terms of inner governance. The old Ottoman Greek elite, centered around the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople, took the power and Ioannes Kapodistrias, the first elected president went on to 
exert dictatorial, non-democratic power. And his assassination led to a period of absolute 
Monarchy in the hand of foreigner Kings. Hence, the repetitive story of colonial nation-state 
construction. 
The imitation dynamics and its corresponding biopolitics plagues Greek nationalism, too. A 
transition happened: the proud neohellenic nationalism based on Enlightenment turned into a 
volk-constructing medical nationalism inspired by Romanticism.  
A new philosophical outlook made its appearance, beginning from a fundamental criticism and 
refutation of the eighteenth-century philosophy of liberal individualism. This was done in an Essay 
on the Philosophy of History published by Markos Renieris in 1841… Renieris stressed that the 
liberal individualism of eighteenth century philosophy was only a very partial truth inferior to the 
wisdom of social collectivities such as the people, the Volk, whom he considered as the repository 
of true values and true knowledge (Kitromilides 12). 
An imitation and a repetition of Herder’s equation, the national is the true. At the same time, 
those who were inspired by same ideas were wandering Europe and lamenting the loss of the 
Hellenic people and culture. Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer, a 19th century romantic historian and 
journalist, famously wrote: “the race of the Hellenes has been wiped out in Europe. Physical 
beauty, intellectual brilliance, innate harmony and simplicity, … even the name has disappeared 
from the surface of the Greek continent…not the slightest drop of undiluted Hellenic blood flows 
in the veins of Christian population and present-day Greece” (qtd. in Nikolopoulou 268). His 




intellectual brilliance, innate harmony and simplicity” for the lost superior Hellenic race are the 
literal translation of Eugeneics, coming from the “eugenia” – an ancient Greek term which means 
one is well-born. Antonio Negri considers eugenics as the metaphysical foundation of modern 
sovereignty, arche in its double meaning: “only those who are good and beautiful, eugenically 
pure, are entitled to command” (The Political Monster: Power and Naked Life 194). 
The state of the nation was thus dissatisfactory for those who wanted a pure Hellenic nation. The 
healing method came as shocks, as a series of coups started as early as 1909.  
The Successors, the play we started this chapter with, was deemed offensive in such a process of 
nation-making. The exclusionary purist idea of a collective national body was not ready to put its 
senses to test with a slightly modernized version of a mythical inheritance such as Oresteia 
trilogy, central to its identity. In the upward, hierarchical “impulsive organization” of this 
collective body, no interference with the prime impulse (the imagined superiority of a Hellenic 
nation) is to be tolerated.  
Only three years later, the right-wing colonels who made the coup in 1967 called their military 
takeover of the country “a revolution to save the nation”. To save the nation it was, with “the 
nation” taken as the pure ideal. The main figure of the junta, George Papadopoulos used to 
ornament his speeches with medical, grossly obvious biopolitical discourse. But even there, the 
romantic idea of a Hellenic nation, the main impulse, persists. 
We are in front of a patient who we have on a surgical bed, and who, should the surgeon 
not strap on the surgical bed during the operation and the anesthesia, there is a 
probability, rather than the surgery granting him the restoration of the health, to lead him 
to his death. [...] The restrictions are the strapping of the patient to the surgical bed so 
that he will undergo the surgery without danger. 
We have a patient. We have put him in a plaster cast. We are checking him to find out if 
he can walk without the plaster cast. We break the initial cast, potentially to replace it 
with a new one, where necessary. The referendum shall become a general overview of the 




one, we will put it to him. And the one thing I can promise you, is to invite you to witness 
the foot without a cast! 
Our obligations are described by both our religion and our history. Christ teaches concord 
and love. Our history demands faith in the Fatherland. [...] Hellas is being reborn, Hellas 
will accomplish great things, Hellas will live forever. (Mikedakis 79-83-84) 
The colonels crushed the resistance they faced, but they were the one who had to disappear in 
the coming decades of Greece. And the successors ultimately went on the stage. The national 
collective body of the Greece, the Greek nation, formed nonetheless in the process we described; 
and it was challenged and disrupted in the occupy movements that will be described later in the 
chapter. 
 
4.5.2.2 A Volk’s Renaissance in Iraq and Syria 
At the same time with the Greek war of independence from Ottoman Empire, Egyptians started 
a revolt under the leadership of Mustafa Pasha. Napoleon military campaign in Egypt injected 
modernization and corresponding institutions into Egypt. With an ultimate goal of forming an 
independent State, Pasha’s modernization project continued on those foundation, although with 
an arguably local approach in establishing juridical and governing institutions. The Egyptian who 
in this period were sent to France for education came back and theorized the nationalist 
movement. 
Rafi al-Tahtawi, a forerunner of pan-Arabic Egyptian nationalism studied in 1820s in France, and 
upon returning to his own “backward” nation, he put his forward plan based on progress and 
industrialization. “Let the fatherland be the site of our common happiness,” he wrote, “which we 
shall build with freedom, thought and factory” (qtd. in Salem 32). Factories were emerging in 
Pasha’s Egypt. Industrialization and cultural reforms focus on an official, unified language and a 
translation movement. Contemporary to these transformations, al-Tahtawi is considered the first 




Islamic term referring to all believers regardless of their ethnicity, was modernized by him, 
reducing the alleged Arab identity into an Egyptian one.  
The basic claim inherent in the idea of ummah as nation is that such Arab nationalism aims to 
establish a State for all Arab-speaking territories of the Ottoman, particularly the greater Syria. 
During the upheavals against Ottoman, Egypt concurred Syria from 1831 to 1844. The Egyptian 
rule and its legal and educational institutions inspired in turn a Pan-Arab Syrian nationalism that 
travelled to Iraq and finally, through Ba’ath movement, took the power in both countries (Salem).  
All these journeys of imitative nationalist modernizations forth and back between different post-
colonial Arab republics had a disastrous consequence for minorities in these countries. As Sadiki 
points out, “the cardinal sin of most newly independent states – namely, the new Arab republics 
– was to seek a demolition job on peripheral existence.” (Unruliness through Space and Time 6) 
During another Pan-Arab nationalist awakening a century later, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt 
entered into a United Arab Republic with Syria, based again on the idea of one volk, one state, 
one country. A cooperation with pan-Arab nationalist Ba’th movement in Syria, it failed shortly 
afterwards, and Assad’s Syrian Arab Republic emerged in the consequent events with a coup.  
These nationalist movements had a complex history in the coming decades until the present time. 
In the discussion on the nation-state and Modernity, we discussed the latest brutal project of 
nation-state making, the project of “the Islamic State”. It was noted that such a project was 
pursued by a ultra-right wing fundamentalist Jihadi group calling itself “the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria”, claiming authority over the mythical land of the Fertile Crescent, the Greater Levant. 
Extending from Iraq to Egypt, this area has been divided into different nation-states following the 
fall of Ottomans and the intervention of colonial powers in the first world war. The accidental 
and colonial nature of the Sykes-Picot imposed nation-state borders in the Middle East was then 
discussed.  
In such a historical context, a Lebanese Greek Orthodox became to influence another political 
system of Volk making in the middle east. Antun Sa’adah founded the Syrian Social National Party 
(SSNP) in 1932. A Nazi party, literally, that still exists in Syria and backing the blood-thirsty 




influence in the whole Levant, as it also claimed that a mythical Volk has been thriving in that 
geography.  
Antun Sa’adeh was inspired by German romanticism. His ideas were based on biological 
evolution. He claimed that a certain “Syrian race” has been formed in the particular geographical 
territory of the Fertile Crescent. Rather than religions or ethnicities, this particular geography, he 
believed, has given the Syrians a singular Volksgeist that is making a nation out of them. 
SSNP ideas did not remain on the margins. The Ba’ath movement practically shared such mythical 
visions of a national identity and finally took over both Syria and Iraq. 
Ba’ath literally means renaissance, a reawakening of a nation that lost its unity, homogeneity, 
authority and thus, identity. A prominent theorist of Ba’ath, Michel Aflaq writes of nation as an 
ideal, belonging to totality: “the nation is not a numerical sum, but an ‘idea’ embodied either in 
the total or in part of it. the leader … is not to appeal to a majority or to a consensus, but to 
opposition and enmity; he is the master of the singular idea from which he separates and casts 
aside all those who contradict it” (qtd. in Chirot). 
Aflaq’s nationalism exhibits similar ideas to the romantic version of the volk. Like any other 
modernist imitator, he also suffers from the tensions of two opposing forces: Occidentalism and 
longing for progress and industrialization, as well as Orientalism and the mystified desire for a 
unified Arab nation. We have seen that such dynamics results into a desire of “curing” the nation, 
purifying it into a more homogenous body (see Salem). 
Moreover, Aflaq’s insistence on spirituality, religion and affections marks another central 
element in romantic nationalism. Aflaq was critical of those Arab anti-colonial intellectuals who 
engaged themselves in “verbal investigations” for forming a liberated nation and losing “the force 
of nerve and the heat of emotion”. According to him, “‘nationalism is not science’, it is … a living 
remembrance.” (qtd. in Chirot) Not surprisingly, this perspective made both Ba’ath and SSNP the 
enemies of left-wing politics.  
The main difference between the Ba’ath and the left comes to the foreground when Aflaq 




Abbasid caliphate. Shu’ubiyah shares the same root as Sha’ab - a Quranic term for an entity 
bigger than tribe, close to nation. In Shu’ubiyah movements, non-Arab Muslims protested against 
inequality caused by the privileges of being Arab in the caliphate. Shu’ubiyah were muslims too, 
since all are but equal according to the holy text of Islam, independent of their Sha’ab. Such a 
struggle from a pan-Arab nationalist perspective meant only a move to divide the perfect 
hegemony of a collective body.  
Shu’ubiyah became one of the main derogatory terms in reference to minorities in Iraq and Syria. 
Sha’ab and Umma were appropriated as the keyword of Ba’athist pan-Arabic governments in 
Syria and Iraq. In these countries, Sha’ab as nation was the revolutionary part of the Arabic 
Umma, Saddam Hussein's last televised speech exhibits this supremacism coated in a theological 
rhetoric:   
History is rather the reservoir in which exist, and from whose depth we derive, the laws that 
elevate the nation to assume its great mission for humanity, having attained the sublime status 
of communication with Allah, as a nation of loving, chosen believers, who are confident and 
obedient to the commands of the Almighty; a nation conscious of its great mission of faith both 
nationally and on the level of humanity, which is extended from the essence of the tenets 
established throughout its eternal history and the wealth of values adorning the landmarks of 
distinction along its mission (printed in The Guardian). 
Although Umma was being used by Islamist nationalists (those who seek a national identity based 
on Islam) of some Muslim countries, it rarely became an official designation for a nation-state. In 
Iran, the word found its way into the constitution after the 1979 revolution against Pahlavi 
dynasty, but Millat became the official designation of national collective body and Umma 
remained to signify a vague global Muslim nation. In Turkey, the same divide exists.  
In Arab-speaking countries, Umma had the same significations as Iran and Turkey and ghomiya 
used as to signify the national. In nationalist discourse, sha’b became equal with the nation, but 
functioned as the closest translation-imagination of volk in Arabic political discourses as the 




State, as there should be no dissensus or antagonism, no gap or difference in the imagined 
collective body.  
Such a will to a perfect body accompanied as usual by medical, biopolitical discourses and 
genocidal military campaigns of purification. Ridda, an Islamic term signifying treason, reaction 
or conspiracy, started to use in reference to communists, opponents of pan-Arabism, political 
opposition and minorities, and became the main word around which a medical discourse took 
shape during Saddam Hussein's rule in Iraq. Saddam designated ridda as “the sickness of 
revolution” and promised to cure this “internal” problem by means of military action (Bengio).  
Kurds turned to be an early victim of Iraq and Syria nationalist governments. According to Human 
Rights Watch, “in 1962, an exceptional census stripped some 120,000 Syrian Kurds -- 20 percent 
of the Syrian Kurdish population -- of their Syrian citizenship … The number of stateless Kurds 
grew with time as descendants of those who lost citizenship in 1962 multiplied; as a result, their 
number is now estimated at 300,000” (Sherry). The census happened in Jazira, now a self-
governing autonomous Kurdish canton in northern Syria. After the census, its former Kurdish 
citizen registered under “foreigner” or “unregistered”. In 1965, Syrian government started to 
form a “Arab cordon” in the Jazira region by resettling Bedouin Arabs in that area. (Vanly 126) 
Kurds were given back their right to citizenship only in 2011, after the sovereign, faced with a 
widespread revolutionary movement, had no choice but to make concessions.  
Saddam also called the Kurdish movement a ridda and started a long, violent campaign of 
resettlement, ethnic cleansing and genocide in different periods in order to “protect” the Sha’b 
identity.  
There are the examples that clearly set the case for considering the internal colonial relation 
inside anti-colonial State nationalism(s), or as Ronit Lentin argues, the inherent settler-colonialist 
relation in the foundation of any nation-state. 
A familiar impulse dominated the organization of national collective bodies in the levant. One 
land, one identity, one nation. The purification processes to achieve this goal marked a 




following the suit was the Republic of Turkey. Another nation-state-making project that 
suppressed the Kurdish population in the pursuit of a perfect, healthy national collective body.  
 
4.5.2.3 The Happy Turk 
“Kurdish question” is the most controversial discussion in contemporary Turkish politics, as it was 
in the beginning of the Republic.  
Turkish national identity has been historically made through the exclusion of other ethnicities 
inside Republic’s territory. A genocide against Armenian happened when the seeds of the new 
Republic was being planted by the pan-Turkist movement. Indeed, the case of Turkish Republic 
witnesses to aforementioned Lentin’s theory of nation-state as an inherently settler-colonialist 
form.  
After the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, the nation building process of this single-party 
State – as an inevitable part of its “modernization” – started with a focus on “an ethno-nationalist 
ideology despite the multiethnic and multilingual composition of the country” (Dayan 1). The 
eugenic mystifications of the constituted power assumed the figure of a “happy Turk” as Ataturk 
famously put it, according to that a fully Turkified collective body had to be formed. Ismet Inonu, 
the second president of the Republic, explains this belief with a violence proper to it: 
We are frankly nationalist and nationalism is our only factor of cohesion. In the face of a 
Turkish majority, other elements have no kind of influence. Our duty is to turkify non-
Turks in the Turkish homeland no matter what happens. We will destroy those elements 
that oppose Turks or Turkism. (Inonu qtd.in Dayan 1) 
The oriental/occidental dynamics of imitation was directly visible in pan-Turkism discourse. The 
main thesis of early Turkish nationalism was the White, European origin of Turkish nation.  
Ataturk adopted this racial mythology as a core belief on the new Republic.  
In the early 1930s, historians, encouraged by Mustafa Kemal, linked pre-Islamic Turkish history 




of Turks as members of the ‘yellow race’, the Turkish history thesis claimed that the Turkish race 
is a member of the superior Caucasian race family.  
The medical and anatomical discourses functioned to justify this mythical superior race family. 
But they did not end there. A happy Turk was going to be constructed not only through the 
exclusion of unwanted non-Turks, but also by imposing cultural technics of body. As Kemal said, 
“[Turkish] bodies remained in the East while their thoughts inclined toward the West”. A body 
worthy of such thoughts had to be reshaped accordingly, getting rid of its “uncivilized” traits (qtd. 
in Dorsy 87).  
The first eugenic thoughts in Turkey was formulated by the Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP) members. CUP was founded by a group of medical students in Istanbul, 1889 and it 
transformed from a secret committee into a major ally of Young Turks in the coming decisive 
years. The nationalist physicists believed that progress could not be made without the biological 
improvement of society and “degenerate traits were hereditary and detrimental to social 
progress” (Alemdaroğlu). That improvement became a self-appointed task of a State that 
assessed the physical state of Turks was poor and it “arose from a century’s worth of ill care 
rather than lack of talent” which was supposedly inherent in their European lineage.  
After the declaration of the Republic, a full-fledged apparatus of eugenics set to function in the 
strategies of governmentality. encouragement for the physical training became part of the 
government policies in order to “lengthen and flatten the backs of the ill-shaped Turkish bodies”. 
The basic argument that the Turkish eugenicists employed was that human bodies were the 
principal and most profitable capital of a nation-state. Hence, human bodies should be sustained 
and managed to increase national wealth. In ‘The Essence of Eugenics in National Population 
Politics’, Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, a psychiatry professor and a prominent advocate of eugenics, 
claimed that insane and mentally retarded people were economic and hereditary burdens, and 
harmed a society’s order and peace (Alemdaroğlu). 
As it is mentioned earlier, states coming out of nationalist tendencies actively encouraged the 




collective body. An interesting story of a state-imposed performance on individual bodies could 
be seen in the laws regulating headwears in Turkey (Alemdaroğlu).  
Tanzimat era was not only about the reform of the political structure. The socio-political 
regulations on body movements and physical behavior started to appear, too, as the citizens of 
Ottoman had to mirror the ideal national identity. The headwears story started from there. In 
1829, Ottoman turban, a headwear based on cloth winding, was banned and fez, a close-fitting 
skull cap replaced it. Turban was mostly a symbol of the East, being used as a religious headwear 
by men and women alike. Fez had a more modernized look, although it owed its popularity to 
the Ottoman Empire. That is why after the announcement of the new Republic, fez was also 
banned in 1925. Mustafa Kemal articulated the reasons for such a ban when he once confronted 
a man in his audience wearing fez:  
I see a man in the crowd in front of me; he has a fez on his head, a green turban on the fez, a 
smock on his back and on the top of that, a jacket like the one I am wearing… Now, what kind of 
outfit is that? Would a civilized man put on this preposterous garb and go out to hold himself up 
for universal ridicule? (qtd in Yumul 349) 
“Universal ridicule” for a particularity that was deemed, by Kemal, not modern enough. The same 
reason that convinced him to ban Women’s hijab, another headwear symbolizing the always 
degraded Islamic East, with violent enforcement. The bodies, as Ataturk wished, had to be 
displaced to the West. 
This section presented the different collective bodies formed through context-specific 
performativizations and State’s imposed regulations. In the following, this question will be asked: 
how could these bodies be transgressed and transgressive, transformed and transformative? 
 
4.6 The Performative Disruption of the Encoded Organism 
 
To approach the process of transformation in collective bodies, it is helpful to continue with 




The entire process of the punishment in Kafka’s Colony, as we have witnessed, is the inscription 
of law on the convicted body. The inscribed code is the law that the man is violated, although it 
remains a code hard to be decoded for the foreign witness. 
But the action, as much as it is elaborately detailed and micro-managed, does not go as it is 
planned. The body’s contingency, its excess of blood, contaminate the clean functioning of the 
apparatus. The officer puts himself into the machine to prove its functionality only in order to 
face his ultimate demise, and the coming demise of his old regime penal colony.  
On one hand, it shows the resistance of the body against the capture and its evasiveness, even 
when it has been under fierce suppression. “The condemned man is laid out on his stomach on 
the cotton wool—naked, of course. There are straps for the hands here, for the feet here, and 
for the throat here, to tie him in securely. At the head of the Bed here, where the man, as I have 
mentioned, first lies face down, is this small protruding lump of felt, which can easily be adjusted 
so that it presses right into the man’s mouth.” And all this suffocating design fails by a simple 
bodily excess. “My machine’s as filthy as a pigsty.” 
For Peter Brooks, The Penal Colony tells a story of body’s defiance and the incompleteness of 
inscription and of coding. The totalitarian ideology of shaping and taming the body is doomed to 
fail:  
It is as if the promise of a body recovered for the law and for meaning by writing were untenable, 
false. To the extent that the writing project is imposed by a totalitarian ideology, one may see in 
the officer's untranscendent death an affirmation of the body's resistance to claims of correction, 
ennoblement, and conversion asserted upon it. (Brooks 285) 
Lyotard conceptualized heterogenous body as an incommensurable singularity, suggested the 
idea of a bodily mode of aesthesis, and considered “its quality as a surface receptive to sensation 
and affect, a receptivity heterogeneous and prior to the ordered rules and codings of inscription” 
– all in order to think of body prior to the law but not as natural:  
the body, rather than being deficient, is in fact in excess with regard to the law. It exceeds the law 




executes… the body is intractable, that is, unmanageable and uncontrollable; it is 'that which 
resists all law' because it remains non-totalizable, incommensurate to the law's realm (Curtis 254). 
There is a certain bodily movement that escapes the stasis of the prescribed organization (that is 
infinitely permanent by the authority of the law), and evades the discourse, or in general, the 
code of the everyday sign. Another performative disruption of the code, close to Lyotard’s figural 
that introduces heterogeneity and openness into the discursive. 
The most immediate imagination of an embodied bodily mode of aethesis, of what Lyotard 
considers as the body prior to the law, is the day-dreaming. The work of art has long been 
associated with day-dreaming and artists as dreamers.  
Daydreaming is interesting because it is not the presupposed passive state of sleeping, but an in-
between: rather than a state exclusive to the unconscious, it comes out of a surprise appearance 
of the unconscious. 
What escapes the dominant discourse also attacks its forged consistency. What has been made 
invisible haunts the realm of the visible. Daydreaming is the embodiment of an instance of such 
attacks and hauntings, when the code becomes defunct.  
When someone tells us that we are 'dreaming out loud', it means that something impulsive has 
shaken or upset the code of everyday signs: we have been surprised by our 'unconscious' 
(Klossowski, Vicious Circle 40) 
In the final section of previous chapter, we argued that how the performative relates to both 
incorporeal and corporeal transformations, to a dream-like state of change in the bodies. The 
introduction of the performative, as we discussed here, disrupts the stereotypical coding, based 
on the everyday signs. This is the disruption that we discussed in the chapter on the performative 
event, “an experience of rupture, an expressive excedence that is able to go beyond the Erlebnis” 
(Negri, Marx and Foucault: Essays). 
Klossowski calls this an attack on “the institutional level of gregariousness” that can bring about 




beyond the agent, that is, the individual” and “they are harmful to the purely defensive and 
gregarious impulses” (ibid 92). 
The choice of terminology, attack, invasion, and harm signifies that for Klossowski, 
transformation of a collective body and getting rid of the institutional coding is a violent process. 
He even founded his arguments on one of Nietzsche’s central pains, his migraine. Braidotti’s idea 
of a bios-zoe-technos body also calls for an opening toward the pain. Even the bodily mode of 
aesthesis, as Lyotard formulates it, seems to always appear in excessive situations of pain and 
torture like a penal colony, reminding Bataille’s analysis of a photograph depicting a Chinese 
prisoner’s torture.  
Pain is a problematic concept. How could one call for an opening toward the pain, when millions 
of people are actually in pain in war torn regions in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, or in 
refugee camps in the global south and the global north. But if we want to go beyond the pain, 
what is the violence in decoding the stereotypical, in becoming another body? Why does 
Klossowski, through Nietzsche, claim that “in the experimental domain to create is to do 
violence?” (VC, 129). 
Deleuze and Guattari see such a violence in the concept of “cruelty” in Artaud’s theatre of cruelty.  
Cruelty has nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violence that might be commissioned 
to explain the history of mankind; cruelty is the movement of culture that is realized in bodies and 
inscribed on them belaboring them ... This culture is not the movement of ideology: on the 
contrary, it forcibly injects production of desire, and conversely, it forcibly inserts desire into social 
production and reproduction. For even death, punishment, and torture desired, and are instances 
of production (compare the history of fatalism) (Anti-Oedipus 159).  
The violence or rather cruelty is then in the forceful injection of desire and its production in the 
socius. The deterritorializing force of desire, of the constituent power halts the dominant 
production on the socius, and as we discussed before, it starts with the alternative, creative 
production. And a patchwork body is born.  
The fatalism, or Nietzsche’s amor fati, is not simply a will to self-demise or self-destruction. It is 




condition. That is why it brings about a state of exception from the perspective of the state which 
attempts to conserve the status quo and justifies suppression with the discourse of security. But 
the insecurity is only an insecurity for what has been naturalized in order to be proved the sole 
possible reality. Another world is possible, the slogan we talked about before, is actually a 
production of the real, the working of the constituent power. As Klossowski write:  
Every creation of a new type must provoke a state of insecurity: creation ceases to be a game at 
the margins of reality; henceforth, the creator will not re-produce, but will itself produce the real 
(Vicious Circle 129). 
The halt, hiatus or rupture, whatever we name the effect of an event with, has a specific concept 
in Foucault’s terminology: desubjectification (dassujettissement).  
As it was discussed in detail before, the dominant subjectification (subject-formation or 
assujettissement) is what produces the government’s subjects for Foucault. It runs through the 
code of the everyday signs and the reproduction of stereotypes on the surface of bodies, and 
through preventing the performative processes of creating alternative simulacra. For Foucault, it 
was more aligned with “Rousseau's idealized image of virtuous citizens who rush to assemblies 
when called” (Arditi 41), the ideal of the nation. In contrast to that, Woodward et al tracks such 
a desubjectification in contemporary occupy protest movements, arguing that the subject is 
suspended in these performative events where “suspending in this context means the production 
of a ‘conditional withholding’, an interruption of what ‘subjects’ a situation to overcoding.” (The 
Politics of the Autonomous Space 213) 
According to our discussions till now, subjectification then means: 
● reproducing conscious agent through molar, dominant lines of subjectivity: citizen-
consumer-user; 
● reproducing the dominant image of body: closed, homogenous, digitized, and 
hierarchized body, or what we discussed as lcb; 
● reproducing the conventional image of life, and the biopower’s discourses around it: the 
trinity of soul-meat-pattern; 




So if assujettissement is the reproduction of dominant subjective molds, then dassujettissement 
signifies a break on that reproduction and paves way for the miraculous production, the creativity 
of the poor. This was a concept brought up by our discussion through Bataille, Blanchot and 
Klossowski, to whom the dissolution of the self, i.e. the hierarchy of the body, and therefore 
desubjectification plays the initial role (for more related discussions on this topic, c.f. the 
discussion on BwO).  
The disruption comes with a new experience, as I explained in the section about patchwork body; 
the experience of headlessness. In case of social movements, the master signifier that holds 
everything together with control, hierarchy and homogenization is eliminated and a whole virtual 
field of experiences start to occur. These experiences come about in the moments of high 
intensity (as Klossowski would call); moments of performative events that mark a turning point 
in a particular history.  
Talking about the contemporary protest movements, Benjamin Arditi argues that a radical 
democracy emerges in these movements, which he calls “liminal junctures”. Radical democracy 
for him is a politics of a different collective body, far from the theory of hegemony and as an 
alternative to the modern nation-state and its governmentality; a politics of non-representation. 
In liminal junctures, Arditi argues, are those singular points of history that “limits are confronted” 
(Post-hegemony). The confrontation with limits is where dassujettissement happens: a 
transgression of the limits, a socius slipping into a BwO. Foucault calls this a franchissement of 
borders. 
In Section “Limits and Transgression: the Performativization of Deterritorialization”, it was 
explained that transgression of limits is not simply a going to the other side of a limit. If the limit 
is defined as a region of diminishing forces, instead of a rigid contour, then transgression is 
working on the limits and taking a liminal position.  
In this chapter, this definition of limit was reformulated, through Nietzschean thinkers, for body: 
the limits of body are its capability of affecting and affect, and its closure, the body armor, should 
be viewed rather as a social mechanism. Therefore, body transforms after transgressing the limits 




in Nietzsche by becoming the experience of performative event, rendering all other experiences 
as gregarious, stereotypical reproduction of the already existing repressive phantasms on bodies: 
For Nietzsche, Bataille and Blanchot, experience has the function of wrenching the subject from 
itself, of seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or 
its dissolution (Foucault, Interview with Michel Foucault 141). 
This experience takes the body out of the imposed norms, and therefore creates an abnormal 
body according to the political, cultural and medical discourses that define the limits of normality. 
It is viewed as vice, temptation, evil and monstrous.  
The experience that Nietzsche and those French commentators of him conceptualized, disrupts 
the organization of the naturalized body, Therefore, the experience is a result of an 
experimentation, an openness toward the new. 
The term “Versucher”, which Nietzsche sometimes uses to refer to the experimenter, has 
another biblical connotation, tempter.  As Klossowski writes,  
every creator is at once someone who tempts others and who experiments on (tempts) himself 
and others in order to create something that does not yet exist: a set of forces capable of acting 
upon and modifying that which exists.(Vicious Circle 127) 
This reaffirms our two-sidedness argument about the body and its umwelt, the time-space that 
it is in: in order to change what exists, the body acts upon itself too. This is the violence and 
cruelty of the performative event: a violence “to what exists, and thus to the integrity of beings” 
(ibid 129).  
 
4.6.1 The Stateless Monsters Rallying on the Street? 
Bodily limits are, as we have explained before, much broader in the contemporary capitalism, 
especially in the global North where the forces of counter-culture have been actively recuperated 
since May 68 for the sake of capitalist progress. The rise of the far-right conservatism however 
calls for a re-institution of those limits, wishing for the comeback of disappeared collective bodies 




there is a small, yet highly advertised presence of LGBT stars in white supremacist scene, the 
majority of neo-fascists still violently promote the heteronormativity. Of course, color-lines are 
the strongest dominant phantasm that make them imagine an ethno-state, a state of pure 
national collective body. The underlying affectivity to these sentiments, however, could reach far 
more people through the country, with increasing public appearance of antisemitism, 
Islamophobia and other forms of racism and their systematic integration.  
The United States is the clearer case of such issue right now. As Jonas Staahl argues, this is an 
effect of neoliberalism that calls for an abolition of the state, all the while that promotes an 
outsourcing of the agency to a so-called “deep state”, consisting of private security firms and 
multinational corporations, rendering populations into homogenous difference-less mass of lcbs. 
Staahl argues that a whole apparatus of biopower, with high-tech surveillance and dataveillance 
methods, help create such a control (see To Make a World). The new apparatus superimposes 
itself on the nationalist discourse and all the biopolitical and medical nation-making processes 
that we have explained before become interwoven with the new governmentality.  
Such limits set for collective bodies by bio-coding them. But deterritorializing, decoding forces of 
radical performativity could sometime successfully transgress them in the Occupy Wall Street 
and would fail in other instances regarding some other issues. 
OWS had a diverse range of participants and presented a heterogenous collective body. It was 
not coded through the hyper-capitalist subjectification lines that is dominant in the context of 
the US, nor was it divided according to the systemic racial lines between the White and the non-
White that has arguably contributed a lot to the image of American identity and its corresponding 
American dream and thus phantasmatic subjectification. One other element of national identity, 
the glorification of labour, was almost absent as well too – one of the pillars of individualism that 
corresponds anybody’s wealth or poverty to the amount of labour s/he does: “if you are poor, 
you should work more”.   
That the collective body deterritorialized such national boundaries could be seen in its 
performativizations. The homeless, who are always labeled and even criminalized by the 




protestors actively. Their contribution and engagement witnessed to the non-hierarchical 
organization of the body, and the transformations in the social relation, meaning the destruction 
of the function of the code. The protestors started to learn the ways of living in open and 
sustaining in the cold weather from the homeless. Homeless performativity of everyday life now 
came to rescue the bodies that were trained under the protection of the system (see Writers for 
the 99%).  
An openness toward the socially designated monstrous as the lowest predefined social status 
transforms the collective body and increases its power of living. One other case was the Body 
language in the moderation of general assemblies, that proved to be the only way for a 
sustainable discussion in big groups. These hand signals for communication en masse (twinkling) 
originated in American Sign Language (ibid 28); another contribution from another marginalized 
social group with so-called disabilities in hearing and talking.  
The bodies involved in creating a common in their protests, caring for each other, sharing food 
and space, giving free food to everybody present. In the beginning, people were joining to the 
first smaller group who attempted the occupation because, as one activist explains, it kept a 
distance from "traditional way" of doing politics: “many people felt a sense of community, it came 
from the movement's atypical format” (ibid 9). This had a long-lasting consequence as one other 
activist thinks, transforming the traditional representative bodies such as unions that “even in 
the sixties it didn't happen”. (ibid 58) 
But at the same time, after the tent city established, the reproduction of the everyday signs began 
partly. One cannot ignore the racial divide between the White and the Non-white that is 
recounted by many participants. “Almost everyone I talked to concurred that racial disparities 
were important for Occupy to address”, writes one activist. The other describes OWS as a “white 
organizing culture,” where “the consensus model pushed people of color away.” Even the initial 
planning was done mostly by white men and women (ibid 15) and those who were taking the 
floor in GAs remained stubbornly white and male (ibid 30). 
After a certain time, the labour culture prevailed again and it hit first the one its always targets 




and do not participate actively in protests, so they should not get free food. And in final days, 
homeless were excluded from the food rations. As one other activist remembers, “socio-
economic divides in the park became evident around hygiene issues. middle class more educated 
occupiers tended to have friends with apartments not far away. ... more polite and respectful 
occupiers were sent to homes of volunteers. … mentally organized people with cultural capital 
thus had a good chance at getting clean” (ibid 65) 
Nonetheless, an important point was that these issues were not going on unnoticed. The 
heterogeneity of the movement made it possible to critique and transform it from within, as it 
was not a static or established organization of bodies, but an ongoing experimentation with the 
problem of linkage and machinic connections. That is why the people of color started to organize 
the POC working group in the tent city 
the POC purpose is to keep the movement accountable, to keep these white progressive activists 
accountable, to have them understand if they know feel the pinch and the burn....it doesn't mean 
that people’s worlds haven't been in turmoil for decades, for centuries”. (ibid 112) 
They even started to give advice to Occupy Philadelphia and Occupy Boston as they had both the 
same problems in terms of race. The POC working group then organized an occupy Brooklyn, a 
black-dominated neighborhood that was being invaded with the gentrification processes (ibid 
117). 
These divides appeared in many Occupy movements: a low participation of Kurdish population 
in Gezi or immigrants in European Occupy movements have been noted by their activists, too. 
Again, not left unaddressed as we have described in our examples. 
In many countries to the East, the disciplining bodily limits stay clear and harsh. Abnormality is 
suppressed viciously and the dividing lines of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality and class 
are rigid and any violation of the modern discourses on health is seen as perversion or sickness.  
Religions are often instrumentalized for safe-guarding such limits. As it was discussed before, the 
limits on bodily excesses and overflows have been established through historical processes tied 




ancient order, while extending the court ethics, the ethics of those born well to rule, throughout 
the society with medical, moral, and eugenical discourses and practices.  
In Egypt, Yasmin Moll calls such moral codes as Akhlaaq, the Arabic for ethics, which she argues 
that “emerges … as a key site for constructing normative notions of citizenship and civic 
participation in a way that privileges the idea of ‘productivity’ as essential to the constitution of 
the New Egypt. Within such discourse, the formation of a proper religious interiority becomes 
central to the project of national systemic reform.” (Building the New Egypt) Like the American 
articulation of religious puritanism and glorification of labour, Egypt has as well connected the 
Islamic sunny orthodoxy with nationalist aspirations for development and practice, and Islamic 
codes beside traditional codes function as a way to organize the collective body and channel the 
impulsive forces of bodily desire into production. 
Within this discursive universe, individual citizens are morally responsible for economically 
improving both their own lives and the lives of others through their own efforts, rather than 
through holding the nation-state accountable to its own developmentalist rhetoric (ibid). 
These imposed borders of daily performance were being challenged by the monstrous alliance 
on Tahrir. The main-stream narratives tried to capture the collective body there through binary 
oppositions such as pro/anti-Mubarak, pro-democracy/pro-regime, pro-stability/pro-revolution. 
But it was not fitting the people there, as many Egyptians from all classes and backgrounds 
“whose political stances don’t fit neatly into one or the other of these categories” were present 
in the movement. The Muslims, Christians, Jewish people, communists and liberals joined hand 
in Tahrir and tried to imagine another sociality possible between themselves.  
However, the details show that it was not an entire open collectivity again, but a site of conflicting 
forces, a place that challenging the normativity and sovereign authoritarian coding of bodies 
could happen. 
One of the main problematic issues of Tahrir was the participation of women. Young women 
were in Tahrir as in many other Occupy movements, but eventually, they confronted what Paul 
Masson calls “an obvious and predictable backlash: and sexual assaults in Tahrir Square and in 




However, to see the real transformation, one should go back to that Akhlaaq and its functioning 
in contemporary Egyptian society. Mole, herself a young woman director recalls how she was 
told that “from an “Islamic” perspective – I, a Muslim woman, shouldn’t be going to such public, 
and potentially dangerous, demonstrations as this was rather the duty of Muslim men” 
(Conversation on the Egyptian Revolution). And she resisted such coding, deviated from the 
natural, which seems monstrous from the patriarchal point of view of the system.  
I could use the footage I was capturing to intervene in what has been for far too long a dominant 
narrative about women living in Muslim societies. I wanted to say something –something quite 
simple really – about women and their participation in the revolution and I felt the best way to 
do this would be through the very medium that galvanized many of these women to take to the 
streets in the first place – moving images (ibid). 
This is change in the narrative about Muslim women, a narrative that has a global currency to the 
point that the current President of the United States used it against a Muslim mother of a fallen 
American soldier. The artivist says that her video even changed these assumptions, as the viewers 
of her online documentation of women repertoire in Tahrir would told her that “the video made 
them rethink their assumptions about the types of actions possible for veiled Muslim women, 
and so on.” (ibid) 
In theocratic states, religion becomes a tool for governmentality. It is an instrument in making 
national collective bodies, through the perspectives that we have explained before. During the 
performative events, however, religion also becomes a field of affectivity that can be tapped by 
happy affects, putting religious people from different religions as well as non-religious activists 
in the same patchwork body. 
In Turkey for example, the Gezi protests saw the Anti-capitalist Muslims initiatives as we 
explained. As Muslims, they protested against a government that has been criticized as being 
Islamist. The many activists that I have interviewed, however, point to a different historical fact.  
On one hand, the two mostly allied opposition against the suppressive and discriminatory policies 
of the modern Turkish republic were the suppressed Muslims and the leftists who included many 




toward the former colonial power, and capitalism in general. With the rise of tensions and 
protests, a series of coup attempted to suffocate the attempts for reforms and revolutions. As 
Giorgio Agamben argues, the modern (economic) paradigm of governmentality retains the 
original meaning of kybernes, that a good captain is the one who sails through the tempest, and 
therefore, governmentality becomes managing the crises instead of preventing them, governing 
the effects instead of causes (From the State of Control to a Praxis of Destituent Power). This 
profit-based liberal-economic perspective has been intensified to the point that today “to govern 
means to make a continuous series of small coups d’état” (ibid 22). This was clearly a case for 
Turkey since 1970s and has extended until now. The last failed coup attempt was in July 2016, 
three years after the Gezi protests.  
The military government after the important 1980s coup started the management of Islam as a 
tool for governmentality. When Recep Tayyib Erdogan rose to power, he intensified the 
neoliberalization of the economy, adopted an unprecedented open border policy for imported 
goods and services. And he of course used Islam as a tool for constructing a national collective 
body proper to his own agenda, in order to seize a limitless power. “Justice and Development”, 
the ruling party’s discourse seems to present a synthesis of seemingly contradictory identities, 
Ataturkism and Ottomanism: a synthesis of Republican national identity, based on the exclusion 
of Kurdish, Armenian and Alawite population, and Ottoman national identity, based on Islamic 
identity. It also includes one share element between those two poles: the discursive anti-western 
attitude, while “imitating” Western models of governmentality. And it has developed its own 
particular biocode in a country that immaterial, performative and feminized labor in the service 
industry is increasingly exploited.  
In Gezi, however, such a synthesis of Ataturkism and Ottomanism seemed defunct. The code 
stopped functioning and the people blurred the hierarchical lines of division that the imagined 
national identity imposed on collective bodies. The Muslims had an important presence which 
makes a clear point about those discourses that tried to solely see the Gezi movement as a 





the participation of working-class people, practicing Muslims, and ethnic and religious 
minorities belies any simplistic attempt to characterize this movement as a simple 
reiteration of existing divisions between secular and religious, urban and rural, Turkish 
and non-Turkish, and so forth (Is Everywhere Taksim?). 
It was a moment of desubjectification: the citizens of a certain nation-state showed that they do 
not will and they are not the imagined nation of any dominant discourse in the country, secular 
or not. The return of the difference and the process of deterritorialization made such an intense 
affectivity that the collective body was heterogenous in all aspects and levels. 
In the most molar perspective, from city to city and neighborhood to neighborhood, the 
aesthetics and the content of the protests were different. Slogans, language and the symbols 
varied as the dominant phantasm of a certain context could be anarchist, leftist, nationalist, 
secularist, Kurdish, Alawite or Armenian (ibid).  
In a molecular level, each collective body present in any site of the protest was also 
heterogenous. This is how the Revolutionary Muslims explain this fact to Erdogan as he tries to 
paint the protest as anti-Islam: 
Some news for the Prime Minister and his collaborators who try to reduce the resistance to a 
particular [secularist] political group and in so doing sow the seeds of polarization among us: 
1. It was the atheists who formed a human blockade around those praying in the [Taksim] 
Square. 
2. It was the soccer fans of Galatasaray who resisted the police attempts to detain the 
fans of Fenerbahçe. 
3. Socialist victory arks and nationalist “grey wolf” hand gestures54 were in the same 
square yesterday 
4. The leftists and veiled women were in the same square yesterday 
 
54 We discussed before the problem of right-wing extremism presence in occupy movements. It is very troubling in 
the case of Turkey, where grey wolves are now involved in a campaign of anti-Kurdish war in the Kurdish areas. For 




This is called resistance. This is called solidarity. Against fascism the people are one heart55. 
The gender lines and the ethnic limit in the collective body were also surpassed. As two other 
Turkish scholar explains, “the protests were the embodiment of an unexpected ‘we’ emerging 
from bodily presence, but not controlled, mastered, fully grasped by any of society’s conventional 
identities or ideologies”. For them, the gender resistance provided a clear example of such an 
unexpected ‘we’.  
2013 LGBTT Pride March in Istanbul presented an unprecedented show of solidarity between all 
fractions of the Gezi movement with their queer comrades. “We exist” became an important 
slogan for queer protestors, as the pure bodily presence of the excluded elements from the 
naturalized collective body inside the protesting collective body established that unexpected 
“we” through what Butler would call a “collective thereness”. Their refusal of being rendered 
mute and invisible is their performative rebellion against the constructed consciousness and the 
regime of words and light – as a banner in that march shouted “gays exist! Kurds exist!”. (ibid) 
“We exist” becomes a bodily sign, rather than a sentence saying the evident. Otherwise, there is 
no way to escape calling a slogan of “we exist” absurd.  
Erdogan and all other political leaders use “we” in their speeches two. But similar to the 
aforementioned difference between people and “People”, there is a clear line – the line of the 
statis56 – between the we consisting of such a heterogenous body and a we that refers to an 
imagined homogenous body. Although not homogeneous, the former is an attempt to make 
equality in terms of power between different positions of expression, instead of instituting – 
through representation – hierarchical positions of expression. The latter is an attempt to make 
homogeneity through dividing the body with imposing lines of identity and establishing a 
hierarchy of power. The move from the latter to the former necessitates that rupture, that 
experimentation and as it is not aiming to make unity out of homogeneity, a Turkish activist calls 
it convergence: 
 
55 Revolutionary Muslims' communique 




Nobody, none of us has become purified in Gezi. But something happened, beyond telling and 
understanding. Something that have never happened before and that would have never 
happened, we thought. What happened in Gezi was convergence (Halavut qtd. in Canlı and Umul 
19). 
With the appearance of such a transgressive collective body, Erdogan’s government started to 
degrade the protestors, labelling them terrorists, vandals, troublemakers, lawbreakers57. From 
the perspective of the state, however, the experimenter is evil, and to continue with Nietzsche, 
“whenever he sketches the experimenter philosopher, he always casts a glance on the monstrous 
aspect of these characters” (Klossowski, Vicious Circle 128). 
Foucault uses the abnormal to refer to those bodies that could not be totally reconciled through 
the coding process. He also explains that such subjects, as we will see, have been called 
monstrous. The arche of the modern governmentality was argued to be the well-born and it is 
not surprising that political philosophers of 19th century got interested into medical discourses 
about human body. In the beginning of 20th century, when the term biopolitics first entered the 
Western discourses, it was in the context of organistic and vitalistic theories of the state, as we 
discussed before, and they define state in terms of a living being with its proper collective body 
(Volk, nation, people).  
Against this arche, many contemporary political philosophers as well as artists summons the 
monster. The monster is the generic name that specifies the alternative collective body which 
can present the alternative.  
The monster wanders in the dream and in the imaginary of folly: he is a nightmare for those who 
are “beautiful and good”: it can exist only as catastrophic destiny that must be atoned, or as divine 
event (Negri, The Political Monster 194). 
The monster is the patchwork body, the body of a performative event, or else, a catastrophic 
destiny of the alt-right and white supremacism or other right-wing extremism, Islamic or non-
 





Islamic. Staahl formulates this situation in terms of two forms of statelessness as the two aspects 
of contemporary “reality of globalism”. The first one the so-called alt-right: 
the rise of ultranationalism, which ultimately manifests itself in political structures outside of 
public control … the disappearance of the state altogether, and its replacement by power 
structures that do not recognize any form of democratic control by the very people these 
structures affect. Nor do these structures restrict themselves to what used to be known as 
national borders (Staal, To Make a World). 
But at the same time, there are alternative monstrosity, a heterogenous body affirmative of 
difference, has been rising in different forms around the globe: 
the resurfacing of stateless internationalism, a political struggle that attempts to redefine 
a common culture beyond territorial and ethnic demarcations (ibid).  
It is such a monster that becomes a subject of fascination for many radical artists and thinkers. 
The history of the name shows the reason. 
 
4.6.2 The Monstrous Threat against the Natural-Identical 
The monster could be a Leviathan, the one that announced “everything under heaven belongs to 
me” (Job 41: 11), that declared the natural common (earth, air, water, everything under heaven) 
as its property, and that was summoned to fill the mythical foundations of the modern Nation-
State and its era of public/private dichotomy. Or else, could it be the monstrous witches who 
were often revealed, not surprisingly, during the peasant revolts against the nascent bourgeois 
State – opposing its appropriation of common lands – and had been hunted down, burned and 
crashed in the aftermath (Linebaugh and Rediker 52)? Or is it another Caliban, subjugated to its 
ultimate civilized colonial Master, rejecting him only in order to learn in the hard way that 
colonialism is for its own good? The skeptic may also ask about the monstrous body and “what it 
can do”: is it an organism with one or several heads, homogenous but divided, an oedipal 
“Frankenstein” which is only capable of resentiment against the Father, or an “Acéphale”, 




the imposture of the individual”, a community “distinct from the community of blood, earth, and 
interests” (qtd.in Kendall 138)? The word monstrous signifies the serious acts of crime, or 
perceived “huge threats” against society58. 
In his second book of Physics, Aristotle defines the monster (τέρας, teras) as a mistake in or a 
deviance from Nature, such as the malformed new-born babies or hybrid animals with human 
bodies and animal heads.  
Since the so-called “natural” was also the measure of the political and the social in ancient Greek, 
teras was nonetheless not, even in Aristotle, limited to the mythical and biological phenomena. 
For example, when Aristotle writes that “anyone who does not take after his parents is really in 
a way a monstrosity [teras], since in these cases Nature has in a way strayed from the generic 
type” (Aristotle, qtd.in Biles 163), he relates the idea of the natural to a social phenomenon, i.e. 
the familial relation, and thus who does not obey the natural rule of familial hierarchy would be 
considered a monster. In any case, monstrosity is a transgression of the natural limits.  
The word “τέρας refers firstly to a wondrous and therefore terrifying omen of a future event, 
sent by gods and needing interpretation” (Mollendorf 94). Teras means sign, but mostly, a sign 
of threat that contains a divine power in itself. Etymologically, teras comes from the proto-Indo-
European *kʷer- (to do, to build, and to make) which keeps its form in the Indo-Iranian word kār 
 .”meaning “work”) and its Proto-Balto-Slavic derivation, čȃrъ, refers to “charm, and magic ,کار)
The Latin counterpart to teras, monstrum, shares the important meanings of the Greek term, as 
it comes from the same root with the verb “to demonstrate” and the noun “demonstration”. 
However, the signifying meaning of the monster has a particular nature: it signifies itself, the 
warning of a threat to the so-called humanity, by its pure presence. It does not need to even do 
something: its mere apparition, like the divine, is its action, turning a situation into an inhuman 
 
58 During the cold war, communists were often depicted as imaginal monsters, usually coming from the outer space, 
to destroy the “human civilization” (meaning the United States). As if Joe Hill knew the mentality of future, when he 
wrote in his last letter one day before his execution, that “the following day he expected to take a trip to Mars during 





one; simply because monstrosity is first of all refers itself to the potentia, the pure potentiality of 
building and making (*kʷer-). 
Ifrit (ِعفریت), the name for supernatural monsters in Arabic, reveals the same abstraction-technic 
in the face of monsters. The word comes from Iferr (ِّعِفر), “strong and huge” or “malicious evil”, 
and simultaneously from afar (ر
َ
 soil, dust, or to disperse like dust”. On the other hand, it“ ,(َعف
comes etymologically from the Middle Persian āfrīt (آفریدن) which means “creation”. Thus, ifrit is 
not only very strong, but also as volatile and fleeting as dust, while these characteristics belong 
to its creative power (or one might say potentia again). According to Islamic mythologies, it is also 
said that ifrit is made out of fire (or smoke), and in its rare appearance in Qur’an testifies to its 
evasion of being fully known. In Surat An-Naml (27:39-40), an ifrit promises “King Solomon” to 
bring him “the Queen of Sheba’s thrown” in an instance: “I will bring it to you before you rise 
from your place, and indeed, I am for this [task] strong and trustworthy." The last clause, which 
begins with indeed, a rough translation for “ 
 ennī) that functions as an emphasis, reveals that) ”ان ّ
nobody, even a messenger of God himself such as Solomon – who, according to Qur’an, knows 
everything in the world, even the language of non-human creatures – could know an ifrit 
completely, or could predict its actions. That is why the ifrit itself has to emphasize that it can be 
trusted. Even the divine knowledge does not know what a monstrous body can do. Monster 
challanges the transcendent.  
Monster is a category of the living, separated from human-being. It always situates itself in-
between of the human and the animal; that is why numerous monsters are animal-human 
hybrids or some animals have been called monsters, when threatening the humans. For instance, 
international community started a world-wide program against Malaria mosquito in 1960s, in 
which the little insect was characterized as “the most tormenting, the most persevering, savage, 
vicious little monster on the face of the earth” and the program itself as “a clash between 
humanity and mosquitoes” (Shaw, Jones III and Butterworth 261). This in-between-ness of the 
monstrous made it difficult for human being to be able to identify it, to place it in the 
epistemological functions of similarity and comparison in natural sciences, and to categorize it 




originally from such abstract meanings, and only after that they could refer to “natural” 
manifestations of the denaturing monstrosity.  
The monster is a general name for the body that is not naturalized; or rather, it resists the 
naturalization and its bio-code. Such a monstrosity has been seen on many sites of protests; not 
only because protesters are seen as monstrous from the perspective of system, but also because 
they affirm their monstrosity. The affirmative monster will be explained in the next chapter, but 
an example from the occupy movements will make this more understandable.  
How do these bodies challenge the natural collective body, i.e. nation, in themselves? If the 
conventional image of thought, that we discussed through Thacker, centers around the trinity of 
meat-soul-pattern, the monster is a body of what he calls the contemporary biophilosophy. 
Instead of a trinity, it is the immanence of flesh, its impulsive forces and the power of affective 
relationality, as it resists and dismantles the vertical organization of body. 
All the above discussed etymological reverberations of the monster, from transgressing the 
natural limits to its potency and non-identifiability, but also its unintelligible body, are 
interestingly intermingled in a modern Arabic-Persian noun: hayulā (هیوال, “monster”). 
Translating the Aristotelian concepts, the early Muslim philosophers arabified the word “hyle” 
(ὕλη, “prime matter”) into hayulā or to be more exact, al-hayulā al-o’la ( الهیویل االویل, هیوالی اویل, 
“the first or the prime hayulā”. According to Aristotle, hyle is the primordial matter, serving as 
the raw and unformed material of, and consequently the underlying cause of, all objects. From 
this perspective, hyle is pure potentiality, which can act itself or be acted upon in order to acquire 
a form, to be actualized. Hyle as pure potentiality is strictly distinct from form as pure actuality, 
but their composite constructs the identifiable and knowable substance.  
The function of hyle in Aristotle’s thought is however not clear. It could be a non-substantial 
element, as it has no characteristics or qualities; for form is the essence determining the actuality, 
which is always a unique essence for a certain moment, while potentiality (of matter) is multiple 
in itself, and makes the change and alteration – the movement foreign to heavenly bodies – of 
earthly objects possible. Thus, matter and its potentialities signify imperfection for Aristotle. That 




Form, in which no potentiality could harm the perfection (see Nash 20; Castoriadis 333). The God 
is “something which moves without being moved; something eternal which is both substance 
and actuality” (Aristotle, Metaphysics XII 1072a), a “thought thinking itself” (qtd.in Castoriadis 
333).  
Hyle could also be a passive raw matter, when one considers that its Latin counterpart, “materia”, 
which “is originally another metaphor, having its literal meaning not in handicraft but in the 
supposedly passive role of the mother (mater) in conception” (Liedman 129). It is also argued 
that “Aristotle has the tendency to call hyle ‘sperma’ and to ascribe a certain activity to the 
female” (Long 179).  
In the Arabic and Farsi translations of Aristotle’s thought, particularly in the contributions by Ibn-
Sīnā (ابن سینا, “Avicenna” in Latin), hyle in the form of hayulā became more determined as a 
concept. In Islamic philosophy, hayulā as matter is categerozied into first, the Prime (or first) 
hayulā as Aristotelian hyle, the formless matter which is the pure potentiality to acquire a form, 
then secondary hayulā, which refers to an already formed matter with the possibility to change 
its form, and it goes on even to the tertiary and quaternary types of hayulā. In particular, Ibn-Sīnā 
considers prime hayulā as a substance alongside with the Body, the Form, the Soul, and the 
Intellect (see Rezai and Hedayat-Afza 115, Richardson 44, 68, 87). The natural body is thus a 
composite of prime hayulā with the form, from which the latter is the extensive element of a 
body, constitutive of its continuity. Ibn-Sīnā writes: 
You found out that body enjoys a massive continuous magnitude, and sometimes division and 
discreteness occurs to it. You know that a thing which is in itself continuous will be different from 
a thing which accepts both continuity and discreteness, and has both as its attributes. Therefore, 
the potentiality receptive of these two attributes is apart from the actual continuity and its form; 
and that potentiality receptive of both continuity and discreteness is not the same with ‘the 
continuous’ which will be destroyed by discreteness and gives way to the emergence of a new 
thing, nor is it such a thing that will be restored, if that continuity returns (Ibn-Sīnā 57 qtd.in Rezai 
and Hedayat-Afza 119). 
This argument serves to demonstrate the existence of hayulā, in which the continuous is the 




formed (or deformed). The alleged continuity and extension of body, and its contradictory 
relation with discreteness, remains unproved in Ibn-Sīnā’s philosophy. But we know that for the 
ancient Greeks, as Peter von Mollendorf claims, humans who are separated from their original 
halves are monsters, are “made deficient ‘dividuals’ out of real ‘individuals’” (Mollendorf 94). 
Trying to reject the existence of prime hayulā, however, “Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi”, another 
Muslim philosopher, points to the fallacy in Ibn-Sīnā’s argument by saying that  
continuity is not receptive of discreteness’ is true only if the intended continuity is a continuity 
between two bodies. But if the intended continuity is indeed the magnitude, such a claim is not 
acceptable; because using the term ‘continuity’ instead of ‘magnitude’ brings about the fallacy of 
using related term instead of each other, and thus, it is mis-thought that the intended continuity 
in a single body amounts to the continuity which perishes through discreteness (Suhrawardi 75 
qtd.in Rezai and Hedayat-Afza). 
According to Suhrawardi, thus, the connection between prime hayulā and its form as an external 
continuity, as its essence, does not prove itself to be necessary. Although he rejects prime hayulā 
for the same reason , one might take the inverse direction, trying to see hayulā under this new 
light. When the link between the potentiality (hayulā) and actuality (form) is broken, hayulā 
becomes the pure potentiality, the “potentiality to not-be” as Giorgio Agamben puts it.  
If a potentiality to not-be originally belongs to all potentiality, then there is truly potentiality only 
where the potentiality to not-be does not lag behind actuality but passes folly into it as such. This 
does nor mean that it disappears in actuality; on the contrary, it preserves itself as such in 
actuality. What is truly potential is thus what has exhausted all its impotentiality in bringing it 
wholly into the act as such (Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy 183) . 
Therefore, the prime hayulā embodies the potentiality to not-be, since it is a primordial matter 
that challenges the position of God as pure Actuality, and does not have or necessitate any 
natural form or essence. Hayulā is thus against any essentialism, refuses from the pre-existing 
natural forms, and for this very reason, it does not let itself be rigidified or identified. Moreover, 




like the monster that demonstrates itself by its mere apparition. So it should not be surprising 
that hayulā have become throughout its history in Farsi language a synonym for monster. 
Considering this ontic link between pure potentiality and monstrosity, a critique of Agamben 
seems legitimate. Agamben still situates being as actuality in contrast to the potentiality to not-
be as the act of creation, or better as separated with “a Nothing alone” (Potentialities 247) from 
this act. From this point of view, the relation between potentiality and actuality is either 
mediated by the possible or by its lack. But the monster-hayulā, as Foucault has asserted, belongs 
to the realm of the impossible (Abnormal 56), or rather to a zone of non-identifiablity which is 
indifferent toward the possible: a monster could be, by definition, a logically impossible wolfman, 
or a logically possible queer activist collective. Accordingly, if one wants to approach the 
impossible monstrosity, one should replace Agamben’s ontology with an ontogenesis. Hayulā 
then appears as the unique Spinozian substance according to which the divine (God or the 
transcendent) becomes immanent in relation to Nature. Substantial hayulā presents itself as an 
open, heterogeneous Whole that qualitatively differs in and from itself, and generates a 
qualitative multiplicity. On the other hand, these virtual processes of differentiation and 
individuation may result, but not necessarily, into quantitative differences: a contingent passage 
from the realm of non-representation and difference in nature to that of representation and 
difference in degree. 
One might now ask about the materiality of the affirmative monstrous as the constituent power, 
extending our being. Commenting on the notion of hyle, Howard Robinson (2014) writes that 
“‘Matter’ [hayulā] is rather the name for whatever […]. Relative to the human body, matter is 
flesh and blood.” To translate this hint into our conceptualization of monster, blood must be 
removed from the formula, for it has served historically as an essentialist ground – with the 
exception of its function in the case of vampirish monsters, where it is taken regardless of gender 
or race. Hence, remembering our discussion on biophilosophy, the flesh is the prime matter, the 
materiality of hayulā-monster, or the Element of being. 
For monster always resides at the limit, at the threshold, at “the cutting edge of 




monster, could only be flesh, the prime Matter, al-hayulā al-o’la. Hence, the tautology of the 
monstrous, as Foucault (Abnormal 57) puts it: monster is monster; monster demonstrates.  
In the poetics of flesh, where flesh is seen Elemental and common, there will be no 
anthropomorphic hierarchy: in David Cronenberg’s movie, “The Fly”, fly and human flesh’s 
potencies can only be assessed after they are machinicly connected to each other, intensifying 
their forces of deterritorialization, and crossbreeding monsters. Flesh is the self-differentiating 
continuum of being, heterogeneous, flowing, and plastic. As an Element of being, it is constituent. 
Flesh incarnates the potentia. Therefore, the only monster proper for this formulation is the 
creative monster, the joyful schizo in the process of becoming-schizophrenic; one of those 
Mosley’s hopeful monsters, “born perhaps slightly before their time; when it's not known if the 
environment is quite ready for them” (Hopeful Monsters 71). 
Fly, mosquito and many other insects have been projected as monsters by humans in different 
forms. Cockroaches join them in being targeted in an interspecies war as monsters. But one 
collective body, a group of humans in Greece, was becoming cockroach through the 
transformative power of the occupation movement.  
Cockroaches are resilient, as much as being the sole survivors of a possible nuclear war, dying 
out of hunger if their head is to be cut, or resisting cyanide more than any other animal. They are 
said to have an elaborate social structure, social behaviors and collective decision-making. They 
are fast, they can appear and disappear in a second, they swarm without having leaders.  
These are the characteristics that made cockroach “the face of the monster” (Tsianos 228) in 
Athens 2011. The parliament had to vote for adopting a life changing austerity policy, which they 
did, and the people came out to protest the law, just prior to the parliament session. They 
occupied two neighboring squares in the city center close to the parliament for several months, 
and chanting “we won’t go away before they do!”. The session was hold because the riot police 
used excessively tear gas on the protestors. But the protests continued. As two Greek activist-
scholar describe:  
Since yesterday, June 28, we live like cockroaches in Syntagma square. We are sprayed 




persist. We leave Syntagma square for a while to catch our breath and keep on coming back. We 
rest a bit and return to the square (Kambouri and Hatzopoulos). 
Becoming cockroach becomes a tactic of occupation that challenges established taxonomies, 
they argue:  
As we are becoming cockroaches we begin, without really realizing it, to adopt tactics of stasis, of 
perseverance and endurance, that were previously unknown to us. Chemicals keep on flying, 
sound bombs keep on exploding all around us making terrible noise and the crowds respond by 
not leaving, by remaining at Syntagma square. Becoming cockroaches and growing more and 
more resistant to the chemicals, our bodies begin to mutate (ibid). 
Speaking about statis, they point to the constituent power of their monstrous becoming, the 
affectivity of the mutation they are undergoing that comes in the midst of a performative event. 
What is the mutation then? What challenges the established organization? As we argued, the 
event’s hiatus and its subsequent introduction of the new in the established collective body mark 
this mutation, this becoming-hayula, which is not only a break with the statist discourse of the 
national body but also a break from the conventional leftist politics:  
The classic urban tactics of demonstration (marching in a linear fashion, protesting in front of the 
Parliament, dispersing after the end of the demonstration) or confrontation (like throwing 
marbles, stones, and Molotov cocktails against the police and destroying symbolic targets like 
banks, multinational commercial chains etc.) seem and are secondary in face of our tactics. 
Cockroaches do not attack, they do not make much noise, nor do they destroy something (ibid).  
The performative character of their protest is obvious here. They do not march from point A to 
point B in the limited time of a day. They occupy time-space to produce a new subjectivity. That 
is why the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), the representative of traditional left, failed to 
understand the new movement and argued that “movement did not represent any danger to the 
establishment, had no alternative political suggestions beyond the immediate rejection of the 
government and the austerity measures” (qtd. in Prentoulis amd Thomassen 213). 
A coalition of new leftist parties (Syriza) came to existence during the protests and it consisted of 




hooligans or bunch of excited youth. When Syriza took the power, it acted as another 
government, and the new prime minister rejected a part of protestors of the austerity policies – 
that his government yielded to –  as delusional, non-realist, and too much left. Yet the 
cockroaches still exist to this date, marching in Greek cities against austerity, as they knew that 
they do not aim to take the state power.  
 
4.6.3 Political Monster: A Case of Fascination  
Lurking smoothly into the Modern era, monsters are far from being extinct: they “have always 
defined the limits of community in Western imaginations” (D. J. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and 
Women : The Reinvention of Nature 181). That is why the non-natural and non-identifiable 
transgressive monster has been long a source of fascination for modern and contemporary 
thinkers.  
Feminist Donna Haraway shifts the dissent character of monstrosity into the gender and 
sexuality, claiming that the monstrous “Centaurs and Amazons of ancient Greece” upset the 
norms of these fields “by their disruption of marriage and boundary pollutions of the warrior with 
animality and woman” (Haraway, Simians 181), with their in-between-ness. For her, in whose 
works the main protagonist (cyborg) itself belongs to the category of monster, “the possibilities 
for our reconstitution include the utopian dream of the hope for a monstrous world without 
gender” (182). 
As we hinted before, in his 1974-75 lectures at the College de France, collected under the title 
“abnormal”, Michel Foucault follows the modern procedures of “overlaying”, “appropriating” 
and “colonizing” the monstrous since 18th century. He defines monster as a “juridico-biological” 
notion, for “what defines the monster is the fact that its existence and form is not only a violation 
of the laws of society but also a violation of the laws of nature” (Foucault, Abnormal 56). What 
Foucault notes as the (discursive) characteristics of monstrosity in 18th and 19th century echoes 
again the abovementioned etymological meanings. Non-identifiable is the monster as “a 
principle of intelligibility in spite of its limit position as both the impossible and the forbidden”; a 




monster is to express itself as, precisely, monstrous, to be the explanation of every little deviation 
that may derive from it, but to be unintelligible itself” (57). Remembering the prevalent figure of 
the mad as the monstrous in Foucault’s thought, this claim is more or less asserted by Pierre 
Klossowski: 
Outside the time of the intellect, outside its dimensions: something monstrous that takes shape 
only through a delimitation of the non-comprehensible (Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle 134). 
Arguing in a similar manner with Negri’s critique of the eugenic, Foucault extends the field of 
monstrosity from a human dominance over non-human humans into a human dominance over 
the absolute non-human, or rather, the living entirely, in which the monster reveals itself always 
as “the limit” and “the exception” (Abnormal 56). Thus, perhaps most importantly, Foucault 
considers the monstrous as immanent to the Nature, although it occupies a liminal position – not 
unlike Derrida who situates the monster “within the nature”. Foucault writes:  
The monster is, so to speak, the spontaneous, brutal, but consequently natural form of 
the unnatural (Abnormal 56) 
The exterior – the unnatural – is never in an Outside on the other side of a limit; on the contrary, 
the inside is “an operation of the outside” (Deleuze, Foucault 97), a folding of the outside that 
interiorizes it, “as if the ship were a folding of the sea” (ibid). It is according to this relation 
between the exterior and the interior that Foucault describes the monstrous Renaissance 
madman as “the Passenger par excellence” (Foucault, qtd.in ibid), because he would be 
imprisoned on a ship, “in the interior of the exterior”, and become a prisoner of the field of 
immanence (“sea”) which is “the freest, the openest of routes: bound fast at the infinite 
crossroad” (ibid). The monster lives “on the edge”, lurking on the singular points of the folds. Its 
liminal position is immanent to the field of immanence, and its transgression is “from inside the 
border” – monster is non-identifiable, it does not pass from one identity to another one; it is “the 
prisoner of the passage” (ibid). 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari seem to be in terms with the last Foucauldian characterization 
of monsters, but they would have criticized his other points, and consequently his entire 




(potestas, “constituted power”) of medical, juridical, and penal institutions is to bestow upon the 
transcendental (meaning, the form of potestas) the first analytic59 position of one’s perspective. 
It is also not compatible with Foucault’s own analysis of the monster in the ship, his conception 
of transgression, or his view on the nomadic powers of the monstrous. Moreover, the title of all 
Foucault’s lectures and his main focus is the abnormal, in which he also includes monsters.  But 
by referring first to the becoming-animal of Captain Ahab through “a monstrous alliance with the 
Unique, the Leviathan, Moby-Dick”, Deleuze and Guattari notes the following about the 
abnormal and the anomalous: 
It has been noted that the origin of the word anomal ("anomalous"), an adjective that has fallen 
into disuse in French, is very different from that of anormal ("abnormal"): a-normal, a Latin 
adjective lacking a noun in French, refers to that which is outside rules or goes against the rules, 
whereas an-omalie, a Greek noun that has lost its adjective, designates the unequal, the coarse, 
the rough, the cutting edge of deterritorialization. The abnormal can be defined only in terms of 
characteristics, specific or generic; but the anomalous is a position or set of positions in relation 
to a multiplicity. (A Thousand Plateaus 243-44) 
The monster, therefore, entails a multiplicity. Moreover, as “the cutting edge of 
deterritorialization”, it stands as the creative-resistant or revolutionary force of a situation, 
(re)territorialized by the transcendental point of potestas; a constituted power that manifest 
itself in form of hierarchical and centralized institutions. That is why Deleuze and Guattari define 
the “originary undertaking” of the becoming-monstrous with “a rupture with the central 
institutions that have established themselves or seek to become established” (ibid 247). The 
Nietzschean experimentation, the performative disruption of the code. 
From this perspective, then, monster becomes the affirmative monster. Just like the distinction 
the two authors make between the revolutionary schizoid process and “the way schizophrenics 
are produced as clinical cases” (Deleuze and Guattari, On Anti-Oedipus 23), there should be a 
distinction between the becoming-monstrous, or the affirmative non-identifiable monsters that 
are always in the process of becoming and alteration, with the “identified” monsters either 
 




trapped in medical, judicial, and penal institutional influence of the constituted power, or turned 
into the servants of the transcendence, of the sovereign, and completely detached and 
crystallized from the field of immanence.  
The fascination with monsters comes from its affinity to the constituent power: those 
interrelated forces of becoming that constitute the being, extend its limits, and destroy the 
barriers of constituted power, all those false transcendent crystals of its own becoming, which 
actualized an identifiable form out of countless possibilities. And monster resides on the limit: on 
the zone of becomings, alterations, and deterritorializations, on the exclusive zone of constituent 
power. “The monster is not only event, but positive event”, writes Negri, defining the monstrous 
as “a mechanism of … (material and/or utopian) construction” (Political Monster 200).  
The occupiers of Athens squares have been the cutting edge of the deterritorialization. They have 
not been the “abnormal” monster, the outsiders, as the victory of the left-wing government in 
Greece proved later.  
The cockroach monstrosity formed a multiplicity open to other different, so-called “alien” 
elements in the collective body. When the refugees of the war-torn post-Arab Spring Middle East 
fled the bloodshed toward Europe, the former occupiers of Athen’s squares opened their squats 
to them. The squats increased dramatically during the protest movements, as part of the war on 
the space. The immigrants who were rejected help by many European elites found shelter in 
these self-governed autonomous squats. In my interviews, the Greek activists told me how they 
struggled with language barriers, different cultural norms, and many other issues in hosting the 
refugees, which is part of the long-term processual construction of a multiple, heterogenous 
collective body. 
It must be noted here that although the etymological meanings of teras, monstrum, or ifrit can 
be still heard in the contemporary discourses around the monster, its figure, its body, and its 
relation to the humans have of course been changed throughout the history. Monster challenges 
the arche, the origin, and that is exactly why its ancient meanings still seem relevant today. 
Nonetheless, with the introduction of the natural/civil rights dichotomy in particular, the monster 




has demonstrated itself more concretely during the history of its struggle and resistance against 
capitalism, transforming itself from an imaginal, spectral, and natural-juridical monster into a bio-
political immanent one, with a concrete multitudinous body, in the age of immaterial labour (see 
ibid).  
This affirmative perspective toward the monstrous, which gives it a class character, has certain 
consequences for the organization of a monstrous body. 
 
4.6.4 The Kurdish Stateless Monstrosity 
A deviance from the natural “Turkish” collective body, based on blood and soil, the Kurdish 
became the monstrous and its unintelligibility led to its discursive exile on the exterior of Turkish 
identity: Kurds were even designated the name “mountain Turks”.  
This “Caliban” seems to be raised again, free, and in the flesh. When nobody could stop the fascist 
ISIL’s apparatus of capture, Kurdish monster manifested its joyful strength in Kobani, stopping 
the Jihadists’ military with its war machines.  In a passage in the Theses on the Concept of History, 
Benjamin writes that today’s critical “mode of thought” needs to make the world “repugnant”, 
or one might say, monstrous. For the politicians “in whom the opponents of Fascism had placed 
their hopes” compromised with fascism, and for this very reason, the monstrous mode of thought 
must intend to free “the political child of the world from the nets in which they have ensnared 
it” (Benjamin, On the Concept of History 393). It is certainly the case with Kobani’s monster, to 
which “Kurdish” serves only as a common name, not a signifier of any identity.  
But what has created the monstrous flesh of the struggle in Kobani was occurred before this 
“canton”, thanks to its daring defense, transformed into a spectacular image in the mainstream 
media. The singular and monstrous form-of-life which is tied to the name of Kobani, its becoming 
“canton” instead of a “city-State”, the organizational form of the collective body, and the minor 
narratives about the life of its militants construct together the truth of Kobani, where comrades 
dance and sing for the living as well as for the dead, where the seemingly “traditional” 




Kobani is one of the three Rojava Cantons in Syria. Insisting on the right for self-determination, 
these cantons have formed an autonomous territory. Canton originally means “region or corner”, 
and had been referred to autonomous members of the Old Swiss Confederacy during 14th and 
15th century with their own form of direct democracy60.  
Inspired by the Idea of cantons’ confederacy, residents of Rojava have written their own, still 
limited, Constitution for an alternative organization of the collective bodies that starts with the 
following: 
We, the people of the Democratic Autonomous Regions of Afrin, Jazira and Kobane, a 
confederation of Kurds, Arabs, Syrics, Arameans, Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens, freely and 
solemnly declare and establish this Charter. In pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity and democracy 
and led by principles of equality and environmental sustainability, the Charter proclaims a new 
social contract […] we, the people of the Autonomous Regions, unite in the spirit of reconciliation, 
pluralism and democratic participation […] in building a society free from authoritarianism, 
militarism, centralism and the intervention of religious authority (The Constitution of the Rojava 
Cantons). 
However, the manner in which militants from other regions have been joining the struggle in 
Kobani, and even the historical formation of the collective body in this city, points more toward 
a monstrous alliance with the collective body, rather than a “social contract”, as a way of making 
“being-together”.  
Kobani is a city made by World War I and its consequent nationalist States. Its name means 
“company” and refers to the German Railway Company which was building the controversial 
Berlin-Baghdad railroad. During the Armenian genocide in the Turkish Empire, refugees built 
Kobani near the railway, and were joined later by the Kurds who fled the Turkification of the 
Turkish Republic. The liminal city was again divided by a new national border in the aftermath of 
Sykes-Picot, and situated literally on the borderline between Turkey and Syria (Taştekin). Now, 
this hybrid one-hundred-year-old monster demonstrates itself with a new collective body, 
 
60 This form of direct democracy must be analyzed within its own historical context, since numerous gendered and 




heterogeneous, multiethnic, and multilingual, which actively refuses the “natural” modern form 
of the Nation-State.  
Looking to the horrors of identity politics in the West Asia and North Africa, it is exactly today 
that “we need new giants and new monsters to put together nature and history, labor and 
politics, art and invention,” Hardt and Negri write, “in order to demonstrate the new power that 
is being born in the multitude” (Multitude 194). With its political and creative art of making “war 
machines”, even in the literal sense of the word, the Caliban of Kobani demonstrates the power 
of the flesh, resisting the advance of the gregarious slave-master resentiment for the sake of “the 
particular case”. 
The proclaimed new social contract proved to be more a “monstrous” alliance, such as the one 
Deleuze and Guattari conceptualizes through Captain Ahab’s way of connecting with the 
monster. Joining the monstrous collective body is not a matter of contract; rather, it is a pact with 
the monster: dangerous, threatening, necessitating a permanent transformation and an 
insistence on the threshold. During the battle of Kobani, many people from all around the world 
joined the Kurdish affirmative monster to resist a statist monster that promoted homogeneity, 
obedience, nation-state making and establishing national borders. Fighters from all over the 
world came to help the indigenous monster of Kurdish soil to resist the newly emerged State and 
as such, they proved the stateless affirmative aspect of the Kurdish project: as monsters, they do 
not seek the power, nor they behave according to conventional leftist politics in the Middle East.  
That is another important aspect in the monstrous collective body: the connecting point is not a 
presupposed universal social contract with the State, outsourcing the agency to a tamed monster 
of the state. The autonomy of the political monster is exactly this: the refusal of imposed 
passiveness.  
The fact that the foreign nationals from all over the world (the US, Canada, Australia, Iran, Turkey, 
the Netherlands, Germany, …) joined Kobani’s Kurdish struggle point to the fact that the 
affectivity of their struggle was contagious beyond the naturalized national borders.  
But the rise of extreme-right reactionary movement and its ultra-nationalist agenda has been 




effect of contagion on collective bodies? and what does contagion tell us in general about 
performative political movements and their bodies?  
 
 
4.7 A Conclusion: Contagion 
 
On January 4, 2011, Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian Street Vendor, passed away as a result of 
his grave injuries after he set himself on fire. On 14th, Ben Ali, the dictator of Tunisia resigned. 
Then we had other movements and revolutions happening in Egypt (January 25), Jordan (January 
28), Syria (February 4), Kuwait (February 6), Yemen (February 11), Algeria (February 12), Iran 
(February 14), Bahrain (February 14), Libya (February 16), Iraq (February 16), Morocco (February 
20), Oman (February 27), Lebanon (February 28). Let’s even stay in these geographical limits and 
don’t mention others that witnessed other protest movements.  
Theories tried to understand the particular logic of dissipation and repetitions of such 
movements. There were those in cultural and performance studies who brought up the notion 
of imitation or mimesis, which we have criticized before and will continue to rest our case in the 
following in favor of the coming concept, and others from the same disciplines who recourse to 
a more biopolitical, affective concept: contagion. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have 
argued, the age of globalization is the age of contagion.  
Contagion comes from a different logic. In our simple biological understanding, we know that 
there are no two cases of similar reactions to even most common viruses such as cold. When the 
virus comes, the transformations and changes through the interaction of immune system with it 
are all interdependent on the singular network of relations inside a particular historicized and 
disciplined biosphere, a human body. The paradox of such a perspective is how a local struggle 
reaches a universal repetition, without it being originated in certain Western values. Contagion 
argues for a certain universality, too, but not a universality on actualized, possible options, but a 




that universal transformative forces can intensify local forces through happy affects (progressive, 
deterritorializing) or sad affects (reactionary, reterritorializing); but both are intensities, either in 
negative degrees or positive one. As intense affectivity, they mark their effects on social psyche, 
reactivating stereotypical phantasms on the surface of collective bodies, or allowing for creating 
new image of thought and its corresponding simulacra. It breeds monsters: they can be either 
affirmative, being open to the different, heterogenous elements in the collective body, or 
negative, trying to violently eliminated everything that threatens the homogeneity of the Statist 
body.  
This is how the indigenous struggle of Zapatista inspired the Carnival against Capital, the Kurdish 
struggle and other minoritarian struggles in the world. Its monstrosity was to struggle as the 
dispossessed against colonial mechanisms of dispossession, and to form a non-Statist collective 
body against the nation and the urge to nationalist obedience. The Zapatista had a far-reaching 
network of alliance with many activists around the world. They even called for Global Days of 
Justice, as their local struggle was a struggle against both the nation-state and the global capitalist 
relations of biopower. Yet they were insisting on their indigenous identity.  
Their contagious power was in their affirmation of indigenous identity and of its radical openness 
as opposed to the Statist discourses. It resonated with many others, as a monstrous anomaly that 
comes from the forces of deterritorialization, and these virtual forces are performativized 
differently, and singularly, in each local context. 
Subcomandante Marcos, former masked speaker of the Zapatistain Chiapas believed that the 
struggle of local and indigenous peoples is the avant-garde of a war against the neoliberal 
capitalism today, a radically decentralized war. 
The Catalan, Basque and Galician pro-independence movements claim that “We are the 
Zapatistas of the South of Europe,” and want it for “all peoples of this world who struggle for the 
right to self-determination” (Staal, To Make a World). The Kurds with their idea of democratic 
confederalism feel close to Zapatista’s struggle, which is mutual feeling according to many 




Thus, contagion does not negate the idea of indigenous struggle. Each context is different, each 
monstrosity is singular, and each performativization is accordingly unique. However, contagion 
effects bodies through affectivities that do not recognize national borders. As we said earlier, 
affect categorize alternatively the bodies: not according to their identity, but through their 
affections, forces and powers.  
What kind of affects? In Spinoza, the three basic affects are appetite (desire), joy or happiness, 
pain or sorrow. In the Spinozist readings of affect, considering Spinoza’s monist ontology of 
forces, desire becomes equivalent to the potentia, the constituent power, which Spinoza 
designates to the Multitude. For him, all forms of potesta, i.e. constituted power, such as State-
formations from Absolute Monarchy to Oligarchy are still a product of that potentia in one form 
or another (Political Treatise). It was also discussed that in Deleuze and Guattari, affect/affection 
relation translates also to the realm of force, where there are two basic affect-affection relations: 
one that increase the constituent power and one that decrease it, former is called happiness or 
joy and the latter sadness.  
But one should not neglect the bodily element of the affect. What Deleuze and Guattari call “the 
ability of affecting and being affected” is the logic of affective contagion. Affect is material, 
though virtual and indeterminate; it is, according to Deleuze, based on the non-cognitive 
perception of a situation that leads to a modification of the body which triggers the emotion. 
Therefore, emotion comes in the end of the process of affective production: the affect is 
situational and contextual, singular to its context, and then it traverses bodies while bodies also 
interact on the flow of affect. Then an affection is produced in the flesh which can rise to the 
emotion as the dramatized affect. Emotions (anger, rage, hatred, delight, gaiety, etc) as products 
are representable, belonging to the spectacle of public display, but only considering them leads 
to the mystification of the processes that leads or contributes to it or springs from it. It also leads 
to homogenize all singular contexts in a logic of generality and particularity, not unlike Social 
Performance theories.  
Consider Gezi protests. Around the midnight of 27 May 2013, bulldozers and demolition 




space for constructing a copy of an Ottoman barracks with a shopping mall and mosque inside it. 
The protestors gathered to prevent this and started an encampment. On 31st of May five in the 
morning, police evacuated the park forcefully and the wide-spread protests happened 
afterwards. 
If we only consider the trees being uprooted as the triggering point, if we consider the origins or 
the first emotions rising from the desire to protect trees, we miss the very dynamics of Gezi. I am 
not talking about the development policies of Erdogan’s AKP party government, to which some 
Turkish scholars put the name of “performance of infrastructure” and its function has been to 
both ground their political authority (the economic success story) and to naturalize a particular 
project of generating value (which is visible in the coupling of a mosque and a shopping mall in 
an Ottoman barracks). I am not talking about multiple gentrification projects around Gezi park 
and Taksim square that targeted various ethnic and gender minorities as well as the poor in 
general. I am not referring to the initiative of Taksim Solidarity with more than 100 different 
groups that formed in 2012. My point is exactly about trees, that they can even show the logic of 
generality and abstracting static images or generalizing emotions does not work and neglects 
some parts of that public display too. The tree as a political symbol became indeed uprooted in 
Gezi protest, functioning in a flexible form that was the result of them becoming rhizomatic. The 
tree floatingly became the embodiment of different lines of resistance and struggle, which 
intersected in a performative event. A line from a communist poet, Nazim Hikmet, saying "to live 
like a tree, solitary and free, and like a forest, in brotherhood/this is our longing” hanging from 
one tree with red flags. Next to it, revolutionary Muslims attached a quote from the Qur’an to a 
tree—“the trees bow down before God.” A line from Orhan Pamuk’s novel, My name is Red, 
reads that “I don’t want to be a tree, I want to be its meaning”. Some trees had signs such as 
“listen to your conscience, don’t kill me”—and personified with the names (and in some cases, 
photos) of people killed in the conflicts relating to the oppression of Kurdish minority. Graffities 
around like “parks, not concrete” had environmentalist claims, or were against neoliberal 
capitalism, gentrification, but among them was even the giant marching tree-spirit Ents from the 




This is the abstract logic of affective relations, those performative relations between bodies: a 
logic related to the non-conscious and imperceptible forces of life, that traverse between and 
distribute human and non-human actors within a field of virtual forces. The body is thus a 
“conversion channel” or transducer that can modulate this intensive force through a kind of 
sensing feel, rather than a conscious calculation. But this modulation comes in two types of, as 
we said before, decreasing and/or increasing the potentia.  
Affective radical relationality points to a flow of affects and affections as the basis of sociality and 
blurs the I/other dichotomy versus the affective self-containment, where being healthy meant 
being able to contain in oneself, accepting a clear boundary between inner and outer self as well 
as between oneself and the other. The former (affective radical relationality) has been 
marginalized in different forms through the modern political organization of the Nation-State.  
When this organization is shattered to a radical, affective intermingling of differences, one can 
search for the virtual forces of a performative event. 
On the evening of June 28, 2013, a group of several-thousand people marched through the 
streets of Kadıköy in solidarity with the Kurdish town of Lice, in the district of Diyarbakir, where 
Medeni Yıldırım, a young protestor was shot dead in a protest against the extension of a military 
station (Schafers and Ilengiz). The groups active in Gezi park movement took to street in order to 
show their solidarity, but the case of Kadıköy is particularly illuminating.  
Kadıköy is a neighborhood on the Asian side of Istanbul that is known to be mostly inhabited by 
middle-class, “white Turkish” residents. A deviance from the natural “Turkish” collective body, 
based on blood and soil, the Kurdish became unintelligible and its unintelligibility led to its 
discursive exile on the exterior of Turkish identity: Kurds were designated the name “mountain 
Turks”. Even the Kurdish language had been long prohibited in the public space, let alone its 
education.  
But on that evening, Thousands of residents of the White Turkish neighborhood were for the first 
time shouting Kurdish slogans “Long live the brotherhood of peoples!” (Bijî biratiya gelan in 
Kurdish) while the language was completely foreign for them, they didn’t know the words, their 




mistakenly shouting Dicle instead of Lice), errors and mixings of pronunciation to enunciate from 
a different subject position, the position of a Kurd. Even the geography of Turkey’s Kurdistan, 
which they had not been calling it as Kurdistan, was only a vague image in their minds. This is 
how the affective relationality, a performative non-linguistic contagion goes through bodies, 
modify them and create affections. 
It is this kind of mimesis or imitation that challenges the Eurocentric paradigm of mimicry based 
on free will, signification, meaning, the hierarchical power relation of progress and 
underdevelopment, and the duality of original/copy. It is not enough to understand this 
challenge, similar to what Social Performance theorists such as Turkish scholar Nilüfer Göle 
formulates as a reversal (Public Space Democracy). Göle refers to a mimetic reversal that “occurs 
between the West and the East. To the extent that the West is not the only standard bearer of 
democracy, interconnected imaginaries and transversal solidarities between different societies 
emerge”. This explanation keeps the mimetic principles intact, presupposing it and with it, 
presupposing the modern (even if former) superiority of White Western advanced countries. Or 
Jeffrey Alexander, the main figure of Social Performance Theory does the same when he writes 
“there is an unprecedented connection of Eastern and Western impulses, demonstrating that the 
tide of democratic thought and action is hardly confined to Judeo−Christian civilizations.” (qtd. 
in Göle) As Zeynep Gülşah Çapan argues, the scripting of Gezi comes with its “thingification” and 
“sacralization”. posited in “a linear progressive narrative of the story of the ‘Turkish Nation’” or 
focuses on the “foreign influences” on the movement, the presupposed dynamics of imitation 
and getting closer to the European context, therefore scripting Gezi “through Eurocentric spatial 
and temporal designations” (Çapan). 
But if we are not in the paradigm of meaning/interpretation/consciousness, then we are in the 
paradigm of affect/interpretation/phantasm; the idea that we discussed through Nietzsche. If 
mimesis is related to conscious agent, affectivity transmits through the process of contagion. 
In their introduction to an essay collection on the concept of contagion (“Ansteckung”), Mirjam 
Schaub and Nicola Suthor explains that contagion is the corporeal dimension of an aesthetic 




can be conceptualized without recoursing to metaphysical sovereign control of a 
knowing/imitating subject. As they put it, contagion is a contingent transfer via contact; an 
aesthetic mode of appropriation that reach “under the skin” (Schaub, Suthor and Fischer-Lichte).  
There are other attempts in approaching the problem of mimesis through the affect theory, 
centering around the idea of a “mimetic desire”. In the paradigm of mimetic desire, a form of 
complex imitation is posited that is not based on the mimetic principles of free will, 
consciousness, original/copy, and signification. The theorists of this field point to the main initial 
discursive figures of affect theory in philosophy, James and Bergson, who had interest in hypnotic 
suggestibility and psychic phenomena. They implement various studies of hypnotic suggestibility 
and psychic phenomena to explain how forms of affect and emotion would spread throughout 
population. 
Going back in this tradition, Gabriel Tarde stands as a founding thinker. Tarde gives the most 
important social role to the imitation. For him, “the social being, in the degree that he is social, 
is essentially imitative, and that imitation plays a role in societies analogous to that of heredity 
in organic life or to that of vibration among inorganic bodies.” (Tarde 11) 
In the beginning of this chapter, we referred to the historical inheritance of bodies through 
Merleau-Ponty and Foucault, which referred to body’s situatedness and facticity in Merleau-
Ponty and its administration through biopolitical mechanisms in Foucault. Through Klossowski, 
we later discussed how the code of the everyday signs reproduces the naturalized organic body 
and how performative forces disrupt such process by creating their own phantasms and 
simulacra on the surface of bodies.  
Imitation for Tarde has the same implications. Tarde’s conception of imitation was not based on 
the meaning and conscious repetition, but on a strange notion of imitative rays, waves of 
affective suggestibility that passes through different bodies and affect them in a way that triggers 
an action based on the same affection. Theatrical, for sure.  
Tarde’s microimitations happen inside a monadic society. The monads are neither individuals nor 
collectives. They are singular bodies that cannot be categorized through pre-defined identities; 




Tarde, “every phenomenon is a social fact.” (qtd. in Sampson 7) According to Tarde, a collective 
body is thus not an assemblage of human bodies: it is a machinic assemblage of human and non-
human elements in a site.  
But as monads of social relationalities, they are always dividual. Or as Latour puts it, “everything 
[in Tarde] is individual and yet there is no individual in the etymological sense of that which 
cannot be further divided.” (Tarde’s Idea of Quantification 155) 
The contagion spreads between such monads. It is a flow of affectivity that passes through these 
heterogenous bodies that make them perform similar actions. Tarde says that imitative rays 
“radiate out imitatively”. Microimitations that comes out of those rays cannot be conceived 
through the classical paradigm of imitation/mimesis: 
What radiates out imitatively (what spreads) should not be confused with a purely cognitive, 
ideological, or interpsychological transfer between individuals and organic social formations 
(groups, masses, etc.). The imitative ray comprises of affecting (and affected) noncognitive 
associations, interferences and collisions that spread outward, contaminating feelings and moods 
before influencing thoughts, beliefs, and actions (Sampson 19). 
Therefore, there are fields of phantasmic affectivity that could create similar actions and 
simulacra in different bodies. What Tarde calls microimitation is the transfer of those fields of 
affectivity, or a region of forces through different dividual bodies. In the second chapter, we 
argued that in the course of a protest movement, names appear phantom-like, as a sign to 
translate (and to give name to) an intensive region of forces or the immanent field of constituent 
power and its intensities. Those names also signify a source of imitative rays that transmit that 
affectivity. Tarde makes clear that such a source of imitative rays should be perceived through 
the affirmative forces of creativity. It is not, in the beginning, a reproduction of the old, but an 
introduction of the new. And its repetition as imitation comes from such creativity: 
All repetition, social, vital, or physical, i. e., imitative, hereditary, or vibratory repetition  … springs 
from some innovation, just as every light radiates from some central point, and thus throughout 




Although Tarde here refers to a central point, the central point does not seem to be a fixed, 
individual body as his social monadology teaches us. According to more recent commentators of 
Tarde, the imitative rays are those differential relations between bodies that join them together; 
they are affective capabilities of making relations. “Imitative ray does not travel between (inter) 
individual persons;”, argues Tony D. Sampson, “rather, it moves below (infra) the cognitive 
awareness of social association". (20). For Tarde, imitation is more of suggestibility.  
According to our discussions throughout the thesis, we can conclude that the imitative rays as 
differential relations are not subjected to their terms. and do not originate in one point, going to 
the other one – unlike the basic presumption of imitation theory, which – as we have shown – 
consider for example the West as the original point of “Modernity” or “nationalism”, and the East 
as an often-bad imitator. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, “[Tarde’s] microimitation does seem to 
occur between two individuals, but at the same time, and at a deeper level, it has to do not with 
an individual but with a flow or a wave.” (A Thousand Plateaus 218) 
Therefore, Tarde’s theory of contagion is based on first, a source of creative forces, those “much-
imitated social inventions”; second, a network of interconnected monadic bodies; and third, the 
interaction of those forces with the monads, i.e. affectivity. Therefore, it fits with the notion of 
patchwork body in contrast to those theories that search for a unified, hegemonic body as a 
subject of change. The connectivity in contagion “follows the pathways of networks -- and 
especially distributed networks -- rather than the pattern of hegemony and its chains of 
equivalence” (Sampson 38). 
But as the happy affects could be contagious, the sad affects transmit the same way. That is why 
suggestibility signifies a threat of dictatorship, fascism and totalitarianism. If Wilhelm Reich, for 
instance, conceptualizes the capitalist body armor as a shield against bodily affectivity and flows 
of desire, he also argues that people may desire fascism. The rise of far right in the Western 
countries is a symptom of such contagion. 
The case of Donald Trump teaches us that the reality principle, factual validity, or true/false 
duality or any other cognitive category does not play an important role in the dissemination of 




They signify those fields of affectivity and regions of forces that are sad, reactive, and 
reproductive of the dominant order; or as was quoted earlier from Nietzsche, they are those 
mistakes that help with the survival of a particular organism. The support for those ideas, rather 
than being a conscious cognitive decision, has an affective aspect. 
The simplest argument for this fact was actually given by a high-ranking republican politician, 
Newt Gingrich, after Trump became the official nominee of the republican party. Trump made 
one of his famous speeches in that ceremony: 75 minutes speaking of crisis, of “unprecedented” 
rise in crime and terrorism in Barack Obama’s United States, and all incompatible with real 
statistics and facts. Presenting the real statistics, a CNN host asks Gingrich to explain Trump’s 
claims. The following conversation between them speaks on itself (Gingrich): 
CNN host: Violent crime across the country is down. 
Gingrich: The average american does not think crime is down, does not think they are safer.  
-: But it is. We are safer. 
-: No, that’s you view. 
-: It’s a fact. this is statistics.  
-: what I say is also a fact. Liberals have some statistics which theoretically may be right, but that’s 
not what human beings are. 
-: this is FBI statistics. They are not a liberal organization. 
-: But what I am saying is equally true: people feel more threat. 
-: Yes, they feel it. but the facts don’t support it. 
-: As a political candidate, I’ll go with how people feel and I let you go with the theoreticians.  
Going to how people feel: that is what brings us to those theories which traditionally concerned 
arts. In fact, modern and contemporary arts as well as critical theory always challenged liberal 
economy’s attempts to model human behaviors according to numbers and quantities. If the 




pointed to an increase inequality, an increase in the number of billionaires, and an increase in 
the share of wealth for the 1% of the society.  
What these statistics cannot register is the affects and affections in relation with the changes and 
differences in the numbers. If the Occupy Wall Street was a contagious movement, the white 
supremacist movement is also a contagious one, and it even affects the decisions of those who 
consciously think they are not racists.  
Sampson explains this contagious transmission by an interaction between two streams: upstream 
flows of affect and downstream flows of biographical responses, which for him disintegrates “the 
Enlightenment artifice between contaminating emotion and pure reason” because “what is 
socially suggested, and biologically responded to, intersects”. The imitative rays that go below or 
over social persons can change their moods, thus thinking: 
It is the manifestation of affects in this encounter which move upstream, activating mostly 
unconscious feelings of horror, before they intersect with the downstream flows of a neural 
circuitry loaded with manipulable and biographical emotional content. It is this seemingly ready-
made, yet highly absorbent and adaptable circuitry that is tapped into by political strategists 
(Sampson 9). 
In other words, there are not only accidental overflows of creativity and desire that function as 
the sun for imitative rays of contagion. Rather, there is a ready-made circuitry of affectivity that 
can be tapped into by political strategists, advertisement experts and other public relations 
engineers.  
The social networks and cyber space have intensified and multiplied the possibilities of 
communication and consequently, transmission. Even when in Internet a photo or video or short 
text is shared immensely, it is tagged as “viral”.  
The internet “memes” are the most common viral things and they have different types, like 
“challenges”, “gifs”, “trolls”, etc. But meme is actually a term of mainstream cultural analysts 
who pursue a kind of evolutionary biological pattern with a strong Eurocentric perspective. These 
neo-Darwinian thinkers consider meme as transferable cultural behaviors and believe that there 




its growth and sustainability, cultural memes determine our cultural destiny and its “natural” 
environment of growth and progress. Although they perceive memes as viruses that transmit 
through contagion, their paradigm remains one of determinist imitation, plagued by body/mind 
and subject/object duality. The meme virus thus becomes “a unit of imitation which determines 
the evolutionary invariance and survival of the ideas that spread through a population of minds” 
(Sampson 16). Their linear evolutionary thought, memetics, divides human beings more 
according to the lines of Volk theory that we discussed earlier.  
Memetics is based on a false reading of Tarde. The memetics theorists consider him as their 
conceptual fore-runner, which according to our aforementioned discussions, can only be proved 
otherwise. As Sampson argues, “a Tardean ‘epidemiological’ diagram can be clearly 
differentiated from the deterministic logic of the neo-Darwinian meme/gene analogy, and its 
claim to be the definitive biological force shaping social and cultural fields.” (ibid) 
Although founded on wrong, Eurocentric and even racist premises, memetics has become the 
foundational science behind the PR strategies. Donald Trump’s presidential campaign was an 
unfortunate successful attempt of such strategies in engineering the affectivity, and in a more 
shocking manner than previous advertisement and political PR campaigns.  
And it is not only about that. The other aspect of contagion in dominant political theory is as we 
discussed, a negative aspect that justifies, through the biopolitical processes and modern medical 
discourses, a hygiene that supposedly protects nations and individuals against the 
contamination. Eugenics, in other words, is based on a campaign against the contagious elements 
that can disrupt an imagined pure nation. As Eugine Thacker says, “contagion and infection are 
more than mechanisms of antigen recognition and antibody response; they are, as our textbooks 
tell us, entire ‘wars’ and ‘invasions’ continuously fought on the battle lines of the human body.” 
(Thacker, On the Horror of Living Networks) 
Both aspects are contributing to contemporary capitalism’s mechanisms of machinic 
enslavement. They contribute to the immaterial turn in capitalist production. 
But the modern medical (and their corresponding political) discourses that underlies such 




thought. The contemporary biophilosophy necessitates an alternative way of thinking life that 
goes beyond the individual toward the idea of the impersonal life. As Margrit Shildrick, a 
contemporary biologist asserts, “the purity of the distinction [between self/non-self] is illusory 
and what constitutes the proper ‘me’ is already shot through with otherness" and “all human 
bodies swarm with a multitude of putatively alien others”. (Chimerism and Immunitas 95).  
On the other hand, as a long history of avant-garde performance has shown, management and 
engineering the performative affects and predicting the affections that audience receive, even 
with the most advanced audio-visual and lighting technologies, is simply not possible.  
(An interesting case is the Moscow First Workers Theatre. In that theatre, Sergei Eisenstein, Boris 
Arvatov and Sergei Tretyakov followed an interesting avant-garde revolutionary experimentation 
with theatre between 1921 and 1924, in the form of what they called “eccentric theater” and the 
“montage of attractions”. Although it may have begun first as a counterstrategy against “the 
effects of the organic representation of situations in the theatre”, calling for leaving the stage 
toward the streets, it soon developed to adopt a positive strategy, an avant-garde one that aimed 
for “a consistent and precisely calculated agitation of the audience in the theater” (Raunig, Art 
and Revoltion 154). This time, the stage was set in a space best fit to the target audience and the 
content of agitation. Eisenstein and Tretyakov cooperation in performing Tretyakov’s play 
Protivogazy [“Gas-Masks”] is an interesting example of this attempt, and also its last one. Gas-
Masks was their final cooperation in 1924, before Tretyakov left the theatre of production for 
the life of production in Kulkhuz. They wanted to perform a play specifically written for some 
particular workers to those workers in their work-place, so that workers experience the play 
written about their everyday life of production in their everyday life of production. And they 
believed this one to one correspondence between elements of play and the site of performance 
will have given them the ability to induce the affection in workers’ bodies they wanted them to 
have. The result is captured in one of the actor’s notes about the performance: “It already 
became clear after the first performance that we were disrupting their work.…They put up with 




No matter how advanced technologies become, there is always – as Deleuze and Guattari put it 
– leakages and lines of flights that evade the total control. In other words, no total affective 
manipulation or control is possible. 
Therefore, we can agree with Sampson to distinguish between two forms of contagion and 
virality, a molar one and a molecular one.  
Molar virality is … endemic to new biopolitical strategies of social power that is, a discursive (and 
prediscursive) means of organizing and exerting control… biopower is further exercised through 
the exploitation of the entire valence of human emotion—not just through fear, panic, terror, and 
fright but via the positive affects that spread through a population when it encounters, for 
instance, the intoxication of hope, belief, joy, and even love. (Sampson 5) 
Molecular virality located in the accidents and spontaneity of desire. This precedes the endeavor 
to organize the social via representational categorizations of epidemic disease or joyful 
encounters of hope and belief. (Sampson 6) 
Therefore, there is again a relation of production between molecular and molar virality, rather 
than a simple opposition. The molecular virality corresponds with the affectivity of performative 
and impulsive forces and creation of new simulacra; it also corresponds with the patchwork body 
that disrupts the imagined homogeneity of national collective body. The latter is related to the 
molar virality, which is a way of coding through the everyday signs, and reinforcing stereotypes 
through engineered affectivity.  
These attempts signify an attempt to bring mimesis close to affective contagion. Therefore, we 
can ask about the repetition in these performative acts, and the corresponding affections of a 
radical affective relationality. 
In the 60s, where for the first time the performative aspect of events challenged the modernist 
claims to universality, modern hierarchies, and colonial rule, Mary Douglas, somehow 
anticipating Butler’s theory of performativity, conceptualizes the logic of contagion through 
disruption, ritual and margins: “Disruptions, caused by disorderly expressions that do not align 




contagion by polluting the established order through disruptions, which are ephemeral until they 
become ritualized and thus normalized into ritualized order” 
Such a contagious disruptive repetition can be seen in the case of Rainbow Stairs in the aftermath 
of Gezi. This case shows how the original motivation of an individual act, its meaning, and its 
signification for a certain people is not what contagiously repeated afterwards. In October 2013, 
a retiree painted the cement-color steps connecting two neighborhoods of Istanbul, Findikli to 
Cihangir, in a colorful pattern similar to rainbow colors. The municipality re-painted the stairs in 
gray to bring back the original color and this governmental violation produced another affective 
solidarity, where many other stairs in public spaces in Turkey were painted in rainbow colors. The 
retiree said in the meantime that his idea was not to protest, but to make people smile, of course 
not thinking about the queer implications of rainbow colors. To paint is an artistic strategy and 
artistic practices are those which produce affects and affections.  
If contagion of performative event is about happiness and disruption, it is not surprising that 
many went back to festive forms and Bakhtin’s concepts of the carnivalesque. The repetition is 
inherent in festivals, carnivals and ceremonies; as a repetition of a singularity (mythical, religious, 
..). Deleuze calls this the apparent paradox of festivals: "they repeat an ‘unrepeatable’. they do 
not add a second and a third time to the first, but carry the first time to the ‘nth’ power.” 
Repeating the unrepeatable is where the disruption does not become, as Mary Douglas pointed 
out, “ritualizied” and “normalized”, but keeps its power of contagion. To understand this 
repetition, we can start again from the established modern order of generality. The order of 
generality and particularity is based on resemblances and functions through the exchangeability 
and substitutability. Deleuze says: "repetition is a necessary and justified conduct only in relation 
to that which cannot be replaced. Repetition as a conduct and as a point of view concerns non-
exchangeable and non-substitutable singularities". In other words, to repeat is to behave in a 
certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent. 
(Deleuze, Difference and Repetition 2) 
Deleuze differentiates even between “the repetition at the level of external conduct” or what we 




that the former “echoes [the] more secret vibration which animates it”, the intensive contagious 
repetition of singular affects themselves, and points to the same productive relation between 
affective relation and emotion as product that we started this presentation with.  
According to Deleuze, the repetition in artistic practices, or in works of arts, is “a singularity 
without concept”. Concept is the determined form of an idea, being dramatized under the effects 
of virtual performative forces. This is also the main idea of performativization method, as it 
argues that each performative event is a repetition of singular forces of a problematic in a 
singular context (being indefinite, non-representational, affective, and contagious). A singularity 
without concept resides in the field of the performative and the affective, and its concept can 
only emerge in its process of performativization. No performative event has an actualized past 
or a predictable, already-existing future. Therefore, the analyses that see Gezi in terms of 
contradictions between secular versus religious, Eastern authoritarianism versus Western 
democracy, Ottoman-style rule versus liberalism of European union are not analyzing a social 
protest movement, or a radical performativity in between bodies, but reproducing the same 
static, modernist, and Eurocentric images of thought. Recoursing to statistics for justifying such 
sociological rigidities has not been helpful, too. Statistics, as it cannot capture contagion beyond 
the conscious significations is utterly confusing vis-à-vis a performative event. In the case of Gezi, 
according to Konda statistics (2014 19), around 30 % of the protestors came to the park for 
liberties, 20% to claim rights and to protest against violations, 10% to protest against dictatorship 
and oppression, 9,5% for the resignation of the government, 8% for peace and democracy, 6,2% 
to protest the police violence, 6,1% for support and solidarity, 4,6% to protect the trees and the 
Gezi Park Square to avoid the construction, 3,2% to challenge the system and for revolution, 2,5% 
to be heard. The important thing that these numbers capture is the revelation of their 
insufficiency and the existence of an element they cannot capture in the categories of generalized 
demands.  
The order of repetition that we discussed through Deleuze does away with equivalency, exchange 
and therefore numbers. For him, "if exchange is the criterion of generality, theft and gift are 




However, there is a ritualized, empty repetition. In Douglas, we found that ritual is a product of 
that disruptive, affective, and contagious repetition. This ritual is translated into habit in affect 
theory, where habit is a solidified and actualized form of affection with a repetition without 
difference. “Habits are socially or culturally constructed. But they reside in the matter of the 
body, in the muscles, nerves, and skin where they operate autonomously”. Disruption, the 
affective contagion, is a disruption of habit, of theatrical spectacle.  
That is also why disorder, marginality, and anarchy present the habitat for affect (p19) and 
affective contagion works on margins and borders. 
But if habit is in the flesh, its performative change presents a transformative power in the flesh, 
and in our domain of discussion, on the collective bodies and their spatiotemporality. As Lisa 
Blackman argues, “the body within this formulation is both a transducer of potential but also an 
interrupter to the system of flow that becomes lodged through the action of habit”. 
So, if we talk about a logic of contagious repetition that does not function through exchange and 
substitution, but affect, affections, theft and gift, of a singular repetition of singular forces, then 
analyzing performative event through sign analysis, semiotics and semantics is not helpful. 
The case of the standing man in Turkey presents another case for studying contagion. When the 
first performer acted as a silent “standing man” (Duran adam), so many others followed and re-
enacted it afterwards. Erdem Gündüz was a Kemalist, he later published a statement and cleared 
“the meaning” of his performance, and during his act, he was looking straight to Kemal Ataturk’s 
big picture hanging on one corner of the Taksim square, neighboring Gezi, but anyways, the 
standing man repertoire repeated in different places antagonistic to Kemalist views of a Turkish 
national identity, in Kurdistan, on the spots where Alevi young men were killed, by anarchists, 
leftists, old and young and veiled and secular people. If Gündüz won publicity and prizes out of 
his act, there was an activist woman, going with the performative repertoire of Duran adam to 
minorities even in Kurdish regions, standing with and beside them, and her name is never 




Can we say it spread because Gündüz published his statement later, and there was a gap between 
his act and the understanding of that act, actually a delay in perception of a meaning? The answer 
is no, this cannot be a coherent argument. 
Here we can again bring the differences between a logic of imitation, based on 
similarity/contradiction and identity, signs and meanings, and a logic of affective contagion, 
based on difference and intensive repetition. Both logics are always at work. Even in the case of 
the standing man, the AKP supporters made the same performance as a reaction/contradiction 
to Gündüz, which means they just imitate, and their act cannot be seen through the lens of 
contagion. 
In my interviews, a certain point was always being repeated: the limits of Kurdish participation in 
the Gezi protests. Although there was a Kurdish stand in the occupation and other examples that 
we have mentioned happened during the Gezi movement, many believe that the movement 
could not show enough openness to absorb Kurdish people in it.  
These are the limitations that we have spoken about other cases before in this chapter. They 
show that even we can witness temporary powerful performativization of an open, multiple, 
affirmative monstrous anomaly in these societies, they can be rolled back easily when they are 
not sustained through constant organization and engagement. Even now, when Turkish State has 
been in a brutal war against Kurds in the south, there is little popular protest against it. And the 
country seems far more divided based on identity lines than before. 
The affective, contagious struggles and solidarities have yet continued, although in a smaller 
scale. One particular struggle is against the patriarchal coding of the collective body. The feminist 
movement, the queer movement and the Kurdish movement have had a strong alliance in recent 
years in Turkey – which is interestingly evident in the physical existence of non-governmental 
organizations defending LGBTQ and Women’s rights in Dyarbaker, a very important city in the 
Kurdish movement (which itself has an Alawite minority among other Kurdish populations). And 
their solidarity composes a patchwork body that its parts have been deemed as a threat to the 




Gezi movement, we witness how contagion is transmitting this deterritorializing power back and 
forth between these groups.  
The women’s movement became a movement inside the movement, as they challenged the 
patriarchal social codes, being dominant even inside leftist and Kurdish opposition groups. “We 
started our struggle against the Turkish state,” says Fadile Yıldırım, a representative of the 
Kurdish Women’s Movement , “but later we realized it was not just the matter of the repression 
of the Turkish state…[and thus] women’s freedom movement started inside the national 
liberation movement.” The systemic inequality they had suffered was also experienced by 
LGBTQ, as they tried to resist transphobia and homophobia inside leftist groups and the people 
of Gezi Occupy Movement, as we discussed. 
Yıldırım explains how their struggle is in the intersection between race, gender, capitalism, 
colonialism and consequently, the state. Therefore, this trans-sectional movement was not a 
struggle against some certain bossy men, but with a general discourse being promoted by the 
very form of the nation-state: 
We Kurdish women saw that if we want to be free, we have to be independent. We realized that 
women represent the first class of slaves, and also the first colonized class. So we said if the first 
class and the first oppressed sex in history and society are women, then history and society can 
only be liberated by women. We believe that female liberation is only possible in a society where 
there is no state, no hierarchy and no power, where these structures are overcome. If we look at 
other national liberation movements or if we look at the Soviet Union we see that all revolutionary 
organizations that could not manage to do their own revolution inside looked like the enemy. 
As we see, such a struggle affirms an openness toward others suffering from the limitations 
imposed by the constituted power, recognizing in the poor and in the dispossessed the 
constituent power of creativity inside a performative movement that breaks with former political 
forms of struggle, such as Soviet’s style of socialism.  
Solidarity with women struggle has been a sign of struggle against the Turkish state, especially 
after 2013, when the peace process with Kurds failed, the State started another war, and 




being performatively manlier and manlier, and they see a direct relation between increasing 
Turkish nationalism with women’s violence. The women being killed or harassed by their male 
partners have been in record numbers in recent years, simultaneously with the degrading social 
relation in Turkey and further divides based on naturalized Turkish identity promoted by the State 
(Ashdown, 2015 & UN Women 2016).  
Other minorities have also suffered during recent years and struggled prior and during the Gezi 
protests. Those struggles proved how a patchwork body could form between different groups 
beyond any Turkish identity, groups that are under-represented or unrepresented in the nation-
state discourses. A sad fact witnesses to this participation, as Mustafa Dikec documents in his 
book, is the victims of Gezi Movement protests: 
Who were these victims and where were they killed? All the victims killed by the police were 
Alevis, and they were all killed in areas peripheral to the centre of protest and media 
attention…two in Armutlu neighborhood in Hatay, and one in Okmeydani in Istanbul (Urban 
Rage: The Revolt of the Excluded 204). 
He continues to name other neighborhoods in Ankara and Istanbul that have “Alevi-leftist 
identity”. The Armutlu neighborhood in Hatay, Antakya was on the other hand a clear case of 
how contagion happened during Gezi between the so-called periphery and the centre of protests, 
connecting different suppressed groups in an affirmative protest together. 
Armutlu protests was predated the Gezi Park movement in Istanbul, inspired it and later, being 
inspired and accelerated by it. Armutlu movement was an occupation movement, too; but it 
started as the revolt of the Alevi population barricading their own neighborhood against the 
security forces that for decades exercised the violence of State’s nation-making project on their 
bodies.  
We discussed the 1980 military coup and their new projection of Turkish national identity 
through using religion as a tool in the re-establishment of power hierarchy in the collective body. 
That process had a brutal actualization in Armutlu, where a Military Complex had been built right 




of the town and to control them better hence”. Armutlu “was isolated and specifically targeted 
by the state during the 1980 military coup.”  
Right before Gezi, the protests started against the security state. This protest affected the bodies 
of Gezi protestors, as they showed their solidarity (“the affection of the people”) and Gezi  
protests intensified the indigenous, local struggle in this particular neighborhood. Armutlu was 
claimed by their Alevi residents, as the graffiti on the walls show. One special graffiti was even 
showed an inspiration from another struggle for self-determination and against Fascism:  
Armutlu were blocked off with barricades created by the residents, barriers made of cast-
off pieces of metal, wooden planks, and even old refrigerators and washing machines. 
One graffiti reads, “No pasaran!” (ibid) 
Saufegaurding the neighborhood, "¡No pasarán!" was famously used during the Spanish Civil 
War, at the Siege of Madrid by Dolores Ibárruri Gómez, a member of the Communist Party of 
Spain. And it was being shouted just recently from Catalan people against the police violence on 
their day of independence referendum. 
The contagion connects those oppressed, dispossessed groups who have been divided by a 
Statist, nationalist discourse that tries to impose a certain identity on the whole population and 
simply suppress or neglect the rest of the population. As Benjamin Arditi argues, what makes 
these initiatives viral is the rejection of a totalitarian identity in these movements: “they linked 
with one another as dispersed nodes that shared values with other groups/nodes and mobilized 
for a cause but were unconcerned about a unitary political score or creating the +1 of a common 
identity” (39) 
The case of trees in Gezi that became rhizomatic, as it was argued earlier, points to another 
important of contagious performativity: its transversality. Transversality of the rhizome stands in 
contrast with the verticality of the tree on one hand, and the subjugated horizontality of the 
radicle. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari conceptualizes these three kinds of 
organization: (1) Tree-like or vertical organization with strict classification depending on a main 
root as its center (centric organization). (2) Radicle-like or semi-horizontal organization 




another (multi-centric organization) (3) Rhizomatic or transversal organization which doesn’t 
depend in any kind of root or point of reference, and its lines aren’t drawn between fixed points 
but go in between (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 2005, 1-26). Before that, in an 
essay called Transversality (1984 (1964)), Guattari distinguishes between three institutional 
cultures in psychotherapy: first, verticality and being hierarchical which has the voice of authority 
over patients; second, subjugated horizontality which Guattari describes as “a state of affairs in 
which things and people fit in as best they can with the situation in which they find themselves” 
(17), much like the organization culture of contemporary corporation of hypercapitalism; and 
third, transversality, an in-between state in which the movement between levels occurs and the 
heterogenous bodies come together in a machinic assemblage though subjectification processes. 
For Guattari, transversality as a relation can lead to the formation of subject-groups, a collective 
heterogeneous subject that not only lacks leadership or hegemony, but also is based on 
difference and liberated desire. He writes: 
Transversality in the group is a dimension opposite and complementary to the structures that 
generate pyramidal hierarchization and sterile ways of transmitting messages. Transversality is 
the unconscious source of action in the group, going beyond the objective laws on which it is 
based, carrying the group's desire. (ibid 22) 
Arditi sees this transversal rhizomatic organization in the networks of contagion in the Occupy 
movements where “nodes communicate with another without necessarily passing through a 
single core or even a series of hubs.” Something that, returning to Clausewitz, maximize the 
capacity of resistance against erasure by the enemy forces, because if the core or multiple hubs 
are destroyed, the virus continue to follow the path of contagion and affect more and more 
bodies, forming the dividual patchwork body of the whole movement. Contagion forms "a map 
that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and 
exits" (D&G-21) 
The patchwork body of heterogenous elements, positioned equally in terms of both power and 
expression, seems to be temporary though, if it does not follow by a constant care and 




of No pasarán in Spanish civil war, we know that in near future, the leader of the nationalist 
forces would shout that "Hemos pasado" ("We have passed"). 
To care for the monstrous body of a performative event is an endeavor in time and space, or 













5 Chapter Four: Time-Spaces of the Performative Event 
 
5.1 The POV of Time-Spaces 
 
An occupy movement is above all an occupation of time and space by a certain collective body. 
The difference of occupy movements with previous forms of social protests was exactly a 
difference in dealing with time and space. As we have seen, two Greek activist-scholars point to 
this difference about Athens 2011 movement by explaining that “the classic urban tactics of 
demonstration (marching in a linear fashion, protesting in front of the Parliament, dispersing 
after the end of the demonstration) or confrontation (like throwing marbles, stones, and molotov 
cocktails against the police and destroying symbolic targets like banks, multinational commercial 
chains etc. )” (Kambouri and Hatzopoulos) have been secondary in the performative struggles of 
anti-austerity protests.  
Occupy movements have invented a new form of protest that was processual and durational on 
one hand, and site-specific on the other hand, as we have explained in the discussion on 
Aesthetics in Chapter 3. They insist on a space, trying to transform and reshape it while being 
shaped by its dynamics. They subsist in a duration of time, trying to reclaim it in their molding of 
new subjectivities. And in this time-space, a patchwork monstrous body emerged, breathed and 
developed until its ultimate disappearance. 
In previous chapter, we discussed the patchwork character of collective bodies in a performative 
event. Therefore, we need to understand the time-space proper to such collective body; a time-
space that could host the new body that is not only human, but integrated the elements in its 
surrounding, a time-space that could explain the contagious relationality exists in the formation 
of those collective bodies, a time-space in which the affirmative monstrosity lives in. 
Time and space cannot and should not be considered as totally separated categories. Earlier in 
the course of this thesis, it was explained that these are aesthetical categories and as such, social 
relationalities that form the positions of subjects. An established order (re)territorializes and 




reproductive code on the surface of collective bodies, in order to achieve the imagined national 
collective body. However, when such coding is halted in a performative event, the time-space is 
becoming deterritorialized, too.  
The deterritorialization of time-space in contemporary Occupy Movements that have been 
revisited in this research have happened in various forms and in response to different local 
conditions. From a general point of view, they have exhibited a resistance toward modern nation-
state conservatism, which is itself a reaction to the untamable constituent power of the 
heterogenous collective body; a deterritorializing force that evades total control. Thus, “the 
modernist desire for stability and permanence is one which arises in the midst of a society 
constantly changing and recreating itself and is a reaction against these conditions" (Burkitt 131). 
The altermodern desire is not desiring its own blockage, as the modernist desire does by 
reproducing the State and its conscious agent, the imagined nation. The altermodern desire 
comes from a patchwork monstrous body that claims its freedom and agency.  
On the other hand, there is a globalist tendency, the so-called post-modern globalization that 
made another effect paradoxical to that desire for stability.  
On one hand, as Ian Burkitt argues, social relations are in contemporary times “mediated to such 
an extent that they becoming fleeting and unspecific to either time or place” and the modernist 
idea of a self has been transformed to a post-modern “the product of images that are created in 
the nexus of relations” (132), or as it was discussed through Klossowski in previous chapter, are 
created as stereotypical images on the surface of collective bodies.  
This unspecificity to either time and place, being effected in an economy of image production, is 
already established through a globalized neoliberal economy that not only causes an erasure of 
public spaces but also performs a constant capture of people’s time with value-creating activities: 
from freelance, flexible, or in fact timeless jobs that are blurring any former modernist division 
between labour time and leisure time for the sake of extracting more profit, to entertainment 
industry that needs people as constant consumers of immense (re)production of entertaining 
programs on TVs, Internet, Cinemas, theatres, operas, exhibitions, street festivals, paper-back 




of turning any politics into an entertainment, as the US 2016 election and its subsequent White 
House politics have shown an American style of reality TV show as politics.  
Apart from these, the post-colonial governments in the Middle Eastern countries have continued, 
through their modernization aka imitation policies, to homogenize the time-space toward a 
linear, elitist and suppressive understanding of progress. This is a more important aspect in the 
occupy movements struggles in those countries, as they have tried to uphold their imagined 
naturalized homogenous national collective body that was thoroughly explained in the previous 
chapter. While transforming the imagined exclusionary collective body, those occupy 
movements had to also transform the social relationality constitutive of such bodily organization, 
i.e. the time-space.  
In this chapter, for the sake of a clear analysis, we will focus separately on the time and the space 
of performative events regarding the separate levels of contextual analyses that was mentioned 
in previous paragraphs, but we will argue for a concept inspired by Bakhtin and Latour, 
“kairotope”, that relates these two social relationalities in one mixture.  
 
5.2 Time Wars 
 
Many of people whom I interviewed had one thing in common: the occupy movement marked a 
turning point in their life and divided it into a before and an after “the” event. For many of them 
who stayed a few days or more in the occupation site, their time as an active participant of the 
movement has been the most “wonderful” experience of their life, and as such, it offered them 
another sense of perceiving time, different in nature from any other time they spent in labour or 
leisure. The same feeling has always been mentioned regarding other important personal life 
events, like wedding nights or the days one becomes mother or father.  
This difference in nature has been a focus of critical thought for a long time; or rather, there has 
been a war on “time” at least in the modern era.  However, as our earlier discussions on time and 





5.2.1 Dominant Temporality 
The war on time challenges its dominant perception and use in different layers. On one hand, 
there has been an ontological war in a history of conceptualizing time. Critical thinkers go back 
as far as Ancient Greece to question the Western foundations of perceiving and theorizing time. 
On the other hand, the critique of capitalism and its system of social relations have made time a 
focal point of its struggle. Marx relates the production of value directly to a productive time that 
has been quantified and divided as a measure for value, for he believes that “economy of time, 
to this all economy ultimately reduces itself” (Grundrisse 173). 
Ancient Greek philosophy defined time as a measure, subjected to the space. For Aristotle for 
example, time was a measure of the quantity of motions, and since there is a multiplicity of 
motions, there is a multiplicity of time. Time did not have an ontological status to explain in itself 
the world of motions. Being devoid of the creative power, time became a negative force in 
Aristotle, as an origin of decay.  
Time in and of itself is the origin of decay; time is the number of motion, changing movement 
however brings that which is towards its collapse. (Physics  221b1–2 qtd. in Murchadha 13) 
The time as measure for movement was defined based on space, both extensive quantities 
dividable into measurable units.61 Xenon’s paradox was a product of such an image of thought: a 
maximum subordination of time to space.  
In their search for an ultimate criterion or standard for measuring all motions against it, the 
ancients also conceptualized an ideal, absolute motion. In “Timaeus” (360 BC), Plato dramatizes 
this perception of time. There, the character of Timaeus of Locri describes the World Soul as two 
crossing circles: the outer circle, to which the primacy is given, is the circle of the Sameness, 
undivided, motionless and unchangeable; the inner circle, the circle of Difference is divided into 
seven circles that are in motion with either equal speeds or constant relative speeds. The circle 
of Difference consists of heavenly bodies and it functions as the measure of all other motions, as 
 




it is eternal and infinite, immutable and permanent. In this Platonic schema, time is in time-less 
subjection to eternity as “originary time”.  
Interestingly enough, Timaeus dialogue discusses cosmology and time in order to finally define 
the “good polis”, the place of ideal Platonic politics. Here, it starts with the principle “the relation 
of being to becoming is of truth to belief”, follows with the definition of time as “the moving 
image of eternity” and of eternity as the being immune to becoming. The eternal truth then is 
immutable, too, and it functions as the foundation of Platonic “good polis”. This is an eventless 
time, as Negri argues: 
[In classical thought] time is the mobile image of the immobility of being. In this tradition, time is 
thus an extrinsic modality: it presents itself as illusion or as a measure, never as event, never as a 
this here. (Time for Revolution 148) 
This conception of time serves the conservative war against contingency. The claim on universal 
and eternal truths has continued well into the contemporary world, especially with its 
corresponding perception of time as measure in the modern era, and a continuity and reversal 
in the direction of spatialization of time. However, one should be careful not to presuppose a 
linear historical continuity between the ancients and the moderns, which will be a trap of the 
same perception of time we are criticizing. As Antonio Negri writes,  
It is true, in antiquity we have absolute (Plato), relative (Atomists) and hybrid (Aristotle) theories 
of time, but they should not be confused with the absolute (Newton), relative (Einstein) or hybrid 
theories of modernity, because the epistemological framework has been completely modified. 
(ibid 101). 
One phantasm, a dominancy of one impulsive force, has nonetheless continued between these 
two separate epistemological frameworks: the war against contingency. 
The dominant temporality, as critical thought has formulated, resulted from an attempt to do 
away with contingency. In modern times, this amounts to the nationalist projects of nation-state 
making and of eugenical policies toward the biopolitical ideal of the homogenous body, as we 




As Manuel De Landa’s etymology of contingency shows, it is composed of two elements, “con-” 
meaning together (con-, another form of com, as in common) and “tangere-”, that is "to touch": 
“contingency brings togetherness and body or sensation into the time: a paradigm of time which 
includes contingency in itself implies collectivity.” 
We have argued in previous chapter that the linking in a collective body is contingent, as it comes 
through affect and affection relationality, a togetherness of touches. The contingency in time 
breaks down the nationalist modernization agenda based on a mythological origin for a 
homogenous body in a path of so-called progress. 
To avoid contingency, time had to be fully determined. And a full determination of time meant 
adopting a linear perception, where what has been actualized is all that is real, and the future is 
built on this totally determined time as past. In Manuel De Landa’s words,  
with the final mathematization of classical physics in the nineteenth century, a certain dominant 
picture of the world emerged, in which clockwork determinism reigned supreme and time played 
no creative role, so that the future was effectively closed, completely given in the past. (Deleuze, 
Diagrams and the Open-Ended 29) 
This chronological view of time presents a line of succession between past, present and future, 
where time is still thought as “spatial segmentations of a continuum that are themselves 
immobile” (Rodowick 81). The Newtonian conception of time, very much a Kantian one, 
bestowed an independence to time (being considered by the variable of t in mathematical 
equations for mechanics), but it still kept it as a dividable quantity that functions as a measure of 
movement. As De Landa states, “time-variable refers to a simple instant or a chronologic period 
of time (not duration), always divides time into measurable segments of three distinct respective 
qualities: past, present, and future.” (Deleuze, Diagrams … 29) 
This was the dominant empirical as well as transcendental form of time; the one that “is always 
already determined” and “is given either as calculated intervals of movement or as a whole 




Regarding this conception that became dominant in the modern empirical sciences, critiques 
point to a synthesis between the ancients and the moderns, or Greek and Christian traditions. 
Casarino for instance defines dominant temporality as “the unhappy offspring of the arranged 
marriage between, on the one hand, the circular and cyclical time of Greco-Roman antiquity, and, 
on the other hand, the continuous and linear time of Christianity” and cites Aristotle and Hegel 
as the two main figures of such conception. (Time Matters 220)  
For Hegel, “time ... is the thing existing which is not when it is, and is when it is not”; a definition 
that witnesses to the conception of time as homogeneous and quantifiable succession of instants 
where the present instant is past as it happens and leads to the future as it perishes, finding “its 
realization and fulfillment only in the next instant … as it negates itself.” (Casarino 237) This is the 
temporality of progress, as we have already explained in second chapter. Here time is given in 
the form “of measure and accountability, of command and function”. (Negri, 48) 
The ideology of progress wants to turn time into a measurable quantity in order to quantify and 
evaluate labor. As Casarino points to, Hegelian definition of time bears similarity to Marx’s 
definition of money, as which is not when it is, and is when it is not. Hence the famous motto of 
capitalist societies: time is money. As such, time becomes the temporality of money-circulation 
and does not have any creative power to introduce the new – the time of reproduction. Instead, 
it becomes a temporality of debt, since “such a process of circulation leads to a society ruled by 
debt and to a definition of the human as always already indebted” (244). The occupiers in Athen’s 
square were reclaiming their time to fight the imposed definition of being indebted. 
The previous chapter started with a reference to another occupy movement: OWS protestors 
who sealed their mouth with dollar notes, arguing how body has become a living currency. The 
dominant temporality of money-circulation affects body toward such a function. If capital is a 
social relation, time of circulation is an element of its social relationality, and as an atomized 
chain of fleeting instants proper to the system of wage labour, it contributes to the dominant 




Extraction of relative surplus value is not just about the division of the worker’s working day 
between the necessary labour part and the surplus labour part: it also revolutionizes from top to 
bottom both the technical processes of labour and the social groupings. (Marx and Foucault 18) 
The time of wage labour is also the time of discipline, or as Michael Hardt calls it, “prison time”, 
since modernist definition of freedom is the control over one’s time, and many avant-garde art 
strategies has also shown a focus on the leisure as creativity against the reproductive function of 
labour time: 
Prison takes our time in precisely determined quantities. Like the equations between labor-time 
and value, our society sets up an elaborate calculus familiar to all of us between crime and prison-
time. Theft of a car equals six months; sale of illegal drugs equals five years; murder equals ten 
years (Prison Time). 
Such a temporality is thus of inscribing the code of the everyday signs on the body62. Therefore, 
the everyday itself had to become an empty repetition of quantifiable time-units. As Susan 
Stewart describes it,  
temporality of everyday life is marked by an irony which is its own creation, for this temporality 
is held to be ongoing and non-reversible and, at the same time characterized by repetition and 
predictability. (On Longing 14) 
The inscription of the machinic code on body, including the dominant temporal codification, 
brings out a memory of a conscious agent (as we remember from the previous chapter, a memory 
of bodily technics, discursive abilities, and so on) through which bodies are inserted into the 
socius. Deleuze and Guattari consider this memory as the necessary condition of “synergy of man 
and his technical machines”, and clock as a social machine to effect such a code, “as a technical 
machine for measuring uniform time, and as a social machine for reproducing canonic hours and 
for assuring order in the city.” (Anti-Oedipus 155) 
As an element of social relationality, temporality is then always political. Therefore, the modern 
state attempted to regulate the temporality of the social in line with regulation of bodies and 
 




space to ensure a certain vertical, hierarchical economy of power, value and desire. According to 
Antonio Negri, the central Hobbesian condition of establishing the state is the condition of 
“organization and of command over the time of life”. (Time for Revolution 83) 
“Power in our society is above all power over our time” (Hardt, Prison Time 65), each in its own 
singular context, and “is invested directly into time as a series of disciplines, regimentations, 
orderings” (ibid 64). The command over the time of life turns everyday time as one that when is 
spent, it seems to “have no duration, no substance because of … the homogeneity, the lack of 
novelty” (ibid 65).  
But the contemporary transformations in the regime of production and the immaterialization of 
labour have had certain consequences on the understanding of time as well. Putting the cognitive 
and immaterial faculties of human beings at the center of production, the globalized capitalism 
gives a certain autonomy to labour force, deterritorializes disciplinary borders limiting the 
creative potentialities, and unleashes a source of cooperation and collective construction. Calling 
the workers of late capitalism as “social workers”, Negri recognizes the temporality of their 
labour as both a means of subjection and a potentiality for liberation – one is the temporality of 
the machinic enslavement and the other is the temporality of the machinic assemblages in a 
revolutionary machine: 
The time of the social worker presents itself here as a relation between expansive times, as a 
relation between different but concurrent velocities. The relation of diverse times has two 
fundamental aspects: the first is that which is taken up by the assemblages of struggle and 
recomposition under the sign of the conditions of exploitation and of its asymmetrical effects; the 
second is that of individual liberation, of collective constitution and of the corporeality of the 
associative and co-operative relations. (Time for Revolution 104) 
Thus, contemporary capitalism’s apparent paradox is its subsequent attempt to reterritorialize 
all the created value inside the territory of capital. Negri summarizes this paradox in what he 




The process has three fundamental characteristics: it must be endogenous to the system; it must 
be continuously productive of functions and systemic innovations; and it must reach equilibrium 
(ibid 49). 
We already discussed the fallacies of a thermodynamics of equilibrium, arguing in favor of a 
thermodynamics far from equilibrium that can register the performative, virtual forces of 
transformation, preceding the actualized products of performativizations (see Chapter One 41). 
The total control and management of time is not possible. The creative time flashes itself out in 
performative events, even if as transitory as a lightening. According Casarino, the Aristotelian-
Hegelian enslavement of time to space formed the dominant temporality of modern nation-
states in order “to neutralize time’s most fructiferous and disquieting aspects.” (225)  
That is why reclaiming time becomes a critical point for revolutionary projects. For Lazzarato, 
“the big problem, clearly, is the political struggle with respect to time: the plasticity of the 
political” (Grasping the Political 12); a plasticity that breaks down the naturalized hierarchy in 
national collective body and creates the altermodern patchwork body; a plasticity that destroys 
the prison time, the temporality that “lies at the heart of our social order” (Hardt, Prison Time 
64), as the necessary condition for altermodernities to come.  
If the empty time imprisons us, then a revolutionary project should consist of the constitution of 
a new time, “a new rhythm of living”, and this is a transformation that is “both material and 
immaterial” (ibid 64), that is performative. Or as Agamben would say, “the original task of a 
genuine revolution, therefore, is never merely to 'change the world' but also – and above all – to 
‘change time’.” (Infancy and History 91) 
To put it more exactly, it is a war on time as we started this chapter with. It is an attempt to 
construct a new paradigm of temporality, one that accounts for the becomings, the creative 
power of time and its ontogenetical status. A temporality that affirms the singularity of each 
moment, and the novelty for everyday life: 
We can only experience time become homogeneous and without qualities while staring at the 




moment is unlike any other and will never return – experience is thereby atomized and put out of 
reach as even time is commodified by the measure of the hourly wage (Tepper). 
Following previous discussions in previous chapter, to experience is to experiment, it is the 
moment that the code of the everyday signs becomes defunct and the monstrous body is 
breeding in the chaos of liberated social relations. Therefore, we are seeking the time of the 
performative event. 
 
5.2.2 Time of the Performative Event: A Return to the Future  
The present instant is not a spatialized immobile unit in a sequence of such interchangeable, 
homogenous units. Indeed, as Rodowick reminds us through Deleuze, “closer attention to the 
present shows that there is real movement, a movement of becoming which is the pure form of 
time as change.” For Deleuze, the present splits into two heterogenous direction, past and future.  
In his video installation series titled “Time Machine!” (2002-2004), Japanese Artist, Masayuki 
Akamatsu, tried to capture the split in each moment of time: the split of the past and the future 
in the present. Using a sophisticated video processing program, Akamatsu placed a DV camera in 
front to record the live image of a visitor, and then the digitally mutated and transformed image 
was projected on a screen facing the visitor. Using a jog wheel controller that allows them to jog 
through video media, visitors could interact with the installation and modify the projected image. 
Each movement of visitor’s body was projected with a delay and the delayed image also 
contained virtual multiplication of that movement in various spaces of the surface. The digitalized 
projected video included even other directions of the same movements. Visitors could see an 
image either from an immediately past moment, coming into even farther past and including 
“other people who might have been there together with them” (Ars Electronica 2004), or 
returning to the present moment, as if returning into its future (see Murray). Even in the present 
image, the multiplication of the body movements into different directions and spaces of the 
surface made one think as if some potentialities of the present had been activated in an obscure 




In other words, the act of “returning to the future” had been happening in each present moment 
of the projected image by splitting the present image into two immanent directions so that the 
temporality of the image was an immanence of the past, the present, and the future in relation 
to each other. “[Time] has to split the present in two hetergenous directions”, writes Deleuze, 
“one of them is launched toward the future while the other falls into the past.” (Cinema 2: The 
Time-Image 81) 
Timelessness, the quality of being immeasurable, then, is the state of time in such a split moment. 
This unique temporality of a return to the future in the present is the temporality of an event.  
“Who would have believed it! / we are told that new Joshuasat the foot of every tower,/ as though 
irritated with/ time itself, fired at the dials/ in order to stop the day.” (On the Concept of History, 
Thesis XV) 
This poem, as Walter Benjamin recounts the event, was written by an eye-witness of French 
Revolution of July 1830, where the clocks in the towers of Paris were being fired on in several 
places simultaneously, but as a result of separate initiatives; as if time was irritating, as if day had 
to be stopped.  
Just like the drama Benjamin presents about the temporality of a revolution, an event causes an 
interruption in the existing dominant time of the situation. “At that moment, there is a stop, a 
suspension”, writes Blanchot, “history is interrupted” (Disorderly Words 205). We will return to  
this discussion.  
The interruption, as it was discussed in previous chapters, comes with a performative event. 
According to our discussion in Chapter Three, the performative event is as an aesthetic-political 
happening. In other words, according to Whitehead for example, each event is aesthetical when 
it works on time/space, folds onto them and folds them; and it is also political, because of the 
participation, or partaking of bodies in these time/space relations, transforming them and being 
transformed by them. 
Event is relational, too. It acts on the relations between different elements inside it, for example 




an economy of process full of both oneness and manyness. In a political reformulation, for 
example, indigenous Zapatista movement in Mexico has expressed its desire of transforming the 
existing reality in this slogan: “A world in which many worlds fit” (Conant).  This relation between 
oneness and manyness, or the One and the multiple makes a distinction, as we will see, between 
two kinds of “return to the future”.  
The interruption of the time is nevertheless ambivalent, for it can present at least two relations 
between the past, the present, and the future, correspondingly to two distinct conceptions of 
the One and the Many.  
Alain Badiou, for instance, interprets this interruption as a will to future. “What will come to be” 
is the time of event, because for him the event is the process of unveiling truth (identified with 
Lacan’s the real) from beneath the covers of already-established symbolic order and is therefore, 
“decoupled” from existing temporal relations. Therefore, the past as the determined or the old 
is completely subtracted from the present and only a “will have been”, a future perfect for 
signifying the break as completed, will remain to embrace the new.  
But the old will eventually prevail again, if a fidelity to the truth does not exist. It is not a fidelity 
to an ahistorical truth such as an essence or a bureaucratic State after a revolution that would 
turn it into a fidelity to the old. Rather, it is a fidelity to a historically determined truth of a 
situation, to the possibility of the impossible. In this way, it does not have any actual object; on 
the contrary, it is a fidelity to the fidelity itself.  
Therefore, there is indeed a “return to the future” in Badiou’s event; a future of truth which is 
still to come. But one should be careful that, as Homi Bhabha warns, sometimes in a situation, 
“in order to maintain consistency, events are constantly re-enunciated, new pasts constantly 
drawn to justify the changing image of the present: cultural reinscription thus ‘moves back to the 
future’ by means of projective pasts which activate new histories.” (Monaldi 27) If the past is 
completely subtracted from the temporality of the event, if event is actually a “radically new 






5.2.2.1 Multiplicity without One 
Badiou’s conception of timelessness of event corresponds to his ontological claim that being is 
multiple. Then, any presence of the One amounts to a totalitarian reduction of the multiple into 
a false Whole. Therefore, Badiou has to found the Being on the void, rather than on a full, positive 
Being. The set theory gives him a proper tool, in which on one hand, all sets derive from the 
empty set, the subset of every set, and on the other hand, the size of each set is defined by 
counting of elements in it. The cardinality or the number is the proper expression of multiplicity, 
Badiou believes, for “multiplicity must be pure quantity (no quality) if it is to generate the 
paradoxes that condition the possibility of an event; and it must be homogenous and empty if it 
is to be the basis for a truly universalist politics” (Mullarkey 171). Set theory is then the language 
of ontology.  
Being speculated on such ontology, reality is thus a human situation as a set, which has a State, 
and the membership operation in it signifies the existence of something and the subset operation 
expresses the representation of the member by the State. If an element belongs to a set, but is 
not its subset, then it is not represented by the State; it is a singularity, a carrier of truth – which 
is not representational and functions as a void in the symbolic order – that event gives it visibility 
and countability, and it becomes a subject of the event, faithful to its truth. On the other hand, 
truth should itself be declared and named by the subject, and therefore, the individuated and 
individual subject and Truth come out together in an event. So, the event is a transformation of 
numerical, quantitative relations between elements in a way that everybody is counted, and 
there exists a pure indifference to any qualitative difference: an affirmation of the pure multiple, 
outside of any logic of the One. From this viewpoint, event is an interruption of time, but as the 
qualitative differences are cancelled, the temporality as such does not exist: it is the time of the 
infinite. 
 
5.2.2.2 The Multiple One 
But event can be timeless from a different point of view. As we said, an event for Benjamin is an 




comes in a form of a singular jetztzeit, a Kairos (or Cairós or Aion), a star in a constellation of the 
history, whereas history is often written to emphasize the linear Chronos, the teleological time 
of sciences that is based on the idea of progress. But ontologically, what is constituent of being 
in time is not the chronological time, for “history is the object of a construction whose place is 
formed not in homogenous and empty time, but in that which is fulfilled by the here-and-now” 
(On the Concept of History, Thesis XIV). Jetztzeit is measureless and uncountable; and since it is 
constituent of historical situations, then ontologically a situation cannot be defined by 
quantitative multiplicities of a set. Rather than forming a void in the situation as Badiou would 
say, interruption of an event is therefore the actualization of a potentiality in the past, of a 
singularity-star. It intervenes as constituted power, destroying the already actual constituted 
Power of the situation, the whole system of counting and numbers.  
Badiou’s quantitative perspective on multiplicity renders his conception of time closer to the 
capitalist time, however with a more Platonic tone through his notion of absolute truth. For 
Badiou, event becomes an intrusion of Platonic transcendental time, the immobile eternity, the 
immutable Truth that stands above the immanence, into the current order of the things, which – 
according to him – is the field of bodies and languages.  
Badiou’s claim that there is a truth versus bodies and languages based on a presupposition: 
“there are only bodies and languages. This statement is the axiom of contemporary conviction.” 
(Bodies, Languages Truths) He ascribes this axiom to the contemporary thought, mostly to the 
tradition that this research draws from, which itself is too heterogenous to be totalized in such 
an axiom. However, there is another presupposition inherent in that presupposition: a duality 
between bodies and languages. As we have already discussed thoroughly in previous chapter, 
there is a productive relation between the performative-affective-bodily sign and the linguistic 
sign, latter as the product of the former. We also discussed how truth emerges out of a certain 
organization of impulsive forces. Ignoring this dynamic, the immobile eternity becomes the time 
of Badiou’s truth, and political liberation happens in an incessant segmentation of existing time 
with the negative edge of eternity’s blade, cutting through the imagined homogenous surface of 
bodies and languages. For Badiou, truth functions as “a faithful reflection of a static world of 




But does Benjamin’s Jetztzeit capture this dynamic, or is it a single instant in a chain of eternal 
repetition of empty spatialized temporal units? If Jetztzeit is a fulfillment of a past potentiality, 
what is a return to the future? For more on this, we take a closer look at the concept of Kairos.  
 
5.2.2.3 Kairos 
If there is always a war between the constituent power and its constituted possibilities, then 
kairos is the moment that the constituent power reveals the potentiality beyond the existing 
order, waging a new war toward it. It is an opening toward an alternative temporality that is often 
met with police brutality, military oppression, and all other means of State’s exclusive law-
protecting violence that aims to close it up again. 
Reinhart Koselleck reads Kairos besides crisis. It is the moment of a “crisis refers both to the 
observable condition and to the judgment (judicium) about the course of the illness. At such a 
time, it will be determined whether the patient will live or die” (qtd. in Alloa 201). This critical 
moment of determination, of war, is charged with another future: a future not already 
determined by the existing order.  
For Saint Paul, Kairos is the moment of deciding the faith. According to his perspective,  
Murchadha explains, “Kairos is not ‘contained’ in the future; rather it is the moment (Augenblick) 
between past and future; it is the temporal dimension of decision” in which “the decision of faith 
is already living.” (14) Paul used the term Kairos as the messianic time extending from the event 
of Resurrection, calling for a new future in terms of a new dividing line. Paul, a Jewish and a 
roman citizen, declares that the line is not any more between Jewish and Roman people, or any 
other ethnicity or religion, but between those who believe in Jesus and those who not (see 
Badiou, Saint Paul). He brings the past as a whole to the presence for a future already virtually 
there. A new plane of immanency for a new war, a new history, and a new temporality.  
Origen also uses Kairos as that moment when the prophecy is fulfilled, and a new period begins: 




Time, on the scale of days, is thoroughly homogenized by and on the model of the clock and 
natural time, while on the scale of years and ages … there remain traces of a qualitative experience 
of time – in holidays – the repetition of which was, in fact, an archaic signification of the word 
“revolution.” (Tepper 5) 
The same moment happened in Laylat al-Qadr (لیلة القدر) when Quran was first revealed to 
Muhammad, and the prophecy was fulfilled. But al-Qadr (القدر) also means literally measure, and 
comes from the same root with the words power, value, decree, and destiny. In that night, a new 
line was drawn that was rooted in the Kairos of revealing the power that decrees, evaluates, and 
makes things anew by ascribing a new destiny through a new war. The Quran says: “ O’ Humanity! 
Without doubt We have created you from a male and a female and have made you into various 
nations and tribes, so that you may come to know and understand one another. Definitely the 
most honoured among you in the sight of Allah is the one who is the most Allah-Consciousness”. 
Drawing the new line between those who are conscious of Allah and who are not, Quran mostly 






 as its audience. It is the difference that makes [...ٌيا أ
the people of a new future. 
The problem is that such a transcendent kairos bring eschatology into time. It truly interrupts the 
chronological understanding of time, that time subjected to the natural movement of heavenly 
bodies, and brings the past and future into the present, but it homogenized time as a whole by 
subjugating it to the transcendent. No more heterogeneity is allowed in the course of time, even 
though the new time is itself founded on heterogeneity. That is why when religion became an 
institution, its civil war was appropriated by the State–form entities – the disaster that plagues 
the post Arab Spring societies.  
A critical re-evaluation of the time of event in Badiou and Benjamin opens a way toward another 






5.2.2.4 Kairos and The Open Future 
Badiou maintains that an event witnesses to an unfulfilled past and an undetermined future. 
From this perspective, he criticizes those views on occupy movements that analyze them as an 
expression of a will to European liberal values, arguing that it is self-paradoxical if future of a 
revolutionary movement were already determined and thus foreseeable. There is simply nothing 
new in what has been already established. 
Nonetheless, his theory does not live up to this claim. According to the aforementioned 
discussion, Badiou’s theory of the new rests on the operation of subtraction: the determined past 
is subtracted from the present and only a “will have been”, a future perfect for signifying the 
break as completed, will remain to embrace the new. The future is not an open whole, but a 
subtraction of past from present with the blade of eternal truth. Investing on the negative 
through subtraction, such a theory does not explain the creative power of time and the to-come. 
It does not recognize a definition of time as affirmative becoming. And it does not explain how 
an alternative temporality could emerge.  
As it was discussed before, Badiou considers kairos in a heterogenous plane regarding bodies and 
languages, which for him form the homogenous plane of logos – the realm of the law, order and 
authority. But as Rowan Tepper explains, the relation between kairos to logos is not a matter of 
contrast, but a temporalization of a formerly presupposed eternal logos in the unique moment 
of Kairos, or as De Landa would say, a plasticization of the political, revealing that no single 
actualization of an idea in logos (as the plane of representation) exhausts totally its performative 
and virtual forces. 
This becoming-temporal and becoming-contingent of the eternal, unconditional logos within 
Kairos is not merely the truth of time or a historical category, but it is the moment in which time 
becomes history (Tepper 7) 
The linguistic signs are frozen performative signs of bodies. Logos in the moment of Kairos goes 





On the other hand, a problem of Benjaminian Jetztzeit, Negri argues, is that it describes only the 
current temporality of capitalism.  
Capital not only presents itself as measure and as system, it presents itself as progress … political 
economy is entirely directed towards drawing the innovative element that history - in any case - 
produces into the time of administration (accumulation like administration, reversible time, 
eternal return, and cyclical-ness). Now-time, innovative precision, utopia: capital considers them 
as its own. Progress is the eternal return lit-up by a flash of a now-time (Time for Revolution 110). 
According to Negri, Benjaminian Jetztzeit remains a form of time-as-measure and does not 
capture the gradual temporality of the constituent power; the processual franchissement of 
limits of being that for Negri happens at the arrow of time, another meaning of Kairos, always 
toward an open future. In other words, “after its sudden, glorious, and only too episodic flare— 
[Jetztzeit] is retranslated into quantified and measured time, and hence flattened back into the 
relentless march of progress precisely because it was only a flash” (Casarino 234) 
In Benjamin, Kairos thus becomes a momentary flash, a shining star of eternal truth, that forms 
an alternative history in a constellation of stars. There are after all similarities between the 
immobility of such constellation as the measure of history’s suppressed truth and Plato’s eternity 
of heavenly bodies. Moreover, Jetztzeit does not have any duration: it is an insurrectional time 
that either functions as a hiatus to the dominant temporality or its exaltation with an innovative 
moment. 
On the other hand, Kairos is an actualization of a potential unrealized in the past. Although that 
potential was a promise for an alternative future, Benjaminian’s Kairos – without including the 
dimension of duration – is an immanence of present in the past, keeping future closed, as its 
designated name, Jetztzeit, speaks for it.  
Referring to Benjamin’s dramatization of time with the figure of Angelus Novus, Negri sides with 
the open future: 
Matter discovers its hardness there where temporality decides of being, to create new being at 




is where the Angelas Novas is also presented to us: the angel does not look back, but ahead, 
proceeding in the storm (Time For Revolution 180). 
In this research, one position has been reaffirmed constantly: static elements, above all State, 
are a product of a process of becoming, of virtual forces and performative transformative power. 
The time of the performative event, its Kairos, should attest to such a conception of time. As 
Negri asserts, “any correct phenomenology of the events gathered ... shows us that at this level 
mobility, asymmetry, irreversibility - a multiversal horizon - are already given due to the liberation 
of ontological time itself.” 
Both Badiou and Benjamin have been criticized for their anthropocentric thought, which cannot 
explain such a “multiversal horizon”, traversing the human and the inhuman, the animate and 
the inanimate in a network that circulates and sustains life force. In other words, they could not 
challenge the hierarchy of Being, established in the Western thought. We have discussed through 
the patchwork collective bodies of occupy movements that non-human elements are as much in 
the network of life forces as human bodies. An anthropocentric thought, even if it criticizes those 
discourses that presupposes a human essence and thus, universal human values, as both 
Benjamin and Badiou have done partially, falls nonetheless in the trap of human essentialism. 
And when essence exists, future is already defined by essential potentialities. 
The notion of government of things was suggested to do away with the essentialist 
anthropocentric view and the object-subject divide. This non-essentialist paradigm contributes 
to an understanding of an open future that exists in the tradition of thought this research inspires 
most from: the Spinozist thinking of immanence.  
To open the world is to reject essentialism: if essence existed, the past would be eternity and the 
future already defined by the always the same essences. Therefore, if essences are non-existent, 
objects cannot be objects as defined by the long tradition of philosophy. That is why Deleuze says 
"I don't believe in objects" (De Landa 31). 
Disbelief in object is an affirmation of those virtual processes that actualize in a certain time and 
space, but not exhausted by that actualization. In other words, it argues for a processual genesis 




performative interplay of difference of intensities. De Landa argues that a theory of the genesis 
of form could be built “on the basis of processes of becoming driven by intensity differences” 
(21) and prioritizes what has been called performativization in this research: 
most of the important philosophical insights can be grasped only during the process of 
morphogenesis, that is, before the final form is actualized, before the difference disappears (32). 
Difference is the becoming through which experience (of a Versucher) takes shape: 
performativization is above all differentiation. And the “world” it aims to create is a different 
world: not different in degrees but different in nature. Such a project entails a total 
reconceptualization of time in a way that an open future could be re-affirmed.  
 
5.2.2.5 Kairos and Hiatus 
The performative event, as we argued before, comes with the interruption of the code that paves 
the way for the construction of the patchwork body and a reimagination of time-space. Event’s 
hiatus stops the time and implodes the linear temporality of progress. In Murchadha’s words, 
“chronology forms a continuity, a continuity which is suspended in the kairological moment.” 
(15) 
Therefore, Kairos and Chronos are different in nature63 or as Hippocrates states, “chronos is that 
in which there is kairos and kairos is that in which there is little Chronos.” (qtd. in Agamben, The 
Time That Remains 65) 
This is the same break of the performative event we have discussed in previous chapters, a 
Foucauldian dassujettissement (desubjectification) that signifies a break on that reproduction 
and paves way for the miraculous production, the creativity of the poor.  
 
63 Rowan Tepper traces the difference between Chronos and kairos in two German words Moment and Augenblick: 
“we generally see spatial metaphors, numerical and quantitative measure, and homogeneity/interchangeability 
associated with one word/concept (Chronos), while we encounter nonspatial (re-)presentations, intensive, 
qualitatively distinctions between times, as well as a heterogeneity that makes each moment or time unique and 




What is being stopped when dominant temporality stops? As for the body, its surface is flooded 
by stereotypes (frozen simulacra, resulting from phantasms) that the dominant hierarchy of 
forces, the constituted power, has produced and is reproducing through the conscious agent as 
its mediator. We referred to Wilhelm Reich’s notion of body armor that seals the individualized 
body and shields it from the flows of impulsive forces and the contagious affectivity of 
experimentation (which for him, like the idea of philosopher-Versucher that Nietzsche uses to 
refer to experimentation, has an erotic meaning). It is interesting that Kairos for Homer means 
“a part of the body, which is particularly vulnerable, due to a gap in the armour plating of a 
warrior. In battle, it is a particular success to hit that point with a spear”. (Murchadha 14) Being 
the moment of hiatus and rupture, Kairos creates that gap on the armor plating, make it possible 
to attack the gregariousness. Thus, desubjectification that comes with hiatus puts a stop on 
power’s grip on body.  
Dominant temporality, the prison time of capitalism is the measure of power, as discussed. Time 
is structured as if, Michael Hardt writes, “all is planned in advance by a higher power” which is 
why he also warns that “once a sovereign power has our time it is loath to let it go”. (Hardt, Prison 
Time 65) Kairos of the performative event liberates time from the inflexible grip of constituted 
power. It is “the moment of decision, in which the standards of the past are no longer in force” 
(Murchadha 15). 
Since the established norms and the code of the everyday are no longer in force in the 
performative event, its kairological time frees itself from subjection. It becomes an 
unconditioned time, an openness toward the new. According to Paul Tillich, “a moment of time, 
an event, deserves the name of Kairos, fullness of time in the precise sense, if it can be regarded 
in its relation to the Unconditioned, if it speaks of the Unconditioned, and if to speak of it is at 
the same time to speak of the Unconditioned.” (The Interpretation of History 82) Thus, Kairos as 
the moment of fullness of time is the momentary point of contact between the temporal-
conditional and the eternal-unconditional. Time becomes a performative social relation, freed 
from fixed points, flowing in-between bodies. But as this very argument shows, since the 




conditioned by the history in which it emerges. That is to say Kairos is a situated rupture and it is 
as historical as it forms the very possibility of another history. 
The power of forgetting, which Nietzsche considers contrary to gregariousness, emerges in such 
a moment of hiatus. In other words, Kairos is the moment that the memory fashioned by society 
for the sake of a continuous reproduction, forming through a machinic assemblage with the clock 
as a technical machine, is lost. In Kairos, “there occurs a forgetting of Chronos”. 
Therefore, Kairos is a moment of intensity, where intensity, as Klossowski explains, attacks the 
gregarious and creates a singular state64: 
depending on the strength of its intensity, however, this singular state, though anachronistic in 
relation to the institutional level of gregariousness, can bring about a de-actualization of that 
institution itself and denounce it in turn as anachronistic. (Vicious Circle 80) 
For Klossowski, following Nietzsche, this is an anachronistic moment as it brings with itself the 
future into the presence. It is as well a contemporary moment, because it bestows the present 
moment its fullness, its fulfillment: it is no more an empty moment in the succession of the 
same65. And with bringing the future into the presence, it effects a deactualization of institution 
“following a circuit of chance that Nietzsche will make the dimension of his thought” (ibid 64). 
Chance is the affirmation of contingency, of the untamable character of constituent time.  
As we remember from the previous chapter, the bodily mode of aesthesis opens up to the world 
in this moment – which we call Kairos now. In other words, Kairos opens a horizon of affectivity 
and an environment suitable for contagion. That is why Murchadha argues that in such a 
moment, “mood swings between hope and despair, Angst and joy” (8), which according to our 
terminology, refers to two general affects in Spinoza, the happy affect of active forces or the sad 
affect of reactive forces.  
 
64 See chapter four 
65 Giorgio Agamben defines “becoming contemporary” in Nietzsche as the ability to see the invisible light of the 
future; in other words, training and creating a new eye that can see the unseeable, the virtual forces that are present 
yet not actualized and bear a promise of to-come. (“What is the Contemporary?” in What is Apparatus and Other 




Thus, this has problematic aspects: when time stops and the established order’s coding is 
discontinued, the crisis begins, and chaos of a signification liberated from the Master Signifier 
can both lead to better or to worse: 
Danger arises from the discontinuity which characterizes the Kairos… The moment … can bring 
about a new beginning, but can equally lead to catastrophe. This is the kairological situation of 
revolutionary action: to enter a new order, to take part in a revolution, can lead to happiness and 
peace, but also to disappointment and war (Murchadha 15). 
In post-Arab Spring Middle East, both of these aspects came into existence: on one hand, it 
directed history toward altermodernities, as in the case of Kurdish movement, brought the future 
into the present, and made a world fit to the contemporary thought; on the other hand, it 
brought war and destruction, labour slavery in Libya and sexual slavery in Syria, as it went to the 
darkest ruins of the past. A stateless monster unleashed to claim the right of the aboriginal and 
a State monster appeared to homogenize an entire levant for a new nation-state in an old form.  
This does not represent a contradiction. On the contrary, it reaffirms the productive, ontological 
relation between a kairological temporality, where time retains its transformative power in form 
of becoming, and a “Kairos subsequently integrated into chronos” (Murchadha 16), recaptured 
by the continuity of time of progress.  
Although chronos is the quantified unit of time, it is just a moment like any other moments. As 
Hardt dramatizes it, hours and days of the chronological time resemble different points on an 
accordion. As much as they can extend, they can also fall back onto each other, as no 
differentiation exists between them, no intensity-difference as De Landa says. Therefore, it is 
only Kairos that “counts”. It is the fulfilled moment, the full moment, the moment that marks a 
differentiation. And that is why it explodes the continuity of dominant temporality as the 
reproduction of empty, unfulfilled moments.  
But each moment is singular, if lived fully. And through this conception of time, the everyday can 
be imagined differently, not as an empty repetition of a certain routine, but as a true experience 
of life – an experience of the everyday that the occupiers in various movements across the world 




established order too, because as Rowan Tepper writes, “as our time is apportioned, it becomes 
all too easy to forget that this moment is unlike any other and will never return”  
 
5.2.2.6 Kairos and Everyday 
Negri’s critique of Benjamin shows that an instantaneous break in time(-space), without a 
constituent aspect of restructuring temporality(-spatiality), can be well integrated into the 
dominant temporality, or suggests a mystical and mystifying reading of reality that aligns with 
the already produced imagination – the phantasms and stereotypes attached themselves to the 
hierarchical body66.  
Entertainment business and modern arts both used such a technic of alienating by making 
dominant temporality (the segmented, quantified labour time) stop. As leisure time starts, the 
imaginary rules the bodily perception of time. The modern theatre, for instance, presents an 
invitation to a new temporality that is set in motion by designating a special space to the theatre. 
Has it been a break from the dominant temporality or its imaginary reinforcement? A time 
disconnected from the daily life, sure, but as a time that was part of an economy of reproduction. 
And in the colonized countries, imaginary extension of colonial cultural dominancy. 
The occupation movements did not aim to set a stage in contrast to the daily life; on the contrary, 
they stayed there in order to create an alternative daily life, a daily life in which one controls its 
own time. The time of the daily life is managed differently. All the little things, cooking, cleaning, 
discussing, voting, following news, taking photos and videos with smart phones, all were done in 
a way that seemed to be miraculous and graceful even if they looked trivial before, a waste of 
time. A “wonderful” time, with each moment pregnant with a new experience of the daily life, 
because it was done in a self-organized, collective way, without the presupposed necessary 
patronizing role of the state and the outsourcing of power to it that has been said to be necessary.  
As Murchadha shows by tracing the notion of kairos in religious rituals and rites, “kairos is not to 
be confined only to world-changing events, but rather is constitutive of belonging to a 
 




community, indeed to a historical people.” (16) Indeed, this is the temporality of Carmelo Bene’s 
imagined popular theatre. Bene, who believed “the people are missing”, considered popular 
theater a theater that “does not represent the people; rather it anticipates a people who may 
not yet exist and whom the theater must help bring into existence” (Rodowick 141). Such a 
kairological time cannot be only a flash of discontinuity in chronological time. It also consists of 
a duration, a longevity proper to a process of constitution. Because change comes in the process, 
in the duration of an event. As Tillich argues, Kairos makes philosophy to deal with history, “not 
in terms of its logical and categorical structures only, but also in terms of its dynamics” and it 
points to “a new understanding of the meaning of history and life.” (Tillich, Systematic Theology 
369)  
If Kairos is the moment of a people’s formation, then its hiatus is related to what we have called 
in chapter three a machinic exodus. Exodus, as we argued, was not only a negation of established 
relations of production, but also an attempt to create a new sociality, a new conception of time-
space as social relationality. Kairos represents the moment of exodus, when the prophecy has 
been fulfilled for Moses in the action of taking the suppressed slaves out of Egypt and starting a 
process that a people was born out of it. As Massumi writes, “bodies in flight do not leave the 
world behind. If the circumstances are right, they take the world with them -- into the future.” (A 
User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia 105) 
On the other hand, Kairos is singular and as a singularity, it never exists individually. As Jean-Luc 
Nancy writes, “the singular is primarily each one and, therefore, also with and among all the 
others, the singular is a plural” (Being Singular Plural 32) and exactly like singular which has 
always been referred to as singuli (the plural form), one needs to talk about kairoi, a qualitative 
multiplicity where each kairos comes out of its own particular context and its own singular 
dynamics of creating altermodernity. On the other hand, to talk about kairoi is to talk about a 
time of everyday where every moment is at once experienced as singular and heterogeneous, or 
rather, a kind of everyday that affirms each moment as virtually singular, carrying the virtual force 
of an alternative, not-already-determined future. This multiplicity of kairoi presents time as a 
series of singular moments, an everyday full of wonders just like what the occupiers felt in the 




lives changed after the movements, was a historical now, a Jetztzeit, “a historical now is not an 
indifferent instant but a kairos, which opens the horizon for past as well as for future.” (Lowith 
185) Living in such an everyday is living in an intensity of historical present moments that makes 
possible the “apprehension of a virtual or future event as a force in the present emerging from 
the past” (Rodowick 142). 
Therefore, as Negri suggests, one may differentiate between two conceptions of Kairos. The 
classical conception of Kairos as a transcendent instant of rupture or Kairos as an instant of 
rupture but one that is a “singular and open present” (Negri, Time For Revolution 152), occurs at 
the edge of time, deterritorializes it only in order to open a possible process of constituent 
practice of transforming temporality. 
Let us here go back for a moment to our initial example of Time Machine! and its instantaneous 
division of present to past and future. If modernist theatre made use of hiatus to set in motion a 
time of the imaginary, the performative turn in arts was an affirmation of process and duration, 
of a gradual constitution of a collective relationality. It reaffirmed our aforementioned dimension 
of Kairos as constitutive of belonging to a community. Akamatsu also tries to create a new 
temporality through his video work by another articulation of narration, one that is not based on 
chronological order, a chronicle, but creates an unconditional time that brings past, present and 
future into a plane of immanency. Time Machine! is an embodiment of Deleuze’s time machine 
where “there is no present distinguishable from a present-becoming-past, on the one hand, and 
the present-becoming-future on the other” and “rather than a chronological and successive 
addition of spatial moments, time continually divides into a present that is passing, a past that is 
preserved, and an indeterminate future”. (Rodowick 81) 
We exist in time, and time as such is the ontogenetical time pregnant with constituent power 
rather than time-as-measure, the subjugated, anthropocentric and modern form of its 
understanding. Therefore, the subject-object divide does not exist as no other perpetual and 
eternal essences exist and thus, subjectivity is not related to the presupposed immutable 
conscious agent, but is rather always an effect of deterritorializing the established order, creating 




understanding of time as ontogenesis, formerly discussed in the section on the aesthetics of the 
performative event, because art gives “material form to change as ‘sensible aggregates’ or ‘blocks 
of sensation’.” (Rodowick 140) 
Deleuze considers past and future on heterogenous planes, because otherwise the future would 
become a mere continuity of the past, rather than being a direction of the new that produces 
being on the tip of time’s arrow, of Kairos. Negri lays the grounds for the necessity of such a 
Deleuzian conception clearly:  
[…] to consider past and future not in accordance with the arrow of time but on a homogenous 
plane… by doing so, time loses its character of irreversibility and Kairos its creative force. From 
this erroneous perspective, time is reduced to a single extension without gaps that is traversable 
in every direction - which contradicts the common experience of the irreversibility of the arrow 
of time. Further, from the perspective we are criticizing, Kairos no longer exists as such, because 
in this time made of extension no creative event can be discovered. (Time for Revolution 161-2) 
Negri believes that a proper conception of time comes with adopting Spinozist perspective of 
absolute immanence. In this way, the time as was discussed becomes a series of kairoi, and 
innovation of Jetztzeit will not be only an exaltation or a “deviation in the course of life”, but will 
occur “within the horizon of eternity”. This is the absolute immanence, “the dynamism of life” 
that “gives life its power” and presents time as becoming, change, and constituent force.  
The difference between constituted Power and constituent power is not a simple opposition 
between two essences or two distinct substances. There is one and only one substance, Spinoza 
believes. potentia –affirmative affectivity – is ontogenetically primary in relation to Potesta. This 
applies also to the distinction between the virtual and the actual. The virtual as the realm of 
becomings, affect, desire, and in sum the constituent power becomes individuated in the field of 
the actual as beings, affections, pleasures, or the constituted Power. But there is no unique 
actualization for the virtual, since the virtual is the field of pure potentiality that can actualizes 
itself into multiple transcendental objects of representation, or eludes the representation, 
remaining non-actualized. It is important to not confuse the virtual with the unreal. On the 




contradiction between these two terms, for the latter is the non-represented material becomings 
of the constituent power, while the actual is a product. Moreover, the metaphoric duality of 
depth and surface does not apply to the distinction between the virtual and the actual, as if the 
former had depth and the former was only appearances on the surface. On the contrary, the 
actual and the virtual are immanent in relation to each other: there is only a surface, a plane of 
immanence, and studying the virtual is the topography of a chaotic surface. 
This is affirmed by Tarde, when he speaks of contagious repetition. Kairos creates the conditions 
of contagion by opening up the body to the world and putting an stop to the machinations of 
already established codes and standards. In Tarde’s world, Kairos is the emergence of an 
innovation-sun, similar to Benjamin’s Jetztzeit-star: 
All repetition, social, vital, or physical, i. e., imitative, hereditary, or vibratory repetition (to 
consider only the most salient and typical forms of universal repetition), springs from some 
innovation, just as every light radiates from some central point, and thus throughout science the 
normal appears to originate from the accidental (The Laws of Imitation 7). 
Tarde asserts that the accidental, or to be more exact, the contingent is the origin of the normal, 
which has been deemed natural and necessary in terms of social order. Normal is an established 
historical actuality of a virtual process, that now stays immobile in its transcendental position. 
From this perspective, Being is not a solid actuality as a “it is”, but a plastic, ductile plane of 
immanence as a “it becomes”. Nor is it a void of the situation, but an affirmative constituent 
force. This is the problematic of time that Lazzarato talks about, “a struggle on the plasticity of 
the political” (Grasping the Political). Instead of numerical and quantitative differences, here we 
deal with intensive, qualitative differences; and instead of numbers and counting that define an 
infinite situation in Set theory, here uncountable differential relations define an infinite situation.
 Thus, rather than an ontology rooted in purely formal, empty multiplicities, the 
speculation here founds itself upon an ontogenesis, a becoming of the being, or how an actuality 
comes out of the virtual. 
The relation between the One and the Multiple finds itself different from what Badiou interprets. 




heterogonous and in constant variation. It is a chaosmos of differential relations that make a 
temporary individuation out of the chaos. The One as a constant flux of becomings and variations 
is then itself multiple, and the multiple is immanent to the one. The one does not impose a return 
of the same, of the old, on every situation by totalizing it, as Badiou fears most; rather, the same 
which returns constantly is the difference, the new. “The eternal return of the difference”: that 
is how Deleuze reformulated the famous Nietzschean axiom.  
In this formulation, time ontogenetically is Kairos, or the pre-individual Aion. And event as the 
ontogenetical assumes this temporality. In other words, the virtuality of time in the event means 
that it problematizes the established truth of a situation, making room for the emergence of an 
alternative truth. “Time has always put the notion of truth into crisis”, writes Deleuze, “... it is the 
form or rather the pure force of time that puts truth into crisis” (Cinema 2 130). By problematizing 
the reality and its truth, an event then deterritorializes the limits and borders of a situation, 
introducing an infinite in the finitude of the reality. The infinite is not however a numerical one, 
as in set theory, but a differential limit, tending toward the threshold of the situation.  
Event then would not be something miraculous or exceptional in nature, as Badiou believes. It 
would not be an unveiling of a historical determined Truth, or the Universal for all local situations 
of a time. Indeed, it is what happening in every moment, as the vehicle of constituting the being, 
the introduction of the new. Nonetheless, event intervenes in any set of predefined regulations 
and axioms; it destroys the established, actualized relations and the actuality produced by them. 
It does not cancel the differences for the sake of a formal multiple; on the contrary, it always 
brings the difference into the situation. And since individual subject is itself a false transcendent 
point over the plane of immanence, an actualization of differential relations, it is not a 
constituent element of an event; instead, there are lines of collective subjectivities that form 
subject-groups, in a non-hierarchical relation with each other. Consequently, an event is 
relational as long as it transforms the relations in and through itself. As Deleuze puts it, “the real 
problem of revolution, a revolution without bureaucracy, would be the problem of new social 
relations, where singularities come into play, active minorities in nomad space without property 
or enclosure” (Desert Islands and Other Texts 145). Thus, the problem is indeed how the relations 




between the One and the multiple, the nature of the transformative relations in an event could 
be characterized. 
 
5.2.2.7 A Return to the Future?  
As we already discussed throughout the research, Erika Fischer-Lichte’s concept of the 
performative turn does not only refer to the emergence of contemporary performance arts in 
1960s-70s, but also tracks its effects on other arts, and their way of presentation and reception. 
One could say that the performative is the hegemonic form of content in different artistic forms 
of expression, and these combinations form a new aesthetics, free from modernist limitations, 
divisions, and hierarchies, which nonetheless sets up its own territory of forces and intensities. 
In the same track, the performative turn in radical politics refers to a paradigmatic break with 
previous forms of protest movements. 
The virtual differential relations of an event, as far as they are not linguistic, not pre-determined, 
and on the other hand, have the transformative constituent power of determination, are 
performative. If the virtual is itself performative, then all events, as long as they transform the 
existing relations between their bodies, should be considered as performative events.  
Thus, the virtual contains three moments, which are all immanent to each other: the 
undetermined, the determinable, and the determined. If we go back to our example in the 
beginning, then the meaning of a “return to the future” would be clear. The temporality of the 
image is an interruption of time, when the past (the determined), the present (the determinable), 
and the future (the undetermined) are immanent to each other in each moment. The image then 
consists of numerous possible individuations and actualizations of the virtual time, which makes 
the current temporality suspended. So, a return to the future is only meaningful when it is a 
return to the future in the present, according to the real problematic of the present moment, or 





Therefore, a temporality of an event expresses itself in the form of a singular moment of an 
immanence in which the past, the present and the future become immanent in relation to each 
other. During May 68 Movement, in a pamphlet written for the chaotic streets of Paris, Blanchot 
wrote: “Tomorrow was May 68”. This single sentence is the expression proper for the temporality 
of a performative event. 
If it is true that the temporality of the projected image of the visitor in Time Machine! is an 
experimentation with time as virtual, then to which extent the whole work in general is an event? 
Does it start from the real problematic of its situation, does it attempt to affect the established 
relations via transformative performative relationality?  
The installation was exhibited in several galleries and museums all over the first world of arts. 
The visitors bought the tickets, stepped inside the territory of art institution (or better, of 
institutional art), went to Akamatsu’s designed room, and left the place exactly as they entered. 
If event is problematizing in the first place, Akamatsu’s work of art only could challenge the time 
perception of its audience, and one tends to say, rather playfully. Akamatsu works for Apple 
Company himself and also develops apps for iPhone and iPad that are available for sale on Google 
Play and Apple Store. His work doesn’t challenge the territories of contemporary institutional art, 
with its global market and international mega-exhibitions. The answer to the question seems 
evident, even if the artwork in question is radical in content: if event entails both aesthetic and 
political wings, then Time Machine! is pure entertainment, like an interesting app for iPhone. 
Walter Benjamin critique on arts which are radical only in content by “indicating the decisive 
difference between merely transmitting the apparatus of production and transforming it” 
(Author as Producer 4) is valid here, too.  
But other performances, those we have considered as performative events in form of occupation 
movements, have shown us – each in its own singular way – a reclaiming of time, and a return to 
the future, a moment of becoming contemporary to the new image of thought, coming out of a 





5.2.3 Kairoi and Occupy Movements 
In our discussions about time and Kairos, different temporalities came to the foreground. Kairos 
has been thought as a temporality “in which there is no or little chronos” (Agamben, The Time 
That Remains 68), in which chronology is forgotten, because the technical social machine of clock 
is no longer in force and the result of a machinic assemblage through that machine, i.e. the 
conscious agent and its “memory”, will be broken down. 
Time in such a moment becomes the constituent power of ontogenesis. New forms are being 
created in kairological deterritorialization at the limits of being, and performativizations create 
new images of thought on the surface of bodies.  The two-sided ontogenesis maintains that time 
is constituent and being constituted during the performative action of a collective body: in fact, 
the paradigm of absolute immanence considers collective body and time-space mutually 
constituent of each other in a duration of becomings and alternative organization.  
In one way, as Hardt shows through readings of Jean Genet’s literary and dramatic works, the 
struggle for reclaiming and recreating time occurs in an exposure of body to the world. Kairos, 
full time as opposed to the prison time, is experienced when body is exposed, is open to the 
world. The exposed body loses its socially imposed armor; and the flow of time, its series of Kairoi, 
traverses it.  
Exposure to the world is not the search for an essence elsewhere, but the full dwelling in this 
world, the belief in this world. The unexposed might construct an interior world, a separate realm 
of depths and abysses; exposure, in contrast, lays all of being equally on the surface, in the flesh. 
Exposed being is univocal; being is said always and everywhere in the same voice. It is not defined 
by being different in itself. When we expose ourselves to the force of things we realize this 
ontological condition, the immanence of being in existence (Prison Time 68). 
Then Kairos is the moment that the social flesh liberates itself from the hierarchical organization 
in a moment of experimentation and high intensity. Flesh is freed from the grasp of “organism”; 
already attached stereotypes on its surfaces give way to a chaosmos of phantasmatic production 
of simulacra under new relations of production, inside altermodernity; and monstrous, 




Klossowski’s theory of the self, we know that the attack of intensities (or in De Landa’s words, 
intensity-difference) liberates the fluctuations in the tonality of the soul and as such it makes the 
past “rings out anew in its present”. He describes such a process as an “incessant combat”, a 
combat between the established order and the deterritorializing forces of to-come that 
metamorphose the body and time-space:  
The incessant metamorphosis: in a brief interval of time you must pass through several individual 
states. Incessant combat is the means… What is this brief interval? not just any moment of our 
existence but the eternity that separates one existence from another. (Vicious Circle 69) 
Two temporalities, then, are interwoven in the moment of Kairos: a quality of timelessness as 
the eternity that separates a former existence from the new existence following the hiatus on 
one hand, and a quality of duration and process, as in an incessant metamorphosis.  
In addition, we argued how in Kairos as the virtual force of time translates as the immanence of 
three different moments of time: the determined (past), the determinable (present), and the 
undetermined (future). It bestows undeterminablity to the past by plasticizing the political; it 
brings the undetermined future into the present and past to situate it in the historical rupture of 
Kairos between the old and the to-come.  
The same way of perceiving time emerged in the performativity of occupy movements. They had 
at least moments of being contemporary with such an image of thought that marked their radical 
difference between the forms of exercising politics prior to them. But a struggle for an alternative 
future is a struggle of the present. Indeed, future in the common sense – in sentences like “are 
you not concerned about the future of your career?” or “invest for the future of your children” – 
is actually a past-present repeated without differentiation, and carries a promise of stability and 
permanence. Therefore, we should differentiate with that future and a future of the new, which 
opens up as the horizon of to-come in kairos.  
It is indeed in the struggle for the free appropriation of the present that life opens itself to the to-
come, and desire perceives - against the empty and homogenous time in which all is equal 





Such a struggle does not only concern future or present but also past. The time is liberated when 
past is also experienced differently – not only as actualized history, but also as a geography of 
virtual forces that are constructing and deconstructing actualities. As Negri argues, “there is no 
possibility of immersing oneself in that being which comes before, if not by illuminating it with 
the present, reconstructing it and feeling it live in the present. […] a genealogy of the present, 
that is, an imagination that brings to being that which came before in the same manner as it 
constitutes the to-come. One does not interpret the past; one tests it out.” (Time for Revolution 
165) 
Imagination as the genealogy of the present: going back to the future, bringing future into the 
past-present immanence needs the immaterial endeavor of reconstructing the imaginal poles. 
This point was discussed in earlier chapters with regard to their particular themes, and it was 
argued that in the moment of performative openness of body to the world, in the exposure, flesh 
creates new phantasms, new images on its surface in order to imagine outside the already 
established borders of imagination – as the body in exodus performs outside the established 
limits of performance.  
This imagination comes in the process of performativization, attempting to create 
altermodernities in the aesthetic-political experimentations of a performative event. In 
Kairological time, the duality between labour time and leisure time, the time of work and non-
work does not exist anymore. If time is not experienced as a homogenous, linear succession of 
empty units, then the whole paradigm of wage labour breaks down and time emerges as the 
force of creativity. Then work becomes the work of the poor, the performativity of the 
dispossessed, which as was discussed, is the miraculous production done under an alternative 
social relationality – not subjected anymore to capital as social relation (which has various forms 
of reenactment in different countries in the world).  “[This] creativity that constituted the hard-
qualitative core of liberated work”, Negri writes, “is manifested here in the form of imagination 
and hope”. (Time for Revolution 121) 
That is why all occupy movements exhibited an incessant production of images, songs, poems, 




streets and side-walks. Most of these aesthetic productions (not all of them) have shown an 
openness toward the other, affective solidarities with other struggles, and a rejection of 
institutionalized art practices and main-stream media representations- all those connections that 
are included in the machinic function of the code of the everyday signs.  
These practices aimed to recreate the imagination, make it go further than what has been 
experienced, presented as end of history or the only viable options for living in a society, and 
make the case for feeling the joy of creating the new, instead of the paranoid fear of losing the 
old. Because as Spinoza teaches us, imagination “has the ontological function of recomposing the 
strata of being” and “it anticipates from within” (Negri, Time for Revolution 156) the 
development of altermodernities, that “to-come” which rests on the power of love and speaks 
about another world, a world in which many worlds fit. 
 
5.2.3.1 A New Machinic Assemblage of Revolutionary Temporalities 
The difference we assign to occupy movements in relation to former forms of struggle manifests 
itself in the unique assemblage of temporalities in their revolutionary machines. For the sake of 
simplicity, we can divide such forms regarding their temporality into three types with their own 
different domain of forces. 
5.2.3.1.1 Insurrection 
Benjamin’s Jetztzeit comes mostly as the insurrectional time, or the time of Divine violence he 
recognizes in the worker’s strikes as a violence that stops the mechanisms of capitalist production 
and its social relationality. Insurrection has a temporality with high acceleration and immense 
velocity in order to break the linear, homogenous order of successive time of progress. A 
temporality like those bullets that destroyed the clocks in Paris in 1848. There is a famous 
sentence attributed to Andreas Bader, a member of insurrectionist Rote Armee Fraktion, that 
“only gun cures the rigidity”.  
Insurrection is sometimes necessary to put a hold on a disastrous affair that a State has embarked 




and so forth as in the case of African countries in 1990s or European countries in 2000s; a corrupt 
government that its management and (post)colonial economic relations has ruined a 
population’s present and future as in the case of 2001 Argentina’s insurrection; a war that will 
claim lives on both sides as in the case of Vietnam War or Iraq War; or a colonial rule with a police 
state and sheer brutality that reaches its climax of intolerability and its examples are as 
widespread as European colonialism was; a production regime that exploits its workers as in the 
case of the Luddites cited in the second chapter, who literally destroyed machinery to put a stop 
on factory lines. 
This list can go on for pages, but the point is the sudden, flash-like temporality of the insurrection, 
resembling a lightning that is able to break the rigidity of the continuum. Insurrections emerge 
usually in a spontaneous way, but its examples in the past show that they either become 
hierarchical or supported by organizations with State-form and its corresponding verticality. 
Otherwise, they disappear as soon as the flash-like energy is suppressed by police violence. For 
instance, arm struggle in Europe after 1960s, when the factory had been deterritorialized and 
extended to the society as a whole, could start with a spontaneous organization of a few militants 
(usually intellectuals or university students), but it would take the form of a pseudo-militaristic 
organization and due to its secretive as well as professional nature (necessary training for using 
weapons, strategies and tactics of warfare in different environments, etc.), it would an elite 
struggle, unable to engage ordinary population or connect with other fields of struggle in society.  
5.2.3.1.2 Resistance 
The temporality of resistance, as we have discussed before through Clausewitz, is different. 
Resistance aims to reduce the speed of enemy’s advance, its mechanisms of dispossession. It is 
a negative acceleration, a movement in place, that wants to gradually erode the capacities of the 
enemy. It is the temporality of friction that stops something from going forward or a temporality 
of viscosity that slows down flows and fluxes.  
Resistance was the order of the day under colonialism. It also slows down the processes of (post-
)colonial dispossession (resistance against the multinational corporations in Africa), the 




the Nazis), and the takeover of one’s land by a foreign army (the nationalist movements, as we 
discussed in previous chapter).  
Resistance movements can go on as non-movements, like those Assef Bayat describes in the 
Middle Eastern dictatorships, because they remain under the skin of cities and does not come 
out on streets as organized collective bodies. In other cases, they could acquire State-forms, 
becoming hierarchical and vertical, such as nationalist movements, many liberation struggles in 
the second half of 20th century, or many other movements that was labeled as “anti-modern” in 
the second chapter. 
As it is obvious from our examples, insurrection can lead to resistance or resistance can culminate 
into an insurrection. But they are two types of struggles with different forces and heterogenous 
temporalities. Both nonetheless appear as a reaction to other forces and against initiatives set in 
motion by those forces, even if they are themselves symptoms of affirmative and performative 
forces of constituent power, their emergence is conditioned by what they act against. Therefore, 
they may point to a liberated time, they do not consist of it; as their temporality is still in relation 
to the dominant temporality, not the unconditioned new time that is the result of a collective 
constituent process, a duration of creativity.  
5.2.3.1.3 Revolutionary Ascetism 
The revolutionaries always attempted to reimagine a daily life under the light of revolutionary 
movements. Avant-garde artists and performance arts artivists tried to change the everyday by 
blurring the boundaries between art and life, or labour time and leisure time. Some displaced the 
work from its designated space (gallery or theatrical stage) into public space. Some joined protest 
movements with their works and artistic tactics even for standing against police force. And some 
made process and performativity a foundational part of their art works.  
Jerzy Grotowski tried to reinvent theatre as a practice of making community, a performative 
“event” that can create different subjectivities, put in force an alternative subjectification. For 
this, he made pieces in his so-called “paratheatrical phase” and “theatre of sources” that could 
go on for an extended period and presented an experimentation with communal rites. Leszek 




a common isolation by a group of people in a place far removed from the outside world and an 
attempt to build a kind of genuine meeting among human beings … this is not a performance, 
because it does not contain in it the elements of theatre such as plot or action. There is nothing 
to see for the audience either, because there is no audience… Transcending theatre was the next 
step on the road. It meant a break … with the one-sidedness of contact, caused by the duality of 
the actor and spectator. (qtd. in Schechner, The Grotowski Sourcebook 210) 
Grotowski was forming an assembly through an ascetic way of being: a different organization of 
bodies to allow a performativization of an idea of a different life, a different sociality and a 
different contact through “transcending” the established limits and forgetting the chronos and 
its standards. It is interesting that after a while, he stops being the leader of paratheatrical 
journeys and it multiplied in different directions. But such a work needs a gradual process, a 
temporality of caring and composition, gradual and slow, without alienation. Thus, all work, all 
production, even if before banal, is bestowed by creativity of the autonomous performativity. 
Grotowski started with an idea of a theatre of production, but he soon understood that any new 
production comes out of new relations and conditions of production: a new time-space, a new 
image of thought, and a new body. If he designed a performance in the form of “a common 
isolation” and a place “far removed from the outside world”, it was an attempt to create 
conditions open to a new temporality (and spatiality) and therefore, he made a bubble immune 
to the already established relations, so in the absence of any urban temporality, the group 
creates gradually its own autonomous temporality – both by and for a new way of connection 
between bodies. 
Criticizing Grotowski’s project is neither a novel attempt nor a hard one. It is individualistic, based 
on the power of truly realized individual selves; it is in line with the metaphysics of 
transcendence, authenticity, and unity, as it attempts to recapture the originary and go “to the 
sources of performativity”. In spite of this, his experimentation creates a simulacrum for 
ontogenetical time: a product of creative forces giving affective material to performative event’s 
time-as-change. As Deleuze says, art gives “material form to change as ‘sensible aggregates’ or 




One thing that Grotowski and modernist Avant-gardes had in common was an investment on the 
leisure time as the non-labour time. If labour time was the temporality of empty repetitions and 
homogenous succession, leisure time associated with play and free flow of time, bestowed with 
forces of creativity as opposed to productivity, because no additional value could be created out 
of play. Such an opposition does not exist anymore, as we have argued throughout this research 
repetitively.  Therefore, if leisure time and labour time are not different in nature, then there is 
no outside to the temporality of prison time and no heterogenous temporality to directly invest 
in. It cannot be presupposed, it must be constructed. 
As the method of such construction, Grotowski adopts the ascetic way of being. Isolation, far 
from the world, in mountains or forests or deserts. Barthes explains the temporality of ascetic 
life as idiorrhythmy, a being-together of singular rhythms, an assemblage of different rhythms 
that are co-existing with each other without any rhythm takes over other ones and no impulsive 
force dominates the collective body. He uses the notion of idiorrhythmy to refer to “something 
like solitude with reular interruptions”, an attempt to deal with “the aporia of bringing distances 
together” (How to Live Together? 6). To exemplify such a “fantasy”, he recourses to the 
coenobitic monasticism and the way its monks living in convents by stressing on the communal 
life. For Barthes, the performativity of coenobitic ascetic life, although territorialized and 
encoded by religious disciplines and rules, can inform him on his fantasy of idiorrhythmic living-
together.   
But Grotowski re-enactment of ascetic being articulates it with play, and therefore, joy and 
spiritual exaltation. Grotowski makes a performance of ascetism, because he wants to 
experiment with the existing temporality through effecting a break by an ascetic performativity; 
or rather, unleashing the performative forces of ascetic life.  
This is an assemblage of production theatre and poor theatre: poor as those who create and 
produce under alternative relations of production. Or an asceticism of happy and joyful affects, 
one that Negri describes in Spinoza:  
Spinoza's asceticism brings to mind a forceful edict that imposes immanence as the proper plane 




common is affirmed … [toward] the development of ethical life which leads to the absolute act of 
knowledge that is love (Time for Revolution 189). 
One then could say Grotowski invented a Spinozian performative method for giving material 
sensation to time as absolute immanence and a flesh, a collective body in the form of assembly. 
Assembly is a product of assemblage. If “and” as a machinic function brings together bodies, the 
machinic function of and-as-idiorhythmy makes a machinic assemblage possible between 
different flows without trying to channel them into one. In other words, and-as-idiorrhythmy 
gives a name to the problem of linkage in altermodernities. It does not only use spatial concept 
of “and” that signifies bodies are beside each other in space: it also indicates that they are living 
a heterogenous time consisting of each one’s singular temporality. 
Therefore, an assembly can refer to the organization of those mythical bodies in the Conference 
of Birds for example, all flying beside each other yet with their own singular rhythms, in different 
temporalities in each phase but ultimately upward toward the transcendence. Just like the 
ascetics of Mount Athos coenobitic monastery, whose way of life sums up as following in Barthes 
description: 
Principle: each monk is free to live at their own particular rhythm. Labour: unequal. Some are 
idle…[with] a flexible conception of constraint. No rules; merely a few suggestions (How to Live 
Together? 33-34). 
Revolutionary ascetism is therefore a slow, gradual temporality for a process of making 
alternative social relations: the temporality of what we have called the machinic function of “and-
as-idiorrhythmy”. Those aforementioned idiorrhythmic assemblies might have accomplished a 
restructuring of time, but they have taken the existence of an outside for granted. We have 
argued that why such a presupposition proves to be false in the contemporary globalized 
capitalism. Thus, we need to search for Spinozian performativizations of idiorrhythmic assemblies 
that affirm the absolute immanence and try to create autonomous temporalities inside the 





5.2.3.2 The Three-Fold Temporal Assemblage 
If we return to one of our previous examples, 2002 Noborder Camp at Strasbourg may serve as a 
prototype for later occupy movements in 2010s which articulated the form of assembly with 
micropolitical performative action as well as insurrectional actions and acts of resistance. The 
camp was an experimentation with collective living and establishing new social relationality. Not 
only artivist groups and collectives such as Publixtheatrecaravan contributed a lot in its idea and 
implementation, but also it was an artistic strategy for giving aesthetic and affective material to 
the idea of change67.  
But Noborder Camp presented an interesting machinic assemblage of temporalities, while 
constructing its own patchwork body of an idiorrhythmic assembly. It started as an insurrection, 
a short-term period of organization for staging a performative action   
It functioned as an insurrection against blacklisting activists of alterglobalization movements and 
tightening the security apparatus with the help of anti-immigration discourse and policies. 
Strasbourg hosted the Schengen Information System (SIS), a database of all those who applied 
for asylum and who are blacklisted as activists and have difficulty in movement across European 
borders. And acts of sabotage and civil disobedience as attempts to put a halt on these security 
mechanisms also occurred during the camp, such as hacking: 
hacking the database was as much about freeing information as it was about helping people move 
by letting them know how much they were being watched, how and where (Shuddhabrata 
Sengupta). 
The camp was itself part of a larger context of resistance, the whole alterglobalization 
movements that started in late 1990s as a global cycle of protests and extended themselves till 
2003, protests against Iraq War. Therefore, a foundational element of this performative action 
was being inside a temporality of resistance.  
 
67 It should be noted that Nobordercamp was not “invented” as an event that year, but the particular Nobordercamp 
in Strasbourg received full attention by activists because of the issues under question, especially the immigration 
policies and blacklisting activists. The history of Nobordercamp dates back to 90s biggest activist network in 
Germany, “Keine Mensch Ist Illegal” which started from the Hybrid Workspace at the "documenta X” (1997) and 




However, this camp – as was discussed – differed from previous events in the alterglobalization 
movement in terms of a refusal of spectacularity and representation, taking initiative in terms of 
time-space instead of organizing a direct action in reaction to a time and space set for an 
international meeting, and living together for a duration of time. Indeed, the camp description 
by Gerald Raunig has all these three temporalities in itself: “a ten-day laboratory for creative 
resistance and civil disobedience”, a gradual construction of an assembly in a context of 
resistance and insurrectional time.  
The constituent temporality of time proper to caring and constructing a new social relation, a 
micropolitical transformation via the machinic function of and-idiorrhythmy, has been captured 
in Shuddhabrata Sengupta description of camp: 
If anything, this microcosmic model of a ‘functioning anarchy’ was an instance of how the actions 
and energies of the ‘multitudes’ might translate into concrete realities on a day to day basis in a 
possible future away from capitalism. 
Occupy movements witnessed the same performative experimentation, indeed a revolutionary 
“laboratory for creative resistance and civil disobedience”. Through them, the common isolation 
in a urban time-space becomes rather an open call to all residents to join in a performative 
experimentation with daily life, and thus, time-space.  
As much as they have similarities to ascetic assemblies, they also lay in a context of resistance 
and emerge with an insurrectional temporality to put a stop and demand a State to be 
overthrown, or a policy rejected.  
In those camps, each in their own specific struggles against a particular temporalization of nation-
state/capitalism progress, a new time has been experienced: a time that puts a stop to dominant 
temporality of prison time, slows down the advance of dispossessing mechanisms, and acquires 
creative forces and fullness of life.  
The general assemblies in different occupy movements embodied the machinic function of and-




affection and production, with meetings being moderated with more suggestive, performative 
rules rather than bureaucratic, hierarchical disciplines.  
The inside stories from Occupy Wall Street Movement tent city talk to us about such a 
performativity of revolutionary ascetism and constituent collective time. One can consider the 
general assembly meetings, particularly in the beginning of the movement. Activists describe 
these meetings as long and tiring, where reaching a decision is a hard, slow collective process. In 
the second day of occupation, general assembly takes from 3 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. (Writers for the 
99% 19-20), which was going to repeat in other days, and with the formation of different working 
groups, in other meetings. As one activist describes:  
Period of meeting, perhaps unsurprisingly, can stretch for long hours into the night, often with a 
dwindling audience, but the same rules of affirmative speaking and respect for the rights of others 
to be heard apply (Writers for the 99% 31) 
In addition, there is another aspect of collective creative temporality that exhibits itself in the 
improvisations with daily objects in the camps. For instance, one activist describes the OWS camp 
like this: 
The camp feels magical, but it's also totally jerry-rigged, improvisation built upon 
improvisation; tape, string, tarp, cloth, metal tent poles holding up a sagging canvas roof, 
plastic sheets propped up on three long bamboo rods taped together. (Writers for the 
99% 7) 
The magic lies in the everyday moments, in the improvisations with materials that are in an 
ordinary situation are just waste. The time of performative event releases the creative forces of 
the collective body there, and thus, dealing with ordinary in-hand material, whatever that can be 
“found”, is in a way not so much different with the way modern avant-garde art dealt with them.  
Consider surrealism. One of main impulses of surrealist movement was to give a “magical” 
character to the everyday and it starts with re-affirming contingency and chance. The artist’s 
time, the time of creativity, was then different in nature from the worker’s time; as immaterial 




production. It was the liberated time of the flaneur who could, like André Breton, go to the flea 
markets and bestow artistic, so-called magical character to objets trouvés [found object] which 
mostly is a waste, is a “useless” thing. Artists could give another use-value to trivial objects 
because of this inherent difference between creative time and labour time. The unified labour 
time and its regime of wage labour create objects with exchange values that hide the real 
processual time of collaborative production by dividing it into hours, whereas the creative time 
of immaterial labour, when invested on an object, creates an alternative use-value for it. The 
work of art is then, as Merleau-Ponty argues, something that sees while being seen, while 
disturbing the subject/object divide.  
Breton recounts his search for such objects in Nadja:  
I go there often, searching for objects that can be found nowhere else: old-fashioned, broken, 
useless, almost incomprehensible, even perverse (qtd. in Weiss 7). 
If Breton was mostly amused by the unknown in such object, as Allen S. Weiss explains, Jean 
Dubuffet had another perspective in dealing with everyday objects. In fact, “it is precisely the 
banal textures and forms, objects and images of the everyday world that Dubuffet would 
ultimately recuperate into his own works of art, into his own aesthetic” (Weiss 8). 
Dubuffet invested in the aforementioned opposition between material labour and immaterial 
labour, which for him translated into an opposition between channeling the libidinal energy into 
productivity and “nonproductive expenditures”. The former is the social, oedipal sublimation of 
desire, effected by the code of the everyday signs, and correlates with the quantified, unified, 
and empty linear time of the everyday – a time captured by the established order. On the 
contrary, the nonproductive expenditure happens in the moments of experimentation, loss of 
the conscious agent and ecstasy, thus in the free flow of onto/morpho-genetical time. And as the 
loss of self, it is desublimatory, breaking the hierarchical organization of impulsive forces in the 
body. 
Referring back to our discussion on the definition of aesthetics (see Chapter Two), Dubuffet’s 
aesthetics serves more as an oppositional aesthetics against what he calls “the cultural arts”, 




aesthetic desire working against itself, moving toward an antiaesthetic or perhaps more 
accurately a counteraesthetic procedure” (10), and trying to give material to another idea of the 
everyday, creating alternative use-values for things trapped in the dominant temporality. 
However, our time particularly in the context of American hyper-capitalism is different from that 
of surrealism. Not only the immaterial labour is the hegemonic form of labour, but also 
nonproductive expenditures have become a part of pleasure-economy. The individual avant-
garde artist has no such place or status anymore, nor could any art claim avant-gardism in the 
contemporary world of creative and cultural industries.  
Only a collective act of constructing alternative temporality can transform the everyday and its 
found objects into something magical, as the occupier in OWS described about a camp of 
experimentation with daily life and improvisation with banal found objects – objects that for the 
first time revive their use-value in a revolutionary time machine.  
Moreover, the plasticity of the political finds itself in occupy movements again in contrast to the 
capitalist precarization of time. The flexible time of immaterial labour under capitalist relations 
of production is already reterritorialized around the extraction of value as rent and accumulation 
of capital. It is flexible only in terms of an extension of labour time and its corresponding 
delimited and pre-determined performativity into the so-called leisure time. And contemporary 
communication technologies and devices such as smart phones, tablets and smart watches are 
contributing a lot to this total capture of living time. Nonetheless, the basic principle of 
quantifying time and using it as a measure for payments is not disappeared. Instead, it is not 
micro-managed flexibly.  
One sign of change in controlling time is the re-appropriation of communication technologies. 
The OWS protestors have been ridiculed because of having their smart phones always in hand, 
sitting in tents behind their laptops and being always connected to the internet. However, they 
transformed the function of such devices from means of labour and value production to means 
of alternative organization of bodies and time-space.  
One other inhuman element that acquired another characteristic was a London plane tree in the 




it that became one of the common spaces of imagination in the tent city. It was a medmob, a 
meditation flash mob, that developed into a network of performative actions, even after the 
movement. One of the networks engaged in medmob organizations is Dancing without Borders, 
an initiative that aims to “harnesses the power of dance, rituals, storytelling and community to 
raise awareness of the most pressing issues of our time and celebrate our humanity.” (Writers 
for the 99%) The meditation practices in OWS, far from being the escapist mysticism consumed 
by a large part of cultural consumers in the global North, was an opportunity – as they claim 
themselves – “to cultivate an understanding of the connection between personal transformation 
practices and social transformation”. And due to this aim, they happened beside other ongoing 
workshops related to art, activism, and western psychology (Writers for the 99% 88), all 
organized by the meditation working group. They also tried to deal with the problems of 
race/class divide (as we described in previous chapter and will revisit in the on-coming pages on 
space) through the notions of “changing oneself”, a method of self-care that attempts in creation 
alternative subjectivities. (Writers for the 99% 90)  
Occupiers also knew the importance of reconstruction of imagination and how artistic practices 
can create simulacra that challenge the established limits of imagination. Therefore, they had an 
arts and culture committee with one task: "to engage the imaginations of people”. (Writers for 
the 99% 12)  
The power of creative imagination is unleashed in the kairological time, time of the uncanny, and 
as we have seen, an articulation of celebration, crisis, decision-making and exuberance – a 
fullness of time and a fullness of existence versus the repetitive routine of a homogenous and 
divided time and the depressive feeling of void that is usually coming with it.  
As the time of everyday is freed from its modern quantification, then the previous trivial activities 
are becoming revolutionary: "I said, ' I'm a librarian. I can organize books. At this time, organizing 
books is a revolutionary act" (Writers for the 99% 61) And the library would have later 4000 
books.  
Returning to our reference to Goethe’s Faust, it is interesting that Dr. Faust feels his fullness of 




modern life, rooted in a modern mythology of science and progress. Goethe’s Faust overall 
project to confront that was a re-insertion of myth through Volk into the social thought. However, 
that mythology was offering a past fully determined, cemented in an idea of an originary human 
environment: nature plus pure race; soil and blood. A dangerous nightmare. 
As Laclau observes, “a society from which myth was radically excluded would be either an entirely 
'spatial' and 'objective' society -- where any dislocation had been banished... - or one in which 
dislocations lacked any space for representation.” (New Reflections 67) The modern mythologies 
of progress – and its linear, chronological and teleological time –, be it nationalist or globalist, 
volk-oriented or millet-based, have found themselves a firm space for representation: The State. 
And a body to reproduce it: the nation. The naturalization of nation-state comes with a cemented 
imagination that only through transgression goes beyond what was and what is toward becoming 
and to-come. The contemporary radical politics are transgressive in the sense that they unleash 
the power of imagination through performative actions that effect an alternative social relation 
between different bodies. And this comes with a re-insertion of a myth into public space. As 
Laclau writes, “intrusion of myth into space that constitutes the politicization of that 'pure space'” 
(New Reflections 68).  
Politicization means problematizing the established order, upsetting its hierarchies and opening 
its closed borders. Nonetheless, unlike Laclau’s recourse to a similar mythology as Goethe’s Faust 
and investing on a will to a homogenous People, the re-insertion of myth in occupy movements 
came with a performative laboratory of living together in the form of improvised tent cities and 
forming a patchwork body – a myth that acknowledges the unfinished potentialities of the past 
and the possibility of a return to the future.  
This is why the performative aspect of radical politics has a foundational effect. The flash-mobs, 
street theatres, graffiti, songs, music, drums playing ceaselessly in the OWS, becoming cockroach, 
making improvised collective statues, performative rules, people’s mic … they are all providing a 
plastic format of political ritual, much different from the dominant political ritual – as Weber calls 
it – imposed by the State, i.e. the ritual of voting each four-five year in general elections. In fact, 




This section focused on OWS with its particular context, confronting the financial capitalism in a 
place most symbolizing it. From this aspect, it had more contextual similarities with occupation 
movements in the European countries, such as the Spanish movement. Indeed, the Spanish 
Democracia Real Ya! describes themselves in their manifesto as a heterogenous collective body 
with differing political views, but united in one thing: being tired of the present established order. 
That is why in Toma la Plaza, occupiers manifesto called “for dignity and the priority of life over 
economic and political interests” (qtd. in Prentoulis and Thomassen 224).  
In the following section, we turn to Egypt to analyze the performativization of a qualitative 
experience of time in another context. 
 
5.2.3.3 Reinventing the (post-)colonial Temporality 
In Egypt particular context, the war on time was different. Al-Tahrir Occupy Movement was a 
result of a long tradition of resistance, dating back to 1990s worker’s struggle and particularly 
2003 protests against Iraq War.  
On the other hand, police brutality, a suppressive type of coding bodies and channeling desires, 
reached to such levels in 2010 that people, first in Alexandria68 and then in Cairo, had to rise up. 
The popular insurrection on the annual Egyptian “police day” was a clear expression of such a 
will to stop.  
And the tent city came, a laboratory of imagining a new sociality, a new relationship between 
followers of different religions, leftists and Islamists, urban middle class and the marginalized. 
The same articulation of insurrectional, resistive, and constituent time that is the abstract form 
of occupy movements, coming from different material and historical trajectories based on 
context.  
One thing that all the Arab Republics which witnessed the formation of such a revolutionary 
machine had in common was a post-colonial modernized nation-state and accordingly, the 
 




formation of a linear time of progress against the indigenous and local notions of time. As Larbi 
Sadiki explains it,  
in Arab setting there are endless examples of how linearity is engineered in the postcolonial 
moment to drive forward being, thinking and doing to erase the traces of colonialism […] Such an 
undertaking meant, among other things, some form of commitment to mimicking the former 
colonizer’s bureaucratic decision-making, construction of newly independent national identities, 
and adoption of ‘rational calculation’ in all matters concerning modernization and development, 
including organization of public time. The postcolonial state envisaged this through socio-political 
engineering of individual and collective identity (Unruliness Through Space and Time 5). 
As a socio-political engineering, this process of imitation had to be top-down, and thus under 
brutal authoritarian regimes who could form a unified people – through imposition, exclusion, 
and biopolitical and eugenical practices –. for “the [linear] march towards progress, new citizenry, 
modernity and the like” (ibid). 
Time then had to be shaped in a linear, progressive and evolutionary frame, from the times of 
the past toward the times of the nation-state. Times of the past included not only colonial era, 
which imported modernity to the Arab Republics, but also the indigenous time. 
As we have explained in the section on nationalism, it was a project of constructing a 
homogenous collective body, here out of a heterogenous, tribal formations with very different 
ways of life. As the factories were being established, the unified time of the wage labour had to 
be imposed on populations through a socio-political engineering. Sadiki calls this a demolition of 
“peripheral existence” and by that, of peripheral conceptions of time, because  
the invention and formation of national identity could not be conceived within ‘traditional’ 
notions of time: a notion that made identity fluid rather than stable, and decentered rather than 
cemented to a center or a single locus of power…, the irrationality of all of this laid in the fact that 
the real intention was to control citizenries, rather than deliver them from either the heavy 
excesses of colonization or those oppressive aspects of traditional time – e.g. khumus or fifth of 
the produce in return for timeless labour by peasants in North African societies (Unruliness 




Obvious examples of modernizing the conception of time as an element of sociality are the 
introduction of a European calendar and adopting Saturday and Sunday as weekend holidays.  
The encroachment of the State power over the time had other mechanisms, too. The nationalist 
project in the Arab Republics, like any other nation-state, selectively wrote down the history in 
order to reinforce the imaginary homogenous national identity. State’s organization and 
manipulation of time had to define codes as “modern” or “traditional”, “of the past” or “for the 
future”.  
And as the constituted power established its prison time, it also hierarchized the access to leisure 
time. This inequality has been another common point of post-colonial nation-states in North 
Africa and the Middle East: 
While the majority of society lived hand to mouth, in some cases literally, those in power lived in 
opulence and extravagance (Gaddafi’s palaces, Bin Ali and Leila Bin Ali’s fortune and the Mubarak 
family’s wealth), where they exercised a quasi-monopoly on distributing ‘leisure time’ to 
themselves and their clients (Sadiki 7) 
And all this was in accordance with the ethical codes cited in previous chapter for the Egyptian 
case. The bodies were subjugated under a subjugated regime of temporality (and spatiality). 
Thus, Egyptians, Tunisians, and Syrians started a collective reappropriation of their own time, 
“engaging in subversion of existing paradigms of time and attendant notions of belonging, 
loyalty, autonomy and self-understanding” (Sadiki 6). And it was done performatively, with a 
contagious repetition of an act of disobedience in Fridays.  
Friday has been traditionally the weekend holiday in countries with Muslim majority, because it 
is the holy day for worship and rest. Holidays have a reserve of a qualitative experience of time, 
the kairological time, as Benjamin notes, in contrast to the empty chronological and quantified 
time of labour: holidays repeat a virtual force of free time. This is what the Arab-speaking 
revolutionaries in these countries invested on. 
Sadiki calls this collective endeavor of Egyptians as “mapping out new conceptions of time” so 




with … a collective sense of history-making”. (Sadiki 8) Kairological time, when constructed 
collectively, is not only a historical rupture, but also a moment of founding history.  
Egyptian protestors started to call for mass demonstrations in Fridays, in an attempt to construct 
another temporality autonomous from the State’s imposed time of progress. Their “re-
demarcation of time disrupted, interrupted and disorientated the authoritarian regime’s 
universalized time scale when they declared Friday 28 January the ‘Friday of Wrath’ (jumu’at al-
ghadhab).”  
The Fridays continued, not only in Egypt, but also in Syria, Bahrain, and other countries. They 
have been weekly given “common names”, such as Friday of Wrath (جمعة الغضب), of dignity 
 victory ,(قصاص) justice ,(حریة) freedom ,(صمود ) resistance ,(اراده) agency ,(رحيل) departure ,(کرامة)
 .(استمرار) and steadfastness ,(تطهی  ) purification ,(النرص)
Continuing the discussion on common names in the first chapter, a common name is created in 
a historical collective act of performative expression. Performative expression, since linguistic 
expression relies on pre-existing signs and already created names. Like a performative utterance, 
the act of common naming corresponds to the act of transforming reality because a new name 
is created to signify a new being. In the case of Friday’s naming in the Arab Spring, it is a name 
that signifies the emergence of a new field of affectivity, putting common values in contrast to 
the State’s values of governance.  
Therefore, common name and Kairos belongs to the same order. As Negri says, “through Kairos, 
the ontological affirmation of the name cannot be understood other than as a decision of a new 
being. In this sense, in kairos, presence is expression.” (Time for Revolution 154) In other words, 
expression comes as a process of producing that expression, not by use of the established codes 
and signs. This is possible in the performative event, “in the struggle that separates the opening 
being-to-come from the senseless repetition in the void of the ‘future’ [of the linear temporality 
of progress]” (ibid 150). 
Fridays could challenge the established temporality with a cyclical, kairological and intensive 
kairology that was opening up to alternative realities, to alter-modernities. However, as Sadiki 




without their physical experience and mapping out in relation to the spatial reordering of 
peoplehood in different sites of struggle in Egypt, including the famous Tahrir.” (8) 
The act of naming always happens in space. “The name marks something in space” Negri writes, 
“that is the first and most simple experience of naming.” But he conditions this experience with 
the axis of time – as it happens in a space that as Laclau argues is re-inserted with a myth that 
“politicize” it – and continues:  
if marking the thing in space (or expressing a common name) did not occur at the same time as 
the event of the thing (or of the common quid), we would not be able to provide the name or the 
common name with truth (Time for Revolution 152). 
As it was repetitively argued, social relations are not only temporal, but also spatial. Time and 
space are relations in between bodies. Bodies exist in spatiotemporal relations, but they can 
transform these relations by their deterritorializing constituent force. Moreover, construction of 
nationhood is not only by imposing the temporality of progress, but also through management 
of public space.  
In discussions on previous cases, such as occupation movements in the US, Greece, Spain, Turkey 
and elsewhere, we have also seen that the qualitative experience of time comes with 
experimentations in/through/with space.  
Therefore, not only the apparatus of capture subjugates both time and space, the struggle for 
altermodernities deal with the liberation of both. A popular theater as Bene would want to 
anticipate the people to-come needs both spatial and temporal dimension. As Sadiki explains,  
The spatial and the temporal are inextricably linked as dynamics of the reconstitution of 
peoplehood and newly freed ‘borders’ of unruliness. The authoritarian space that has for so long 
served the purpose of concealing public sentiments … is in the Arab Spring moment restored as a 
theatre for openly staging discontent, resistance or solidarity through creative conceptions of 
time (Unruliness Through Space and Time 8). 
So, it is not possible to consider temporality and spatiality separated from each other, just as it 




paradigm of immanence; an image of thought that the perception of kairological time 
necessitates it. Thus, it is surprising that Negri, in spite of his endless argumentation for 
establishing a durational and processual concept of kairos, maintains such a duality between time 
and space, when he writes that “the dualistic matrix is given. One could quip, space to capital, 
time to the working class” (Time for Revolution 98). This amounts to understanding spatiality 
only in terms of actuality and ignoring its productive role in shaping social relation between 
bodies.  
Indeed, in disciplinary societies, the empty succession of prison time is assigned to the spaces of 
confinement and discipline. In societies of control, as temporalities has multiplied for the sake of 
empowering the immaterial workforce productivity, the spaces of confinement have been 
shattered down, too. The factory is deterritorialized and its walls are broken down as society has 
become a factory itself. But it does not mean that power has no control over space. It mico-
manages it in its network of control and multiplies the spaces of discipline and coding the bodies. 
As Ian Burkitt argues, “the shift in capitalism towards greater forms of flexible accumulation and 
the development of technologies which allow relations to be disembedded from their traditional 
everyday anchoring means that our embodied experience of space and time is fundamentally 
restructured.” (129) 
 
5.3 From time to space: Kairotope 
 
The contemporary image of thought, proper to the patchwork monstrous body, necessitates the 
paradigm of self-differentiating immanence. When the axiom of identity is rejected, homogeneity 
gives way to heterogeneity and therefore, there is nothing that can unify occupy movements but 
a field of performative, impulsive forces: a constituent power that deterritorializes already 
established limits of performativity and create alternative subjectification processes. Two Greek 
scholar activists formulates this point as following:  
The common produced by the global occupy movement is not a mutually shared opposition to 




political project (for real, authentic democracy). The common does not even embody an identical 
strategy of occupying public space, but rather to a series of becomings that question established 
categorizations and taxonomies that normalize the production of subjectivities and the 
organisation of life (Kambouri and Hatzopoulos). 
The monstrous body breeds with such becomings in a kairological time, where kairos is the arrow 
that aims at the gap on the body armor in order to release the desire from its social subjugation. 
Lyotard’s bodily mode of aesthesis, which was cited as the body of performative event, emerges 
with such a qualitative experience of time, but it also resides in an intensive space, “a Deleuzian 
spatium, a primal or groundless space prior to the passive synthesis performed [by the conscious 
agent]” and Lyotard calls this spatio-temporality as “savage or alien space and time” (see Curtis 
255-256; Lyotard, Prescription 177). We call this “savage time-space”. 
Therefore, reclaiming time and space in occupy movements both should be viewed in the 
immanent paradigm of becomings and thus, interwoven together.  
Kairos is the proper form of time regarding a performative event, but as Latour explains, the 
event cannot be split into separate time and space: “if a place counts as a no-place, it counts as 
a non-event. … When a place counts as a topos, it also counts as a Kairos” (qtd. in May and Thrift 
28)69. Analyzing global occupy movements, Zizi Papacharissi even suggest that kairos itself refers 
to singular context of space-time blocks. 
Long before, Bakhtin was considering how time is being dramatized in arts and “takes on flesh” 
as a set of relationships in connection with spatial ones. He used the term “chronotope” (meaning 
time-space) to designate such an idea: “We will give the name chronotope to the intrinsic 
connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in 
literature…In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one 
carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes 
artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, 
plot, and history.” (The Dialogical Imagination 84) However, the chronological continuity of the 
passing time, chronos, is interrupted by the moment-of-Kairos, i.e. the moment of event in its 
 




ontogenetical and political sense. The materialist theology of Paul Tillich describes Kairos in 
contrast to Chronos as a term that “should express the feeling of many people... that a moment 
of history had appeared which was pregnant with a new understanding of the meaning of history 
and life” (369).  
Therefore, under the light of Latour’s conception of kairos ↔ topos, one can change Bakhtin’s 
chronotope to kairotope. The form of occupy itself, and the resistance of people based on a 
simultaneous defense and re-creation of their habitats, brings one to the consideration of topos 
in relation to Kairos, to that “intrinsic connectedness” Bakhtin refers to. Kairotope is another 
name for Lyotard’s notion of savage time-space.  
Recognizing the importance of Occupy movements and the singular machinic assemblages that 
came into existence during those movement, Donna Haraway has tried to capture the same 
image of thought this research invested on. For her, the contemporary situation has unleashed 
“sym-chtonic forces and power” that are result of machinic assemblages between the human 
and the inhuman. She calls these “real and possible timespaces” as “Chthulucene” (D. J. Haraway, 
Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin). However, not the 
concept itself, but what it signifies is important for this research, as it reaffirms the previous 
discussions.  
we need a name for the dynamic ongoing sym-chthonic forces and powers of which people are a 
part, within which ongoingness is at stake. Maybe, but only maybe, and only with intense 
commitment and collaborative work and play with other terrans, flourishing for rich multispecies 
assemblages that include people will be possible. I am calling all this the Chthulucene—past, 
present, and to come (ibid. 160).  
Not only Chthulucene is an immanence of past, present and to come, but it also comes through 
a processual and gradual constituent time, “with intense commitment and collaborative work 
and play”. Haraway continues to describe Chthulucene from a perspective of government of 
things, an immanence of human and nonhuman, spatial and temporal elements in the network 




spatialities and myriad intra-active entities-in assemblages—including the more-than-human, 
other-than-human, inhuman, and human-ashumus”.(ibid) 
Till now, the axis of time and its transformations during the collective act was analyzed. In the 
next session, the focus will be on the space. 
 
5.4 Site in the Performative Event 
 
In our discussions on time, we established the inherent relationship between temporality and 
spatiality. It was argued that Kairos should be always considered in a kario-tope assemblage and 
the monstrous body of performative event emerges in a savage time-space, in Chthulucene.  
But what space are we talking about? The problematic of space has been critically presented by 
various thinkers and theorists, especially in its relationship with performativity, yet not all of 
them have been talking about the same space.  
To address this problem, one should consider two different types of space that are interwoven, 
yet can be differentiated from each other (which was shortly discussed in the discussion on 
Ranciere’s notion of aesthetics): one, space as social position or one’s already determined place 
in society; and two, space as enclosure, or according to ontogenetical perspective of this 
research, space as a concrete social product and an element productive of social relation.  
 
5.4.1 Space as social positioning 
The first type is space as social positioning. This type of space is directly defined by the 
representation apparatus of governmentality, which is not at all delimited in a so-called national 
territory – at least, not since the 9/11 and the declaration of war on terror. 
An episode of “Homeland” television series – a propaganda TV show devoted to promoting the 
public image of United States War in Terror broadcasted simultaneously with OWS movement – 




terrorists. Checking her background, CIA finds out that the accused was once arrested before in 
United Kingdom, when she was 17 years old and protesting in front of a G8 meeting. A high-rank 
CIA agent then asks: “so, how does a schoolgirl become a terrorist?”  
An activist of alterglobalization movement, a movement that gave currency to performative and 
carnivalesque forms of protest, is considered a “terrorist” in mainstream media mentality. And 
she gets, as a White American, on the same level with “Arabs” who are already considered 
outsider and certainly in lower levels of social status as immigrants. The space of the society is 
partitioned in a way to place certain groups, identities or even individuals in pre-defined “places”. 
Each place is named by the authority of the constituted power of government, just like each 
creature was named by the authority of God and then man as the greatest of all creatures – as 
one can read in the Old Testament, on which Walther Benjamin writes: “God made things 
knowable in their names. And man names them according to knowing” (On Language as Such 
and on the Languages of Man 15).  
The naming creates different identities and places, from normal people to pervert ones, sane to 
insane, healthy to sick, law-obeying to criminal, respectable citizens to terrorists, illegal 
immigrants, and so on. Each place is bestowed by a social status, and limits of action, and all of 
them are redefined in political economic discourses.70  
Here one should be aware of the distinction between space and place: while space is a general 
concept referring to spatial relations and not fully determined and defined, place is a determined, 
pre-defined space. And the process of determination is what matters, as we saw and shall see 
further in the following.  
 
 




5.4.2 Space as Enclosure 
While the first type of space is more related to the social status, the second type deals with a 
more common-sense definition of space as concrete places for individuals and groups to “be in 
there”: space as “habitat”.  
17th century of England was the era of the embryonic bourgeois State. During this period, well-
known as “primitive accumulation” in Marxist terminology, the common lands were appropriated 
by state and turned into the so-called public property. In this process, fences emerged around 
common lands, turning them to “enclosures”, and herds of sheep were released inside these 
enclosures as a sign of another type of property, which was no longer common. The popular 
movement of Diggers emerged to take down these fences and defend common rights, and 
consequently was brutally suppressed. 
The modern society has been partitioned to different concrete spaces with different property 
rights: public or private. Each space has its own regulations and functions with its own 
inhabitants. Even in contemporary capitalism, we have witnessed the emergence of different 
activities who challenges these partitioning, as diggers did. For example, as we read in the agit-
prop of Reclaim the Street (RTS), streets for them are today the enclosed spaces. “What was ‘the 
commons of the city’ in a mythic past, commonly utilizable space for discussions and exchange 
within a social community, has been removed from this use today. Whereas in the past it was 
sheep that led to the privatization of land, today it is cars that take urban public space away from 
use by the inhabitants” (Hamm). 
Representation is again the main factor of defining space here: the State as the representative 
owns the public space and recognizes and protects the right for private property of space for 
citizens while denies it for certain groups of non-citizens. The private owners in their turn will be 
those who represent their owned spaces in front of others. This is also not confined in a national 
territory, as we have multinational companies owning different lands and other spaces in 
different countries of global North and South. 
What seems to be common at the first glance in these two types is their necessarily social 




certain society. Therefore, as we mentioned before, these two spaces are mutually related and 
interconnected, in a way that to talk about one necessarily leads to the other. The following 
sections will first discuss the critical approaches to space which addresses these two types 
simultaneously and then, through the example of recent social movements, will see how new 
spatial relations could form which challenge these two social products of space and make room 
for the new to come.  
 
5.4.3 Space and Sociality 
Space has been a very important factor in maintaining authority and a certain regime of 
governmentality. Drawing national borders and dividing country into different partitions 
(provinces, states, etc) are only the most general obvious examples of this fact. As Linda McDowel 
writes, “there is a reciprocal relationship between the constitution of places and people” (Capital 
Culture 1); not just as social positioning, but also in relation to resistance and struggle against the 
imposed hierarchy on society and the inaccessibility of (public) space for the public.  
Therefore, challenging the established spatiality and using spatial knowledge has been long 
conducted by revolutionaries, leftist theorists, and social protest movements. As Frank N. Pieke 
explain in the case of Chinese students and workers’ struggle against the authoritarian 
Communist regime, it was not accidental that Tiananmen Square became the center of protests 
in 1989; simply because “occupying, and conquering space … became the primary means to 
negotiate and eventually struggle for the exercise of legitimate power in China” (Images of 
Protest 167). 
Henri Lefebvre was among the first Marxist thinkers who gave a special attention to the concept 
of space. Arguing that Marxism has neglected space in favor of time, he formulated his main 
argument as follows: capitalism produces and arranges space in a way that maintains its 
reproduction and accumulation of surplus value. Having experienced the May 68 movement, 
Lefebvre asserted that city and urban spaces have a definite role in the struggle against capital 




City”, one of the most famous essays of Lefebvre, became a slogan in recent urban struggles 
against capitalism.  
The reproductive function of space, in particular urban space, linked those aforementioned two 
types of space in Lefebvre’s work: on one hand, the concrete spaces are organized in a way that 
facilitates the flows of value and labour power and contains them in the capitalist distribution 
system, which on the other hand, relates directly to the class-based social positions of producers, 
workers, consumers, and so on. It is from this perspective that one should understand his famous 
sentence that “space is a product”. Those two types of space presuppose, reinforce and 
reproduce each other.  
However, Lefebvre has been criticized due to mainly two reasons: he ignores the temporality and 
its role on spatial determinations; and he assigns all the power of determining the space to the 
capitalist State or governmentality, subtracting the constituent power of people.  
In Lefebvre, there is certain duality between time and space as two completely autonomous 
entities. Before starting this section, we argued for the entanglement of temporal and spatial 
axes. David Harvey, another thinker of political geography, argues for the same fact: 
The circulation of capital makes time the fundamental dimension of human affairs. Under 
capitalism, after all, it is socially necessary labor time that forms the substance of value, surplus 
labor time that lies at the origin of profit, and the ratio of surplus labor time to socially necessary 
turnover time that defines the rate of profit and, ultimately, the average rate of interest…Under 
capitalism, therefore, the meaning of space and the impulse to create new spatial configurations 
of human affairs can be understood only in relation to such temporal requirements. (The Ways of 
the World) 
Harvey believes that space is “used, organized, created and dominated” to help with the 
circulation of capital. The capitalist spatial organization has produced the international division 
of labour as well as various crises all over the world. Moreover, this organization leads to certain 
division between center and periphery in which the center and periphery also have their own 
centers and peripheries. What these divided spaces contain are certain people with certain 




against this organization, and those who make rebellions in cities, the urban spaces of capitalism, 
to challenge its spatiality. The latter is what Harvey thoroughly discussed in his “Rebel Cities”.  
Just like Lefebvre who proposes a wide urban movement against capital as the only solution 
which can make use of space as a tool and afterward opens the way for a new urbanism or new 
configuration of space, it seems Harvey harnesses the same idea. Discussing the common as the 
metropolitan space in contemporary capitalism, Harvey argues that reclaiming the common is 
not the solution. In his words, 
… the problem is not the common per se, but the relations between those who produce or capture 
it at a variety of scales and those who appropriate it for private gain (Rebel Cities 79 - emphasis 
added). 
Therefore, it seems that a critique of space leads Harvey to put the general solution in an old 
familiar Marxist formulation: a revolutionary movement is to change the relations of production. 
To which one could ask this question: what if the space (and time) is itself a relation? What if the 
space is at the same time produced and productive? What if the transforming of space, reclaiming 
it, is a transformative power which changes those relations between producers?  
Capital as a relation is not subjected to its terms. In other words, “the individual body” cannot 
set itself free of this relation willingly. Moreover, one or many cannot just leave the society in an 
act of self-marginalization to be outside of this relation. Living in farms, going to remote places 
or any other similar act would just serve to ease the bad conscience, while one should abandon 
all illusions of not making one’s hands dirty, all illusions of an actually existing Outside to 
capitalism – as it was the main idea of Marxism-Leninism.  
Here, as we argued before, one can find the paradigm of immanent struggle, in the complex 
system of conjunctions and disjunctions between capitalist relation, spatio-temporality, and the 
performativity of bodies. The bodies perform in a way that produces a relation between them; 
however, the conditions of their performance, the space and time they are performing in, limit 
their performativity or mostly impose a pre-written drama on them, which means they provide 
the bodies with a pre-existing relation and therefore, frame their performance. However, space 




hand, the performative force of the bodies, the constituent power of the moving flesh, or the 
desire cannot be totally delimited and channeled. As Deleuze and Guattari say, a society leaks 
out on all sides. This is where the excessive performativizations begin ephemerally set up another 
relation, to then trigger the radical imagination toward offering an alternative – not a defined 
solidified alternative, but the being of alternative itself, the ghost which is haunting the global 
imagination. 
Limiting ourselves to the spatial relation, we can summarize the whole point as follows: 1) 
existing spatiality is a capitalist social relation; 2) space as a relation works as a condition for 
performativization; 3) but we have a two-sided connectivity between performativization and 
spatiality, which means performative event is able to transform the spatial relation; 4) that is 
because performative event brings about two transformation: corporeal and incorporeal.  
 
5.4.4 Philosophers of Spatial Relation 
Defining space as relation has the benefit of containing all types of space mentioned in the 
beginning. A contemporary French philosopher whose project is fundamentally focused on space 
is Jacque Ranciere, according to who “art is not political because it deals with political matters or 
represents social and political conflicts. It is first political because it reframes the distribution of 
space, its visibility and—let us say—its habitability”. Space as well as time are conceived as “social 
relations” in Ranciere’s re-conceptualization of aesthetics – as it was discussed thoroughly in 
Chapter Two.  
Although he recognizes spatiality as a social relation, Ranciere focuses on the distribution of the 
sensible. He must presuppose the existing spatial relations in order to be able to conceptualize 
their re-distribution and disruption through dislocation. The paradox is if space is a relation, it is 
productive of sensible, and therefore, could be possibly transform into another relation. To 





Michel Foucault’s seminal text, “Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heteropias” (1997 (1967)), not 
only predicts, but also emphasizes on the importance of “relation” in understanding 
contemporary space. In his short genealogy of the conception of space in different 
epistemological periods, he distinguishes three kinds of spatial understanding.  
The first one, medieval space, is the space of emplacement, “a hierarchic ensemble of places” 
divided into sacred/profane, urban/rural, celestial/supercelestial dualities (330). The second one, 
the modern space or the extensive space, comes after Galileo’s effect whose importance, 
according to Foucault, is to show “space is nothing but a point in its movement”, is not closed 
but infinite, and earth is not co-extensive with the space of the world. "In other words, starting 
with Galileo and the seventeenth century, extension was substituted for localization." (331) 
But the third kind, which concerns us, is the contemporary space called by Foucault “site”. Site 
has a familiar ring in our ears: websites, multisite networks, restriction site in a DNA, subsites, 
etc. Foucault also relates the term to technics and defines it by way of referring to data collection, 
memory of a machine, and coded elements. Moreover, he considers site as a heterogeneous 
space delineated by our very social relations: 
The space in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives, our 
time and our history occurs, the space that claws and gnaws at us, is also, in itself, a 
heterogeneous space. In other words, we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could 
place individuals and things. We do not live inside a void that could be colored with diverse shades 
of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another 
and absolutely not superimposable on one another. (333) 
One can see the shift from the extensive space of modernity to the intensive, relational space of 
contemporary capitalism parallel to the passage from disciplinary societies to the societies of 
control; which concerns the crisis of modern spaces of confinement in disciplinary societies and 
their transformation from “molds” to “modulations”; or in other words, from extensive spaces 
to spaces delineated by social relations.  
In the case of art, one can see how this shift contributed to the so-called curatorial turn. To grasp 




all social fields. In that period, as Paul O’Neill correctly indicates, “the primary discourse around 
art-in-exhibition began to turn away from forms of critique of the artwork as autonomous object 
of study/critique towards a form of curatorial criticism, in which the space of exhibition was given 
critical precedence over that of the objects of art” (O'Neill 13). The notion of curator, as the 
guardian or keeper of a museum, is closely tied to the space of art. However, by the social 
uprisings of 1960s, the concept of space itself went into crisis, since the rigid and strict boundaries 
between various spaces – or as Foucault would say, spaces of confinement – became to shatter 
and blur and the whole social field entered into an immanent order of non-vertical organizations 
as well as subjected to an omnipresent control strategy. In the Italian movement of autonomists, 
for instance, workers, students, lawyers, physicians, nurses, women, homosexuals, judges and so 
on joined the movement and contributed to the molecular revolution as well as molar revolution 
in various social fields and spaces. If Boris Buden is right that “an act of criticism almost 
necessarily implies the awareness of a crisis and vice versa,” (Buden), then it makes sense why 
programmers started to develop a critical discourse on the “space” of art. 
Foucault’s genealogy captures the various deterritorializing forces and movements which 
transgress the established limits of space in each epistemological period, construct another 
spatiality with its own limits. These deterritorializations are embodied in contemporary 
capitalism, too, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest. The contemporary space emerges through the 
deterritorializing forces of informatics, machines, and etc. As capitalism moves always in reaction 
to the autonomous constituent power of the collective subjectivities, it has to reterritorialize 
around the extraction of value and accumulation of capital.  
What Foucault sees as the signs of incomplete deterritorialization or liberation of space are the 
still subsisting modern dualities: “for example between private space and public space, between 
family space and social space, between cultural space and useful space, between the space of 
leisure and that of work. All these are still nurtured by the hidden presence of the sacred”. For 
Foucault, the sacred subsists from medieval space71.  
 
71 In the same context, Luce Irigaray dates back the relation between sacred and space much further by interpreting 
the Western-Christian historical conception of time and space in philosophy of subject through mythology: “In the 




But the subsistence of such typologies of space does not explain the contemporary one. Indeed, 
Foucault had to adopt a particular perspective that fits to the contemporary image of thought 
and explains the immanent workings of site as Foucault explains.  
Space is (re)productive as far as it is a social relation, conditioning the performativization of 
subjectivities, the production of so-called identities, and is a product as far as it is shaped and 
configured in-between of these performativizations, the actions of collective subjectivities. Now, 
from this perspective, we are going to inspect this two-sided ontology of space in recent protest 
“Occupy” movements, dealing with the contemporary capitalist space. 
 
5.4.5 Smooth Space: Contemporary Capitalism’s Spatiality 
The distinction between striated and smooth space is helpful to define the contemporary space. 
Developed by Deleuze and Guattari, striated space is a space with determinate divisions: surface 
and depth, roof and bottom, a surface coded as A and a surface coded as B and so on. The modern 
extensive space was such a space: different spaces of confinement, such as family houses, 
schools, factories, universities, mental hospitals, prisons, etc. with their rules, disciplines, and 
strict limits, with their central State, public spaces, private ones, bourgeois institutions and so on. 
Inside each space, there was a hierarchy: father/mother/child, 
capitalist/manager/foremen/skilled workers/ unskilled workers, boss/overseer/white or pink-
collar workers… However, with the new knowledge-based cognitive capitalism, the different 
surfaces and levels of modern striated extensive spaces, its strata, destratified into the capitalist 
smooth space.  
 
less in the service of space… God would be time itself, lavishing or exteriorizing itself in its action in space, in places”. 
(An Ethics of Sexual Difference 7) She then goes on to claim that time is the interiority of the masculine subject with 
the masculine experienced as time, and space is the exteriority implying abyss with the feminine experienced as 
space. Therefore, the feminine, the abyss, or the space has always been subjugated to the subject, the interiority, 
the time. The feminine provides spaces for the masculine, but it is itself an abyss, not locatable, occupies no space. 
So, if Foucault concerns himself with the problem of the sacred in space, one can ask, through Irigaray, the following 
question: if space is feminine, which means it is productive, or rather, reproductive, then how to release it, how to 




With the hegemonization of immaterial labour, the focus of production has displaced on the 
innovation, creativity, flexibility, knowledge, and performance. Using the cognitive abilities to 
produce necessitates easier flowing of information, better communication, minimum levels of 
obstructing discipline and instead, micro-scale employment of control strategies. In other words, 
cognitive or immaterial workers should use artificial commons (sentiments, language, thoughts, 
and knowledge) to produce value. These necessary conditions of productions lead to the 
surpassing of established limits, deterritorializing the traditional territories and hierarchies, and 
going toward the network organization. On the other hand, the neoliberal deregulation and 
intensified privatization of public properties – including public spaces – in favor of multinational 
corporations marks again our era as the era of erasing the traditional set of dualities and limits. 
If Marx and Engels regarded Bourgeoisie as the revolutionaries who have created a new sociality 
in an era in which “all that is solid melts into the air” (Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the 
Communist Party), our era has also witnessed the erasure of many bourgeois institutions and 
ideologies, the dissolution of social traditional bodies such as people, family, clubs, etc, the power 
of multinationals over central states, and so on. This is again an era in which all concepts and 
ideas which were central to bourgeoisie have been melting into the air. The contemporary 
spatiality has transformed in the same manner, too.  
One should keep in mind, as Negri and Hardt points out, that the immaterial biopolitical labour 
is autonomous in relation to capital (see Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth 142). Production needs 
collectivity, organization and communication. In Fordism, this collectivity could be possible 
through gathering workers together around factory machinery, because manual material labour 
was central in producing surplus value and accumulating capital, and for producing collective 
subjectivities to do this, capitalism needed workers to communicate around something. Of 
course, this was an opportunity for resistance too, since resistance as collective action could 
emerge from these collective subjectivities in different processes of subjectification (see Hardt, 
Into the Factory: Negri’s Lenin and the Subjective Caesura). On the other hand, immaterial labour 
put language, affections, and bodily performances into use. Doing this means exploiting the 
immaterial faculties of humans through which communication is possible. That is why immaterial 




access the flows of information -- and not Fordist vertical hierarchies anymore. Consequently, 
the place of production is directly common and the management of immaterial labour is no 
longer immanent to the production process, but external to it, since it doesn’t need to create 
common places for communication or intervene and control the “process of production” directly. 
In other words, if accumulation of capital in Fordism was through the profit production, the 
accumulation of capital in post-Fordism is via rent (see Negri, Postface). Moreover, this process 
led to a blurring of boundaries between “work time” and “leasure life”, or “performance” and 
“daily life” of the workers (Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth 146), those dualities mentioned by 
Foucault. For example, the working day has been seemingly shorter, but it’s extended into the 
whole day via smart phones, netbooks, laptops and other tools. This phenomenon has led to a 
more dispersed and scattered network of Power and supervision and that’s why the so-called 
control societies have emerged instead of discipline societies. 
Although capitalism is external to immaterial production, it cannot let it be free of regulations 
and control. As Foucault shows in his Birth of Biopolitics, the neoliberal art of governmentality 
does not interfere directly in the economic field, rather it sets regulations from outside to channel 
the production process (See Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics). That’s why the relation of capital 
to biopolitical production is of a parasite. This parasite is the mentioned major reterritorialization 
of the smooth space: an externally imposed territory for production of value, which keeps the 
smoothness, but re-appropriates the produced wealth. Therefore, production on this smooth 
space is the production of capitalist reproduction and the reproduction of capitalist production; 
no matter if it is now not striated as conventional Fordist space. 
Smooth space and striated space are not opposite to each other: they develop out of each other, 
are present in each other, and form different mixtures. However, one should note that the 
established sociality imposes striation on social space: the representative government represents 
the public and its public space, develops proper regulations, and manages it. By the increasing 
weakening of central state after neoliberalism and the crisis of representation both in politics 
(representative democracy) and arts, the imposed striation has been disappearing, and the 
aforementioned transformation in conditions of production turned the spatiality of capitalism 




heterogenous, the capitalist smoothening process imposes the hegemony of its labour and 
production conditions (i.e. its social relations of (re)production) on the space, privatizing it, and 
reconfiguring it around the possibility of wealth accumulation. 
Therefore, we need to differentiate between two smooth spaces and two striated spaces.  
● The smooth and striated space of constituted power: the former is a result of 
contemporary global capitalist processes, mostly visible in the erasure of public space and 
an intensification of privatization in form of corporate property, and the latter is the space 
proper to the disciplinary power, and an intervening State that creates rigid lines of 
subjectification for its predefined subjective positions.  
● The smooth and striated space of constituent power: the former emerges when the code 
of the everyday sign is defunct and performative event effects a rupture, thus 
deterritorializing already established limits, while the latter is produced through an 
immanent molecular striation of a smooth space in the gradual temporality of constituent 
action. This will be explained further in the next section. 
 
Flat Ontology and the Site of Performative Event 
The space and its dynamic processes under the rule of capitalism has been described in previous 
sections. What remains to be yet discussed is the spaces of unruliness under such conditions, the 
Deleuzian spatiums that hosts intensive becomings and monstrous bodies.  
In the light of Occupy Movements, Keith Woodward, John Paul Jones III, and Sallie A. Marston 
suggests a perspective of immanence to understand such spaces; the perspective of “flat 
ontology”.  
Woodward et al argue for a "flat ontology" that contests the privileged, transcendent abstraction 
of structural, hierarchical, and formal treatments of "being". (204) For them, flat ontology has 
become a necessary image of thought in order to "stress the situated, immanent nature of being 
(or 'becoming') - often characterized by generative , material processes of self-organization and 




(205) An ontology capable of explaining the emergence of swarming patchwork bodies that – as 
we have argued before – are produced within a machinic assemblage of the human and the 
inhuman, under a government of things. Thus, “an immanent ontology that requires ... no 
transcendental organizing principle or category beyond the swarms of material articulation’ 
(Woodward et al, 2010, qtd. in page 211). 
Their flat ontology signifies our conception of ontogenesis in this research. It does not prioritize 
solid being over becoming as in classical ontology; on the contrary, it tries to capture the 
micropolitcal processes occur in occupation tent cities throughout the world. It also tries to fit 
with the kairological paradigm of time, defining those spaces as kairotopes, where durational 
processes of becoming are performativizing ideas of the political through the space. Indeed, 
when Antonio Negri tries to speculate on the time of revolution in a framework of absolute 
immanence, he points to the same flattening of the being: 
This radical flattening of being, this refound surface of ontology destroys any neo-Kantian claim 
for the difference of intellect from experience; it uproots every subjective genealogy of being; and 
it opens onto the problem of the reconstruction of a new ontological terrain (Marx and Foucault 
5). 
The new ontological terrain that we call ontogenesis affirms a productive relation between the 
performative, virtual bodily forces and the discursive, actualized signs and structures. Although 
the latter conditions the former, it is produced by it.  
One of the reasons for flat-ontological perspective, Woodward et al explain, is also the non-
discursive characteristic of the collective body that forms in the spaces of Occupy movements. 
For them, what appears to come out of those spaces resembles more “noise” than articulated 
demands. This refusal of actualized modern discourses has made many critiques on the Left, even 
between contemporary thinkers who still side with modernist concepts such as Badiou72, as they 
 
72 Badiou calls occupy movements as “blind, naive, scattered and lacking a powerful concept of durable organization" 






also hear nothing but noise from those movements and do not try to train new ears to hear the 
inaudible forces of those movements.  
On the contrary, Woodward et al argue that adopting a flat-ontological perspective witnesses to 
“a willingness to attend to the uncertain noise that erupts with difference and singularity” which 
they describe as “an obscure, uncompromising remainder that imposes itself when all the orders 
and similarities have been enumerated, logged and filed away.” (208) 
The production of nonlinguistic, performative signs that break away with the code of the 
everyday signs is explained through Klossowski’s reading of Nietzsche in previous chapter. We 
argued that performative event’s rupture brings about an emptying out of the master signifier, 
following by a chaotic field of impulsive forces and creating of new phantasms and simulacra. In 
this kairological time, a self-loss happens, a Foucauldian desubjectification (dassujettissement) 
that disrupts the modern duality of subject/object and therefore, it refuses to be grasped by 
subject-oriented thinking. Woodward et al chose the aforementioned Foucault’s notion of site 
exclusively to explain a space proper to such a moment in the performative event. They argue 
that other conceptions of spatialities “are the disciplinary and fetishized sister concepts to 
subject-thinking: they manifest a number of lingering Cartesian extensive spaces that grid 
materiality or reflect Kantian spatial structures arranged by the control center of transcendental 
thought” (Woodward, 2010). In the same manner, Boyarin refers to “close genealogical links 
between the ‘Cartesian coordinates’ of space and time and the discrete, sovereign state” (Space, 
Time and the Politics of Memory 4) that include relations of mapping, boundary setting, inclusion 
and exclusion. 
For them, site should thus be understood through its capability of making relations and its 
micopolitical processes. In short, site is an affective environment ripe for contagion. Therefore, 
the methodology for analyzing sites cannot steam from a thinking based on the principle of 
identity or as Woodward et al formulate it, “refuse the checklist of identity categories” (212); 
rather, as this research suggests, a performativization method can “discern the nonsubjective 
and unnamable, yet completely material processes of the site” (ibid), those “instances of self-




(211), setting in motion with the virtual and performative forces of an event – the forces effect 
that desubjectification: 
certain material (counter)movements ... not only constitute the event space of the site, but 
simultaenously 'suspend' the subject. (206) 
In such a site, identities blur and open up to the other, as we discussed in the case of Istanbul’s 
Kadikoy march in support of Kurds, when the so-called “white-Turks” started to shout non-
sensical slogans in an attempt to talk a banned language for the first time. Woodward et al call 
this an “anexact enactment of an identity”, coming out of the suspension of subject (or more 
exactly, a suspension of subjectification coding) and creating noise, “the extra- or a-subjective 
clusters of orientations – the ‘noise’ – that make up the site” (209). 
With the suspension of the subject, the space opens up to new processes of subjectification, and 
“allows us glimpses of the effects of a site’s drawing-together, the immanent enlistment of 
whatever bodies produce singularities” (Woodward et al 213). In other words, the gradual and 
caring process of molecular striation of the space begins. 
If we are confronted with a smooth space, we should keep in mind that smooth space is 
completely indeterminate and chaotic. Subjectification, on the other hand, needs 
performativization, individuation, and determination. Striating space is not in itself a negative 
concept, if it comes immanently from inside, from the very constituent power that 
deterritorializes the private/public space, making it smooth, and then striates it into the common 
space through its performativity. Neither the common can be pre-supposed, nor the collective 
subjectivity with its different names (people, multitude, and so on); both of them are produced. 
This process of commonizing the space set out the collective subjectification, since it is the event 
which corporeally and incorporeally changes the social relations including spatiality; while the 
smooth capitalist space, due to its hegemonic function of rent which prevents alternative 
collective subjectivities to be formed, reproduces the already established typologies of subjective 
positions73 as its main function. 
 




When the constituent power forms temporarily the social relations, then the production on this 
smooth space is not anymore under capitalist conditions: the non-reproductive production 
produces excess that cannot be absorbed again in the process of reproduction; the excesses that 
according to Woodward et al these excesses “erupting from botched performativity” that is now 
liberated and “begin to produce material effects in the world” (209). Hence the production of the 
poor; the artistic strategies of aesthetic production that prevail in Occupy movements. And an 
alternative sociality will emerge. 
These excesses are produced under an alternative relationality to capitalist relation in forms of 
different simulacra that appear in multiple artistic and performative practices and 
experimentations. They are aesthetic, in the sense that they produce alternative subjectification 
processes. Collective striations mark different parts of the site, and new subjectivities grow on 
them. As such, they create zones with different tonalities, affectivities and textures. Something 
like a patchwork that sews pieces of fabrics with different color, texture and size.  
In Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology (A Thousand Plateaus 476), patchwork functions as an 
example for their conception of smooth space: the common space of nomads, the space of 
nomadic war machines against the hierarchical, established relations of the striated space of the 
State or capitalism. For us, as we explained here, patchwork is a reclaimed smooth space by a 
collective patchwork body that create different affectivities and subjectivities in a non-
hierarchical way. In one sense, it is still smooth, as it is the common site of immobile nomads, 
and on the other hand, it is heterogenous, different in nature from the subjugated space it was 
before.  
A concept that supplements the notion of patchwork in Deleuze and Guattari is “consistency”: 
the autonomous formation of machinic assemblages between diverse elements in a non-
hierarchical way. On one hand, consistency explains the molecular striation of alternative 
subjectification lines on a patchwork site, without it losing its character of smoothness.  On the 
other hand, it connects the spatiality of patchwork with the kairological time of morphogenetic 
process that generates new beings without homogenizing and hierarchizing them: 
Consistency necessarily occurs between heterogeneities, not because it is the birth of a 




another become bound up with one another through the "consolidation" of their coexistence or 
succession. ... What we term machinic is precisely this synthesis of heterogeneities as such 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 364). 
As much as the molecular striation74 needs the gradual and processual kairological temporality, 
it needs a site for experimentation. That is why the space in occupation movements looks like a 
stage cut out from the urban scene. The Versuchers don't need to move away from where they 
are, marching toward other places or attack different governmental buildings, because "their aim 
is to resist over-coding as well as to invent ways of being different without having to seize/smash 
the state as their default option" (Newman 36).  
The fixation on space, however, does not signify any statics. On the contrary, as we have seen, a 
site is swarmed not only by human and inhuman bodies and elements, but also with multiple 
virtual and performative forces. Its dynamics is rather intensive than extensive. "The nomad is on 
the contrary he who does not move", Deleuze and Guattari write (D&G, 1988, 381). Moreover, 
to insist on a space is to resist against the mechanisms of dispossession; a case best observed in 
indigenous struggles for lands and natural resources.  
Still, we need to delve deeper into the cases in order to track the different performativizations 
and as we exemplified the previous section on time mostly through OWS and Occupy Tahrir, we 
continue with that in the following sections section. 
 
 
74 Before, we have referred to a processual piece by the Hawaiian Diggers, a guerrilla theatre group in Hawaii (see 
Chan and Sharma). Their strategy of changing a particular relationality in their community was not through forming 
a common isolation in a space of their urban life, or even staying in one place. Instead, they marked the space with 
a plant in order to problematize the accepted coding of space into public and private, making social established 
answers turn to new questions through a micropolitical performative durational action. Their simple moves (to plant 
papaya seedlings beside the fence between formerly public space turned private and a current public space, to 
inform people about them and introducing future trees as common property for all, opening a free shop) made a 
discussion between people about the nature of space and its owners, keyholders and regulators (state in the case 
of public property, private entities and corporations in the case of private property). It created a different socialites 
when former insensitive citizens became involved in a free circulations of goods and trying to create a common 




5.4.6 The Occupy Form: Immanent Striation of the Contemporary Smooth Space 
One of the biggest city squares in the world, Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, has been a place 
of protest for at least a century. Parallel to this, it has been the main symbol of capital, the place 
of military parades, anniversaries of People’s Republic, statues of People’s leaders, enormous 
pictures of supreme leaders, prestigious site of welcoming foreign leaders, and in short, a public 
space re-appropriated by the State centralized power and used for its own purposes.  
In 1976, The Tiananmen Incident happened, because people wanted to keep, against the will of 
The Gang of Four top officials of the communist party, the displays of mourning after the death 
of Premier Zhou Enlai. Although the public space of Tiananmen was supposed to belong to the 
public, the party ordered to clean the square. Thirteen years later, the square was still in hands 
of the so-called representatives of people, the communist party of china which embraced 
capitalism and its conception of growth. Amid a very high inflation and cutbacks in social 
spending (including education which caused higher tuition fees, worse conditions in dormitories, 
etc.), student protestors went to the square and gradually occupied it. During the occupation, 
the governmental territory imposed on the square deterritorialized and protesters 
reappropriated their own space, commonizing it. The protest was not at all limited to students: 
it was a general call to everyone, surpassing the limits of different identities while recognizing 
the differences. The square became a tent city, with collective self-organization of daily life and 
resources. However, the routine was no longer repetitive and dull: it was full of joy and 
happiness. The politics was also no longer hierarchical and boring: it entangled with collective 
delight and exuberance. People were there with their trucks and tractors. Children were there 
singing and playing (see Pieke).  
Succeeding in removing the imposed striation from the square, occupiers were gradually and 
immanently striating their own space: alternative collective subjectivities were formed. The 
spatiality was becoming totally different as the event was transforming corporeal and incorporeal 
relations. The immanent striation could be seen as embodied in the statue of “Goddess of 
Liberty”; a statue the created in four days by student-occupiers of Central Academy of Fine Arts 




the gurus of management keep telling us that “MFA (master of fine arts) is the new MBA (master 
of business administration)” (Pink 54).  
Out of these real transformations, ordinary people of Beijing, in every street of the city, were 
feeling a different sociality: they were those who stood in front of the army after the declaration 
of martial law and didn’t let the armed vehicles reach the square; they were the main people 
who got killed on 3rd of June. It was not only Tiananmen Square massacre, but Beijing massacre, 
in order to reclaim the space, to destroy the embryos of alternative social relations. 
China is the most famous example for the fact that economic (neo)liberalism does not necessarily 
bring political liberalism, i.e. parliamentary democracy. With the crisis of representative 
democracy as well as economic liberalism in the late 2000s, the occupy form emerged again all 
around the world: from Bahrain and Egypt to Turkey and Greece and Spain to United States.  
 
5.4.7 OWS and its Spatialities  
The sites of Occupy performative events all show similar abstract processes of virtual forces that 
performativize differently according to each context: “the affective bodily arrangements of 
human and non-human participants; the charismatic chaos of unexpected eruptions and routine 
redundancies; the complex of arrivals and departures that both connect sites to one another and 
continually reshape their boundaries; and in the recruiting of human bodies into political 
moments unanticipatable from the perspective of their subjectivities alone” (Woodward et al 
206) 
One of the main performative impulses of the occupy movements was the re-appropriation of 
the space, turning the public property into the common property. An earlier, but self-evident 
example of struggle over common space happened in Greece, although three years before 2011 
occupy movement. In fact, the “Scream” revolt in December 2008 was the background of 
resistance that Syntagma Square occupation placed itself in it. Just months after the revolt, an 
abandoned place in Athens was transformed into a park. Theodoros Karyotis describes this park, 




events” that “despite attempts at eviction, the park retains its character to this day” (The Right 
to the City in an Age of Austerity).  
According to Karyotis, Navarinou “represented an early instance of the substitution of ‘public’ 
space with ‘common’ space; of rigid, aseptic space that serves as a neutral ground between 
isolated individuals with organic space where individuals can connect and intertwine their desires 
in the context of the community, where they can negotiate the terms of their co-existence.” (ibid) 
This communizing of the public space, and turning it into a site of experimentation with an 
alternative sociality, repeated itself in later occupy movements such as Occupy Wall Street. OWS 
started in a park in the heart of US financial capitalism. Zuccotti Park symbolizes a location which 
obviously witnesses to the smoothening process of neoliberalism, since it was a former public 
space, called “Liberty Plazza Park”, fully privatized only in 2006, and became John Zuccotti’s 
private property. A space formerly supposedly belonged to the public, Liberty Plazza Park was 
located where in 18th century, the first public demonstration against Tea Act happened, which 
gradually led to United States independence. One of the few remaining open public spaces in the 
heart of Wall Street financial district, it was covered with dust and destroyed with debris after 
9/11 and then sold to Brookfield Properties for renovation. 
Zuccotti park is located between Wall Street and former site of World Trade Center. In 2010, an 
anti-mosque rally was held there. Unlike other types of protests that meet with sudden police 
aggression, some 300 ultraright-wing protesters held their gathering there, although permit 
request was rejected. After they finished, the park’s western side was a reminder of nationalist 
imagination and a desire to homogenous body, as American and Gadsden flags were flying all 
over the place.  
After occupying Zuccotti Park in September 2011, leftist activists erected a tent city, like al-Tahrir 
square; even their initial call was: “are you ready for a Tahrir movement”? The adbusters who 
made the call, asked their readers to “catch the zeitgeist” and describe their movement “a fusion 
of Tahrir with the Acampadas of Spain” (see Writers for the 99%). 
There were many committees in the camp to make possible and facilitate the direct democratic 




of this struggle, or in other words, to practice the non-representational democracy. But as an 
activist emphasizes, “the space took time to develop into this”, in a durational process of a 
collective constituent time that slowly striated the already smooth space and created alternative 
lines of subjectification. (ibid 44) Indeed, many committees and groups formed in preparation 
time in a network-based organization before the event: food committee, students committee, 
the outreach committee, the internet working group, the arts and culture working group, and 
the tactical committee. 
Having been started as reclaiming a privatized former public Park, OWS extended its struggle 
over space into other parts of the city, especially regarding the gentrification of lower-income 
family neighborhoods that raise the rent and services price and make the former occupants leave 
their houses to new middle class mostly white residents.75 In one case, the occupiers joined 
another occupy movement, “occupy 447” in Harlem neighborhood. Occupy 447 tries to save a 
historical landmark and low-income residential building at 447 west 142nd street, which is a hot 
district in terms of gentrification. Since October 2010, the corporate owners who wanted to 
demolish the building and evacuate its low-income residents, faced with their resistance, and in 
response left the building without heat and hot water. (ibid 119) 
It was mentioned that OWS camp, although equipped with various organizational innovations 
and assemblies, was indeed chaotic. The camp was “totally jerry-rigged, improvisation built upon 
improvisation”, writes one activist. But as Woodward et al remind us, this is part of the flat-
ontological aspect of the site, as it suspends dominant subjectification: 
a politics not tethered to the agency of subjects … accounts for the fact that even direct 
participants have scratching their heads and fumbling to make sense of this messy reality" (209) 
Remembering Ranciere main thesis that is “[art] is first political because it reframes the 
distribution of space, its visibility and—let us say—its habitability” (Artists and Cultural Producers 
1), it is worth to look at OWS map. It resembles a patchwork as it consists of different corners 
 
75 Indeed, this was one of the points of protest in Occupy Gezi, especially for transgender community whose main 




with different functionalities, but even in its dynamics, it differentiates into various forms of 
subjectification. 
The site of the OWS movement made a machinic assemblage possible between the human and 
the nonhuman elements inside it. The props, signs, graffiti and posters covered the space to mark 
it as a laboratory of experimentation. Moreover, smartphones, tablets and other technical 
gadgets were integrated in the flows of the tent city, becoming part of the overall image of the 
movement and its network of life. Not to mention the tree of life which stood a few blocks away 
from the 9/11 memorial but became a living memorial to the imagination of occupiers. 
As we have argued before, the collective body of performative events is best described as a 
“patchwork body” because different phantasms and simulacra attach themselves to such a body. 
The people gathered in the Wall Street had multiple political views or personal histories, mostly 
white but also from minority communities. And they developed different forms of political 
performativity while being part of one movement.  
The space had lost its neutrality and smoothness gradually and the striation began, extending 
itself to the limits of the site. As one activist describes, "far from a homogenous buffer, the four 
sidewalks that make up Zuccotti’s perimeter quickly took the form of distinct zones, each with 
different sorts of interactions, shaped by particularities in the internal organization of the 
occupation itself." (Writers for the 99% 126) 
This shows itself in the inner dynamics in the camp, where the differences were materialized in 
the space, “mapped themselves out on the surface of the square and in the lived experience of 
those sleeping in the park” (ibid 61-62). This fact may however point to one of its failures, or to 
its incomplete process of desubjectification and deterritorialization.  
Many activists described how the space gradually differentiated in a molar way along the lines of 
class and race, simultaneously with the molecular processes that were partially in force in the 
patchwork space of the performative event’s site. The latter manifested itself in a struggle over 
the space as common, where race and class does not represent any dividing line. Not only in 
various graffiti and street performances, but also in slogans one could trace the forces of such 




refers to Troy Davis, an African-American convict who got executed in Georgia for a crime that 
many believed he did not do it. His name became a symbol of structural racism in the United 
States.  
There was another issue with the police regarding the space. As a librarian participant in OWS 
says, “one of the things that you always know is that if the cops don't want you to go somewhere, 
you don't. they block it.” (Writers for the 99% 37) As the police barricaded around the Zuccotti 
Park, the free movement was stopped. (ibid 127) Police force is the harshest form of 
territorializing space, and the occupiers had to deal with that while performatively opening the 
borders of space.  
But the molar differentiation started when the camp was divided geographically into eastern and 
western ends (Writers for the 99% 61-2). According to activists’ inside stories, the Eastern end of 
the park accommodated the more reform oriented and middle-class supporters and the west 
was more occupied by the working class and “politically uncompromising activists” such as native 
Americans, black community and anarchist artists, particularly the drummers who were playing 
atop the stairs for extended periods every day. (ibid 63) Others also point out that the occupation 
sleeping areas were also marked by differences in class and race. In the Northeast, the well-
educated and mainly white occupiers had their more comfortable tents and Zuccotti's southwest 
side was all black and Latino. As one black activist observes, the divisions were just like New York 
City. (ibid 65). The reproduction of divisions in the camp shows the limitations of performative 
movements, and their temporariness76.  
What seems interesting in the map of OWS camp is the name assigned to the space of arts: Art 
Area/Flexible Space. This space exists in every tent city of public square occupiers: in Al-Tahrir, 
for example, there were “a volunteer security service, trash collectors, medical services, a 
 
76 In syntagma square, there was also a division between ' the upper square' and the 'lower' square, although it 
formed its own patchwork space too, creating "collective self-mobilization across numerous fields, from media and 
farming co-operatives to autonomous health and art centres that labour under non-capitlalist and non-statist 
principles of egalitarian participation and social solidarity" (and all these autonomous parts became part of the site 
in the squares). Upper part hosted more nationalist voices, where protesters demanded the rejection of economic 
agreements with the troika (IMF, EU and ECB) without a clear perspective for the future, while in the lower square, 




‘Painter’s Corner’ for literate protesters to make signs, outdoor exhibitions of revolutionary 
banners, a makeshift stage for poets to recite their poems, even an open air space for weddings” 
(Writers for the 99% 6). Or in Gezi, there was cinema, library, and various dance performances. 
These two examples refer to the smoothening processes, too: in case of Gezi, the intense 
gentrification process wanted to replace the park with a trade center, and in case of al-Tahrir, 
the big square was the central point for the flow of labour power, occupied by cars and vehicles, 
too crowded for people to even gather there normally for an hour or two. 
Flexible/art space is a sign referring to the necessarily heterogeneous character of a site as 
smooth space which striated immanently. Unlike the capitalist smooth space which seems 
homogenous due to the privatization of its produced wealth, the immanently striated smooth 
space of collective subjectivities is heterogeneous, hosting various differences without 
homogenizing them. This type of relation is not only present in the organization of space, but 
also in the general organization of whole movement, which is self-managed, self-organized, 
network-based, and leaderless.  
The OWS Arts and Culture Working Group was an important part of the movement. Indeed, they 
were the first group who attempted (and failed) to occupy wall street on September 1st and 
confronted with the first wave of mass arrests (146). One of the artists and performers who did 
this attempt insists on its importance although it failed, saying “we changed the nature of that 
space by stepping out there and calling attention to everybody that was there, speaking to people 
and calling them to see themselves... as a group, as connected” (Writers for the 99% 147).  
When the occupation succeeded, the art group became the living force of imaginal 
recomposition. Alex Carvalho, a founding member of OWS Arts and Culture working group, 
explains their perspective like this:  
Before social practices change, and institutions change, you need to change the 
conversation. you need to change the aesthetics, you need to change the symbols, the 
images people use as a backdrop to frame the conversation in the first place (Writers for 




Their flexible art space became a site of an intensive creativity. They believed that “we are at the 
brink of a new art movement, a new school of thought” (Writers for the 99% 145) and they asked 
others to join them in pushing the boundaries of we consider to be art. The flexible art space 
attempted to create what Benjamin called once an alternative “image space” (Surrealism 216-
17), a space of an aesthetic production of new subjectivities77. As organizers were insisting, their 
art wanted to differentiate itself from the territory established by creative industries, claiming 
that “in the OWS movement, arts are not simply decoration or distraction, but rather tools to 
engage the base, send a clear message, and engage people who would not necessarily find a way 
in” (Writers for the 99% 147). Multiple time, they together with students and trade unionists 
affiliated with Occupy Wall Street infiltrated auctions, interrupting the sale of multimillion dollar 
paintings and furniture (ibid 56). 
A revolutionary pragmatics, in the sense that Deleuze and Guattari use the term78. And it was 
due to such pragmatics that the different branches of art group called themselves “guilds”, a 
word that used to refer to artisans of a town. The puppetry guild made giant puppets such as 
lady liberty and other imaginary figures, the performance arts guild performing different short, 
improvised or scripted pieces and flashmobs, the music guild lightening the mood or increasing 
the intensity based on the moment with their music, and the poetry guild was inventing slogans 
and writing poetry to be read in the tent city, reviving a tradition of people’s poets in pre-modern 
history. Poets in their form of performing poetries exhibited the same organizational ideas that 
the movement was all about: collectivity, participation, non-horizontality and a free economy of 
words, where the words circulates freely through a common field of collaboration. As one of the 
art group members explains, "if the occupation was a horizontal and leaderless movement, 
poetry would be no different. Poets were chosen at random by lot and given no more than three 
minutes to read. Lines of poetry were repeated back to the poet with people's mic" (Writers for 
the 99% 148-49) And interestingly enough, all these guilds joined the movement in contingent 
 
77 For previous discussions on this concept, c.f. chapter two, section “Alter-: the significance of the prefixes“ 





assemblages, not in form of preorganized groups (ibid 148). Even many groups unaffiliated with 
the working group spontaneously appeared and created works on a daily basis (ibid 149) 
These artivists considered the gatherings themselves as works of art. One of them describes the 
general assembly as “the first performance of OWS”. It is worth to keep in mind that in the US, 
the legal limit of twenty participants is only allowed at public gatherings, while the GAs in OWS 
had hundreds of participants in its initial phase. (Writers for the 99% 151) 
The flexible art space was also a site that tried to disrupt the aforementioned molar spatial 
divisions of the tent city in its other part. It presented an open site for all creative and 
performative expressions, engaged actively POC community and other minorities and even 
organized performances to performatively challenge the image of a racially and class-based 
divided space. On Columbus Day (reclaimed and thus renamed as Indigenous People's Day by 
POC working group), Mexica, an indigenous, cultural Mexican performance group staged a dance 
performance in white and read with the beats of OWS drummers. (Writers for the 99% 116) 
The flexible art space characterized a space that embodied an alternative, common mythology 
of a return to the future. Its existence cannot wash away the other molar divisions that striated 
the space according to the code of the everyday signs, as we have discussed, but it kept the 
performative forces of the movement alive with its ceaseless creation of simulacra, constructing 
an alternative image space.  
 
5.4.8 Reclaiming the Space from the Post-Colonial Authoritarianism  
Egypt’s case of spatial management is certainly very different from the American public space in 
terms of national policies. On one hand, the globalization of contemporary capitalism has 
unleashed certain similar processes of creating smooth spaces and homogenizing space by 
flattening everything into the realm of “corporate property” – not only in the US, but also in 
African and Arab-speaking countries such as UAE or Egypt. On the other hand, the state in the 




engineering strategy regarding space. Arditi explains the politics of space in authoritarian regime 
as  
a grammar for building sociability and practices of reterritorialization in authoritarian contexts 
marked by demobilization, the disorganization or ban of political parties and the threats of the 
seemingly ever-present eye of power of the state. (36) 
Sadiki also emphasizes that in the context of the Arab authoritarian states, space must be 
understood as “political constructs within and through which narratives of nation and state-
building are produced and reproduced”.  
It seems however that authoritarian alone cannot capture the difference there. According to our 
discussions, the dimension of (post)`coloniality plays a very significant role in these countries, 
especially in what Sadiki calls the narratives of nation and state-building, which we have 
explained before.  
Not only in Cairo, but also in Tunis and Tripoli, the public spaces were marked by an attempt to 
narrate a national history, rooted in mythologies, embodied in strong male leaders. As Sadiki 
says, the urban planning, especially regarding the central squares that were named after political 
figures or historical events, were part of a post-colonial “socio-political engineering aimed at 
defining the territory of power and state-holders” (3). In the most typical case, Gaddafi largely 
ruled Libya from his residence in the Bab Al-Aziz military barracks. 
When the people stormed these squares, and built their tent cities in front of them, they 
challenged this order. They wanted to symbolically behead the signification hierarchy in order to 
open space for the emergence of a site, and a flow of creative signs and symbols created during 
the movement. In these repossessed site – Tahrir Square in Cairo, and the Habib Bourguiba 
Boulevard and the Kasbah in Tunis – the dispossessed materialized their struggle against the State 
that set up the apparatus of capture and mechanisms of dispossession. 
And the resistance was not only regarding the material conditions of the space, rather, “as they 
reconstructed space and time as spheres of public enactment – suited and dedicated to collective 




That’s why Egypt has witnessed an opening in radical arts on its wounded soil. A wave of radical 
artists’ graffiti-works has appeared on the walls of revolutionary Egyptian cities. Some of them 
have been playing with pop figures such as Batman, Joker, Ghandi, Panda, and so on. But they 
did not really function as metaphors or symbols; rather they revealed a trajectory of 
experimentations with “performative” politics, trying to create “imaginal poles of 
recomposition”. In one of those graffiti, two small astronauts appeared on the walls of Cairo after 
revolution, depicting humans floating in “outer space” (Figure 4).  
Imagining outer space through one’s revolutionary desire is not a new phenomenon. In his last 
letter from the day before his execution, Joe Hill wrote that “the following day he expected to 
take a trip to Mars during which, upon his arrival, he would begin to organize Martian canal 
workers into the Industrial Workers of World” (Shukaitis 81). The space of revolution – the space 
not only on which the revolution happens, but which participates in making the revolution itself 
– is the outer space. If the non-space of mirror is the image of heterotopia for Foucault (1984), 
this outer-space-dystopia presents itself more as the reflecting surface of a sea wave: it gives a 
ground for re-presentation, but still let itself to be transformed by its multitude of molecular 
movements. The problematic of a revolution, when problematic stands for a problem and its set 
of conditions, includes spatiality: revolution dreams of a different spatial relation, an alternative 
geography, or a new map. 
As Sadiki observes in the Occupy movements in the post-colonial Arab Republics,  
once control over time is the sole focus on the present (and its ‘glory’), control of space itself is 
made possible. Public space is then coded and decoded by the public in the newly constructed 
terms that cement it to present symbols (liberation, independence, revolution) and icons (7). 
Graffities and signs cover all over the space, not only to signify a war on the space, but also to 
construct a safe space, a space that should be guarded against the invasions of the State. The 
movements symbols and signs cover the establishment propaganda that is all over the walls of 
the city, either by legal notices, political posters and announcements or advertisements. But as 
they are erasing those signs, a sign of desubjectivation, they are realizing a new subjectivity 




Writing about May 68 in Paris, Maurice Blanchot describes the symbols, graffiti and signs of what 
we call performative event as mobile hosts of a contagious affectivity – a threatening one as it 
disrupts the established order:  
Tracts, posters, bulletins; street words, infinite words; it is not some concern for effectiveness 
that makes them necessary. Whether effective or not, they belong to the decision of the moment. 
They appear, they disappear. They do not say everything, on the contrary they ruin everything, 
they are outside everything. They act and reflect fragmentarily. They leave no trace: they are a 
trait without trace. Like the words on the walls, they are written in insecurity, received under 
threat, are themselves the bearers of danger, then pass by the passerby who passes them on, 
loses them or forgets them (Blanchot, Disorderly Words 204). 
(In Tunisia too, there was a burst of street arts and movement’s signs such as graffiti and other 
interventions on the walls of the main squares proliferated exponentially – mostly done by 
common citizens. The cars that during the occupy movement were covered in such symbols are 
still preserved today as they were, “as if monuments” (Coelho, The Arab Spring in Tunisia - A 
semiotic perspective 5). 
Now, if one go back to Al-Tahrir, one could see that the space was differentiated during the 
protest movement through the patchwork organization of collective body and the multiple signs 
the movement has created. In fact, it was differentiated regarding to various assemblies or 
councils. In addition, or better corresponding to the various councils, the Al-Tahrir tent city had 
different spaces for wedding ceremonies, children playground, painters and graffiti or street 
artists’ corner, library, and so forth.  
From a smooth capitalist space, Al-Tahrir becomes thus a patchwork: an immanently striated 
space. By occupying central public squares, Egyptians, Tunisians and Libyans “re-enacted 
peoplehood by reclaiming the spaces of tyrannical rule, breaking all barriers of fear, and 
redesigning space”, turning it into a patchwork site “where the public breathes life into ossified 
politics.” However, as Deleuze and Guattari say (A Thousand Plateaus 475), there are always 
mixes of these two kinds of space, and they actually emerge out of each other. By the 




autonomous space closed in on itself. It is not anymore possible to articulate expressions freely, 
and even street artists face criminalization. The walls of freedom, with graffiti and other images 
from the revolution were still in Al-Tahrir, but graffiti artists were not allowed to work anymore. 
Therefore, during the Muslim Brotherhood as well as Military coup governments, they had to 
work in the same spot covertly in nights. In one example, in 2013, the iconic graffiti on the "walls 
of freedom" was replaced by a pink camouflage pattern. 15 Egyptian revolutionary street artists 
cooperated in this act, where the pink stands for blood and the camouflage refers to the army. 
"Like the military trying to hide the truth, all the graffiti is now hidden under pink camouflage," 
Amr, a graffiti artist and activist, told Al-Monitor (Stoter). 
The report also explains that the Egyptian revolution in 2011 opened the gates for a wave of 
street art, which had been impossible under Mubarak’s regime, where the Ministry of Culture 
controlled all public expression. Since then, it has been often used by revolutionaries to express 
their feelings about the current situation.  
Indeed, the occupied squares even later became symbols of resistance, bearing those 
performative forces that inserted a new spirit into the politics of its day. This effect was so 
threatening for central states that for example in Bahrain, the rulers destroyed the Pearl 
Roundabout (دوار اللؤلؤ) and teared down its monument (Bronner) where the occupiers built their 
initial site of resistance. The monument, once a State’s symbol, had turned to a monument for 
resistance and struggle during the occupation movement. 
*** 
To summarize the discussions on space, if we consider two types of existing conceptions of space, 
space as social positioning and space as enclosure (from electronic space to public space to 
private space), then defining spatiality as a social relation can refer to both. Holding this 
perspective, we analyzed the smoothening process of contemporary capitalism and its 
desubjectification effect which reterritorialize the whole seemingly homogenous social space 
around the accumulation of wealth through rent. From this perspective, the occupy form of 
recent protests makes the deterritorialization on the smooth space of capitalism, creates a site 




representative order, their participants striate immanently the space, transform corporeally and 
incorporeally the existing spatiality, and plant the seeds of collective subjectivity. These events, 
although temporarily, reveal the possibilities of a life to come, of an alternative sociality which 
has yet to be recognized by far more people to change the current order of the world and prevent 
the imminent catastrophes hanging on our head: from the mass-spreading of far-right 
xenophobic ideas to global warming and other environmental catastrophes to the danger of 















Contrary to the theoretical confusion of “everything is performance”, this research started with 
a call for a reconceptualization of performativity in a way that it distinguishes between what is 
performative and what has been differentiated from it. It argues that the performative forces of 
an event are differential, virtual and non-representational, although they can result into 
solidified, actual and representational products in a process of production. The performative, in 
other words, is the force of creation in its related situations. Built upon this premise, the 
performative event was introduced to conceptualize the socio-political events such as occupy 
movements; and affective contagion became the form of communication between these events. 
Looking back, it seems that this research has mostly dealt with political performative struggles 
that are now either totally disappeared or existing in the form of a pure discourse. In some cases, 
the disappearance joined with war and dangers. In Egypt for example, the Copts and the Muslims 
held their hands together in Al-Tahrir square, made the impossible, and toppled down a brutal 
dictatorship with a mighty army. And after, the tensions and divisions came back again to open 
a way for another brutal dictatorship: the Islamists made wrong decisions when they held the 
first democratically elected government; the army and the intelligence service misused 
revolutionary anger and staged a coup; Christians backed the coup, and fanatical right-wing 
Muslims started targeting them. Now, from those images of solidarity in Tahrir we have arrived 
at the images of burnt bodies in 2013 Rabba massacre and the exploded churches in Cairo and 
Sinai Peninsula. “Egypt, in short, is the clearest example of the revenge of the hierarchy”, Paul 
Mason writes. Or maybe a revenge of identity, one would rather say, that is everywhere playing 
its role after the failure of a universalized socio-political model based on equilibrium. In Turkey, 
other catastrophic events happened: another war against Kurdish population and a rise in 
nationalism, intervention in the Syrian War, a coup, and a wide-spread exclusionary suppressive 
initiative against the opposition; in Greece, after the square movement, a Neo-Nazi anti-
immigrant party is growing into the third strongest parliamentary force; in the US, an ultra-right 




So after all the previous discussions on the virtual, performative forces of change and 
transformation, it seems to be fair to ask: did the Occupy movements change the reality at all? 
How did political performativity and its aesthetics interact with the contemporary world? 
The most feasible answer is referring to the actual phenomena regarding these movements.  
 
6.1 Performative Knowledge Production 
 
One is the proliferation of Critical Performative Pedagogy (CPP) methods related to these 
movements that is a result of affirming the new image of thought. In the dynamics of 
performative liminality, there is a movement toward inside the educational institution, where 
teachers and professors – recognizing that ‘pedagogy is not simply about the social construction 
of knowledge, values, and experiences [but] a performative practice embodied in the lived 
interactions’ (H. A. Giroux 61) – engage in Critical Performative Pedagogy (CPP). CPP is not only 
about changing the institutional relations between the teacher and students, but aims to ‘go 
beyond’ the university, and reconnects itself with the broader social movements. Here pedagogy 
is a performative event (H. A. Giroux), and as an event, it has the potentiality of breaking with 
the constituted old and moving for the constituent new.  
Many recent CPP practices have come out of their local occupy movements or participated in 
them. In Greece, during the occupy movement, some professors brought performative methods 
inside the teacher training programs to search for alternative ways of education not only in 
university, but also for future primary school students. I attended for example a conference 
lecture about how a mathematical teacher training program joined with a group of dancers and 
choreographers in order to study the ‘affective flows of teacher and learner becoming’ and to 
‘recraft mathematical subjectivity’ through improvised choreography (Chronaki). The emphasis 
on the classroom activity and bodily movements in pedagogy, particularly for mathematics as the 
most abstract science, reveals the core idea to which such a project refers: the performative 
production of knowledge and its potentiality to produce its own lines of subjectification in 




In another instance, the project of ‘Student as Producer’ was an experiment in order to ‘occupy 
a curriculum’ as a response to neoliberalization of higher education. As the name discloses, the 
project was inspired by Walter Benjamin’s ‘Author as Producer’ (1934), and as such, it was to re-
affirm Benjamin’s insistence that producing ‘radical content’ is not enough as long as the 
relations of production and its ‘technical’ apparatus remain unchanged.  
Student as Producer ‘is the organizing principle for teaching and learning at the University of 
Lincoln, in the UK … since 2007’ (Neary and Amsler 121) and the academicians who started this 
project believe that ‘the Occupy movement is explicitly pedagogical.’ (111) In 2000s, many 
universities across the UK among other Global Northern countries had witnessed numerous sit-
ins and protests against the neoliberalization of higher education. Student as Producer, which 
has its roots in the revolutionary politics of the 1960s was launched in such a context in order to 
create ‘“counter-spaces” of education, in which the production of emancipatory knowledge is 
accomplished through the re-appropriation and … production of social spaces, times and 
relations of learning.’ (Neary and Amsler 125) To what extent is such an idea functional only inside 
the territory of the university? What is the intensive extension of this project in the ‘Outside’? 
And more importantly, to what extent will this new performative line of pedagogical 
subjectification counterbalance and/or push back the established pedagogical subjectivity? 
Struggling with such problems, the academic-activists of Student as Producer project recognized 
its limitations and developed it into ‘Social Science Center’ (SSC), an autonomous open university 
in the city of Lincoln that works outside the territorial relations of mainstream academy. The fact 
‘that the student does not exceed its own institutional and idealised form,’ as well the emergence 
of multilayered social occupy movements led the pedagogues to draw a far more radical 
conclusion: ‘In order for the student to become more than themselves, the neoliberal university 
must be dissolved.’ (Neary and Amsler 124)  
Although the SSC had no direct relationship with the University of Lincoln, nor with any other 
university, it still located itself on a liminal position. As Neary and Amsler explains, the SSC did 
not aim to dissolve higher education into a homogenized, undifferentiated mass intellectuality, 




The need to go beyond the academic framework for de-institutionalizing higher education is 
expressed in different open universities engaged in performative pedagogy and research that 
emerged out of the protest movement contexts. The examples of such a performance-based 
critical pedagogy are numerous and diverse: Free University of Liverpool, the Really Open 
University in Leeds, and London Free University – all of them later joined together to form the 
Free University Network – in the UK; the Radical Teachers group in the US, who defined 
themselves as part of the larger Occupy Wall Street Movement, and other open universities of 
occupy movements from Kiev to Istanbul; or The Silent University which is an autonomous 
transversal knowledge machine by and for refugees, asylum seekers and migrants (Tan). 
 
6.2 The Affective Solidarity 
 
After the police forcefully evicted the activists from Zuccotti Park, one of the OWS activists noted 
that “with the eviction comes a practice of non-attachment and a shift from attachment to 'place' 
and a greater focus on creativity” (Writers for the 99% 92). It may be a too hopeful of a statement, 
but points to another fact, that the affective relations that were forged in these movements have 
sustained themselves in spite of harsh and brutal crackdown. In Egypt for example, the young 
women kept their vanguard position with regard to the social movement. The LGBT community 
as well started to announce itself with more performative force, and as it has met unfortunately 
with suppression again, this time its voice has been resonated in cities such as Berlin and Paris 
through the established network of affectivity after the Al-Tahrir revolution. The graffiti artivists 
have also not given up and repainting the wall of freedom constantly in Tahrir albeit harsh 
punishment against the so-called “vandalism”. The daily resistance and struggle is still going on 
in a degree that Sisi’s government is considering an option to relocate the governmental buildings 
to New Cairo, a rich neighborhood in the Southern Suburbs far away from the Al-Tahrir square, 
the living symbol of an unfinished revolution, a site that was immanently striated for growing 
alternative subjectivities. Another version of the solution given by Bahraini royal dictatorship that 




fact, Al-Sisi inaugurated the new headquarters of the Ministry of Interior in New Cairo on 27 April 
2016, but it did not remove the dissent from society.  
Other examples happened after other Occupy movements, like Greece. One occupier explains 
the long-lasting effect of the movement as a kind of imaginal reconstruction, development of a 
capability to imagine alternatives: 
This experience made visible a new form of organization in the eyes of ordinary people that things 
can be done in a different way. When the occupation of Syntagma Square finished, when people 
went back to their daily lives, they carried with them the spirit of solidarity that had started at the 
square.  For instance, some people began to support the social solidarity economy (Ishkanian and 
Glasius 10). 
During my interviews with a few Greek activists and artists who participated in the Occupy 
movement in 2011, I encountered those who lived long afterwards in squats emerging before, 
and proliferating during the movement; even after the prevailing return of parliamentary politics 
through Syriza election. Their squats provided important shelters to the refugees who fled the 
wars of post-Arab Spring in the Middle East.  
Other acts of resistance and solidarity happened afterwards, such as the occupation of Vio.me. 
metal factory by its own workers, who opened the factory with self-management backed by the 
support of other Greek people. In their manifesto, they basically repeated the principles of the 
Syntagma Occupy movement: 
The basic and central principle of the operation of the factory, of the struggle we conduct and the 
key term of our future plans is parity in participation and decision making, horizontality and direct 
democracy. 
Other examples are the Potato Movement in February 2012, where activists helped farmers to 
sell their products directly to the people without the middleman, or the refusal of paying the 





6.3 The Performative Realism 
 
Similar things could be pointed out in other contexts which witnessed Occupy movements, but 
one OWS slogan seems to present another answer to our question: “be realistic; dream the 
impossible”.  
The virtual, as we have discussed, is not less real than the actual; indeed, it contains the forces 
of the real as the constituent force of becoming which produces the reality, the actual being. 
With a contemporary world being torn apart by harsh inequalities, persisting neo-colonial 
relations, wars and civil wars, with a globalized sovereign power that decides on worthfulness 
and worthlessness, disposability and non-disposability of certain populations, the actual present 
is not simply sustainable. That OWS slogan witnesses to this reality and affirms the virtual forces 
of the present in order to learn how to live together in such a damaged earth.  
In first chapter, we sought for a methodology that can capture those virtual forces – the virtual 
forces that sustained the aforementioned affective solidarity. Performativization is a 
methodology that deals with performative processes of creation; a methodology in the sense of 
Nietzschean “perspective” toward what is being researched on, toward the world. According to 
this perspective, concepts and established forms of perception in the world of representation are 
the crystals of non-representational performative processes that bodies carry out, or in other 
words, they are the actualized products of certain virtual performativizations. However, these 
products are only possible actualizations of those processes and the interruptions of the flows of 
constituent power that only flows from in-between of collective bodies. Then one must change 
the perspective from observing only the representation and considering also the non-
representational performative processes of creation in order to critique the already-existing 
actuality and understand the other potentialities of historical events. This change of perspective 
necessitates a change of relation between researcher’s body and the researched. There can be 
no more “safe dialectical distance” between a researching individual subject and a researched 




The performativization perspective brings then the productive relation into play and thinks about 
the process of production instead of product. Latour talks about the same relation when he 
writes that “we should not speak of time, space, and action but rather of temperisation, 
spatialisation, actualization…, put, more elegantly, as timing, spacing, acting” (qtd. in May and 
Thrift 28). This consideration dates back to Marx discussion of fetishism, where he tries to show 
why starting from commodity to think about capitalism leads to mystification and how we solve 
this problem by starting from production process. 
As a perspective, performativization is also a set of already known methods such as 
autoethnography, dramatization, research militancy/militant research, performance as research, 
critical performative cartography, and so on. Among these, Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis recognizes 
the interconnectedness of space and time, and recourses to the notion of rhythm which 
according to him “implies the relation of a time with a space, a localized time, or if one wishes, a 
temporalized place.” Therefore, rhythmanalysis is actually analyzing the processes through which 
time and space are both liberated from quantitative segmentarity, and thus defuse into and fold 
onto each other, the processes of creating what we have called in the fourth chapter as 
kairotopes. Processes that could be set in motion either through the molecular kairoi of everyday 
life or the more announced manifestations of constituent power in protest movements. 
The rhythmanalysis should mostly leads with idiorrhythmy of dissenting bodies being together 
toward another future.  Roland Barthes, in his lectures on “How to Live Together?”, explains his 
fantasy of living together that consists of singularities (neither individual nor collective) being in 
common but at the same time have their very own autonomous character which he calls 
idiorrhythmy: “The pattern of a fluid element … an improvised, changeable form. In atomism, 
one manner in which atoms can flow; a configuration without fixity or natural necessity: a 
‘flowing’…in short, the exact opposite of an inflexible, implacably regular cadence”. 
We have used performativization method in these different forms in this research. And in the 
second chapter, we approached the problem of the performative event in which such a 





6.4 Aesthetics, an Altermodern Perspective 
 
With the help of general artistic strategies, performative events pose the problems of the 
construction of 'being-together' and the modes of political subjectivation for altermodernities 
to-come.  
While the ontogenetical processes of performative event have been analyzed, polyphony and 
heterogeneity, processual creativity, autopoiesis and communal (or common) being-together 
that is created simultaneously during the performance, rupture of the code of the everyday signs, 
and transformation in spatiotemporality emerged as the constituent elements of the aesthetics 
of the political performative turn: the aesthetics from an altermodern perspective. 
In Chapter Two, Becket’s Catastrophe was mentioned in order to conceptualize a performative 
event. Now, considering the discussions in this research, one other theatre playwright and 
theatre director even clarify this perspective of performative event more: Carmelo Bene.  
If Bene’s performative aesthetics seems to be marginal in the world of theatre, it is much more 
traceable in the world of political performativity – especially through commentaries made by 
Gilles Deleuze in One Manifesto Less (Deleuze, One Manifesto Less). 
Nonrepresentationality is one of the most important characteristics of Bene’s theatre, who 
aimed for producing a kind of unrepresentable theatre (il teatro dell’irrappresentabile) often 
translated as unperformable.  
Nonlinguistic interventions and prioritizing the performative over the textual (Bene wanted to 
write the play on the stage, during its performance) is one of the strategies of this 
nonrepresentationality. The non-linguistic signs and non-sensical sounds in Bene show an escape 
from the code of the everyday signs and the logocentrism, therefore, rejecting presupposed 
human subjectivity. Because “representation in theatre always sides with codified power (even 
when it dramatizes conflicts and oppositions) and is necessarily the manifestation of political 




For him, the theatre as performative event consists of a rupture that as we discussed in chapters 
three and four, will initiate an experience of self-loss, in the meaning of desubjectification or 
suspension of the conscious agent.  For Bene, creative action comes from the suspension of 
thought and the emptying of the mind, an exodus from the machinations of the established code, 
“which allow the performer to transcend the limitation of language and the obstruction of 
subjectivity”. This discussion was developed in chapter three. 
As Deleuze writes in his commentary on Bene’s nonrepresentational theatre, theatrical signs 
“under the imperial rule of representation” are “already normalized, codified, institutionalized; 
they are 'products'”. In contrast to that, Bene seeks a theatre of production, but of a production 
of the poor, outside the dominant relations of discursive production, since he believed “what 
cannot be said above all must not be silenced”. (Chillemi) Therefore, new ears should be created 
during the performance for these forces to be audible.  
Process thus becomes the other important element of Bene’s productivist aesthetics, a 
productivism that comes from adopting the perspective of aforementioned performative 
realism. Because he, too, attempts to perform the unperformable. This process is embodied in 
Bene’s affirmation of becomings, of becoming minoritarian (another name for the poor, the non-
represented and non-representable): 
Deleuze reminds me that we are a body: it is not true that we have a body, because we are not [a 
being but a becoming; Deleuze’s note] (qtd. in Chillemi). 
Body is itself a becoming. The primacy of process and becoming does not allow one to 
presuppose a collectivity or an audience before it occurs: it should construct its own collective 
being-together. This is in fact the formulation of autopoiesis in Bene’s performative aesthetics.  
Being asked “for whom is your theatre addressed, to which people are they addressed?”, Bene 
answers that “I make popular theatre. Ethnic. But it is the people who are missing” (qtd. in 
Deleuze, Cinema 2 330). This is not an announcement of an elitist avant-garde who thinks he has 




a people, the people of my atoms”79 (qtd. in ibid 227). Not only a homogenous, presupposed self 
as subject does not exist, but as we have discussed in chapter three, “the purity of the distinction 
[between self/non-self] is illusory and what constitutes the proper ‘me’ is already shot through 
with otherness” (Shildrick 95). Human body consists of a multiplicity of impulsive forces and is 
situated in a network of life in-between human and non-human elements. As Shildrick says, “all 
human bodies swarm with a multitude of putatively alien others" (ibid). 
More than that, Bene’s announcement says something about the whole performative dynamics: 
the people of performative event do not pre-exist their performative expression (either through 
a performative work of art or in a performative political movement).  
Performative production and performative expression are the same. In other words, the 
modern distance between production and expression is non-existent in the performative 
aesthetics, since the performative expression has a productive aspect, too. The ontogenetical 
perspective of this research argued that the bodies and their performativizations are mutually 
constituent of each other. 
But if these bodies are transforming and produced by transformation, then autopoiesis also 
comes with allopoiesis in the performative event: the emerging collective relationality does not 
only autonomously constitute itself but also constitute an alternative system regarding the 
established order and structures. Hence the immanence of autopoiesis and allopoiesis. 
Through Bene’s theatre, Deleuze then points to this aesthetical subjectification potentiality in 
artistic practices:  
not that of addressing a people, which is presupposed already there, but of contributing to an 
invention of a people (Cinema 2 217). 
To set such a becoming in motion, the experience of the rupture should happen; and the rupture, 
the struggle against the machinic codification should continue in the process. The production of 
the excess – a product of the non-productive labour – is the corresponding artistic strategy 
 
79 The other translation in One Manifesto Less registers this part as follows: “I am a mass, “see how politics becomes 




because as Deleuze points out, excesses make it hard to “normalize, domesticate, and neutralize 
their productions” (Kowsar 33). Excess is different from the added value in that it refuses to be 
integrated in the reproduction process.  
This situates Bene in the tradition of another theatre artist, Artaud, whose notion of cruelty and 
excess contributes to Bene’s performative aesthetics. In both, the body – which as we have 
discussed, sees and be seen, touches and be touched, makes perspective and is in perspective – 
becomes monstrous. It transforms to its bodily mode of aesthesis, an open body, or as Genet’s 
would say, an exposed body. This aesthetics of exposure is described by Bene as an obscenity: 
Theatre embodies this dis-being, this discomfort of being obscene on the scene. Theatre is what 
is obscene – … which means “outside the scene” – even though it happens on the scene (qtd. in 
Chillemi). 
In fact, this is the difference between Becket and Bene. Beckettian theatrical aesthetics in for 
example the Catastrophe waits for an event that is going to happen in the off-stage, it is a waiting 
for the missing people but relocates the whole subjectivity outside of theatricality, and performs 
what is left on the stage to perform: the absurdity of control and reproduction, the non-agency. 
But Bene’s assertion that “theatre is what is outside the scene” calls for an active, transversal 
engagement with theatre and theatricality in order to affirmatively contribute to the appearance 
of the missing people by setting in motion alternative processes (and molds) of subjectification.  
For such a process, time should be experienced qualitatively, not as the everyday paradigm of 
time of progress, as the empty repetition of successive units. If the nonrepresentational theatre 
seeks to attack the power, it should attack its time too, the prison time. And it should liberate 
the collective constituent time of its auto/allopoiesis, what we have called “the kairological 
time”.  
One of the main points of difference between Bene and avant-garde theatre – just like the 
difference between the performative politics and (anti)modernist politics – is in the conception 
of Kairos. The modernist discourse understands it more as Benjaminian Jetztzeit, a time of 
innovation, that shows the truth of the to-come as a lightning and then disappears into the 




of redemption even for a second. The time of insurrection. The techniques of alienation or 
theatre of attractions. As Deleuze explains, the avant-garde theatre introduces a temporal 
conflict between what is now and what must and will be. It always defines the future and the 
past and presupposes its subjects and audience.  
On the contrary, Bene’s theatre of the missing people tries to work on the present to return to 
the future, experimenting with the current social relation between bodies in order to transform 
it. That is why for Bene-Deleuze the minor authors are those who are untimely: 
But the truly great authors are the minor ones, the untimely ones. It is the minor artist that offers 
the true masterpieces: the minor artist does not interpret his times; mankind does not have a 
specific time, time depends on mankind. (One Manifesto Less 208). 
The untimely author is the one who can track the virtual forces beneath or beyond the actualized 
being. The performative processes of the real underlying the symbolic and the imaginary could 
produce simulacra that envision that to-come, not through the existing language and codes – that 
can only fall into silence vis-à-vis a non-defined, alternative to-come – but by creating its own 
expressive devices. In Deleuze’s words, “minority designates the potential of a becoming, 
whereas majority designates the power or the impotence of a state, of a situation” (ibid).  
Working on the present and tracking the performative differentiations in it, and striating 
molecularly for an alternative subjectivity, occurs (as we have discussed in chapter four) in 
processual, gradual kairological time – a qualitative experience of time that has no beginning or 
end. That is why the theatre of Bene is a theatre of, as Deleuse says, different speeds, fastness 
and slowness: 
The events "in-between" are also the most vital and dynamic. “What is interesting is never the 
manner in which one begins or ends. The interest lies in the middle, that which occurs in the 
middle .. . where becoming, movement, speed . . . excess” take place… The middle, rather than 
the past or future, is the site of becoming outside of time, beyond time (Kowsar 22). 
In the end, his methodological tendency is what this research has defined as performativization, 
and Deleuze formulates it as “to extricate becomings from history, lives from culture, thoughts 




However, even if we can summarize what we have discovered as aesthetics of performative 
political movements through Bene’s theatre, he himself asserts that theatre cannot act on 
politics. Deleuze argues that Bene’s work presents us with a critical theatre, because it performs 
an exodus from the territory of theatre, centered around an organism of hierarchical elements 
such as the Text, the Actor, the Director, and the Structure. (see One Manifesto Less).  
Being toward the missing people, critical function of Bene’s theatre, according to Deleuze, is in 
its open-endedness, adapting “the conscience of a minority, in becoming universal, carrying out 
alliances here and there according to each case, following the lines of transformation that leap 
out of theatre and take another form, or even convert themselves again in the form of theatre 
for a new leap” (One Manifesto Less 221-222).  
This open-endedness is in fact a political capability of forming machinic assemblages with other 
affective fields of society where machinic assemblage is “a dynamic composition of heterogenous 
elements that eschew identity but nonetheless function together, subjectively, socially, in 
cooperation” and “incorporating all kinds of human and nonhuman elements or singularities” 
(Hardt and Negri, Assembly).  
Such a minoritarian performative event follows the lines of contagious affectivity that carries the 
transformative power of performative forces, tra(ns)versing different bodies and regions of social 
production and forging affective solidarities. 
“Theater did not succeed in going into the street and dissolving its aesthetic, emotionalizing 
essence in action” (qtd. in Raunig, Art and Revolution 149), writes Sergei Tretyakov, one of the 
central figures of early productivist theatre after Russian revolution, leaving the literary and 
theatre scene for the kolkhoz, and announcing that “the confrontation between ‘life’ and ‘art’ 
was over.” Bene refused to believe in this confrontation, this avant-garde duality and therefore, 
his statement that theatre cannot act on politics should be read from this perspective. In fact, 
Bene’s perspective on theatre, one may say, opened the potentialities of the performative 





6.5 The Occupation Performative Dynamics, Summarized 
 
While Bene remained marginal in the theories of performance, we have argued that such a 
performative aesthetics80, with similar virtual forces, have been at work in the Occupy 
movements. However, the elements we mentioned and underlined are only mapping such forces 
beside together, and do not provide us with a universal form of their performativizations, 
individuations or actualizations: no possible actual can exhaust the performative forces of the 
virtual. That is the reason one must always talk about altermodernities, always plural-singular. 
The Occupy movements on the other hand extended the powers of those performative elements 
in their singular form of their own cartography. Above all, they were movements that through 
their performtivizations, as discussed in chapter two, collectively thought and developed a 
common intelligence. They did not have any “heads”, and as such, they marked a different, 
headless form of performativity in regard to actual artistic experiments that are initiated by 
identifiable persons – even if they affirm the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the self.  
By disrupting the discourse of imitations, which has claimed the West as the universal model of 
democratic practices, the Arab Spring exhibited the case for the contagious affectivity.  
Regarding the aesthetical problematization of performative politics, one can again point to 
Ranciere’s main thesis that is “[art] is first political because it reframes the distribution of space, 
its visibility and—let us say—its habitability” (Artists and Cultural Producers as Political Subjects). 
It is not accidental that many contemporary movements are named after the particular space of 
their happening: Al-Tahrir Square, Wall Street, Maidan, Gezi, and so on. 
These movements may look less mobile in their insistence on occupying a certain space. They 
reclaimed multilayered public spaces that are subjected to the process of smoothening. Al-Tahrir 
squares for example, a public square that in in the end of 2000s, one could not walk there, or 
would never stay for resting, because the cars – symbols of private property – has occupied the 
 
80 In the case of research, other performative experiments and performance practitioners have been mentioned for 
extraction of the performative aesthetics. Except Beckett and Artaud, Jerzi Grotowski and Publixtheatercaravan 




streets with dense traffic jams and high levels of air pollution that is the result of progress-
oriented urban planning of the post-colonial national State. A square that is the symbol of 
centralized power that has imposed a certain imitative modernization on its heterogenous and 
diverse population, in order to forge a unified imagined collective body as Egyptian nation. People 
occupied this square, defying what Shokr calls “the exclusionary logic that had governed their 
urban space for years. What they created was an anti-city of sorts” (The Eighteen Days of Tahrir 
43).  
Similar eroding public spaces started to be occupied in other countries, and in all cases, the 
occupiers stayed on them, made them common and turned them into the sites of a laboratory 
for experimentations with collective life. According to our discussions in chapter four, these 
experimentations resulted to an emergence of a generic type of space, a patchwork site that 
comes after the immanent reterritorialization and striations for constructing alternative 
subjectivities.  
Although being attached to the ground under their feet, such performative movement was as 
mobile as nomadic lines of flights put in force through these molecular experimentations. As 
intensive movements, from its performative safe space, they extended themselves quickly inside 
a logic of affective contagion.  
Al-Tahrir happened: “the Greek Tahrir awaits us” occurred in Syntagma square in Athens; in 
Spain, indignados called for their version of Cairo and Athens, and started Acampadasol in 
Madrid’s Puerta del Sol (Romanos); in New York, Al-Tahrir was re-enacted in the Wall Street 
(Gould-Wartofsky). 
If the paradigm of thinking this communication changes from imitation to contagion, then it is 
easy to understand the heterogeneity of these movements, as each of them happened in their 
own singular way. And heterogeneity did not fall victim to a desire for the homogenous inside 
any of them.  
Apart from the international level, the contagious connectivity happened in national and also 
molecular, social levels. In the case of Occupy Wall Street (September 2011) for example, 




Washington to Honolulu by early October (Writers for the 99% 156). Even in the US, Occupy 
movements were not homogenous and as they spread, “its success or failure in a particular locale 
was often rooted in the ability of local organizers to accommodate local conditions and articulate 
relevant issues” (Writers for the 99% 160). 
In a more molecular level, contagion was working to proliferate the affectivity of the movement 
outside of its safe space. Arditi describes this aspect of occupy movements as an ability in 
“developing and expanding networks of autonomous zones generated through a homeopathic 
intervention of society on itself” that can “range from alternative research centres to workers' 
coop, from ad-hoc squatter collectives and self-funded employment advisory centres to the 
communal tenure and exploitation of land, from non-electoral political action committees to 
independent media initiatives” (Post-hegemony 36). 
In these sites where time was experienced qualitatively, a particular articulation of temporalities 
in the kairological time emerged. On one hand, it was an assemblage between three temporal 
axes which intersect, intensify and mix with each other. First is the temporality of resistance: it 
slows down the capitalist functional speed and is located in a history of negating the progress 
and encroachment of authoritarian power; second, of rebellion and insurrection: it appears as 
the sudden interruption, as Benjaminian Jetzseit, in order to open a space in pre-stablished 
relations of reality, a time of innovation and rupture; and third, of constituent power, which is 
the temporality of a gradual performativization of alternative relations. On the other hand, it is 
the immanence of three forms of ontogenetical and morphogenetical linkage in collective bodies. 
Through Barthes, we called this temporal order an idiorrhythmy: an immanence of autopoiesis, 
allopoiesis, and sym-poiesis, where the autonomous construction of a collective body keeps it 
open toward the other (the bodily mode of aesthesis, the monstrous), and insists on togetherness 
(sym-) in order to experiment with non-hierarchical ways of collective existence, particularly on 
a damaged earth that a horizon of a livable future is increasingly fading away from it (D. J. 
Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene).  
Time and space are relations in between bodies. Bodies exist in spatiotemporal relations, but 




research that deals with the kairotopes of resistance and revolution is also dealing with the 
dissenting bodies that create such kairotopes. Thus, the aforementioned openness, as we argued 
in chapters three and four, is seen in the monstrous patchwork body which emerges in a 
kairotope – an immanence of a patchwork site and a kairological time – defying the limits of 
normative performance and neutralizing the machinic coding of bodies. Contrasting the 
naturalized, the monstrous is either abnormal and against the rules, or anomalous, i.e. 
antagonistic to but autonomous from rules as it is liberated from that power relation. – 
depending on the intensity of the experience and body’s history of dispossession and resistance, 
and its positionality in regard to the power hierarchy. 
 
 
6.6 Art: The Continuation of Politics by Other Means 
 
The monstrous could be a dangerous, destructive force, if captured by the apparatus of identity. 
Contagion can also lead to the fast distribution of sad affections and extreme reactionary 
sentiments. But this text started with a promise of giving a critical value to the concept of 
performativity, using it in order to differentiate between phenomena and processes. A value 
comes from the actions of a force, and thus, evaluating the concept of the performative had to 
deal with the performative forces.  
As it was established during this thesis, performative forces – particularly in the field of politics – 
are virtual forces of ontogenesis. They have the power of deterritorialization as well as 
constitution. In other words, performative forces do not reproduce already existing forms and 
structures, but initiate morphogenetical processes: they deform and decode, making BwOs and 
planes of immanence, in order to create alternative plastic forms with consistency, where 
consistency means the autonomous formation of machinic assemblages between diverse 




Strictly speaking, performative forces correspond to the process, becoming and alterations. One 
should trace them in the dynamics of productive and creative processes, not in the 
representational final products. If one correlates the performative to the productive and the 
virtual, the spectacular has the same relation to the produced, the reproductive and the actual. 
Itself a product of performative forces, the spectacle is a crystallized virtuality that tries to hide, 
control and channel the performative forces. From another perspective, then, performativity 
affirms the primacy of difference, whereas the spectacle is founded upon the principle of identity. 
Theatricality is oscillating between these two poles: it can be affirmative of performative 
happenings or just reproductive of the already existing hierarchy of visibility and power; it may 
center around a repetition of difference and an experimentation for the new with creating 
performative simulacra, or it can be a static image of the unequal distribution of the sensible in 
social order and reiterate already existing stereotypes.  
Occupy movements showed the complex dynamics of performativity in aesthetic-political events. 
These contemporary protest movements made use of artistic strategies for: (1) performatively 
opening the borders of social relationality to the other; (2) putting in motion alternative 
subjectifications; (3) effecting imaginal reconstruction; and (4) experimenting in the creation of 
altermodernities. These performative political initiatives have now become the hegemonic form 
of protest and struggle, and their cognitive plasticity and open-endedness have helped them to 
be able to maintain its affective solidarity in the social field. 
With the immaterialization and feminization of labour, as it was discussed in chapters one and 
two, the affective labour and performative knowledge have been put into the center of 
production. Thus, any meaningful contemporary act of artistic struggle should be a collective act: 
and thus, a political one. It seems that with the emergence of this form of politics, the long dream 
of the avant-garde art has become true, but only with surpassing the avant-gardism itself.  
Clausewitz axiom has been for long a well-known saying: war is the continuation of politics by 
other means. Although a sort of affirmative reading of Clausewitz’s thesis was discussed in 
chapters one and three, especially through the notion of the civil war, the common sense 




friend/enemy: a politics modeled on the Hegelian dialectics between the self/the other. In such 
a representational politics, particularly in our contemporary condition, the antagonisms should 
be resolved by the intervention of representative authority: either in the negotiations between 
political elite in the parliament, or by the decisions of an authoritarian head as State. When this 
politics reaches an impasse, the war happens to continue politics by other means. The already 
predicted telos of that politics is obvious: one of the self-conscious subjects in this struggle must 
overcome the other, resulting in either her/his enslavement or destruction. Such is, it seems, the 
logic of our contemporary world.  
The performative politics has contributed to another imagination of politics: a politics of 
affirmative affectivity that does not recognize the dialectics of the self/ the other. When the other 
is no longer the anti-thesis of the self, its rival in recognition, then the self and the other become 
liminal elements of each other in the common, as those singularities which exist in a being-
together of a performative event. This re-imagination of politics could not happen without the 
contribution of artistic strategies for alternative subjectifications. 
All the Occupy movements have happened when the representational politics stopped 
functioning and reached its impasse. The civil war followed this unsustainability of the dominant 
politics, but by implementing aesthetic strategies and starting its performative war machines. 
Now, we may then change Clausewitz thesis into this: art is the continuation of politics by other 
means.  
To judge if these strategies can cause any long-lasting transformations toward altermodernities, 
especially in their struggle against all-powerful security states, is a case for future. For now, they 
have triggered a new image of thought, capable for imagining an emancipatory politics, and in 
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Çapan, Zeynep Gülşah. "Enacting the International/Reproducing Eurocentrism." Contexto Internacional 
39.3 (2017): 655-672. <http://www.scielo.br/pdf/cint/v39n3/0102-8529-cint-
2017390300655.pdf>. 
Carman, Taylor and Mark B. N. Hansen. The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Casarino, Cesare. "Time Matters." Casarino, Cesare and Antonio Negri. In Prase of the Common: A 
Conversation on Philosophy and Politics. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 
2008. 219-246. 
Castoriadis, Cornelius. World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the 
Imagination. Trans. David Ames Curtis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
Castro, Fabián Henao. "From the "Bio" to the "Necro"." Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and 
Performative Strategies. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: 
Routledge, 2016. 237-253. 
Catts , Oron and Ronat Zurr. "The Biopolitics of Life Removed From Context." Resisting Biopolitics: 
Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. 
New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 135-158. 
Caygill, Howard. On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance. London: Bloomsbury, 2013 . 
Cederman, Lars-Erik , T. Camber Warren and Didier Sornette. "Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass 
Mobilization, and the Severity of War." International Organization 65 (2011). 
Chan, Gaye and Nandita Sharma. "Eating in Public." Constituent Imagination: Militant Investigations // 
Collective Theorization. Ed. Stevphen Shukaitis, David Graeber and Erika Biddle. Oakland and 
Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007. 180-89. 
Chatterjee, Partha. "Whose Imagined Community?" Mapping the Nation. Ed. Gopal Balakrishnan. 
London and New York: Verso, 1999 (1996). 214-225. 
Chillemi, Francesco. "Filming Nothingness. Invisibility, Ineffability, and the Inviolable Absence of God in 





Chirot, Daniel. Modern Tyrants. New York: The Free Press, 1994. 
<https://books.google.de/books?id=q0SxYRu9aKcC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
>. 
Chronaki, Anna. "Recrafting mathematical subjectivity through classroom activity and improvised 
choreography." Stockholm: Deleuzian Studies Conference , 2015. 
Cöcek , Fatma Müge and M. Sükrü Hanioglu. "Western Knowledge, Imperial Control and the Use of 
Statistics in the Ottoman Empire." Cultural Horizons: a Festschrift in Honor of Talat S. Halman. 
Ed. Jayne L. Warner. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2001. 105-117. 
Cocks, Joan. Passion and Paradox: Intellectuals Confront the National Question. Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2002. 
Coelho, Nuno. The Arab Spring in Tunisia - A semiotic perspective. March 2013. 2016. 
<http://www.motelcoimbra.pt/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/AlternativeAcademia_NunoCoelho.pdf>. 
Colebrook, Claire. Understanding Deleuze. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002. 
Colman, F. J. "Digital Biopolitics: the Image of Life." Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and 
Performative Strategies. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: 
Routledge, 2016. 189-201. 
Conant, Jeff. "What the Zapatistas Can Teach us About the Climate Crisis." 3 August 2010. Foreign Policy 
in Focus. 2013 1 12. 
<http://fpif.org/what_the_zapatistas_can_teach_us_about_the_climate_crisis/>. 
Cote, Mark, Richard Day and Greig de Peuter. "Utopian Pedagogy: Creating Radical Alternatives in the 
Neoliberal Age." The Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies 29 (2007): 317-336. 
Curtis, Neal. "The Body as Outlaw." Body and Society 5.2-3 (1999): 249-266. 
Dayan, Vedat. "Kurdish or Turkish Question?" Frei Universität Berlin, 2014. Draft-Unpublished. 
de Bellaigue, Christopher. "The Sick Man of Europe." The New York Review of Books 48.11 (2001). 
De Landa, Manuel. "Deleuze, Diagrams, and the Open-ended Becoming of the World." Becomings: 
Explorations in Time, Memory, and Future. Ed. Elizabeth E. Grosz. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1999. 29-41. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet. "Many Politics." Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet. Dialogues. Trans. 
Hugh Tomlinson and barbara Habberjam. New York: Colombia University Press, 1987. 124-148. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 
—. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane. 




Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. "On Anti-Oedipus." Negotiations. New York: Colombia University 
Press, 1995. 13-24. 
—. What Is Philosophy? Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York, Chichester, West 
Sussex: Colombia University Press, 1994. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. London: The 
Athlone Press, 2000. 
—. Desert Islands and Other Texts. Los Angeles, New York: Semiotext(e), 2004. 
Deleuze, Gilles. "Desire and Pleasure." Two Regimes of Madness. Ed. David Lapoujade. Columbia 
University, 2006. 122 - 134. 
—. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
—. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Trans. Martin Joughin. New York: Zone Books, 2013 (1990). 
—. Foucault. Trans. Seán Hand. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988. 
—. Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam. New York: Continuum, 2008 (1983). 
—. Negotiations. New York: Colombia University Press, 1995. 
—. Nietzsche and Philosophy. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson. London and New York: Continuum, 2002. 
Deleuze, Gilles. "On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought." Deleuze, Gilles. Desert Islands and Other 
Texts. Ed. David Lapoujade. Trans. Michael Taormina. Los Angeles and New York: Semiotext(e), 
2004. 135-142. 
Deleuze, Gilles. "One Manifesto Less." The Deleuze Reader. Ed. Constan V. Boundas. New York: Colombia 
University, 1993 (1979). 204-222. 
—. Proust and Signs. Trans. Richard Howard. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000. 
—. Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life. Trans. Anne Boyman. New York: Zone Books, 2001. 
—. Spinoza's Lectures. Trans. Timothy S. Murphy. Paris, 17 02 1981. 2009. 
<https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/38>. 
—. The Logic of Sense. Ed. Constantin V. Boundas. Trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale. London: The 
Athlone Press, 1990. 
Dikec, Mustafa. Urban Rage: The Revolt of the Excluded. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017. 
Dombroski, Robert S. "On Gramsci's Theater Criticism." Boundary 14.3 (1986): 91-119. 
Dorsy, James Michael. Shifting Sands: Essays On Sports And Politics In The Middle East And North Africa. 
New Jersey and London: World Scientific, 2017. 





Eagleton, Terry. "Lenin in the Postmodern Age." Lenin Reloaded. Ed. Stathis Kouvelakis, and Slovaj Zizek 
Sebastian Budgen. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007. 42-58. 
Elias, Norbert. The Civilizing Process. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, 2000 
(1939). 
—. The Loneliness of Dying. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. New York and London: Continuum, 2001. 
Engels, Friedrich. "The Real Issue in Turkey." 2007. Marxists Internet Archive - Marx & Engels Collected 
Works: Volume 12. 12 June 2014. 
Fischer-Lichte, Erika. "Performativität und Ereignis." Performativität und Ereignis. Ed. Erika Fischer-
Lichte, et al. Tübingen und Basel: A. Francke, 2003. 11-47. 
—. The Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics. Trans. Saskya Iris Jain. London and 
New York: Routledge, 2008 (2004). 
Foucault, Michel. Abnormal: lectures at the College de France 1974-1975. Ed. Arnold I. Davidson. Trans. 
Graham Burchell. London, New York: Verso, 2003. 
Foucault, Michel. "Interview with Michel Foucault." Power: Essentials Works of Foucault (1954-1984). 
Ed. James D. Faubion. New York: The New Press, 2000. 239-297. 
Foucault, Michel. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." Foucault, Michel. The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul 
Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984. 76-100. 
Foucault, Michel. "Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias." Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in 
Cultural Theory. Ed. Neil Leach. New York: Routledge, 1997 (1967). 330-336. 
—. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Trans. Colin Gordon. Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1980. 
—. Society Must Be Defended - Lectures at the College De France, 1975-76. Ed. Mauro Bertani and 
Alessandro Fontana . Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003. 
—. Technologies of the Self. Ed. Luther H Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H Button. The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1988. 
—. The History of Sexuality. Trans. Robert Hurley. Vol. I. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978. Print. 
Foucault, Michel. "Theatrum Phliosophicum." Mimesis, Masochism, and Mime. Ed. Timothy Murray. 
Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1997. 216-238. 
Foucault, Michel. "What Is Enlightenment?" Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon, 
1984. 32-50. 
Fourier, Charlie. "Reclaim the Streets: an Arrow of Hope." We Are Everywhere: The Irresistable Rise of 
Global Anti-Capitalism. Ed. Notes from Nowhere. London and New York: Verso, 2003. 50-60. 
Fox, Russell Arben. "J. G. Herder on Language and the Metaphysics of National Community." The Review 




Früchtl, Josef. The Impertinent Self. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009. 
Fukuyama, Francis. After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong. London: Profile Books, 2006. 
—. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992. 
Genette, Gerard. Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation. Trans. Jane E. Lewin. New York and Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997 (1987). 
Gilbert, B. J., Gareth Stanton, and Willy Maley. Postcolonial Criticism. Ed. B. J., Gareth Stanton, and Willy 
Maley Gilbert. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014. 
Gingrich, Newt. Feelings vs Fact CNN. 27 July 2016. Video. 28 July 2016. 
<https://youtu.be/xnhJWusyj4I>. 
Giroux, Henry A. Dangerous pedagogy. 2012. 
Giroux, Henry A. "Cultural Studies, Public Pedagogy, and the Responsibility of Intellectuals." 
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 1.1 (2004): 59–79. 
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. Faust The first and second part of the Tragedy. Internet Archive, 1832 
(2016). Ebook. <https://web.archive.org/web/20160309072028/http://en.goethe-
faust.org/dedication>. 
—. Faust: Der Tragödie erster Teil. The Project Gutenberg, 2000 (1808). Ebook. 
<https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2229>. 
Göle, Nilüfer. "Public Space Democracy." 29 July 2013. Eurozine. <https://www.eurozine.com/public-
space-democracy/>. 
Gould-Wartofsky, Michael A. The Occupiers: The Making of the 99 Percent Movement, . New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. eBook. 
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell 
Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1992. 
Grosz, Elizabeth. Space, Time and Perversion - Essays on the politics of bodies. New York and London: 
Routledge, 1995. 
Guattari, Félix and Antonio Negri. New Lines of Alliance, New Spaces of Liberty. Ed. Stevphen Shukaitis. 
Trans. Michael Ryan, Jared Becker and Arianna Bove. London and New York: Autonomedia, 2010 
(1985). 
Guattari, Félix. "Transversality." Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics. Trans. David Cooper. 
Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1984 (1964). 11-23. 
Hamm, Marion. "Reclaim the Streets!Global Protests and Local Space." June 2002. Republic Art. 19 
August 2013. <http://republicart.net/disc/hybridresistance/hamm01_en.htm>. 
Hammond, Timur and Elizabeth Angell. "Is Everywhere Taksim?: Public Space and Possible Publics." 





Haraway, Donna J. "Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin." 
Environmental Humanities 6 (2015): 159-165. 
<http://environmentalhumanities.org/arch/vol6/6.7.pdf>. 
—. Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2016. 
Haraway, Donna Jeanne. Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science. 
New York, London: Routledge, 1989. 
—. Simians, Cyborgs and Women : The Reinvention of Nature. New York, London: Routledge, 1991. 
Harding, James. "Data Doubles and the Specters of Performance in the Bit Parts of Surveillance." 
Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and 
Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 173-189. 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Assembly. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Ebook. 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Commonwealth. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2009. 
—. Commonwealth. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009. 
—. Declaration. New York: Argo Navis Author Services, 2012. <www.argonavisdigital.com>. 
—. Empire. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
—. Multitude. New York: Penguin, 2005. 
Hardt, Michael. "Laboratory Italy." Radical thought in Italy. Ed. Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010. 1 - 12. 
Hardt, Michael. "Porto Alegre: Today's bandung?" The Global Resistance Reader. Ed. Louise Amoore. 
London and New York: Routledge, 2005. 190-94. 
—. "Prison Time." Yale French Studies 91 (1997): 64-79. 
Harvey, David. Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution. London and New York: 
Verso, 2012. 
—. The Ways of the World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Epub. 
Hawkins, Simon. "Teargas, Flag and the Harlem Shake: Images of and for Revolution in Tunisia." The 
Political Aesthetics of Global Protest: The Arab Spring and Beyond. Ed. Pnina Werbner, Martin 
Webb and Kathryn Spellman-Poots. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014. 31-52. 
Herder, Johann Gottfried von. "Ideas Towards a Philosophy of the History of Man." Theories of History. 
Ed. Patrick Gardiner. New York: Free Press, 1959. 35-49. 





Hoffman, Abbie. "Museum of the Streets." 1980. The Anarchist Library. 12 May 2012. 
<http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/abbie-hoffman-museum-of-the-streets>. 
Holloway, John. "Why Adorno?" Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism. Ed. John 
Holloway, Fernando Matamoros and Sergio Tischler. London: Pluto Press, 2009. 12-18. 
Holmes, Brian. "Unleashing the Collective Phantoms: Flexible Personality, Networked Resistance." 01 
2002. Republic Art. August 2013. <www.republicart.net/disc/artsabotage/holmes01_en.pdf>. 
Hoy, David Couzens. Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism to Postcritique. Cambridge and London: 
The MIT Press, 2004. 
Irigaray, Luce. An Ethics of Sexual Difference. London: Continuum, 2004. 
Ishkanian, Armine and Marlies Glasius. Reclaiming Democracy in the Square? London: The London 
School of Economics, 2013. Digital. 2016. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-
archive/publicEvents/pdf/Final-Reclaiming-Democracy-Report.pdf>. 
Jaaware, Aniket. Simplifications. New Delhi: Orient Langman Limited, 2001. 
"Job 41:1–34, New International Version." 2011 . Biblegateway.com. Biblica, Inc.®. 
<https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Job%2041&version=NIVUK>. 
Jordan, John. "The art of necessity: the subversive imagination of anti-road protest and Reclaim the 
Streets." Britain, DiY Culture: Party & Protest in Nineties. Ed. George McKay. London and New 
York: Verso, 1998. 129-152. 
Kafka, Franz. "Fragments." Grand Street 56 (1996): 117-122. 
—. "In the Penal Colony." 2011 (1919). The Kafka's Project. 
<http://www.kafka.org/index.php?id=162,167,0,0,1,0>. 
—. The Sons. New York: Schocken Books, 1989. 
Kafka, Franz. The Blue Octavo Notebooks. Ed. Max Brod. Trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins. 
Cambridge, MA: Exact Change, 1991. 
Kambouri , Nelli and Pavlos Hatzopoulos. The Tactics of Occupation: Becoming Cockroach. 26 November 
2011. <https://nomadicuniversality.com/2011/11/26/the-tactics-of-occupation-becoming-
cockroach/>. 
Kant, Immanuel. "What Is Enlightenment?" 2010. Colombia University. 2013 1 12. 
<http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html>. 
Karpat, Kemal. "Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern, Muslim, Ottoman, and 
Turk." Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey. Ed. Kemal Karpat. Leiden: Brill, 2000. 
Karyotis, Theodoros. "The Right to the City in an Age of Austerity." Roar Magazine 6 (2017). 
<https://roarmag.org/magazine/right-city-age-austerity/>. 




Kershaw, Baz. The Radical in the Performance: Between Brecht and Baudrillard. London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999. 
Khaldūn, Ibn. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History ; in Three Volumes. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1969 (1406). 
Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010. 
King, Brian. "Herder & Human Identity." Philosophy Now 12 (2016). 
<https://philosophynow.org/issues/112/Herder_and_Human_Identity>. 
Kitromilides, Paschalis M. "The Dialectic of Intolerance: Ideological Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict." 
Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora VI.4 (1979): 5-30. 
Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2007. 
Klossowski, Pierre. Living Currency. Trans. Daniel W. Smith. London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017. 
—. Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle. Trans. Daniel W. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997 
(1969). Document. 
Knabb, Ken, trans. Situationist International Anthology. Bureau of Public Secrets, 2006. 
<http://www.bopsecrets.org/SI/May68docs.htm>. 
Kohn, Hans. Pan-Slavism, Its History and Ideology. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press, 1953. 
Kollectiv, Pil and Galia. On Claims of Radicality in Contemporary Art. 27 January 2015. 
Kowsar, Mohammad. "Deleuze on Theatre: A case study of Carmelo Bene’s Richard III." Theatre Journal 
38.1 (1986): 19-33. 
Kuemmer, Harald. "Border Camp // Strasbourg // July 19 to 28, 2002." May 2002. European Institute for 
Progressive Cultural Policies . August 2013. <http://eipcp.net/transversal/0902/kuemmer/en>. 
Laclau , Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics. Second. London and New York: Verso, 2001 (1985). 
Laclau, Ernesto. New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time. London: Verso, 1990. 
Landa, Manuel De. "Deleuze, Diagrams and the Open-Ended." Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, 
and Futures. Ed. Elizabeth A. Grosz. New York: Cornell University Press, 1999. 29-41. 
Landau, Jacob M. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. London: Hurst & Company, 1995 
(1981). 
Lash, Scott. "Genealogy and the Body: Foucault/Deleuze/Nietzsche." Theory, Culture and Soieties 2 
(1984): 1-17. 
Latour, Bruno. "Tarde’s Idea of Quantification." The Social after Gabriel Tarde: Debates and 




—. We Have Never Been Modern. Trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1993. 
Lazzarato, Maurizio. "From Capital-Labour to Capital-Life." Ephemera (2008): 187-208. 
—. "Grasping the Political in the Event." INFLeXions 3 (2008). 
<http://www.inflexions.org/n3_lazzaratohtml.html>. 
—. "Struggle, Event, Media." 5 2003. Republic Art. 12 February 2010. 
<http://www.republicart.net/disc/representations/lazzarato01_en.htm >. 
Lazzarato, Maurizio. "The Aesthetic Paradigm." Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New. Ed. 
Simon O'Sullivan and Stephen Zepke. London and New York: Continuum, n.d. 173-183. 
Lehmann, Hans-Thies. Postdramatic Theatre. Trans. Karen Jürs-Munby. London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006. 
Lemke, Thomas. "Rethinking Biopolitics." Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative 
Strategies. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: Routledge, 2016. 
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism. New York: International Publishers, 
1992. 
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution." Lenin, Vladimir 
Ilyich. Collected Works. Vol. 9. Moscow, 1962. 15-140. 
Lentin, Ronit. "State of Exception and Acts of Resistance." Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, 
and Performative Strategies. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: 
Routledge, 2016. 
Liedman, Sven-Eric. "Is content embodied form?" Embodiment in Cognition and Culture. Ed. John 
Michaels Krois, et al. Amsterdam: John Benjamins B. V., 2007. 127-131. 
Linebaugh , Peter and Marcus Rediker. The many-headed hydra : sailors, slaves, commoners, and the 
hidden history of the revolutionary Atlantic. Boston: Beacon Press, 2000. 
Lloyd, James. "Occupy Gezi: the cultural impact." 17 June 2013. Pressenza. 02 February 2015. 
<https://www.pressenza.com/2013/06/occupy-gezi-the-cultural-impact/>. 
Long, Christopher P. The Ethics of Ontology: Rethinking an Aristotelian Legacy. Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2004. 
Lowith, Karl. Meaning In History . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. 
Lyotard, Jean Francois. Libidinal Economy. Trans. lain Hamilton Grant. Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1993 (1974). 
—. The Differend. Trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988 
(1983). 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. "Prescription." Lyotard, Jean-Francois. Toward the Postmodern. Ed. Robert 




MacKenzie, Iain and Robert Porter. Dramatizing the Political: Deleuze and Guattari. Hampshire and New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
MacKenzie, Jon. "Gender Trouble: (the) Butler Did It." The Ends of Performance. Ed. Peggy Phelan and Jill 
Lane. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 217–235. 
Martinelli, Alberto. Global Modernization: Rethinking the Project of Modernity. London, Thousand Oaks, 
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005. 
Marx, Karl and Freidrich Engels. "Manifesto of the Communist Party." 2000. Marxists Internet Archive. 1 
May 2013. <www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto>. 
Marx, Karl. Capital Volume III. Marxist.org, 2010 (1894). 
—. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Political Economy (Rough Draft). Trans. Martin Nicolaus. London: 
Penguin Books, 1993. 
—. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972. 
Mason, Paul. "From Arab Spring to Global Revolution." The Guardian 05 February 2013. Digital. 2016. 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/05/arab-spring-global-revolution>. 
Massumi, Brian. A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Cambridge : MIT Press, 1992. 
—. Parables For The Virtual. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002. 
—. Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts. Cambridge, London: The MIT Press, 
2011. 
Mauss, Marcel. "Techniques of the body." Economy and Society 2.1 (1973): 70-88. 
May, Jon and Nigel Thrift. "Introduction." Timespace: Geographies of Temporality. London and New 
York: Routledge , 2001. 1-46. 
May, Todd. "Gilles Deleuze and the Politics of Time." Man and World 29 (1996): 293-304. 
McDowell, Linda. Capital Culture: Gender at Work in the City. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "Eye and Mind." Images: A Reader. Ed. Sunil Manghani, Arthur Piper and Jon 
Simons. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006. 131-137. 
—. The Visible and The Invisible. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968. 
Mierovec, Nika and Damjan Kavas. "Economic Analyses of the Cultural and Creative Industries in 
Slovenia." Our Economy 5-6 (2012): 22-33. Document. 
Mikedakis, Emmi. "Manipulating Language: Metaphors in the Political Discourse of Georgios 
Papadopoulos (1967-1973)." “Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the [3rd] Annual 
Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University, 23-24 June 2000”. Ed. E. Close, M. Tsianikas and 
G. Frazis. Adelaide: Flinders University Department of Languages – Modern Greek, 2001. 76-86. 
Mittal, Anuradha. "Foreword." The Battle of the Story of the Battle of Seattle. Ed. David Solnit and 




Moll, Yasmin. "Building the New Egypt: Islamic Televangelists, Revolutionary Ethics and ‘Productive’ 
Citizenship." Hotspots (2013). <https://culanth.org/fieldsights/231-building-the-new-egypt-
islamic-televangelists-revolutionary-ethics-and-productive-citizenship>. 
—. "Conversation on the Egyptian Revolution: Fieldwork in Revolutionary Times." Hotspots (2013). 
<https://culanth.org/fieldsights/240-conversation-on-the-egyptian-revolution-fieldwork-in-
revolutionary-times>. 
Mollendorf, Peter von. "Man as Monster: Eros and Hubris in Plato's Symposium." Bodies and Boundaries 
in Graeco-Roman Antiquity. Ed. Thorsten Fögen and Mireille M. Lee. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
GmbH, 2009. 87-111. 
Momus. AlterModern Week. 2 March 2009. 17 May 2013. <imomus.livejournal.com>. 
Monaldi, Paola. "Folding Cubanidad: A Deleuzian Approach to Contemporary Cuban Cinema." PhD 
Thesis. 2012. <hdl.handle.net/10023/3322>. 
Mosley, Nicholas. Hopeful Monsters. Elmwood Park, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990. 
Mullarkey, John. "Deleuze." Alain Badiou: Key Concepts. Ed. A. J. Bartlett and Justin Clemens. Durham: 
Acumen, 2014. 168-176. 
Müller, Gini. "Transversal or Terror? Moving Images of the PublixTheatreCaravan ." 10 2002. European 
Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies. September 2013. 
<eipcp.net/transversal/0902/mueller/en/prin>. 
Murchadha, Felix Ó. The Time of Revolution: Kairos and Chronos in Heidegger. London: Bloomsbury , 
2012. 
Naggar, Miret El. "In Egypt, diary of 'torture' captures police brutality." The Christian Science Monitor 22 
July 2010. Digital. 2014. <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0722/In-Egypt-
diary-of-torture-captures-police-brutality>. 
Nancy, Jean-Luc. Being Singular Plural. Trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000. 
Nash, Ronald H. The Concept of God. Michigan: The Zondervan Corporation, 1983. 
Neary, Mike and Sarah Amsler. "Occupy: a new pedagogy of space and time?" Journal for Critical 
Education Policy Studies 10.2 (2012). <http://www.jceps.com/PDFs/10-2-03.pdf>. 
Negri, Antonio. "Logic and Theory of Inquiry: Militant Praxis as Subject and as Episteme." Constituent 
Imagination: Militant Investigations // Collective Theorization. Ed. Stevphen Shukaitis, David 
Graeber and Erika Biddle. Trans. Nate Holdren and Arianna Bove. Oakland and Edinburgh: AK 
Press, 2007. 62-73. 
—. Marx and Foucault: Essays. Trans. Ed Emery. Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2017. Kindle Ebook. 
Negri, Antonio. "The Political Monster: Power and Naked Life." Casarino, Cesare and Antonio Negri. In 
Prase of the Common: A Conversation on Philosophy and Politics. Trans. Maurizia Boscagli. 




Newman, Saul. "Occupy and Autonomous Political Life." Radical Democracy and Collective Movements 
Today: The Biopolitics of the Multitude Versus the Hegemony of the People. Ed. Alexandros 
Kioupkiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis. London and New York: Routledge, 2016. 93-110. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. On the Genealogy of Morality. Ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson. Cambrdige and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007 (1887). 
—. The birth of tragedy and other writings. Trans. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs. Cambridge, U.K.; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
—. The Portable Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann. New York: Penguin, 1988. 
—. The Will to Power. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1967 (1901). 
—. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. Adrian Del Caro and Robert B. Pippin. Cambridge, New York, 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Nikolopoulou, Kalliopi. Tragically Speaking: On the Use and Abuse of Theory for Life. Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2013. 
Notes From Nowhere, ed. We Are Everywhere: The Irresistable Rise of Global Anti-Capitalism. London 
and New York: Verso, 2003. 
Nowotny, Stephan. "Immanent Effects: Notes on Cre-activity." Critique of Creativity: Prec"arity, 
Subjectivity, and Resistance in the "Creative Industrie. Ed. Gene Ray, Ulf Wuggenig Gerald 
Raunig. London: Mayfly, 2011. 9-22. Document. <Mayfly.org>. 
O'Connor, Justin. The Cultural and Creative Industries: a Literature Review. London: Arts Council England, 
2007. Document. 
O'Neill, Paul. "The Curatorial Turn: From Practice to Discourse." Issues in Curating Contemporary Art and 
Performance. Ed. Judith Rugg and Michele Sedgwick. Bristol, Chicago: Intellect Books, 2007. 13-
29. 
O'Sullivan, Simon. "The Production of the New and the Care of the Self." Deleuze, Guattari and the 
Production of the New. Ed. Simon O'Sullivan and Stephen Zepke. London and New York: 
Continuum, n.d. 91-103. 




Papacharissi, Zizi. Affective Publics: sentiments, technology, and politics. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015. 
Papastergiadis, Nikos. Spatial Aesthetics, Art, Place, and the Everyday. Amsterdam: Institute of Network 
Cultures, 2010. 
Pieke, Frank N. "Images of Protests and the Use of Urban Space in the 1989 Chinese People's 




Pink, Daniel H. A Whole New Mind. New York: Penguin, 2006. 
Plato. Timaeus. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. London: Macmillan, 1959. 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1572>. 
Prentoulis, Marina and Lasse Thomassen. "Autonomy and Hegemony in the Squares: The 2011 Protests 
in Greece and Spain." Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today. Ed. Alexandros 
Kioupkiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis,. Surrey: Ashgate Publication, n.d. 
Rancière, Jacques. "Artists and Cultural Producers as Political Subjects." Opposition, Intervention, 
Participation, Emancipation in Times of Neo-liberal Globalization. Berlin, 16 1 2006. 
Ranciere, Jacques. "The Emancipated Spectator." ArtForum (2007): 271-280. 
Rancière, Jacques. The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible. Trans. Gabriel Rockhill. 
New York: Continuum, 2004. 
—. "Thinking between Disciplines: an Aesthetics of Knowledge." Parrhesia 1 (2006): 1-12. 
Raunig, Gerald. A Thousand Machines. Trans. Aileen Derieg. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2010. 
—. "A War-Machine Against Empire: On the Precarious Nomadism of the PublixTheatreCaravan." May 
2002. Subsol. 17 September 2013. 
<http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors2/raunigtext.html>. 
—. Art and Revoltion. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007. 
—. Factories of Knowledge, Industries of Creativity. Trans. Aileen Derieg. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 
2013. 
Reich, Wilhelm. Character Analysis. Trans. Vincent R. Carfagno. New York: Farrar, Straus and Grioux, 
1990 (1933). 
Rensmann, Lars and Samir Gandesha. "Understanding Political Modernity." Arendt and Adorno: Political 
and Philosophical Investigations. Ed. Lars Rensmann and Samir Gandesha. Standford: Standford 
University Press, 2012. 1-30. 
Rodowick, D. N. Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997. 
Romanos, Eduardo. From Tahrir to Puerta del Sol to Wall Street: Analyzing Social Movement Diffusion in 
the New Transnational Wave of Protest. Bordeaux: ECPR General Conference, 2013. 
<https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/3b373c0d-5a88-4802-97a0-1a1c68d7ebfc.pdf>. 
"Saddam Hussein's speech." 6 January 2003. The Guardian. 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/06/iraq1>. 
Sadiki, Larbi. "Unruliness through space and time: reconstructing "peoplehood" in The Arab Spring." 
Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization. Ed. Larbi Sadiki. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2015. 1-14. 





Sampson, Tony D. Virality: Contagion Theory in the Age of Networks. London and Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2012. 
Sayyid, Salman. Recalling the Caliphate. London: Hurst, 2014. 
Schafers, Marlene and Çiçek Ilengiz. "Improbable Encounters: Marching for Lice in Kadıköy." Hot Spots 
(31). <https://culanth.org/fieldsights/404-improbable-encounters-marching-for-lice-in-kadikoy>. 
Schaub, Mirjam , Nicola Suthor and Erika Fischer-Lichte, Ansteckung: zur Körperlichkeit eines 
ästhetischen Prinzips. München: Wilhelm Fink, 2005. 
Schechner, Richard. "Introduction to Part II." The Grotowski Sourcebook. Ed. Richard Schechner and Lisa 
Wolford Wylam. London and New York: Routledge, 1997. 207 - 215. 
—. Performance Theory. Routledge: London and New York, 1988. 
—. Performed Imaginaries. London and New York: Routledge, 2015. 
Sengupta, Shuddhabrata. "No Border Camp Strasbourg : A Report." 29 July 2002. nettime.org. 12 August 
2013. <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0207/msg00185.html>. 
Shaw, Ian G.R., John Paul Jones III and Melinda K. Butterworth. "The mosquito’s umwelt, or one 
monster’s standpoint ontology." Geoforum 48 (2013): 260-267. 
Sherry, Virginia N. "Syria: The Silenced Kurds." 1996. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Syria.htm>. 
Shiffman, John and Brian Grow. "The Body Trade." 2017. 26 October 2017. 
<https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-bodies-science/>. 
Shildrick, Margrit. "Chimerism and Immunitas." Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and 
Performative Strategies. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. . New York and London: 
Routledge, 2016. 95-108. 
Shokr, Ahmad. "The Eighteen Days of Tahrir." The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest, and Social 
Change in Egypt. Ed. J. Sowers and C. Toensing. London: Verso, 2011. 41 - 46. 
Shukaitis, Stevphen. Imaginal Machines: Autonomy & Self-Organization in the Revolutions. London, NYC 
and Port Watson: Minor Compositions, 2009. 
Sikka, Sonia. Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference: Enlightened Relativism. Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Smith, Daniel W. "Deleuze and the Production of the New." Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the 
New. Ed. Simon O'Sullivan and Stephen Zepke. London and New York: Continuum, 2008. 151-
161. 
Smith, Daniel W. "Klossowski: From Theatrical Theology to Counter-Utopia." Klossowski, Pierre. Living 
Currency. Trans. Daniel W. Smith. London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017. 1 - 41. 






Spangberg, Marten. "Motivation at the End of Times: To gain respect is just the beginning." Frakcija 
(2011). 
Spinoza, Benedict de. Political Treatise. Ed. R. H. M. Elwes. Trans. A. H. Gosset. London: G. Bell & Son, 
1883. <http://www.constitution.org/bs/poltr-00.htm>. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Can The Subaltern Speak?" Colonial discourse and post-colonial theory: a 
reader. Ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993. 66-111. 
Staal, Jonas. Progressive Art. n.d. 2015. 
<http://www.jonasstaal.nl/site/assets/files/1204/progressive_art_-_sternberg_press.pdf>. 
—. "To Make a World, Part I: Ultranationalism and the Art of the Stateless State." e-flux No. 57 (2014). 3 
2015. <http://www.e-flux.com/journal/57/60395/to-make-a-world-part-i-ultranationalism-and-
the-art-of-the-stateless-state/>. 
Stewart, Susan. On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection. 
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993 (1984). 
Steyerl, Hito. "Politics of Art: Contemporary Art and the Transition to Post-democracy." E-Flux 21 (2010). 
<http://www.e-flux.com/journal/politics-of-art-contemporary-art-and-the-transition-to-post-
democracy/>. 
—. "The Articulation of Protest." September 2002. Republicart. 09 2009. 
<http://republicart.net/disc/mundial/steyerl02_en.htm>. 
Stoter, Brenda. Young Egyptians reclaim Tahrir Square. 19 November 2013. 3 3 2014. 
Stubblefield, Thomas. 9/11 and the Visual Culture of Disaster. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2004. 
"Surat An-Naml." n.d. quran.com. 10 January 2015. <http://quran.com/27/39-40>. 
Surin, Kenneth. "Socius." The Deleuze Dictionary (Revised Edition). Ed. Adrian Parr. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2010. 258-260. 
Taleb, Julia. "From Assad to ISIS, a Tale of Syrian Resistance." Waging Nonviolence 22 August 2014. 
<http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/assad-isis-tale-resistance/>. 
Tan, Pelin. The Silent University: Alternative Pedagogy as our Commons. 2 2014. 
<http://www.migrazine.at/artikel/silent-university-alternative-pedagogy-our-commons-
english>. 
Tarde, Gabriel. The Laws of Imitation. Trans. Elsie Clews Parsons. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1903 (1895). 





Tepper, Rowan G. Kairos: A Political Post-History of the Concept of Time. 2012. 2014. 
<https://www.academia.edu/1468890/Kairos_-_A_Political_Post-
History_of_the_Concept_of_Time>. 
Thacker, Eugene. "Biophilosophy for 21st Century." Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and 
Performative Strategies. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: 
Routledge, 2016. 123-134. 
—. On the Horror of Living Networks. Cambridge, March 2010. 
<http://www.networkpolitics.org/request-for-comments/dr-thackers-position-paper>. 
The Constitution of the Rojava Cantons. February 2014. <http://civiroglu.net/the-constitution-of-the-
rojava-cantons/>. 
Thoburn, Nicholas. Deleuze, Marx and Politics. London and New York: Routledge, 2003. 
Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology. Vol. Three. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. 
—. The Interpretation of History. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2015 (1936). Digitalized. 
<http://media.sabda.org/alkitab-2/Religion-Online.org%20Books/Tillich%2C%20Paul%20-
%20The%20Interpretation%20of%20History.pdf>. 
Treitler, Leo. Music and the Historical Imagination. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Tsianos, Vassilis S. "Democracy, Metropolitan Statis@Real Democracy." Subjectivation in Political Theory 
and Contemporary Practices. Ed. Andreas Oberprantacher and Andrei Siclodi. Palgave 
Macmillan, 2016. 219-236. 
"Uganda: Police Raid Queer Kampala Film Festival." 2017. 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/15/uganda-police-raid-queer-kampala-film-festival>. 
Valamvanos, George. "The Successors by Vangelis Katsanis." Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora VI.4 (1979): 
31-84. 
Vanly, Ismet Chériff. "The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon." The Kurds: A Contemporary Review. Ed. Philip G. 
Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl. London and New York: Routledge, 2000 (1992). 112-134. 
Walker, Rebecca A. "Badgering Big Brother: Spectacle, Surveillance, and Politics in the Flash Mob." 
Liminalities 7.2 (2011). <http://liminalities.net/7-2/flashmob.pdf>. 
Wasik, Bill. And Then There Is This. New York: Penguin Books, 2009. 
Weiss, Allen S. "The Primacy of Matter: Art Brut and Modernism." Weiss, Allen S. Shattered Forms: Art 
Brut, Phantasms, Modernism. New York: State University of New York Press, 1992. 7-24. 
Werret, Simon. "The Panopticon in the Garden: Samuel Bentham's Inspection House and Noble 
Theatricality in Eighteenth-Century Russia." Ab Imperio (2008): 47-70. 
Wilmer, S. E. and Audronė Žukauskaitė. "Introduction." Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and 





Women, UN. Global Database on Violence against Women. 2016. 2017. <http://evaw-global-
database.unwomen.org/en/countries/asia/turkey>. 
Woodward, Keith, John Paul Jones III and Sallie A. Ma. "The Politics of Autonomous Space." Progress in 
Human Geography 36.2 (2012): 204 - 224. 
Writers for the 99%. Occupying Wall Street: the Inside Story of an Action that Changed America. Chicago: 
Haymarket, 2011. 
Yumul, Arus. "Fashioning the Turkish Body Politic." Turkey's Engagement with Modernity. Ed. Celia 
Kerslake, Kerem Öktem and Philip Robins. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 349-369. 
Zengin, Aslı. "What is Queer about Gezi?" Hot Spots (2013). <https://culanth.org/fieldsights/407-what-
is-queer-about-gezi>. 
Zizek, Slavoj. Capitalism with Asian values Al Jazeera. 13 November 2011. 
—. The Parallax View. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006. 
Zizek, Slovaj. The Year of Dreaming Dangerously. London and New York: Verso, 2012. 
Žukauskaitė, Audronė. "From Biopolitics to Biophilosophy." Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, 
and Performative Strategies. Ed. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė. New York and London: 
Routledge, 2016. 74-93. 
 In Farsi: 
Rezai, Mohammad Javad and Mahmoud Hedayat-Afza ( ، محمد جواد و محمود هدایت افزارضانی ). “Suhrawardi’s 
Viewpoint on Peripatetic Hayulā” (" ی هیوالی مشان  سهروردی دربارهدیدگاه  "). Sino Wisdom 49 (2013), 
117-137.  
Ibn-Sīnā ( سیناابن ). Remarks and Admonitions (االشارات و التنبیهات). Qom: Al-Balagha (1997 ,(البالغه. 
Suhrawardi, Shahab al-Din ( الدینسهروردی، شهاب  ). Kitab al-Mashari' wa'l-Motarahat, Arabic texts edited 
with introduction in French by H. Corbin (اق، تصحیح هانری کربن  :Tehran .(مجموعه مصنفات شیخ اشر
Iranian Academy of Humanities and Cultural Studies, 2000.  
